Category: Philosophers

  • Raymond Bradley’s Opening Statement: Bradley v Flannagan Debate

    On Monday 2 August at the University of Auckland Emeritus Professor of Philosophy Dr Raymond Bradley and Dr Matthew Flannagan (of this blog) debated the topic “Is God the Source of Morality? Is it rational to ground right and wrong in commands issued by God?” For the benefit of those who could not be there, who are awaiting the editing and uploading of the video of the debate, we will be running a blog series where we bring you some of the debate in written form.

    PROFESSOR ROBERT NOLA’S INTRODUCTION

    Published here with permission

    It gives me great pleasure to introduce Ray Bradley to you.

    Ray was a student of philosophy at this university in the early 1950s. He also attended the Auckland Teachers’ Training College and become a school teacher.  But then he won scholarship to the ANU to do advanced research in Philosophy where he wrote a PhD thesis entitled ‘Free Will and Logic’.  One of his papers that emerges from this research is on fatalism ‘Must the Future be what it is going to be?”. This paper has been anthologised and it is a pretty good read about what is wrong with fatalism.

    After the ANU Ray spent a year at Oxford and then returned to teach philosophy in Australia.  He was appointed to the Chair of Philosophy at This University in 1964 at the very young age of 33 – he is most likely the youngest professorial appointment at this university. It was at this time that I first met Ray as a student in the Dept.   He was an energetic shaker of a number matters from the organisation of the dept and its courses to protesting against the Viet Nam war. And also debating about religion; he took on the professors of Botany and Classics in a series of about 20 debates.

    Unfortunately he left Auckland at the end of 1969 for a professorship at Simon Fraser University. There he produced many papers and two books: the co-authored ‘Possible Worlds’ and ‘The Nature of all Being’. When Ray retired from Simon Fraser he returned to NZ to live in Northland by the sea.

    Living in Canada gave Ray his chance to realise one of his great passions – skiing. He has won over 60 medals in National and International events, including three World Championships in the speed event known as Super G. You can read about this in the recent Sunday Times article on Ray: they devoted more space to Ray as a skier than Ray as a philosopher.

    One of Ray’s other abiding passions has been to combat religion. In his youth he was a believer but he gave this up in his teens. As a professional philosopher he entered into debates with a range of people from local advocates of religion in Auckland and those elsewhere such as William Lane Craig and Anthony Flew who had a late life conversion from atheism to religion. There are many of Ray’s papers on religion around, – you can find some of them on the web. One of the finest is Ray’s exposition of the claim by David Hume that the rivalry between religions discredit them all, that is, their rivalry shows that each is highly improbable. – see Ray’s paper ‘The rivalry of religions’.

    Tonight Ray is on one of his favourite themes – the connection, more strictly the lack of a connection, between God and morality.

    As I have indicated, Ray has debated issues about God at this University for over 50 years – tonight is yet another stage in Ray’s long engagement with the atheism and his presentation of it.

    Welcome to Ray Bradley.

    PROFESSOR RAYMOND BRADLEY’S OPENING STATEMENT

    Published here with permission

    I come not to praise God but to bury him along with the dead gods of now forgotten religions. Not to praise him as the source of all that’s good in the world, and hence the ultimate guide to human morals, but to indict him as the self-confessed source of all that’s wrong with it. When the Christian God says in his Holy Scriptures, that he is the creator of evil, I am prepared to take him at his word.

    I will assume the role of prosecutor in providing grounds for agreeing with God’s self-indictment. And having conducted God’s trial in accord with the principles of morality and logic, I will hope to see him put, first, into a straightjacket, and then forever in his grave, no longer to command the belief of men.

    Matt will act on God’s behalf as counsel for God’s defence, what theologians call an “apologist”.

    THE DEITY IN THE DOCK

    I’m going to indict God on four categories of charges. Each category has scores, if not hundreds or thousands of instances. If God is guilty of even one of these instances, that alone would be grounds for his conviction. Drawing upon evidence provided by God himself in his so-called Holy Scriptures, I hold that he’s guilty of them all.

