Category: Philosophy of Religion

  • Guest Post: No Official Religion in God’s Own?

    David Simpkin is a Hamilton based lawyer with an interest in church-state issues. He studied law at the University of Auckland and holds a BA majoring in history and political studies. David is married to Susan and has a infant son, Caleb. He attends Whitiora Bible Church in Hamilton. David writes:

    As a holiday weekend that coincides with the most significant festival on the Christian calendar, Easter, concludes we should reflect on the freedom of religion we have in this nation. The Human Rights Commission is calling for submissions on a draft statement on freedom of religion and belief that includes the statement:

    ‘New Zealand has no official or established religion.’

    Race relations conciliator Joris de Bres has publicly said that New Zealand’s absence of a state religion is a statement of fact[1]. Former Prime Minister Helen Clark was also quoted as saying there is no state religion, there will be no state religion[2]. These comments may be a surprise to those Kiwis who thought rugby has the role of a national religion!

    Given the above comments by influential New Zealanders and the tax payer supported Human Rights Commission it must be clearly correct legally to say that New Zealand has no official religion.

    Well, actually, no, it is not.

    Does New Zealand Have an Official Religion?
    An important distinction needs to be made at the outset. A state with an established religion is one in which a particular religion or church is effectively an arm of the state, and the state identifies with a particular religion. A state with an official religion gives special recognition or privileges to a religion. While an established religion and an official religion are usually found together, that is not always the case.

    One of the most (if not the most) important offices in New Zealand is that of our head of state. New Zealand is a constitutional monarchy and the head of state in New Zealand is our monarch, currently Queen Elizabeth II.

    The Accession Declaration Act 1910 provides New Zealand’s head of state’s oath of office’ This accession declaration states:

    “I … do solemnly and sincerely in the presence of God profess, testify, and declare that I am a faithful Protestant, and that I will, according to the true intent of the enactments which secure the Protestant succession to the Throne of my Realm, uphold and maintain the said enactments to the best of my powers according to law.”

    The accession declaration provides that the Queen must claim to be a Protestant. This is inconsistent with the notion that New Zealand has no official religion. It also refers to other laws which “secure the Protestant succession.” These other laws are the Bill of Rights 1688[3] and The Act of Settlement 1700[4]. All these acts of parliament were re-affirmed as part of the law of New Zealand by our parliament as recently as 1988 in the Imperial Laws Application Act (which, curiously given her comments above, Helen Clark voted in favour of passing[5]). The other laws that secure the Protestant succession are intended to ensure that the King or Queen of New Zealand is always a Protestant Christian. These laws are, incidentally, identical to the current law in the now multi-religious United Kingdom. Where New Zealand differs from the United Kingdom is that neither the Anglican nor Presbyterian churches are established.

    The legal requirement that New Zealand’s head of state must be a Protestant Christian means that in our constitutional form at least we are a Christian nation. Technically our official religion is Anglicanism[6]. Having an official religion of course in no way requires New Zealanders to profess a particular religion. But does an Official Religion pose a threat to Religious Minorities? To answer this question lets refer to some overseas examples.

    Having no official religion and a secular state has been no guarantee that freedom of religion and human rights generally will be respected in North Korea, Cuba and the People’s Republic of China, all of which have woeful human rights records.

    By contrast the Lutheran church is the established church in Norway (there is even a minister of church affairs). It would be fair to say that Norway is not known for its suppression of freedom of religion or for having a poor human rights record.

    Likewise, the established Anglican Church in England and the Presbyterian Church in Scotland has not led to a lack of freedom of religion. Indeed the tolerant Anglican Church is preferable for religious minorities to intolerant secularism.

    It may come as a surprise to learn that there are leading Muslim and Jewish scholars who are actually against disestablishing the Anglican Church in the United Kingdom. To paraphrase their argument, an established but tolerant Anglican Church is preferable to a nation where all reference to the religious or sacred is ruthlessly excluded from the public domain[7].

    The intolerant secularism rightly feared by religious minorities has been evident in France recently. France has already banned the Islamic headscarf and outward wearing of the crucifix, and other religious symbols, in state schools[8] and is considering banning the wearing of a burqa altogether, moves which are causing public discord in France[9].

    Having an official religion is not necessarily any threat to freedom of religion, and may actually be more beneficial to religious minorities than aggressive secularism. The advancement of the rights of religious minorities and multi-culturalism should not be mis-used as a Trojan horse to advance intolerant secularism.

    Conclusion
    As a nation we should celebrate our tolerant Christian tradition, not attempt to falsely deny the legal fact that Christianity is a part of our national constitution. Ironically denials that Christianity is our official religion are playing down the Christian religious tradition that bought about the very religious freedom and tolerance the Human Rights Commission is attempting to promote.

    We have nothing to fear and will gain by having a National Statement on Religious Diversity in New Zealand and a Draft Statement on Freedom of Religion and Belief that acknowledge the existence of New Zealand’s official religion rather than willfully ignore it.


