Category: Atheists

  • The Euthyphro Objection Part II: Arbitrariness

    In his work Practical Ethics Singer proposes a version of the Euthyphro dilemma to criticise a divine command theory of ethics,

    Some theists say that ethics cannot do without religion because the very meaning of “good” is nothing other than “what God approves”. Plato refuted a similar view more than two thousand years ago by arguing that if the gods approve of some actions it must be because those actions are good, in which case it cannot be the gods’ approval that makes them good. The alternative view makes God’s approval entirely arbitrary: if the gods had happened to approve of torture and disapprove of helping our neighbours, torture would be good and helping our neighbours bad.[i]

    In my previous post, The Euthyphro Objection Part I: Against Divine Commands & Avoiding Strawmen, pointed out that his version of the Euthyphro argument relies upon a straw man. Divine command theory is not typically proposed as a theory about what is good but is usually restricted to deontic properties such as right and wrong. Its worth noting however that, this fact is not fatal to Singer’s position; it is possible to develop analogies to the Euthyphro that do not rely on this straw man. James Rachels is an example, in The Elements of Moral Philosophy he suggests that an action is right either because God commands it or he commands it because it is right. He then offers the same arguments Singer does to suggest that only by embracing the second horn of the dilemma which amounts to giving up divine command theory, can one escape absurdity.[ii]

    The key argument Singer raises against divine command theory is, “if the gods had happened to approve of torture and disapprove of helping our neighbours, torture would be good and helping our neighbours bad”.[iii] Singer couches this objection in terms of goodness and badness but the same objection can be raised with regards to claims that Gods commands constitutes what is right and wrong. Rachels for example states that divine command theory “leads to trouble” because “it represents Gods commands as arbitrary. It means God could have given different commands just as easily. He could have commanded us to be liars, and then lying, not truthfulness would be right.”[iv]

    The objection is that divine command theory entails a certain counter-factual conditional; to use Singer’s example, if God commanded torture then torture would not be wrong. While Singer does not state that this conditional is false, he appears to take it for granted that it is. After all, if the conditional were true then the fact that divine command theory entails it would not constitute an objection to the theory. Unfortunately Singer provides no reason for thinking this conditional is false. He appears to think that it is obvious.

    Phillip Quinn has given reasons for questioning this assumption. Quinn notes that a counter-factual conditional such as ‘If God commands torture then torture is not wrong’ is false only if the antecedent is true and the consequent false.[v] In other words, the conditional is only false in a situation where God in fact does command torture and torture in that situation is wrong. In order for Singer’s objection to be sound there needs to be a logically-possible situation in which God does offer the command in question and the action he commands is wrong. Is such a scenario logically possible?

    It is doubtful it is. God is perfectly and maximally good. Hence, the first premise is true only if a perfectly-good being would command an action such as the torture of children. This is unlikely. The claim that a perfectly-good being would command something morally abhorrent is on the face of it incoherent. Hence, it is unlikely that such a situation is possible.

    A former teacher of mine, Mane Hajdin, suggested to me that this assertion is too hasty a few years ago he offered me the following criticism,

    [I]t is assumed that being good involves being loving, forgiving, etc, in all possible worlds. But why should we assume that? Why aren’t there worlds in which being good involves being cruel, ruthless, etc? To simply assume that, in this context, may leave the impression of begging the question.

    Roy Perrett suggested to me that that there are possible states of affairs where the contingent and factual structure of the world would be so different that what we take as paradigms of virtue in fact are not. In such a world, torture may be conducive to human flourishing or be, in fact, a virtuous activity.There may be something to this response. The problem with this response is that it still fails to provide reasons for thinking that the above-mentioned conditional is false. In order for this conditional to be false it must be logically possible not just for God to command an action but for that action to be wrong in the given situation. Perrett and Hajdin provide us reasons for thinking that it is possible for a perfectly-good being to command actions such as torture or cruelty. However, the situations envisaged are ones in which torture is not, in fact, wrong. In the situation Perrett envisages, torture is, in fact, virtuous and in Hajdin’s torture is good. In such examples it is the virtuous nature of torture that makes it plausible to assume that a perfectly-good being could command it.

    It remains doubtful whether a logically-possible situation in which God commands an action and that action is wrong could exist. This is because a perfectly-good being would not command wrongdoing. To the extent that we think a perfectly-good being could command a particular action, we have reasons for thinking the action permissible. On the other hand, to the extent that we think it is impossible for the action to be wrong we find it impossible to envisage how a perfectly-good being could command it.

    In Part III I will look at the emptiness objection.

    [i] Singer, Practical Ethics, 3.
    [ii] James Rachels, Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) 42.
    [iii] Singer, Practical Ethics, 3.
    [iv] Rachels The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 42
    [v] Phillip Quinn, “Divine Command Theory,” in Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, ed. H Lafollette (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) 70.

    RELATED POSTS:
    The Euthyphro Objection Part I: Against Divine Commands & Avoiding Strawmen
    Euthyphro Objection Part III: The Redundancy of God is Good

  • The Euthyphro Objection Part I: Against Divine Commands & Avoiding Strawmen

    Perhaps the most common argument against an appeal to divine commands in ethical reasoning is the Euthyphro dilemma, first articulated by Plato and utilised by numerous critics of divine commands ever since. A representative example of this line of argument occurs in Peter Singer’s widely-acclaimed monograph Practical Ethics. In the first chapter of Practical Ethics, Singer offers the following argument.