    A. Crimes against Humanity

    The pagan religions typically invoked various gods as supernatural causes of natural phenomena: earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, lightning, plagues, famines, and so on. The biblical god takes over the same sort of role, only he claims to be responsible for the lot. He boasts of repeatedly using natural events such as these to injure, maim, starve, drown, and in other ways kill off millions upon millions of people. Disease and disaster are God’s weapons of mass destruction.

    B. War Crimes

    This god is guilty of the crime of genocide. According to the story of Noah and the flood he wipes out “every living thing on the face of the earth”. In his role as Commander-in-Chief of his chosen people, God is guilty of ethnic cleansing. He orders the slaughter, without compassion, of hundreds of thousands of women, children, and suckling babes. He condones the taking of orphaned virgins for use as sex slaves by his conquering soldiers. He threatens, too, to have unborn children ripped out of their mothers’ wombs; and seems to relish the prospect.

    C. Licensing Moral Mayhem and Murder

    This God prescribes the death penalty for at least 15 alleged offences. These include being a stubborn and rebellious son (Deuteronomy 21:18-21), hitting or cursing one’s father and mother (Exodus 21:17, Leviticus 20:8), desecrating the Sabbath (Exodus 31:14), being a woman who cannot prove she was a virgin prior to marriage (Deuteronomy 22:20-21), being a woman who did not protest loudly enough when she was being raped (Deuteronomy 22:23-24), being a blasphemer (Leviticus 24:16), being an adulterer (Leviticus 20:10-12), worshipping some other gods (Deuteronomy 13:6-9), and being a homosexual (Leviticus 20:13). God’s recommended penalty? Stoning, usually.

    God tells us unambiguously that he’s committed all these crimes and countless more. And he never says sorry for any of them or even shows a trace of regret.

    But all of these crimes pale into insignificance compared with that for which I’m now about to indict him. For all of these are finite in duration, whereas the next is supposed to go on and on for all eternity.

    D. Crimes of Torture

    This god, in the person of his son, Jesus, commits the vilest of all crimes: torture of infinite duration in the fires of hell. For whom and why? The majority of the human race for the simple alleged offence of not having the right religious beliefs.

    There are at least thirteen passages in Matthew alone in which Jesus talks about the fate of those who will go to hell—a fate that he describes as “eternal”, as “fiery”, as a place of “unquenchable fire”, as a place where there will be “weeping and gnashing of teeth”. The apostle Paul (2 Thessalonians 1:8-9) looks forward to the time when, in his words, “the Lord Jesus Christ shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire taking vengeance on them that know not God.” And the author of Revelation paints a picture of hell in all its voyeuristic obscenity when he reports that all whose names were not written in the book of life would be “cast into the lake of fire” (Revelation 20:15), a place where all non-believers will, in his words, “be tormented with burning sulphur in the presence of the holy angels and of the Lamb, and the smoke of their torment ascendeth for ever and ever” (Revelation 14:10-11). The expression “the Lamb”, scholars and theologians agree, refers to Jesus. Nice to know that Jesus will watch the eternal tortures of the damned, i.e., of many like me, and hosts of unbelievers like some of you.

    Is it any wonder that Christians who take God at his word have tortured themselves with fear about their own eternal prospects, have burned heretics at the stake so as to save their souls from eternal perdition, or have dashed infants’ brains out on the stones so they wouldn’t have a chance of becoming non-believers? Yet God, by virtue of his omniscience, knew all this.

    Is it any wonder that televangelists are able to use the fear of hellfire to bring money into their coffers?

    Who today, you may ask, would take this sort of moral primitivism seriously? Well, many Muslim fundamentalists certainly do: the Taliban, for instance. Arguably, the moral laws they and other Islamic fundamentalists seek to enforce are little more than the Islamic versions of the Old Testament, which Mohammed drew upon freely.