    [1] “There’s No State Religion –De Bres” New Zealand Herald 19 February 2007.
    [2]
    As above.
    [3]
    The relevant section of Bill of Rights 1688 provides:

    And whereas it hath beene found by experience that it is inconsistent with the safety and welfaire of this Protestant Kingdome to be governed by a Popish Prince or by and King or Queene marrying a Papist the said Lords Spirituall and Temporall and Commons doe further pray that it may be enacted that all and every person and persons that is are or shall be reconciled to or shall hold communion with the See or Church of Rome or shall professe the Popish religion or shall marry a Papist shall be excluded and be for ever uncapeable to inherit possesse or enjoy the Crowne and Government of this Realme.

    [4] Section 3 of the Act of Settlement 1700 states (inter alia) “that whosoever shall hereafter come to the possession of this Crown shall joyn in Communion with the Church of England.”
    [5]
    Hansard, 1988 (4th Labour government 1984-1990).
    [6] The Head of State is required to be an Anglican – refer to footnote 4.
    [7]
    Tariq Modood “(Muslim) Establishment, Multiculturalism and British Citizenship,” Political Quarterly 65 (1994) pp.53-73; Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, Ibid at 63-64; also Jonathan Sacks, The Persistence of Faith: Morality and Society in a Secular Age, London, 1991, cited in R Ahdar and J Stenhous et al God and Government The New Zealand Experience, University of Otago Press 2000.
    [8] “Party Pushes Burqa Law Despite Public Discord” New Zealand Herald 10 January 2010.
    [9] Ibid.

    [Wikipedia have a chart showing which countries Queen Elizabeth II is currently head of state of.]

  • Contra Mundum: Slavery and the Old Testament

    “Why didn’t the Christian God ever explicitly and clearly condemn slavery?” This was John Loftus’ question in his book, Why I Became an Atheist: A Former Preacher Rejects Christianity. He posed it after sharing the following chilling account of slavery as practiced in the antebellum American south,

    He took her into the kitchen, and stripped her from neck to waist. He made her get upon the stool, and he tied her hands to a hook in the joist. After rolling up his sleeves, he commenced to lay on the heavy cow skin, and soon the warm, red blood came dripping to the floor … No words, no tears, no prayers, from his gory victim, seemed to move his iron heart from its bloody purpose. The louder she screamed, the harder he whipped; and where the blood ran fastest, there he whipped longest. He would whip her to make her scream, and whip her to make her hush; and not until overcome by fatigue, would he cease to swing the blood clotted cowskin.

    Loftus is not alone, it is often affirmed as an incontestable and obvious truth that the Bible supports slavery. Atheist philosopher Walter Armstrong substantiated this accusation with a citation from the book of Leviticus, “as for your male and female slaves whom you may have: you may buy male and female slaves from among the nations around you” (Lev 25:44 ESV).

    The ESV here uses the English word ‘slave’ to translate the Hebrew word ebed. The problem is that it is not at all clear that these two terms are analogous. In 1690 philosopher John Locke argued that an examination of the Old Testament’s references to an ebed shows that it is not the equivalent what we think of when we hear the term ‘slave.’ Locke is only one of many scholars who have come to the same conclusion.

    The Oxford Dictionary defines a slave as a “person who is the legal property of another or others and is bound to absolute obedience, human chattel.” Rodney Stark utilises a similar definition, “A slave is a human being who, in the eyes of the law and custom, is the possession, or chattel, of another human being or of a small group of human beings. Ownership of slaves entails absolute control, including the right to punish (often including the right to kill), to direct behavior, and to transfer ownership.” Timothy Keller astutely observes that the English term ‘slave’ carries connotations of new-world slavery as it was practiced in the British Empire and made infamous in the antebellum southern states of the US.

    In the British Empire and in many US states, slavery was governed under the Code of Barbados. This code was explicitly racist and described Africans as “heathenish, brutish, and an uncertaine, dangerous kinde of people.” It allowed owners to use, “unlimited force to compel labor without penalty even if this resulted in maiming or death.” It denied slaves due process rights and permitted owners to, in effect, kill their slave for any cause. It forbade slaves from marrying. It effectively prevented owners from setting their slaves free. Keller writes that, “The African slave trade was begun and resourced through kidnapping.” Stark notes that “20 to 40 percent of slaves died while being transported to the coast, another 3-10 percent died while waiting on the coast, and about 12 to 16 percent boarded on ships died during the voyage.”

    However, what the Old Testament refers to differs from slavery, so understood, in several important respects.

    First, an ebed was not acquired by kidnapping. Kidnapping a human being and selling that person as a slave was a capital offence in the Old Testament (Ex 21:16). Moreover, slave trading is implicitly condemned in the book of Revelation (Rev 18:13) and explicitly condemned by Paul as contrary to the law and sound doctrine (1 Tim 1:9-10).

    In the Old Testament an ebed was usually person who offered to work for another, free of charge, in exchange for a debt being cancelled. It resembled a form of indentured servitude.

    Second, the institution was not based on notions that ebed were of an inferior race. In fact, the opposite is affirmed. In the book of Job we read,

    If I have rejected the cause of my male or female slaves [Hebrew: ebed amah] when they brought a complaint against me; what then shall I do when God rises up? When he makes inquiry, what shall I answer him? Did not he who made me in the womb make them? And did not one fashion us in the womb? (Job 31:13-15)

    Here Job refers to an ebed as having a right to go to court and sue his or her “owner” in pursuit of his or her rights. Job bases this on the idea that both he and his ebed are equal, both are created by God.