    [E]thics is not something intelligible only in the context of religion. I shall treat ethics entirely independent of religion. Some theists say that ethics cannot do without religion because the very meaning of “good” is nothing other than “what God approves”. Plato refuted a similar view more than two thousand years ago by arguing that if the gods approve of some actions it must be because those actions are good, in which case it cannot be the gods’ approval that makes them good. The alternative view makes God’s approval entirely arbitrary: if the gods had happened to approve of torture and disapprove of helping our neighbours, torture would be good and helping our neighbours bad.[i]

    Several features of this critique are noteworthy. Singer identifies a position known as the divine command theory of ethics. He construes this position as the view that “the very meaning of “good” is nothing other than “what God approves.” He bases this on the testimony of “some theists”. Singer’s argument here consists of three stages. He proposes the famous dilemma proposed by Socrates in Plato’s dialogue, Euthyphro. He then claims that divine command theory makes God’s commands arbitrary. He asserts that acceptance of divine command theory entails that paradigmatically-evil actions such as torture could be good. He concludes that divine command theory makes God’s goodness redundant,

    Some modern theists have attempted to extricate themselves from this type of dilemma by maintaining that God is good and so could not possibly approve of torture; but these theists are caught in a trap of their own making, for what can they possibly mean by the assertion that God is good? That God is approved by God?[ii]

    In this three part blog series I will respond to the Euthyphro dilemma. In this post I will comment upon Singer’s description of his opponents’ position and suggest it is a straw-man. In the next two posts I will assess the arguments he proposes and argue they are unsuccessful. Contrary to what is commonly asserted in ethics textbooks and first year philosophy lectures, I do not think the Euthyphro dilemma is sound.

    As I stated above, Singer’s argument is an attack upon a position known in the literature as divine command theory or voluntarism. Schneewind notes that in the late Middle Ages two schools emerged as to the relationship between God and the existence of an objective law. The first and older position is known as Intellectualism. In this view, God does not create morality; rather, God’s will is guided by his intellectual knowledge of eternal moral standards. The second position is divine command theory. This position grounded the moral law not so much in God’s intellect but in his will. God himself creates the moral law.[iii]

    It is worth noting at this juncture that divine command theory is only one possible way of construing the nature of divine law and since Singer only offers an argument against this position, even if his argument is sound it fails to establish that the idea of divine law is problematic. Nevertheless, even as a critique of this theory the argument appears to attack a straw man.

    Singer construes divine command theory as claiming “the very meaning of ‘good’ is nothing other than ‘what God approves.’” It appears then that Singer characterises divine command theory as a theory about the meaning of the evaluative term “good”; however, this is a caricature.

    Few, if any, notable defenders of divine command theory propose it as a theory about the meaning of the term ‘good’. This is demonstrated by examining the literature of those contemporary theists who do defend versions of the theory. A notable, contemporary defender of divine command theory is Robert Adams. In Divine Command Ethics Modified Again and later in his monograph Finite and Infinite Good, Adams puts forward the view that “ethical wrongness is (i.e., is identical with) the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving God”.[iv] [Emphasis original]

    Note two things here; firstly, Adams does not offer a theory about ‘the good’ but explicitly limits his theory to deontological properties such as wrongness. Secondly, his theory is not about the meaning of terms; rather it is a metaphysical claim about identity.

    This last distinction is important. Contemporary philosophy of language offers several examples of this distinction between two terms having the same meaning and two things being identical. One of the most famous is the relationship between water and H20. Water is H20. This is a claim of identity. The liquid on earth that we call water is hydrogen hydroxide. However, this is not a claim of meaning. The claim that water is H20 is not an analytic truth that is true in virtue of the meaning of the words, rather it is a claim discovered by empirical investigation. Moreover, a competent language user could refer to water and understand the meaning of this term without needing to know about the atomic structure H20. Similar examples are available with such claims as ‘the morning star is the evening star’ or ‘Superman is Clark Kent.’ In each case, we have a statement of identity that is distinct from the claim that two words have the same meaning. Adams then explicitly denies he is proposing the position Singer attributes to modern theists.

    Similar things can be said about the other major defenders of divine command theory. William Alston holds that divine commands are constitutive of deontological properties and notes Adam’s identity claim as a paradigm of the type of relationship he is defending.[v]

    Philip Quinn defends a version of divine command theory that is limited to the deontological status of actions.

    In speaking of the deontological status of an action, I mean to refer to whether it has such properties as being morally permitted, being morally forbidden or prohibited, and being morally obligatory or required.[vi]

    Quinn argues that God’s commands cause or bring about these properties. He specifically denies that he is offering a theory of ‘the good’ in general or that the relationship between God’s commands and moral properties is one of meaning. In fact, he argues against such a view.[vii]

    Edward Weirenga defends a similar theory proposing that divine commands are those properties of actions that make them possess deontic properties such as right and wrong. He does not affirm that the word ‘good’ means commanded by God.[viii] Similarly, John Hare argues, “that what makes something obligatory for us is that God commands it”.[ix]

    This is not just true of contemporary defenders of divine command theory. In a survey of the historical literature, Janine Marie Idziak notes that, historically, divine command theory was usually understood as a theory about what makes actions right and wrong and not a theory about the meaning of moral terms.[x] Moreover, historically, divine command theorists such as Locke[xi] and Puffendorf limited it to deontological properties and not to broader axiological properties such as goodness.