    Ditto with many Christian fundamentalists—the Christian Reconstructionists, for instance. Comprising a sizable and increasingly influential proportion of the Southern Baptist Convention—itself the most potent force for evangelical Christianity—the extreme Christian Right, like their Muslim brethren, demand their country become a theocracy and unflinchingly acknowledge that implementing God’s commands would inevitably result in the death of tens of millions of their fellow citizens: over 45 million, on one estimate. Welcome to a replica of Sharia Law.

    It’s not just the ultra-fundamentalists of theistic religions that take God’s precepts seriously. Even the relatively liberal branch of the Christian church–as represented by the Church of England and its Episcopalian offshoot–are troubled enough by God’s word to agonise over some of them, what he has to say about homosexuals in particular: that they are an “abomination” who should be killed in this world and spend the next in hell. Hence the prospect of another great schism in Christianity, and the pathetic excuse by gay bishop, Bishop Gene Robinson that the church is “still trying to figure out God’s will” on the subject. Robinson and Archbishop Rowan Williams (who’s on the other side of the debate), should read the Bible. It reported God’s will long ago.

    Has God changed his mind about any of his moral dictates? If so, he has kept it to himself. Yet acclaimed Christian philosopher and apologist, William Alston, claims God still communicates with sincere Christians. Could it be that all those sincere Christians who–for about two thousand years–have gone on crusades with God’s word on their lips, are listening to themselves, not God.

    Why don’t any ever report having heard God say clearly “Stop! You’ve got me wrong.”

    The biblical god is not what Saint Anselm thought he was: that than which no greater, no more morally perfect, can be conceived. Out of his own mouth God condemns himself as that than which no viler, no more evil, can be conceived.

    “God is love” is a sick joke. The pleasantry, “Do unto others as you would have others do unto you”, is little more than propaganda to cover up God’s true nature. The Golden Rule we might applaud, as a rough rule of thumb. But it’s a bit rich, don’t you think, coming from the mouth of someone, Jesus, who would send most of us to hell? No moral reciprocity there!

    How do God’s depictions of his own behaviour square with the belief that he’s perfectly good? Or that he’s the source of what some call “The Moral Law”? They don’t.

    Putting God and his Defenders in a Logical Straight-Jacket

    The fact that God himself chronicles all his crimes–often in graphic and gruesome detail–falsifies the belief that he is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. His self-revelation places both God and his followers, such as Matt, in a logical straightjacket. For there is no way of escaping from the following set of five mutually inconsistent propositions:

    1. What God proposes for our belief–including beliefs about what we ought to do–is what we ought to believe or do.

    2. In his holy scripture God proposes for our belief that he has caused, committed, condoned, or laid down commands for us to obey, every one of the four types of crimes of types A, B, C, and D.

    3. It is morally wrong to cause, commit, condone, or command any of the crimes of types A, B, C, D.

    4. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.

    5. A morally perfect being would not do anything that is morally wrong.

    Theists believe in all five. The trouble is that these five statements form an inconsistent set such that from any four one can validly infer the falsity of the remaining one. Thus, one can coherently assert (1), (2), (3) and (4) only at the cost of giving up (5); coherently assert (2), (3), (4), and (5) only at the cost of giving up (1); and so on.

    The problem is to decide which of these five statements to give up in order to avoid contradiction.

    To deny (1) would be to deny that we ought to do what he says we should believe as to matters of morals, or matters of fact. It would be to deny, for instance, that we ought to obey God’s commandments, such as those instanced in category C. It would be to deny that God is the ultimate authority on what is true or false, right or wrong.

    To deny (2) would be to deny the authority of scripture. It would be to say either (a) that God didn’t know how to say what he meant or (b) that he really meant what he so clearly said. But the first alternative would entail denying his linguistic competence and hence his omniscience. On the other hand, the second alternative would entail that we have to rely on human interpreters to tell us what he really did mean. That’s where the art of apologetics comes in. But in that case, the so-called Word of God becomes the word of man subject to rival, subjective, interpretations. All pretence of objective moral truth is then abandoned. We would then place ourselves in the same sort of position as primitives who wait on witch doctors to tell them what the chicken entrails really mean.

    To deny (3) would be to assert that it is morally permissible to cause, commit, condone, or command some of the vilest crimes imaginable. It would be to ally oneself with moral monsters like Ghenghis Khan, Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot.