    Third, as Locke noted, an ebed was not the property of another and could not be disposed of. To deliberately kill an ebed was a capital offence (Ex 21:20-21). Similarly, it was illegal to strike an ebed (Ex 21:26-27).

    However, some dispute this latter point on the basis of Exodus 21:20-21,

    If a man beats his male or female slave with a rod and the slave dies as a direct result, he must be punished, but he is not to be punished if the slave gets up after a day or two, since the slave is his property.

    Some interpret this passage to mean that because a “slave” is the property of another they can severely beat the slave and providing the beating is not fatal, there is no legal punishment. However, this fails to deal adequately with the context and the Hebrew text, the word translated as ‘property’ here is actually ‘silver’ (a reference to money) and the word translated ‘punishment’ here is not the usual word for punishment.

    Old Testament scholar Christopher Wright notes that the word implies “the shedding of the blood of the master of the slave” and so refers to capital punishment. It is used in direct contrast with the same word in the previous verse where it is stated that deliberately killing an ebed is to be avenged. Therefore, it does not say the person will not be punished for beating a slave, it says he will not be executed for it unless he kills the slave. For further evidence that the passage is not a license to beat, a couple of verses later even causing a minor injury on an ebed, such as a bruise, is explicitly condemned. The same contrast occurs in the passage immediately preceding where a free man who struck and killed another was to be “held responsible” but not if the person survived. It is clear, however, that the person was in fact to be legally punished as v 19 states he had to compensate his victim for the injury. Hence, in context the ‘held responsible’ is referring only to being held responsible for murder and is not speaking to the lesser charges of assault. What Ex 21:20-21 says then, is that if a person deliberately kills his or her ebed then that person is to be held responsible for murder and executed. If the slave “gets up after a day or two,” then the person is not to be held responsible for murder because the ebed is his or her “silver.”

    This makes sense as a few verses later, in Ex 21:26-27, striking a slave is explicitly prohibited and the legal punishment is for the ebed to go free. In The Old Testament, the penalty for assault was for the assailant to provide monetary compensation to the victim. This would create a quandary in this case as an ebed is in a position of servitude because he or she is in debt to the person he or she works for. In such a case the assailant would owe money to a person who owes him or her money. The Old Testament resolves the issue by declaring that even a trivial strike, such as causing a bruise (v21:25) should result in an immediate cancelation of the ebed’s entire debt, which would often result in a financial loss to the assailant. The New Testament similarly concurs, prohibiting “masters’ from even threatening their “slaves” (Eph 6:9) and to treat their “slaves” the way the “slave” is required to treat them.

    Further, unlike new-world slavery which was life long and where, under the Barbados Code, emancipation was effectively prohibited, an ebed could not be held in service for more than six years (Ex 21:2). Upon release, their employer was morally required to give them sufficient resources for them to be set up on their own feet (Deut 15:12-18) and the community left resources for them to live on for a year (Ex 23:10-11, Lev 25:2-7).

    These passages are often thought to refer only to Hebrew and hence Jewish slaves. Wright, however, argues that that in its original context the key word ibri designated a social class, not an ethnic group. This was the class of people who did not own land and in an agrarian economy survived by hiring themselves out to land owners.

    In fact, in the passage immediately before the verse Armstrong cites the Old Testament forbids any Israelite taking another Israelite as a ebed on the grounds that they are a “ebed of God” whom God has redeemed. Paul applies the same teaching to Christians prohibiting Christians from being sold as ‘slaves’ (1 Cor 7:23). Similarly, the Old Testament commanded people to prevent family members from becoming an ebed by paying their debts for them (Lev 25:48). Further, Paul, after writing to the Corinthians and encouraging them to “retain the place in life that the Lord assigned,” encourages slaves to purchase their freedom and to not remain in this position if it was possible to do so (1 Cor 7:21-22).

    Finally, if an ebed fled from an oppressive employer it was illegal to return him or her to “his master.” Instead, he or she was to live “wherever he likes and in whatever town he chooses” (Deut 23:15-16). It was forbidden to send an ebed back to his or her owner; contrast this with the practice in the antebellum south, the Fugitive Slave Act 1850 required the return of run-away slaves at penalty of law.

    Contrary to what some contend, the Old Testament does not permit slavery. It is more accurate to say it tolerates indentured servitude under certain situations; the paradigm being where the servitude is voluntary, temporary, is done in exchange for payment of a debt where the alternative is starvation and destitution and only in situations where the servant is given the same basic legal rights as everyone else and is protected from abusive treatment. To suggest this picture fits with the opening quote above is a stretch to say the least.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the April 10 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

    RELATED POSTS:
    Contra Mundum: Secular Smoke Screens and Plato’s Euthyphro

    Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others?
    Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith
    Contra Mundum: “Bigoted Fundamentalist” as Orwellian Double-Speak
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: Confessions of an Anti-Choice Fanatic
    Contra Mundum: The Judgmental Jesus

  • “Has Science Disproved God?” The Podcast (Fixed!)

    If you missed the “Has Science Disproved God?” panel discussion at Auckland University last week and you just cannot wait for the video to be edited, formatted and uploaded to You Tube then simply follow this link: “Has Science Disproved God?” to listen to the podcast of the event.