    Robert Adams did defend a semantic theory in some of his earlier writings but, as noted, he later rejected his theory in favour of the one I sketched above. Moreover, the semantic theory Adams did initially defend bears little resemblance to the interpretation of divine command theory made by Singer. Adams explicitly asserted that his theory was limited to analysing the meaning of the word wrong and not broader notions such as goodness. Moreover, it was limited to an analysis of what the word means in Judeo-Christian discourse not what the word meant in general.[xii]

    It is difficult then to ascertain to whom exactly Singer is referring when he states “Some theists” hold this view and he fails to provide any citations as to whom he is referring. He appears to attack a straw man that has little resemblance to the theory as it has usually been articulated and defended in both historical and contemporary literature.

    Not only does Singer attack a straw man but attention to the arguments he uses reveals that in the very next sentence he changes his interpretation from a theory of meaning to a dependence or causal theory. Immediately after stating, “the very meaning of “good” [is nothing other than] what God approves”, Singer follows Plato in suggesting that either something is good because God approves of it or God approves of it because it is good.[xiii] However, this presupposes that the relationship between divine approval and goodness is some kind of asymmetrical relationship where one entity in the relationship is temporally or ontologically prior to the other.

    If, as Singer maintains, divine command theory is the claim that “the very meaning of ‘good’ is nothing other than ‘what God approves’,” then the relationship between divine approval and goodness is not an asymmetrical relationship but rather a relationship of meaning so this dilemma simply does not apply.

    Consider the following example. A person tells you that a bachelor is an unmarried man because the word bachelor means unmarried man. It would not make sense to respond to this claim ‘yes, but is he a bachelor because he is unmarried or is he unmarried because he is a bachelor?’ A person’s unmarried-ness is not prior to or the cause of his bachelorhood nor is his bachelorhood the cause of his being unmarried. His being unmarried is just a different way of referring to his bachelorhood. The relationship between a bachelor and an unmarried man is not causal; the relationship is one of meaning.

    Immediately after stating that divine command theory is a theory about the meaning of terms, Singer offers an objection that presupposes it is not a semantic theory but a causal one. However, only a few lines later he offers the following objection to the theory “what can they [theists] possibly mean by the assertion that God is good? That God is approved by God?”[xiv] Here Singer’s objection relies on the claim that good means approved by God in order to generate the trap he refers to. Not only does Singer attack a straw man but also his target appears to change throughout the discussion. In fact, it appears to change in order to fit the objections raised.

    In Part II I look at arbitrariness.

    [i] Singer, Practical Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 3.
    [ii] Ibid., 3-4.
    [iii] Jerome Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 8-9.
    [iv] Robert Adams, “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again,” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979): 76.
    [v] William Alston, “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists,” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 303-304.
    [vi] Phillip Quinn, “An Argument for Divine Command Theory,” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 291.
    [vii] Ibid., 293.
    [viii] Edward Weirenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry into the Divine Attributes, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 215-27. See also “Utilitarianism and the Divine Command Theory,” American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984): 311-318 and “A Defensible Divine Command Theory,” Nous 17 (1983): 387-408.
    [ix] John Hare, God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands and Human Autonomy, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001), 49.
    [x] Janine Maree Idziak, “In Search of Good Positive Reasons for an Ethics of Divine Commands: A Catalogue of Arguments,” Faith and Philosophy 6:1 (1989): 60.
    [xi] For a defence of the claim that Locke was a voluntarist see Francis Oakley & Elliot W. Urdang, “Locke, Natural Law and God,” Natural Law Forum, 11 (1966): 92-109.
    [xii] Robert Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness” In Divine Commands and Morality, ed. Paul Helm (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 83-108.
    [xiii] Singer, Practical Ethics, 4.
    [xiv] Ibid., 3-4.
    [xv] Ibid.
    [xvi] Ibid., 40.

    RELATED POSTS:
    The Euthyphro Objection Part II: Arbitrariness
    Euthyphro Objection Part III: The Redundancy of God is Good

  • Abortion and Capital Punishment and Craig Young

    An acquaintance of mine sent me a copy of this article at Gaynz.com by Craig Young. Craig and I have a kind of knack at studying the very same topics at the same time. He wrote a PhD thesis criticising conservative Christian views on abortion around the same time I started writing my PhD thesis defending such views. With this article the timing is somewhat uncanny. One of the main burdens of Craig’s article is to argue for the conclusion that it is not inconsistent to both oppose capital punishment and support abortion “rights”. Craig bases this conclusion on the contention that fetuses are not human because they lack sentience. Intriguingly I have just submitted an article for publication rebutting the claim that fetuses are not human until sentient and I have just had word that another article, where I discuss the relationship between feticide and capital punishment, has been accepted for publication. Since Craig has put his thoughts on these issues before the public, I will respond to them here.

    Before getting to the nitty gritty is worth noting the deceptive slips in Craig’s post. Craig writes:

    Amnesty International opposes torture, harassment organised homophobic violence and the death penalty when performed on the basis of homosexuality. Saudi Arabia demonstrates the complexity of the issue, with formal sharia law but co-existing cruising grounds and private indulgence of what is legally forbidden. However, Nigeria, Sudan, Iran, and Iraq’s Mahdi Army all penalise male homosexuality, while Iran also mandates capital punishment for persistent lesbianism, Hezbollah and Hamas also believe that their version of fundamentalist Islamism, whether Shia or Sunni, has no place for homosexuality. They base this on their arguable interpretation of the Qu’ran and particular traditions of interpretation of attributed sayings of the Prophet Muhammed, although the Hanafi school of interpretation is more liberal than others….