    To deny (4) would be to deny that the god we are talking about has the properties that theologians regard as the defining, and distinguishing, properties of the Christian God. In short it would be to deny the core belief of theism.

    Finally, to deny (5) would be to deny a virtual truism. To deny it would to license the use of the word “good” so as to mean the equivalent of “evil”. It would be to play word games, like Humpty Dumpty who thought he could make words mean whatever he wanted them to mean–including their opposites.

    Which, I wonder, will Matt deny so as to avoid contradiction?

    Let’s wait and see.

    I’ll also challenge him to discuss the false scientific presuppositions of the story of God’s genocide by means of Noah’s Flood, and the dubious historical presuppositions to the stories about Jesus condemning unbelievers to eternal torment in Hell.

    Please note that this series is not a transcript of the debate. Each post in this series is effectively a very close approximation of what was said on the night and has been put together from the papers and notes each speaker prepared and spoke from plus any additions each recalled making.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Video: Bradley v Flannagan “Is God the Source of Morality?
    The Podcast: Bradley v Flannagan
    Joint Communique: Bradley v Flannagan Debate
    Matthew Flannagan’s Opening Statement: Bradley v Flannagan Debate
    Bradley’s Reply to Matt: Bradley v Flannagan Debate
    Flannagan’s Reply to Ray: Bradley v Flannagan Debate
    Glenn Peoples’ Review: Bradley v Flannagan Debate

  • Joint Communique: Bradley v Flannagan Debate

    On Monday 2 August at the University of Auckland Emeritus Professor of Philosophy Dr Raymond Bradley and Dr Matthew Flannagan (of this blog) debated the topic “Is God the Source of Morality? Is it rational to ground right and wrong in commands issued by God?” With a turnout of 400-500 people, this debate was the largest Christian event to occur on Auckland University’s campus since the 2008 debate between Dr William Lane Craig and Dr Bill Cooke. For the benefit of those who could not be there, who are awaiting the editing and uploading of the video of the debate, we will be running a blog series where we bring you some of the debate in written form. This will include:

    JOINT COMMUNIQUE
    Read by moderator Professor John Bishop

    1. Matt and Ray wish this to be a genuine debate in which they, so to speak, ‘lock horns’ on the issues, not — as so often happens — ‘talk past each other.’ They therefore agreed to exchange in writing their opening remarks so as to make it possibly for each to engage each other, not some caricature of what the other was saying.

    2. They also agreed, right from the beginning, that they did not wish the organisers or supporters of either so-called ‘side’ to conduct a final poll as to which of Matt or Ray, if either, had ‘won’ the debate. Such polls, they both believe, encourage shallow thinking and an unfortunate disposition for supporters of one side or the other to go away crowing ‘our side won’ and thereafter put it out of their minds.

    3. Matt and Ray are both philosophers who like to encourage people to reflect at length and seriously about the issues raised and to weigh carefully the evidence and the arguments for each of the opposing viewpoints.

  • Dissecting the Bradley v Flannagan Debate

    We’re just in from the debate at Auckland University where Raymond Bradley and Matt debated  “Is God the Source of Morality? Is it rational to ground right and wrong in commands issued by God?” and we see the discussion from those there has started in more than one place on the net – including here. We don’t plan to write much on our own thoughts just yet – we need to wind down first! But for those of you keen to start/keep sharing your thoughts go ahead – the discussion is off to a great start!

    • Glenn Peoples, a Dunedin based Philosopher of Religion who many regulars will know as the author of Say Hello to my Little Friend: The Beretta Blog and Podcast, watched a live video feed of the debate via Skype and will be writing a review of his thoughts which we hope to have online in the next few days.
    • We plan to publish Matt’s opening statement and Ray’s (if he is agreeable) tomorrow.
    • The video will be online in a few weeks once it is edited and uploaded.

    [I’ve moved the comments people have already left on the sticky post (which I have now unstickied so it is further down the page) to this thread in case you were wondering how your comment got here.