    In the first hour the speakers addressed four issues:

    1. Should a working scientist operate as a methodological atheist or, in other words, does the scientific project necessarily exclude God? – Dr Jeff Tallon
    2. Scientific beliefs are based on measurable, verifiable evidence, is belief in God any different? – Dr Matthew Flannagan
    3. Does evolution threaten belief in God? – Dr Neil Broom
    4. Science and free-will. – Dr Robert Mann

    The second hour consisted of questions from the audience.

    Hat Tip: Thinking Matters

    The second and final event in this series, Christianity on Trial, is on at Auckland University tonight at 7pm.

  • Christianity on Trial – Tuesday Night

    Just a reminder to come to tomorrow night’s event at the University of Auckland where Matt will be part of a panel along with scientist Dr Jeff Talon, theologians Joe Fleener and Michael Drake, whom you can fire questions at around the topic “Christianity on Trial – is belief in God delusional, is it a roadblock to political, moral and scientific progress?”

    The speakers are:

    Jeff Tallon (PhD) is Distinguished Scientist at Industrial Research Ltd and a former Professor of Physics at Victoria University. He is internationally known for his research in high-temperature superconductors, is a Fellow of the Royal Society of New Zealand and in 2002 was awarded the Rutherford Medal, New Zealand’s highest science award.

    Matthew Flannagan (PhD) adjunct lecturer in Philosophy at Laidlaw College and Bethlehem Tertiary Institute and is currently teaching philosophy, ethics and religious studies at St Peters College. He specialises in applied ethics and the interface between philosophy and theology. He is a prominent New Zealand Christian commentator, debater and blogger.

    Michael Drake
    (DipTeach) is the principal of Carey College in Panmure and a pastor of the Tamaki Reformed Baptist Church. He has been involved in advocacy for Christian schools and in raising issues about race, education, and Christianity before Parliament. He is also a Tertiary Student Christian Fellowship Associate Chaplain at the Manukau Institute of Technology.

    Joe Fleener (MDiv) lectures in Old Testament, Church History, Christian Worldview, Apologetics, and Christian Ethics at The Shepherd’s Bible College.

    When: Tuesday 16 March at 7pm

    Where: “The Centennial” 260 – 098 Owen G Glenn Building, 12 Grafton Road, The University of Auckland

    The organisers – Thinking Matters, the sponsors – TSCF and I are expecting a good turnout. As this is the last event in this series it is definitely not to be missed so get your questions ready and come along!

    This is a lay-friendly event, all the panelists will be speaking plain english and breaking down anything complicated so that the rest of us can follow. The three teenagers I brought to last week’s “Has Science Disproved God?” are all keen for more so that should give you an idea of how accessible these events are.

    More information is available here.

  • Has Science Disproved God? Thursday Night

    Just a reminder that tomorrow night, Thursday 11 March, at 7pm, in OGGB 4, at the University of Auckland, Matt will be part of a panel along with scientists Drs Neil Broom, Jeff Talon and Robert Mann, whom you can fire questions at around the topic “Has Science Disproved God?”

    The organisers – Thinking Matters, the sponsors – TSCF and Matt and I have had a lot of feedback and buzz around this event we are expecting a good turnout and people seem to be getting their questions ready; topics that look set to come up include the scientific evidence for God, against God, issues around Naturalism and the project of science itself. So make sure you don’t miss it!

    Now to the lay person these topics may sound complicated, I have been assured by the organisers that this is a lay-friendly event. All the PhD’s on the panel will be speaking plain english and breaking down anything complicated so that the rest of us can follow. Matt and I are bringing our teenagers and some of their friends so that should give you an idea of how accessible it will be.

    More information is available here.

    If you cannot make this event, can you make it to Christianity on Trial on Tues 16 March?

  • Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part II

    In Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part I, I set out a common law property rights argument drawing from the writings of jurists Blackstone and Locke as well as contemporary philosopher Ed Feser. I looked at what circumstances, if any, might justify the state taking of real property, looking specifically at minerals from the sub-soil of privately held property. In this post I identify and critique some of the purported justifications for the historic and current expropriation of property in New Zealand, using the examples of petroleum, gold and silver.

    II.        Purported Justifications
    One of the earliest attempts to justify an inroad into property rights in sub-soil was made in The Case of Mines. Three arguments offered by counsel for the queen are recorded which I have labelled excellence, necessity and currency:

    Excellence: “because gold and silver were the most excellent products of the soil, they should, ipso facto, go to the Queen, who was the most excellent person in the realm.”[29]

    Necessity: “That the King as head of the realm needed the money to keep up the army and enforce the laws.”[30]

    Currency: “That gold was necessary or coin or commerce, and the Crown ought to have it to mint,”[31]

    Whilst “none of the reasoning of the judges is given, just the bare decision”,[32] I will assume that the reasons offered by counsel were the reasons accepted by the court and address the merits of each in turn.

    The excellence argument is clearly problematic as it is not a given that the monarch will always be the most excellent person in the realm (especially when one pauses to consider the character and conduct of some of England’s monarchs). Further, even assuming that a monarch is the most excellent person in the realm, it would not follow that this attribute confers an automatic right to the most excellent form of every conceivable thing regardless of whether those things were owned by other people. Further, the assumption that gold is the most excellent of metals suggests that ‘excellent’ is being used in an economic sense to denote gold as the most economically valuable of metals. However, if this assumption is correct then the most excellent person must be the richest, which would entail that anyone wealthier than the queen was entitled to take her gold (an argument that I am fairly confident counsel for the queen did not intend).