    Surely no-one could object to the above, especially given that the Christian Heritage Party, which alone supported reintroduction of the death penalty in New Zealand, died after Capillgate in 2005.

    Now a couple of things to note here. Craig states that Amnesty opposes capital punishment when “performed on the basis of homosexuality.” He then insinuates that only the Christian Heritage Party opposed Amnesty’s stance because it supported the reintroduction of capital punishment.

    This is deceptive. As Craig knows, Amnesty does not just oppose capital punishment for homosexuality, it opposes it for any crime including murder. It is this aspect of Amnesty that the Christian Heritage Party opposed. As Craig knows, the Christian Heritage Party did not support the death penalty for homosexuality, it supported it only for pre-meditated murder when there were multiple eyewitnesses. Craig is trying to conflate support for Capital Punishment per se with support for executing Gays.

    Craig also seems to think that because some countries execute homosexuals it follows that people should support the abolition of the death penalty for any crime. This is a very weak argument. After all,many countries imprison homosexuals so an analogous line of argument would suggest that Craig should oppose imprisonment for any crime yet strangely he advocates imprisonment for murder later on in his article. This demonstrates Craig is quite capable of drawing distinctions between the morality of a practice and the morality of a specific application of the practice.

    It is also a weak argument to suggest that because an organisation like Amnesty supports some worthy causes, such as opposition to torture, it follows it should not be subject to criticism for other causes it supports, such as abortion rights. If abortion is homicide then for every person saved by Amnesty thousands, if not millions, are killed with its tacit support.

    However, what I really want to comment on is Craig’s argument for the consistency of a pro-abortion stance with an anti-death penalty stance. Craig writes:

    However, the Christian Right has piped up with references to embryos and fetuses. There’s a vast difference between pre-sentient potential humans and actual, flesh and blood biographical human subjects, not that that troubled Right to Life New Zealand throughout the nineties when it had Graham Capill as one of its patrons, or when Voice for Life Vice-Presidnet Annetta Moran stood on the same Christian Coalition party list as Capill in 1996. And as Amnesty International is a pluralist organisation, why should it support an essentially religious campaign against women’s reproductive freedom, in any case?

    Now several things are worth noting here; Craig’s key claim is that, unlike capital punishment, abortion does not kill an actual human being. This is because fetuses (up till around 28 weeks) are not sentient and hence not “biographical subjects.” There is a serious problem with this argument. It presupposes that a being must be a “biographical subject” to be a human being.

    Now while it is true that prior to sentience fetuses are not such subjects, neither are they such subjects for some time after sentience. In fact, for some time after birth infants are not “biographical subjects” either. This point was vigorously demonstrated by Michael Tooley in his monograph Abortion and Infanticide. Sentience is a necessary condition for being a “biographical subject” but it is not a sufficient condition.

    To be a biographical subject one needs more than just sentience. One needs to have a concept of an enduring self and to have this, a certain level of cognitive development is necessary. As Tooley demonstrates, the requisite development does not take place until after birth. Hence, if Craig were consistent he would support not just abortion but also infanticide. Craig can maintain a consistent stance on the ethics of killing only if he maintains that serial killers have a right to life and newborn infants do not.

    Craig’s appeal to sentience is similarly problematic. In A Defense of Abortion, David Boonin notes that those who attempt to ground humanity in the psychological development of an organism face a dilemma, “Any appeal to what a brain can do at various stages of development would seem to have to appeal to what the brain can already do. Or to what the brain has the potential to do in the future.”

    Either option leads to problems for a defender of the permissibility of feticide who does not also want to endorse infanticide. This is because “by any plausible measure dogs, and cats, cows and pigs, chickens and ducks or more intellectually developed than a new born infant.” Suppose, then, one takes the first horn of the dilemma and appeals to what the brain can already do. However, unless one wishes to affirm that cats, dogs and chickens are human beings, “appeals to what the brain can already do” will “be unable to account for the presumed wrongness of killing toddlers or infants.”

    Suppose then, one takes up the second horn of the dilemma and appeals to “what the brain has the potential to do in the future”. This will entail that feticide is homicide. “If [such an account] allows appeals to what the brain has the potential to do in the future, then it will have to include fetuses as soon as their brains begin to emerge, during the first few weeks of gestation.” Again, Craig is forced to either grant the humanity of a fetus or deny the humanity of an infant.

    Finally it is worth noting how Craig attempts to pass of his contradictory stance with some really silly inferences. He dismisses support for Capital Punishment on the grounds that the Christian Heritage Party “died after Capillgate.” Similarly, in the citation above he notes that some anti-abortion groups were either associated with Capill or had people associated with Capill in them.

    One wonders what this has to do with anything?

    Both groups had the associations in question before it was known Capill was a criminal. There is no evidence they supported his actions or that they were complicit in his crimes. Given these facts, how is Capill remotely relevant? The only purpose reference to him serves is to encourage people to jump to unwarranted conclusions that certain people support abusing children when they do not.

    However, let us suppose, contrary to fact, that these people had been complicit in Capill’s crimes. This would still tell us nothing about the permissibility of capital punishment or abortion. It would merely tell us that some people who oppose abortion are criminals. In the absence of a compelling reason for thinking that no just policy is ever supported by criminals and remember Criminals tend to vote left of centre, the correct response to Craig’s assertion is to ask “and?”