  • Contra Mundum: Did God Command Genocide in the Old Testament?

    Perhaps the most perplexing issue facing Christan believers is a series of jarring texts in the Old Testament. After liberating Israel from slavery in Egypt, the Israelites arrived on the edge of the promised land. The book of Deuteronomy records that God then commanded Israel to “destroy totally” the people occupying these regions (the Canaanites); the Israelites were to “leave alive nothing that breathes.” The book of Joshua records the carrying out of this command. In the sixth chapter it states “they devoted the city to the LORD and destroyed with the sword every living thing in it—men and women, young and old, cattle, sheep and donkeys.” In the tenth and eleventh chapters the text states that Joshua “left no survivors. He totally destroyed all who breathed, just as the LORD, the God of Israel, had commanded.” The text mentions city after city where Joshua, at God’s command, puts every inhabitant “to the sword” and “left no survivors.” If these passages are taken in a strict, literal fashion then it is correct to conclude that they do record the divinely authorised commission of genocide. In light of this critics of Christianity often ask how a good and loving God could command the extermination of the Canaanites?

    In response, I want to suggest that this strict, literal reading is mistaken. Reading these texts in isolation from the narrative in which they occur risks a distortion of the authors intended meaning. Consider the book of Joshua, critics are quick to point out that in chapters ten and eleven the text states that Joshua “totally destroyed all who breathed”, left “no survivors” in “the entire land”, went through the land “exterminating them without mercy”.

    The problem is that chapters fifteen to seventeen record that the Canaanites were, in fact, not literally wiped out. Over and over the text affirms that the land was still occupied by the Canaanites, who remain heavily armed and deeply entrenched in the cities. Astute readers will note that these are the same regions and the same cities that Joshua was said to have “destroyed all who breathed”, left “no survivors” in just a few chapters earlier.

    This continues through into the next book in the Old Testament. The first two chapters of the book of Judges record that the Canaanites lived in the very same regions and cities that Joshua was said to have put every inhabitant “to the sword” in and “left no survivors” in. Moreover, again we see that they occupied these cities and regions in such numbers and strength that they had to again be driven out by force, which chapter one of Judges declared was very difficult.

    Read in context then, it is difficult to see how the language of total genocide in chapters ten and eleven of the book of Joshua could have been intended to be taken literally by the authors.

    This phenomena is not limited to the books of Joshua and Judges. The book of Deuteronomy in chapters seven and twenty contain commands to the Israelites to “destroy them [the Canaanites] totally” and “not leave alive anything that breathes.” The books of Deuteronomy and Exodus, in numerous places, state that the Canaanites are to be slowly driven out and expelled from the land, which is not the same thing as killing them. In fact, legislation is cited in the texts which clearly assumes that the Canaanites will survive Joshua’s the invasion. Immediately after stating that the Israelites should “destroy them totally” the text reads, “make no treaty with them, and show them no mercy. Do not intermarry with them. Do not give your daughters to their sons or take their daughters for your sons.” If they were all supposed to be dead then why bother issuing instructions regarding treaties and intermarriage?

    When read in context, it is unlikely that the author of these texts intended the language “destroy totally”, “do not leave alive anything that breathes”, destroy “men and women, young and old”, and so on, to be taken literally. How then should these passages be understood? At a recent conference at the University of Notre Dame, Philosopher Alvin Plantinga suggested a possible solution is to take this language hyperbolically. He suggested phrases such as, “destroy with the sword … men and women … cattle, sheep and donkeys” are phrases to be understood more like we understand a person who, in the context of watching David Tua in a boxing match, yells, “Knock his block off! Hand him his head! Take him out!” or hopes that the All Blacks will “annihilate the Springboks” or “totally slaughter the Wallabies.” Now, the sports fan does not actually want David Tua to decapitate his opponent or for the All Blacks to become mass murderers. Plantinga suggests that the same could be true here; understood in a non-literal sense the phrases probably mean “something like, attack them, defeat them, drive them out; not literally kill every man, woman, child donkey and the like.” If this is correct then the differences between the different texts is easily explained and more significantly, the texts do not teach that God commanded genocide or that Joshua carried it out.