    The other two arguments are more plausible. They both speak to the state’s need to be able to finance the discharge of its basic functions (i.e. defence, justice, minting the currency, etc) and, as such, are arguably extensions of the necessity justification. Given the then threat of Spanish invasion, the need to raise an army in times of war and the practical uses of gold and silver in the 16th century, these arguments may have had some merit. However, in contemporary New Zealand where the core functions of government are funded by taxation, where we keep a standing army and our currency is not minted from, or based on, gold and silver, the elements of necessity that ground the reasoning within The Case of Mines are not currently present.

    As current precedent The Case of Mines can justifiably affirm the principle that in situations of necessity, such as defence or natural disaster, where the state needs a particular mineral and cannot realistically obtain it from within its own lands or by trade then it might be justified in expropriating it from private citizens for the duration of the necessity. Something like this justification was arguably present in the passage of the Petroleum Act 1937. Oil had become a mineral of strategic importance to defence as the British Royal Navy fleet had converted to oil in 1914. This proved to be critical in their sea victories during WWI. In 1919 existing regulations governing the extraction of oil were extended to private land. Driven largely by the British Navy’s need for oil, a post-war search for oil in the British Colonies began.

    In 1927 a Petroleum Bill was drafted but abandoned. At the time, the petroleum industry was growing by itself; Shell and BP were both active in New Zealand, private agreements to extract petroleum were being struck and the national urgency in the wake of WWI was waning. However, as the 1930’s progressed, issues of national defence increasingly came back into focus;[33]

    The growing strategic threat from Japan and Germany caused the New Zealand government to focus on the need to increase investment by international oil companies in the discovery and extraction of New Zealand’s oil reserves – and on the ability of those companies to deal with a single owner (the government) as being ‘in the national interest’.

    The Petroleum Act 1937 nationalised all petroleum. The justifications cited were petroleum’s strategic importance in defence, the economy, transport and the preference of the oil companies to deal with a single party.[34] Whilst the appeal to national interests found broad support within society, the passage of the act was highly controversial.[35] It was disputed that the expropriation of private property was necessary to achieve the objectives and the lack of compensation was widely objected to, particularly so by Maori.

    The Waitangi Tribunal reports that “Maori shared in the wider endorsement, and their challenge was not to the intent to nationalise the resource but to the failure to pay landowners compensation for their loss of property rights under the common law and the Treaty.”[36] The 1937 Act did not grant royalties to the landowners despite the provision to do this initially being left open;[37]

    The approach of the government in 1937 and 1938 was based on the position that, where the ‘national interest’ justified action and where the owners of the confiscated rights could be presumed to share in the national benefits of the policy, no compensation for the loss of private property rights need be paid.

    The government of the day appeared to hold that property rights could be justifiably overridden without compensation on the grounds of “national interests.” Traditionally these were a mixture of strategic national security issues and economic benefits to the country as whole.

    A.        National Security Justifications
    Now earlier I suggested that the necessity justification may apply to such appeals; however, the strategic necessity arising from factors such as the threat posed by Germany, Japan, Spain or the British Navy’s need for oil is no longer present (the British navy is these days increasingly nuclear propelled and the New Zealand Navy barely has a fleet). Yet despite the change in the strategic situation, legislation asserting ownership of petroleum, gold, silver, and uranium to the state remain — in fact, post-WWII legislation has affirmed their position as state property “whether or not the land has been alienated” and has reserved additional minerals to the collection.[38] (In the case of the continued state reservation of uranium this seems rather odd given that it appears incapable of attaining the standard for military necessity given New Zealand’s nuclear free policies.)

    B.        Economic Justifications
    Peter Ackroyd suggests that taking property to acquire economic benefit was a driving justification for many of New Zealand’s past legislative acts. He cites from Hansard, “The Colony, however, could not afford to dispense with the mining industry, and every effort should be made by the Legislature to assist in maintaining its position.” [39]

    It is indisputable that a prosperous mining industry can contribute greatly to the progress of a society; however, whether the gain of this benefit, in and of itself, can justify the taking of another’s property seems rather dubious. Almost any taking of one person’s property by another will economically advantage the taker yet this does not typically justify taking (even if the taker invested the property in a way that ended up benefiting the takee). Every person has a right to retain their justly acquired property and to have the taking of it protected by law. Paternalistic justifications such as “it is economically good for you” are not normally grounds for overriding the rights of adults.

    In the event that someone does take from another, it is normal practice under the principles of restorative justice that the taker be required to compensate the takee. Likewise, when a state takes property in the name of national or economic interest it was recognised at common law that compensation must be paid. Further it is common to find this requirement in other jurisdictions. A recent survey of the constitutional legislation within 30 OECD countries showed that 28 expressly acknowledge property rights and 24 required expropriations of property rights to be adequately justified and to not occur without compensation.[40]

    In New Zealand the CMA provides compensation for the disturbance of the land caused by mining activities but not for the loss of the minerals. The situation is analogous to a judge ordering a burglar to fix the window broken during the burglary but permitting the burglar to keep the widescreen plasma TV he took from the house.