    Let me illustrate the problems with Craig’s inferences by turning the tables here. Craig writes for Gaynz.com, a few years ago it was discovered that one of Gaynz’s regular writers, Jim Peron, had been an apologist for the views of NAMBLA. Jim Peron had published paedophile erotica written by convicted child molesters, written articles agressively labelling critics of “man boy love” as “hysterics” for viewing paedophilia as abuse, sold NAMBLA material and had NAMBLA meetings in his store. His visa to NZ was denied on the basis of these facts about his character.

    Now, would it be fair of me to insinuate from this association that Craig is a NAMBLA supporter or that everyone who agrees with him on abortion and capital punishment is morally suspect because Craig is associated with a group that was once associated with this man Jim Peron? Could I logically dismiss Craig’s position on abortion and capital punishment merely by pointing this fact out? Of course not!

    What I need to do and have done above, is provide an argument against these positions. Similarly, if Craig is to provide a rebuttal of the stances I and others have taken on capital punishment and abortion he needs to provide arguments against those stances but as usual, Craig and the team at Gaynz have none.

  • Contra PC

    Not PC has taken exception to my recent criticism of his blog. He also takes issue with my comments on faith and reason. His responses I think are illustrative of the popular secular mindset so it’s worth responding here.

    PC expounds a great deal of rhetorical energy describing my work in pejorative terms. I committed to arguing that “black is white” if the hierarchical Church says so. My reasoning consists merely of “word games” my standards of debate are “low” and my writing is a “tangled thicket” of “misdirections”. Unfortunately simply using pejorative names to describe a position does not provide any reason for rejecting it. A rational person, and PC claims to be a follower of reason, provides arguments. It is to these that I will turn.

    1.) PC objects to my comments in a previous blog where I criticised the statement that it is irrational to believe something without proof. (a proposition which was labeled [2] in the original post) PC writes:

    Now he may or may not have been referring to exchanges here at Not PC, but if he is then proposition 2 is misstated. What I’ve said here is that a proposition without proof is flatly arbitrary, and the arbitrary is out. Arbitrary statements don’t even get to be called irrational; they don’t even get to the table. Matt then goes on to base a whole post on this misstatement.

    Now the key word here is *if*.In fact I was not referring to exchanges in not PC. However it’s worth noting that even if I was, PC’s rejoinder could be easily responded to. One could simply change the word “irrational” with the word “arbitrary” in my argument and everything else would still follow. My conclusion would be that it’s not always “arbitrary” to believe things without proof and each of my arguments would be reasons for this altered conclusion.

    Not PC clearly takes issue with this conclusion. Latter in his post he states:

    Matt himself provides us with an tip that is like a signpost for those of us curious about christian epistemological standards. Says Matt: “you can rationally believe certain things, in certain situations, without evidence.”

    Oddly PC thinks that simply noting the existence of my thesis refutes it. However, in reality, PC merely demonstrates his lack of understanding of the issues. I am not in this comment defending “Christian” epistemological standards. The thesis that one can rationally (or non arbitrarily) believe some things without proof is largely uncontroversial amongst secular epistemologists. In fact Aristotle, whom not PC attempts to follow, accepted this claim for some of the very reasons I provided in my blog. Roy Clouser summarizes the problems:

    If everything needs to be proven then the premises of every proof would need to be proven. But if you need a proof for every proof, you need a proof for your proof, and a proof for your proof of a proof and so on-forever. Thus it makes no sense to demand a that everything be proven because an infinite regress of proofs is impossible( Knowing With the Heart p 69)

    As the above citation shows, there are arguments for the position I advanced. There are serious philosophical problems with claiming that all beliefs need to be proved. Strangely PC does not even attempt to address these arguments. Instead he merely asserts my position, calls it “Christian epistemological standards” and thinks that’s enough to rebut it. Unfortunately it is not.

    2.)PC goes on to state

    as all assiduous listeners of Monty Python are aware, “an argument is a connected series of propositions intended to establish a conclusion.” What I posted above was not an argument. It was one post with four quotes, one point and an invitation to think about it; some thoughts for a Sunday on how faith undercuts reason. It was not an argument,

    I had assumed that when PC was contending that faith destroys knowledge he was actually attempting to provide reasons for his conclusion instead of several assertions. That I though was a more charitable interpretation of PC’s work Apparently, I was mistaken, my contention that he provides a weak argument for his conclusion is mistaken, I should have said he provided none at all. Does this make his position more defensible, No

    3.) PC also contents I misinterpreted his position on Tertullian, he states “. I do not “cite” Tertullian as “a Fideist.” I simply quoted what he said.” Well what according to PC did Tertullian say? PC contends that Tertullian is one of several thinkers who “held the view that faith is antagonistic to knowledge and reason, a divorce which [Tertullian] approved.” However, as I pointed out in my blog, fideism is the name given to the view that faith is antagonistic to reason. Hence PC, by his own admission did contend that Tertullian is a fideist. He simply was unaware the position he attributed to Tertullian has a name and that name is fideism.

    4.) PC continues that

    He[Me] carries on in this manner, acribing to me all sorts of things I haven’t said and positions I haven’t taken, eg,”First, [PC] provides some counter examples to anti-evidentialism…” and “Second, he offers some criticisms of the Kalam Cosmological Argument…”. In other words, he faults me for insufficiently countering in the comments section two very specific theological sallies, when my response was simply to two fairly general and poorly argued points.

