MandM header image 5

Entries Tagged as 'Philosophy of Religion'

Matt Speaks at Orewa Community Church.

September 27th, 2021 Comments Off on Matt Speaks at Orewa Community Church.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cp9rW8t6MWQ&t=3s&ab_channel=OrewaCommunityChurch

I was scheduled to speak on the topic “The Holy Spirit teaches” at Orewa Community Church on Sunday September the 26th. Because the government ordered New Zealand into lockdown six weeks ago, and has maintained Auckland in lockdown since, I had to do the message in an ad hoc manner by video. The message is […]

Tags:

Can a Divine Command Theory Vindicate the Objectivity of Morality: Huemer on Observer Independence, part two

September 12th, 2021 Comments Off on Can a Divine Command Theory Vindicate the Objectivity of Morality: Huemer on Observer Independence, part two

In my last post, I discussed Michael Huemer’s argument that a divine command theory cannot vindicate the objectivity of moral requirements. As I interpret him, the  argument is: [1] Our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are objective. [2] Moral requirements are objective just in case there obtain facts about what is right and […]

Tags:   · · · · ·

Can a Divine Command Theory Ground the Objectivity of Morality? Michael Huemer on Observer Independence: Part One

September 12th, 2021 Comments Off on Can a Divine Command Theory Ground the Objectivity of Morality? Michael Huemer on Observer Independence: Part One

In a previous post  I criticized David Brink’s argument that a divine command theory cannot vindicate the objectivity of morality. Brink argued: [1] Our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are objective [2] Moral requirements are objective just in case facts about what is right or wrong obtain independently of the moral beliefs or […]

Tags:   · · · · ·

Can a Divine command theory account for the objectivity of moral requirements? Elizabeth Tropman, Russ Shafer-Landau, and “Stance Independence”.

September 1st, 2021 Comments Off on Can a Divine command theory account for the objectivity of moral requirements? Elizabeth Tropman, Russ Shafer-Landau, and “Stance Independence”.

In my last post, I criticised David Brink’s argument that a divine command theory cannot vindicate the objectivity of morality. A different version of the objection comes from Elizabeth Tropman. Tropman begins by giving several reasons for thinking that moral realism is an attractive moral theory. She then argues that a divine command theory fails […]

Tags:   · · · ·

Can a Divine command theory account for the objectivity of moral requirements? Brink and Appraiser Independence.

August 24th, 2021 Comments Off on Can a Divine command theory account for the objectivity of moral requirements? Brink and Appraiser Independence.

David Brink has objected to a divine command theory of ethics by contending such theories cannot vindicate the objectivity of ethics. Brink begins by defending a particular conception of the objectivity of ethics and then argues that a divine command theory fails to meet that conception.  Brink writes: Our commitment to the objectivity of ethics […]

Tags:   · ·

Does the Incommensurability of Prudential and Impartial rationality avoid the dualism of Practical Reason?

August 14th, 2021 Comments Off on Does the Incommensurability of Prudential and Impartial rationality avoid the dualism of Practical Reason?

I have been discussing the dualism of practical reason. As I understand it, this is an inference from three premises: [1] We always have most reason to do what is morally required [2] An act is morally required if and only if it is impartially demanded: demanded by rules justified from a perspective of impartial […]

Tags:   · · · · ·

Does the Dualism of Practical Reason assume Egoism?

July 30th, 2021 Comments Off on Does the Dualism of Practical Reason assume Egoism?

Recently, I have been examining the question, “If there is no God, why be good?” As I interpret it, this expresses an argument about the “dualism of practical reason” made by Henry Sidgwick and John Gay. This argument had three steps. First, unless we assume that it is always in our long-term self-interest to follow […]

Tags:   · · · · · · ·