    As cited earlier, a justification commonly offered for the state’s failure to pay compensation is that “the owners of the confiscated rights could be presumed to share in the national benefits of the policy.” Lewis Evans, Neil Quigley and Kevin Counsell identify a problem with this line of reasoning;[41]

    This position will … only be justified if it can be shown that those affected by the confiscation of the private rights will receive benefits roughly equivalent in value to the share of the benefits that they would have otherwise received. In this case [the Petroleum Act], of course, no such analysis was done.

    Even if the state did undertake this analysis of costs and benefits, the justification fails to note that compensation does not actually introduce any additional cost. The following example will bear this out. A person owns a piece of property, P. P is worth a certain value, V. If the state expropriates P and fails to compensate the owner then the owner loses V. However, if the state does compensate the owner then the state loses the value of V. Either way, someone is going to pay the cost of V. The question is who should bear this cost – the private owner or the government? Both the loss and the cost remain the same regardless of who bears it.[42]

    Lewis, Evans & Quigley note that the absence of compensation increases the chance that the state will over-estimate the benefits of various takings and not accurately measure the costs.[43]

    Uncompensated confiscation is not justified by actions that are deemed by politicians to be ‘in the public interest’. It is too easy for interest groups who benefit from government actions but bear none of those costs to create the appearance of a public benefit when none in fact exists. If there is a public interest, its value must be quantified against the loss to the private property rights that would be destroyed by the action. In the absence of this accounting, government will overuse its power of eminent domain and will engage in actions that impose net costs on society as a whole.

    As shown above, compensating owners does not increase the cost to society but a policy permitting expropriation without compensation may.

    III.       Conclusion
    I have argued that there is a common law presumption in favour of property rights, which is based on a moral principle antecedent to state recognition. According to this principle, a state must justify any expropriation of property. While I granted that expropriation may be able to be justified on certain grounds, contemporary New Zealand does not currently meet such grounds. Expropriation on economic grounds is far more dubious and even if this ground could be justified, the absence of statutory provisions for compensation renders such takings unjust.


    [29] James Parcell “A Thesis on the Prerogative Right of the Crown to Royal Metals” (Government Printer, Wellington, 1960) 13.
    [30] Ibid 14.
    [31]
    Ibid.
    [32] Ibid 11. Parcell suggests that the report was a forgery or had been embellished.
    [33]
    Lewis Evans, Neil Quigley & Kevin Counsell “Protection of Private Property Rights and Just Compensation: An Economic Analysis of the Most Fundamental Human Right Not Provided in New Zealand” (2009) New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation (at 21 January 2010) 23.
    [34] Ibid 23-24.
    [35] Hansard and the national archives record fierce debate; breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi were alleged and the Petroleum Haka became part of New Zealand history.
    [36] Waitangi Tribunal The Petroleum Report – Wai 796 (2003) 29.
    [37]
    Lewis, Evans & Quigley, above n 33, 24.
    [38] Key examples: Atomic Energy Act 1945; Coal Act 1948, 1949; Iron and Steel Industry Act 1959; Mining Act 1971, which were all brought under the CMA.
    [39] Peter Ackroyd “Mining Legislation and the Reservation of Mineral Resources in New Zealand” [1988] NZLJ 41, 42.
    [40]
    Lewis, Evans & Quigley, above n 33, 43-48.
    [41] Lewis, Evans & Quigley, above n 33, 24.
    [42]
    I am grateful to Matthew Flannagan for the development of this argument.
    [43] Lewis, Evans & Quigley, above n 33, 41.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part I
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part I
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part II

  • Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part I

    New Zealand, like many nations, has a long history of the state taking real property, often without compensation. In this two part series I examine one sub-set of takings, minerals from the sub-soil of privately held property (although the argument herein could apply with equal force to any state taking). Drawing from common law, the writings of jurists such as Blackstone and Locke and contemporary philosopher Ed Feser, I look at what circumstances, if any, might justify taking. I then apply this to the current practice in New Zealand and ask is the practice justified, does it meet the standard?

    Drawing from Talmudic Law, the jurist Accursius of Bologna wrote the phrase cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos (to whom belongs the soil it is his, even to heaven and to the middle of the earth) as a gloss on Justinian’s Digest.[1] By the 16th century this maxim had become accepted common law doctrine for determining the extent of the rights enjoyed by a tenant in fee simple (“landowner”).[2] The English Laws Act retrospectively declared that “so far as applicable to the circumstances of the Colony of New Zealand,” all statute and common laws of England became “part of the laws of New Zealand.” [3] This was confirmed by the Imperial Laws Application Act 1988. Since 1840 to the present day there have been few instances where the court has held that a statute or common law of England was not applicable to the circumstances of the colony of New Zealand.[4] Hence, in the absence of statutes overriding it, the maxim is part of New Zealand law.

    Historically the rights of the landowner included ownership of the minerals in the sub-soil. “The grant of the land includes the surface and … all that is infra, i.e. mines, earth, clay etc.”[5] The sub-soil minerals were assumed to be conveyed along with the land, unless the conveyance instrument stipulated otherwise.[6]

    Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards. … whatever is in a direct line, between the surface of any land and the centre of the earth, belongs to the owner of the surface; as is every day’s experience in the mining countries. So that the word “land” includes not only the face of the earth, but every thing under it, or over it. And therefore, if a man grants all his lands, he grants thereby all his mines of metal …

    Until the last century or so, the only minerals not subject to this doctrine were gold and silver.[7] In The Case of Mines, the court held “that by the law all mines of gold and silver within the realm, whether they be in the lands of the Queen, or of subjects, belong to the Queen by prerogative.”[8] When it came to ownership of other minerals the court held,[9]

    That if the ore or mine in the soil of a subject be of copper, tin, lead, or iron, in which there is no gold or silver, in this case the proprietor of the soil shall have the ore or mine, and not the Crown by prerogative, for in such barren base metal no prerogative is given to the Crown.