    PC states that he was not attacking the Kalam Cosmological Argument and anti-evidentialism. He was rather attacking some general and poorly argued points. Well what were those points? One was the claim that God provides the best explanation of the origin of the Universe. In Philosophy of Religion this argument is known as the Kalam Cosmological Argument. The second, was PC’s contention that its *arbitrary* to believe without evidence. In the literature this is known as evidentialism which is of course the anti-thesis of anti-evidentialism.

    Hence, contrary to what PC affirms, he in fact did comment on these issues. It’s just that PC is so unfamiliar with the literature as to know that the positions he criticized had these names. Moreover the arguments he raised were in fact general arguments against these positions not criticisms of specific popularized versions. Hence everything I said stands. PC offered dubious arguments against both positions.

    Finally, PC continues to make some questionable claims. He states that I am a doctoral student training to be a theologian. In fact I am a professional theologian with a doctorate. He asserts, that the Gospels were probably written in the second century and third centuries despite the fact the few NT scholars accept such a late date, and again without any evidence. He ignores the numerous scholarly debate about what Kant’s views on religion actually were. He seems unaware for example of Kant’s rationalistic methods in Religion within the bounds of reason or Kant’s attempt to argue for God’s existence in the Critique of Practical Reason. He seems unaware of the debate over whether Kant was a deist, a closet atheist or a Lutheran and he, oddly, seems to think that Kant’s position in the First Critique is clear and obvious (has he read it?) He refers to Mr Alvin Plantinga as a Theologian when it’s Dr Alvin Plantinga and he is a Philosopher.

  • More Facile Anti-Theism

    Not PC has a blog on “How Faith destroys Knowledge”. The basic line of argument appears to be as follows: three famous thinkers appear to hold that faith and reason are at odds and that faith is the preferable stance. I am tempted to say so what? Does the fact that three people appear to believe this mean it’s true? The only reason PC provides for thinking it is, is that Christopher Hitchens and Ayn Rand say so.

    PC also makes some fairly dubious clams. He cites Tertullian as a Fidest and states that the Gospels were written around in the third century AD. Both claims are highly questionable.

    What intrigues me most however is his discussion of in the comments section.

    But there is no evidence for fairies at the bottom of my garden, spiders on the far side of Mars, or an unlimited bar tab at my local with my name on it.

    Until or unless evidence exists for any of these (or for gods, dragons, unicorns or centaurs), then as far as reason and good sense are concerned, they’re part of the realm of myth, legend and wishful thinking respectively.

    “What caused the start of the universe?”

    This is a question that is doubly meaningless. Existence exists. There is no start to existence, though there may be changes to the form in which existence is constituted (through hypotheses such as the big bang for example). But here you’re proposing god simply to plug gaps in your knowledge, sort of like a dog-ate-my-homework line.

    And even if you reject that obvious point — that existence has always existed — and you insist on hypothesising that a god kicked existence into existence, then your hypothesis poses a further who question: who kicked your god into existence, and who kicked her god into existence, etc., etc., etc.

    “God done it” is not an explanation, but an admission one doesn’t yet have one.

    PC here addresses to two issues. First, he provides some counter examples to anti-evidentialism ; the position that belief in God is rational in the absence of evidence for its truth. Second, he offers some criticisms of the Kalam Cosmological Argument: the argument for God’s existence based on the fact it has a finite past. I think on both issues he is mistaken, and demonstrates unwittingly some popular confusions on these issues.

    Turning first to Anti-Evidentialism. Anti-Evidentialists have argued that you can rationally believe certain things, in certain situations, without evidence. It does not follow from this that one can believe any old thing without evidence. Nor does it follow that the mars and spider examples meet these conditions. These latter claims would require argument. Unfortunately PC gives none.

    Similar misunderstandings occur with PC’s critique of the Cosmological argument similar misunderstandings emerge he states

    This is a question that is doubly meaningless. Existence exists. There is no start to existence, though there may be changes to the form in which existence is constituted (through hypotheses such as the big bang for example).*

    The problem here is that those who propose this version of the cosmological argument do not claim that *existence* started to exist, nor do they argue that something outside of existence ( ie. Something non existent) created existence, that would be absurd. What they claim is that the spatio temporal universe began to exist and that whatever begins to exist has a cause. Not PC’s interpretation of the argument follows only if one assumes that the spatio temporal universe is the totality of existence which of course begs the question.

    Not PC then cites the famous “who made God objection”

    then your hypothesis poses a further who question: who kicked your god into existence, and who kicked her god into existence,

    I have never understood the force of this argument. Those who defend the cosmological argument state that the universe has certain features ( for example a contingent modal status or finite past) which mean its existence requires some form of explanation and they conclude that from these premises that there must be a being that *does not* have these as an explanation. Consequently, it’s false that the question arises at second remove. Of course simply actually reading a defender of the argument would have cleared this up.

    I suspect however that PC has not read Christian thinkers he has read Ayn Rand and various libertarian caricatures of Christian thinkers. On the basis of these caricatures he denigrates Christians as irrational and politically dangerous. That is unfortunate.

  • Perigo on Faith, Reason, and Tertullian

    In a recent issue of Salient Lindsay Perigo laments the “power wishful thinking”. Predictably he cites Christianity as a paradigm of such thinking. However, like many in the media who take swipes at orthodox or conservative expressions Christianity his analysis is superficial. Perigo writes.