    Interestingly, research into Ancient Near-Eastern history writings bear Plantinga’s idea out. In a comprehensive comparative study of Ancient Near-Eastern conquest accounts, Old Testament scholar, K. Lawson Younger documents stylistic and literary similarities between Joshua and reports of wars written by the some of these surrounding cultures. He concludes that the Old Testament uses the same literary conventions. He notes, “the composition and rhetoric of the Joshua narratives in chapters 9-12 are compared to the the conventions of writing about conquests in Egyptian, Hittite, Akkadian, Moabite, and Aramaic texts, they are revealed to be very similar.” He substantiates with numerous examples in his book.

    In addition, when one examines the literary conventions of such accounts it is evident that the rhetoric of total conquest, complete annihilation and destruction of the enemy, killing everyone, leaving no survivors, etc, is a common hyperbolic way of describing a victory in the manner Plantinga suggests. Renowned Egyptologist Kenneth Kitchen notes,

    [T]he type of rhetoric in question was a regular feature of military reports in the second and first millennia, as others have made very clear. … In the later fifteenth century Tuthmosis III could boast “the numerous army of Mitanni, was overthrown within the hour, annihilated totally, like those (now) non-existent” –- whereas, in fact, the forces of Mitanni lived to fight many another day, in the fifteenth and fourteenth centuries. Some centuries later, about 840/830, Mesha king of Moab could boast that “Israel has utterly perished for always” – a rather premature judgment at that date, by over a century! And so on, ad libitum. It is in this frame of reference that the Joshua rhetoric must also be understood.

    Some examples will illustrate this. The Merneptah Stele states “Yanoam was made nonexistent; Israel is laid waste, its seed is not.” here the Egyptian Pharoh Merneptah describes a skirmish with Israel in which his armies prevailed, hyperbolically, in terms of the total annihilation of Israel. The Assyrian king Sennacherib uses similar hyperbole, “The soldiers of Hirimme, dangerous enemies, I cut down with the sword; and not one escaped.” Mursili II records making “Mt. Asharpaya empty (of humanity)” and the “mountains of Tarikarimu empty (of humanity).” Similarly, The Bulletin of Ramses II, an historical narrative of Egyptian military campaigns into Syria, narrates Egypt’s considerably less than decisive victory at the battle of Kadesh with the rhetoric, “His majesty slew the entire force of the wretched foe from Hatti, together with his great chiefs and all his brothers, as well as all the chiefs of all the countries that had come with him” [Emphasis added]. The examples could be multiplied but the point is that such language was hyperbolic and not intended to be taken literally.

    Consequently, if one does not read the texts in isolation and is sensitive to the genre of Ancient Near-Eastern writings then a literal reading is far from obvious. As Egyptologist James K. Hoffmeier notes, such a reading commits “the fallacy of misplaced literalism … the misconstruction of a statement-in-evidence so that it carries a literal meaning when a symbolic or hyperbolic or figurative meaning was intended.” This underscores an obvious but often neglected point, the bible is not written in accord with the conventions of 21st century English. It was written in ancient foreign languages and in the conventions that governed historical, legal, epic, etc writings of that time. To understand what it teaches accurately one needs to ask what it teaches given these factors. When one does this, it seems probable that the Old Testament does not teach that God commanded or that Israel carried out the genocide or extermination of the Canaanites.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the Aug 10 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to:
    editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

    RELATED POSTS:
    Contra Mundum: Fairies, Leprechauns, Golden Tea Cups & Spaghetti Monsters
    Contra Mundum: Secularism and Public Life
    Contra Mundum: Richard Dawkins and Open Mindedness
    Contra Mundum: Slavery and the Old Testament

    Contra Mundum: Secular Smoke Screens and Plato’s Euthyphro

    Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others?
    Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith
    Contra Mundum: “Bigoted Fundamentalist” as Orwellian Double-Speak
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: Confessions of an Anti-Choice Fanatic
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  • Epistemology 101: Clash of Authorities Part III

    This three-part blog series is essentially the talk I gave at the recent Clearing the Air Forum, which was entitled “Discovering Truth in the Synthesis of Science and Faith.” The audience was comprised of scientists, church leaders, journalists and other interested parties so this is a fairly lay introduction to epistemology.