    Whilst gold and silver were the primary focus of the New Zealand government’s first legislative reservations of minerals,[10] successive legislation incrementally added all the “base” minerals (and more) mentioned in The Case of Mines into state ownership.[11]

    Initially the state only claimed the minerals contained in state land and reserved the mineral rights on alienation of its own land.[12] However, subsequent legislation saw all land subject to a retention clause on alienation that reserved, for the state, all minerals existing in their natural condition within that land.[13] Today there are still pockets of minerals that remain in private ownership, as some land has not been alienated since the passage of the relevant legislation. However, these minerals cannot be petroleum, gold, silver, and uranium as these minerals belong to the state regardless of whether or not the land has been alienated.[14] The state possesses an exclusive right to alienate (or grant a licence to alienate) the minerals it owns.[15] In many circumstances, land owners cannot refuse consent for prospecting, exploration and mining to occur on their land.[16]

    This state of affairs, with respect to the ownership of minerals, has eroded the rights of the landowner as mineral ownership has changed without the consent of the original owner. Further, this change in ownership occurred without the owner being compensated. Prima facie, this change of ownership cannot be said to be compatible with property rights.

    I.          Property Rights
    Property rights are often described as “a bundle of rights.” This bundle includes the full or limited right to access, use, assign, exclude others from and destroy property. William Blackstone identified property rights as “The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, … which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.”[17]

    It is important to understand this quote in context. Blackstone grounded the legal right to property in a moral right that exists antecedent to the state.[18]

    There is indeed some difference among the writers on natural law concerning the reason why occupancy should convey this right, and invest one with this absolute property: Grotius and Puffendorf insisting that this right of occupancy is founded on a tacit and implied assent of all mankind that the first occupant should become the owner; and Barbeyrac, Titius, Mr. Locke, and others, holding that there is no such implied assent, neither is it necessary that there should be; for that the very act of occupancy alone, being a degree of bodily labour, is, from a principle of natural justice, without any consent or compact, sufficient of itself to gain a title;—a dispute that savours too much of nice and scholastic refinement. However, both sides agree in this, that occupancy is the thing by which the title was in fact originally gained; every man seizing to his own continued use such spots of ground as he found most agreeable to his own convenience, provided he found them unoccupied by any one else.

    Blackstone appeals to John Locke’s polemic against absolute monarchy, which sets out the locus classicus for the justification of property rights.[19] Locke argued that human beings have a series of rights antecedent to the existence of civil government. The state serves people by protecting and recognising these rights. One such right is the right to property. Locke argued that people own their own bodies and as such their own labour. When one mixes one’s labour with previously unowned land one acquires a right to this land, subject to the proviso that one leaves “enough and as good … for others”[20]

    Edward Feser has suggested that Locke’s proviso is mistaken and that an initial acquisition of the sort Locke refers cannot be unjust;[21]

    This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption … that external resources are initially unowned. Consider the following example. Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisition of R, B would have to have had a rightful claim over R, a right to R. By hypothesis, however, B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after someone has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.

    If one mixes one’s labour with, and gains ownership of, previously unowned land then one acquires a property right to it, which in turn gives one the right to assign it to others. Given this, Locke’s proviso is unnecessary. Assignees of such land acquire the property rights along with the land. Unless another can establish that the initial acquisition was unjust or that there has been an unjust transfer at some point in the chain of ownership, the landowner’s property rights must be respected.

    The moral property rights of the landowner are not absolute in the sense of never being able to be overridden.[22] Although Blackstone suggests property rights are limited “only by the laws of the land”, he qualifies this in the very next paragraph,

    So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorise the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community. If a new road, for instance, were to be made through the grounds of a private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this without consent of the owner of the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of the individual ought to yield to that of the community; for it would be dangerous to allow any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of this common good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no. Besides, the public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of every individual’s private rights, as modelled by the municipal law. In this and similar cases the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does, interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. The public is now considered as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and even this is an exertion of power, which the legislature indulges with caution, and which nothing but the legislature can perform.[23]

    Blackstone suggests property rights can be overridden for the public good provided that, public good is understood as “the protection of every individual’s private rights”, “the legislature alone” authorises it by law and the owner is compensated. Elsewhere he suggests that necessity might be a further option; a person in need “may demand a supply sufficient for all the necessities of life from the more opulent part of the community, by means of the several statutes enacted for the relief of the poor.”[24]

    Ed Feser elaborates on the idea of necessity or “absolute distress”,[25]

    The most obvious implication is that individuals in circumstances of what Cronin calls “absolute distress” have a right to the use of the resources of others, where the paradigm examples would be the starving man in the woods who takes food from a cabin, or a window washer who grabs a flagpole to break his fall from a building, or someone fleeing robbers who can only escape by running through someone else’s back yard. Someone in circumstances like these is not guilty of theft or the like, because for actions like the ones in question to count as theft, etc., the cabin owner or flagpole owner or homeowner would have to have such an absolute right to his property that he could justly refuse to allow others to use it even in the circumstances in question; and, according to natural law theory, no one could possibly have so absolute a property right. For the same reason, if some resource (say, the only remaining source of water in an area stricken by drought) became “absolutely necessary … to save the community or part of it from extinction,” then any individual who had heretofore privately owned that resource would have an obligation in justice to relinquish it.”