    Two thousand years of Christianity have been based on a lie, in which countless millions have blithely and willingly believed, notwithstanding its absurdity—in fact, because of its absurdity, as Tertullian proclaimed:
    “The Son of God was born: there is no shame, because it is shameful. And the Son of God died: it is wholly credible, because it is inappropriate. And, buried, He rose again: it is certain, because impossible.”
    He might have added: “and because something perverse in us makes us want to believe nonsense.”

    Perigo here asserts that Christianity is absurd. Of course merely asserting some thing is absurd hardly constitutes a compelling objection to it. Perigo however suggests that, not only is Christianity absurd, but its practioners actually recognise it’s absurdity and believe because of it. The idea is that they deliberately go against what reason tells them and choose a path recognised as irrational He cites the famous “Credo quia absurdum” popularly attributed to Tertullian to substantiate this claim.

    There are a couple of problems here: First, even if it’s true that one Theologian (Tertullian) has suggested that Christianity is absurd and commended belief in it for this reason it does not follow that all Christians or even many follow suit. To establish this Perigo would need to show that Tertullian’s position was the dominant mainstream one for most of Christian history. He does not even attempt to do so. Moreover, the suggestion Tertullains views, as Perigo interprets them was the mainstream views is very dubious .

    Second, Perigo’s picture of Tertullian is inaccurate. Its was once common for people to Tertullian as a proponent of extreme fideism a position defined by Alvin Plantinga as “the exclusive or basic reliance upon faith alone, accompanied by a consequent disparagement of reason” and the “Credo quia absurdum” passage is the usual reason for this attribution of fideism to Tertullian.

    The problems with the extreme fideist interpretation of Tertullian are nicely set out in an article by Robert Sider published in Classical World 73 (April-May 1980), pp.417-9. Sider notes two problems; first, the comment Credo quia absurdum is in fact a misquote and second, he notes that when understood in its context Tertullian was actually commending the Christian faith as rational and philosophically defensible. What Tertullian does in the passage Perigo cites is utilize a line of argument from Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Aristotle (who is something of a hero to Perigo) argues that if something is contrary to current expectations and highly improbable its unlikely that a rational intelligent person will believe it unless they actually witnessed it. Tertullian then is not saying we should believe what reason shows to be absurd because it is absurd. He is utilizing the best epistemological theories of his day to argue that belief in the Gospel is not absurd. Perigo relies on a popular but erroneous stereotype of Tertullian to make his point. A little reading on the issue would cleared have this up. In fact a Google search would have revealed it straight away.

    After caricaturing Tertullian as an extreme fidest Perigo goes on to offer another caricature. He states

    Taborites of Bohemia predicted that Christ would return to earth in February 1420. Believers in the prophecy braced themselves. ..As the date drew near, mass hysteria took hold, much as it is doing now over global warming. Expecting a huge flood, many people built boats or moved to higher ground. The flood never came. But all over the world, folk carried on believing whatever they wanted to believe.
    The Puritans were especially enthused about an imminent apocalypse, notwithstanding Jesus’ singular failure to keep any of his previous appointments, and exported their enthusiasm to America, where it’s had a ready audience ever since.

    Perigo cites the example of the Taborites a millennial sect who falsely predicted the imminent return of Christ. Perigo then suggest that Puritans held the same view and imported it to America and hence to contemporary American evangelicals. This is dubious In a study of Puritan Eschatology entitled The Puritan Hope Iain Murray notes that mainstream Puritan Eschatology was not millennial. Looking, at primary sources he argued that the Puritans developed the position that Christ’s return was not imminent the world had to be converted and the institutions of the world Christianised before Christ would return. Nor is it true that the Puritans view has had “wide audience ever since” in fact most American evangelicals today do not except Puritan eschatology ( some would say to their detriment).

    Apart from caricature Perigo does provide the occasional argument for his claim that Christianity is absurd. He notes that “in her newly-released letters that Mother Teresa felt she was praying to no one all those years might give [Christians] some cause for pause” but why should it? Does the fact that a prominent apologist of Atheist Anthony Flew relatively recently decided that his advocacy of atheism for numerous years was mistaken and that a God exist give Perigo pause.

    Perigo then notes that Kerry Packer after being dead for 15 minutes testified that “there’s nothing there” but again one wonders why this should bother Christians. Christianity teaches a resurrection of the dead at the parousia not popular the stories associated with “near death experiences” the movie ghost or the TV series Medium.

    Perigo often says some thoughtful and interesting things. On theology and religion however he does not. Like most in the media he simply spouts stereotypes provides facile arguments and backs this up with ad hominem abuse.

  • Craig Young on “Bare Backing”

    Craig Young is shocked by statistics about “bare backing” being prevalent in the Gay community. Bare backing in case you don’t know is the name Craig gives to un-protected anal sex. Young is shocked because it suggests there exists a “parallel world where Paul Cameron tells the truth.”

    To understand this you need to understand something of Craig’s methods. Many critics of homosexual conduct have been for some time citing studies and evidence which suggests that homosexual conduct, as typically engaged, in is dangerous. Craig Young’s standard response has been ad hominem; he notes that one source sometimes cited in support of these claims is Paul Cameron and, according to Craig, Cameron was kicked out of the American Psychological Association for falsifying one of his studies. Craig fails to see that this is not an adequate rebuttal. First, even if Cameron’s work lacks credibility he is often only one of many sources these authors use. Contrary to what Craig seems to think you do not refute numerous studies by showing that one of them is false. Second, the fact that Cameron was kicked out of an organization for falsifying his research in a particular a study does not mean that every study he wrote or authored was shonky or bad.