    Necessity can be a justifiable but limited inroad into property rights.  Feser argues that the necessity exception can extend to political situations,[26]

    It [necessity] is also what would justify the taxation required for the necessary functions of government (national defense, courts of law, etc.), since … the very existence of the community … depends on the state’s performance of these functions.

    Feser also suggests that necessity might,[27]

    justify taxation for the purposes of funding some measure of public assistance for those in absolute distress who are incapable of either finding work or getting help from family members and friends. For these circumstances would seem to be relevantly similar to those in which the starving man in the woods finds himself.

    Whilst the right may not be absolute, a prima facie property right exists. The burden falls on the expropriator to justify takings.[28]

    That we do in fact, in everyday life, put the burden of proof on the denier of claims to property is evidenced by the presumption that exists in law that the possessor of a holding is the rightful owner of it. This reflects our intuitive sense of justice in holdings. It is only (egalitarian) philosophers who—bizarrely—put the burden on the possessor to prove that we shouldn’t expropriate his holdings. Such philosophers are reminiscent of the epistemological skeptic who challenges you to prove you’re not dreaming, or are not a brain in a vat, or whatever—as if it were such strange logical possibilities, rather than the commonsense belief in the external world, that had the presumption in their favor!

    In Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part II, I will set out some of the purported justifications for expropriation of property, using the examples of petroleum, gold and silver. I  will then analyse and critique these.


    [1] Yehuda Abramovitch gives a fascinating history of the origins of the maxim in “The Maxim ‘Cujus Est Solum Ejus Usque Ad Caelum’ as Applied in Aviation” (1962) 8 McGill LJ 247.
    [2] Bury v Pope (1586) 1 Cro Eliz 118; 78 ER 375.
    [3] 858 s1.
    [4] David Williams “Gold, The Case of Mines (1568) and the Waitangi Tribunal” (2003) 7 Australian Journal of Legal History 157, 165.
    [5] Mitchell v Mosley Cozens [1914] 1 Ch 438 at 450 (CA) Per Hardy MR.
    [6] William Blackstone “Chapter 2: Of Real Property; And, First, of Corporeal Hereditaments” in George Sharswood (ed) Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books (J.B. Lippincott Co, Philadelphia, 1893) Vol 1, Bk 2, Ch 2, s 19.
    [7]
    R v Earl of Northumberland (1568) 1 Plowden 310 [75 ER 472] (Case of Mines). Upheld in Woolley v A-G (1877) 2 AC 163 (PC); A-G v Morgan [1891] 1 Ch 432.
    [8]
    Case of Mines 510.
    [9] Ibid 511.
    [10] Gold Fields Act 1858.
    [11] In 1991 all incremental legislation relating to the extraction of minerals was brought under Crown Minerals Act subject only to Ngai Tahu (Pounamu Vesting) Act 1997.
    [12]
    Land Amendment Act 1913.
    [13] For example, Land Act 1948 and Crown Minerals Act 1991 (“CMA”).
    [14] CMA s10.
    [15]
    Permits to prospect, explore and mine minerals are granted under ss23-29 of the CMA.
    [16]
    Access to land is covered under ss49-80 of the CMA. A landowner might succeed at vetoing the exercise of a mining permit on his or her land (if it is not a mining permit for petroleum) but stands little success opposing the exercise of a permit to prospect or explore as the public interest grounds referred to in s66 of the CMA are very broad.
    [17] William Blackstone “Chapter 1: Of The Absolute Rights Of Individuals” in Sharswood, above n 6, Vol 1, Bk 1, Ch 1, s 139. This is similar to the opening flourish of property as “sole and despotic dominion” in Blackstone’s chapter “Of Property in General” below n 18.
    [18] William Blackstone “Chapter 1: Of Property, In General” in Sharswood, above n 6, Vol 1, Bk 2, Ch 1, s 9.
    [19] John Locke Two Treatises of Government (1690) Peter Laslett (ed) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967), Second Treatise, Ch 5.
    [20] Ibid s 27.
    [21] Edward Feser
    “There is no such thing as an Unjust Initial Acquisition” (2005) 22 Social Philosophy and Policy 56, 58-59.
    [22] Although Blackstone describes property rights as absolute rights of people, it is clear from the context that  by ‘absolute’ he means a right a person has in the state of nature, that is, a right that exists antecedent to any state recognition. He does not mean absolute in the sense of never being able to be overridden.
    [23]
    Feser, above n 21.
    [24] Ibid.
    [25]
    Edward Feser
    “Classical Natural Law Theory, Property Rights, and Taxation” (2010) 27 Social Philosophy and Policy 21, 43.
    [26]
    Ibid 47.
    [27] Ibid.
    [28] Feser, above n 21, 11.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part II
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part I
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part II