    Despite his initial shock at discovering that merely attacking the character of one scholar does not establish the falsity of a thesis. Craig attempts a predictable save. The prevalence of unsafe sex amongst homosexual men is actually the fault of evangelical Christians not of the bare backers who actually do it.

    [T]he US Christian Right has had some dark successes in curtailing LGBT rights and mainstream HIV/AIDS prevention programmes. This has meant that the US LGBT communities are far more ghettoised than most other international LGBT communities, so it tolerates distorted antisocial behaviours that are one response to segregation from the rest of one’s society. What else could one call the cowboy bareback DVD producers that prey on young gay men barely past the age of consent that appear to be the backbone of barebacking?

    Craig here argues as follows: dangerous sexual practices are a response to segregation from society and segregation from society is the result of moral condemnation from Christians in that society. Ergo these Christians are responsible for the dangerous practices. Now something like this argument is common, like many common liberal arguments I reject it. Here is why:

    This argument suggests that people (in this case certain Christians) are responsible not just for the foreseeable causal consequences of their actions. But also for other peoples free responses to these actions (or at least such responses which one can be expected to predict) Young suggests that because it’s foreseeable some people choose to respond to Christian condemnation of homosexual conduct by forming a segregated culture, and its foreseeable that this culture will respond to segregation by condoning and engaging in “anti social behaviour”. It follows Christians are responsible for the behaviour.

    I think this understanding of scope of moral culpability is false. Consider the following example from Augustine. Suppose a man approaches a woman and tells her that he will kill himself if she refuses to have sex with him. Does that mean that she is a murderer if she refuses?[1] Her refusal would not constitute homicide even though his death is a foreseeable result of her choice. Although she foresaw his or her death, she did not cause it. It was caused by the free decision of the tempter to commit suicide.

    In an excellent article, Alan Donagan notes that historically Christian and Jewish casuistry agrees with Augustine on this point. Christian ethicists typically…

    limit an action’s effects, and a fortiori what its agent intends to bring about in doing it, to those that follow from it in course of nature and the ordinary operation of social institutions, and not from the free reactions of others to it.
    (Thus actions in the ordinary course of business, for example, those of postal officers in delivering a letter that has been mailed, are not counted as free reactions.) The principle on which they do is that a free reaction to an action, is a ‘new action’ (‘novus actus’), the effects of which are their effects, and not those of the action to which they are reactions.[2]

    If we apply this point to Craig’s analysis his argument falls down. Christians who condemn homosexual conduct do not cause people to engage in bare backing. In fact by condemning homosexual conduct they are explicitly telling them not to engage in it. If a person does it anyway, then they doing so in defiance of their will and hence without their consent consequently any negative consequences that follow are the responsibility of the “bare backer” not the person opposed to bare backing.

    I think the same line of argument addresses Craig’s second argument,

    And how could the blanket censorship of targeted adolescent gay HIV/AIDS prevention education not have resulted in a situation where there are young men who see nothing wrong in having unsafe sex- possibly because they’ve been isolated from metropolitan gay communities where they would have gotten that message?

    Putting to one side Young’s mistaken definition of censorship, here the same problem arises. The Christian expresses a volition that people not engage in homosexual behavior they believe that such behavior is wrong. Because they believe this they also refuse to help people engage in such conduct, that would make them complict in wrongdoing. A group of adolescents refuse to listen and do it anyway as a result they die. Craig suggests that this means that Christians are responsible for these deaths. This follows only if people are responsible for and culpable for the foreseeable actions of other people even when these other people are acting contrary to their expressed desire and as I argued above this is false.

    There is something even worse about this line of argument however: if it were true it would mean that any person can require me to assist them in any behavior they wish merely by threatening to do something worse if I do not. Such a principle essentially sanctions black mail and creates an obligation to collaborate in any wrong no matter how grave in response to a threat to a third party. Even worse, if the blackmailers carry out the threat they make us responsible what happens and not them. I can help but think this is a terrible distortion of ethical analysis

    I think it’s clear then that Craig’s analysis is mistaken. I will add a final note: Barebacking is an activity that occurs between consenting adults. Both parties agree to engage in causal unprotected anal sex. Now people like Craig have been arguing for some time that homosexual sex is permissible, precisely because it’s engaged in by consenting adults. Denials of this principle have been denounced by Craig’s news group Gaynz as bigoted, oppressive etc. Hence it’s hard to see how they can consistently oppose barebacking. Of course they may believe that barebackers need to be informed of the dangers of the practice. Such things as the fact that their partner is likely to have had hundreds of previous ones, that there are dangers associated with anal sex etc. The problem is that Craig and Gaynz have decried claims like this as false, as scaremongering etc. So I guess the question we need to put to Craig is this. If people who engage in same sex behavior are typically not promiscuous but enjoy relationships as stable as their heterosexual counterparts. If homosexual sex is not dangerous and there is nothing wrong with any sexual activity between consenting adults. What’s wrong with bare backing?

    Craig should stop being bigoted and be celebrating the sexual diversity that exists within his own community. The fact he is not celebrating shows that he cannot consistently live with the ideology he expounds.

    [1] Augustine, On Lying, 9.
    [2] Alan Donagan, “Moral Absolutism and the Double-Effect Exception: Reflections on Who Is Entitled to Double-Effect?” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (1991): 498.