    In my first post, Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part I, I set out some basics about epistemology. In Part II I looked at testimony and authority. Now I will turn to my final point, what about the clash of traditions or authorities, what should we believe then?

    Here is a fairly obvious example, suppose I am not a biologist but I hear it on authority that the scientific consensus is that evolutionary theory is the correct account of human origins. In the absence of any defeaters for this, such as the absence of compelling reasons for thinking that the biological sciences are unreliable in this area or some compelling disproof of evolution, I should accept this claim. One the other hand, I read the Bible and it looks like it states that the world was created by God in six 24-hour days and that humans and animals were created on separate days. I examine the subsequent genealogies and I discover that when added up these entail that the world is only a few thousand years old. If I accept the Bible as authoritative and as the word of God, then I have a reason for thinking that evolution is false. What should I do?

    I am using this case as a vivid example because it is such an obvious one in an evangelical setting, particularly one like this full of scientists who will have experienced the tension first hand. I want to look at two approaches that I think are mistaken. The first is exemplified by a well meaning school board member I encountered a few years ago. I was applying for a job as a curriculum developer at a Christian school. I was asked if I would teach that Genesis was true. I responded by saying that at the senior level, students should learn about the debate over how Genesis should be interpreted. They should be encouraged to ask whether it literally teaches that the world was created in six 24-hour days or whether, as some scholars believe, the days are a kind of literary device drawing out the relationship between human and divine work. The board member responded in horror,  he said “are you saying God might be wrong?” I did not get the job.

    There was some wisdom in the board member’s response. If God teaches something then it is true and what God says trumps all human opinion, including scientific opinion. The problem is that I was not questioning what God said, I was questioning an interpretation of Genesis which was the basis of the board member’s conclusions about what God said. God does not make mistakes but human interpreters do.

    Throughout history brilliant Christian theologians have disagreed as to how to interpret scripture and also which theological perspectives are correct. The fact that they disagree means that they cannot all be correct. Our theologising then is fallible and it is not given that we are always correct. It is mistaken then to assume that when the scientific consensus clashes with our theology it is always wrong and our theology is always correct.

    In a room full of scientists this is probably uncontroversial but I want to also reject an equally erroneous view. This is the view that whenever scientific consensus clashes with a theological position, the theological position is always incorrect. Often this view is based on mistaken views on history. In the 19th century an interpretation of Church history known as the conflict thesis emerged. This position taught that religion and science had been locked in conflict throughout their history and that science had flourished only by fighting off the shackles of the church, which had consistently suppressed its ideas. The picture was of a Church constantly losing ground to science. This view of the history of science has been rejected by most historians today but its legacy lingers on.

    In fact the history of science and religion is quite different. There were few conflicts of the sort this thesis puts forward and when they did occur issues were not as simple as science being right and theology wrong. In fact, in some cases the opposite was been true. The fact is that scientific consensus can be and has been, in the past, mistaken. Only a few decades ago the steady state theory of cosmology was widely accepted and it was believed the universe had no beginning, a thesis in direct contradiction to the Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Today, theology now appears to have been correct. In the 12th century a similar clash occurred between aristotlean science and that of the Church. The church was proven correct. There are other examples, such as denials that people groups such as the Hittites ever existed and claims people could not write at the time of Moses.

    Further, scientific consensuses changes over time. Alvin Plantinga notes,

    According to Bryan Appleyard, “At Harvard University in the 1880’s John Trowbridge, head of the physics department, was telling his students that it was not worthwhile to major in physics, since all the very important discoveries in the subject had now been made. All that remained was a routine tidying up of loose ends, hardly a heroic task worthy of a Harvard graduate.”4 Twenty years later the same opinion seemed dominant: for example, in 1902 Albert Michelson, of Michelson-Morley fame declared that “the most important fundamental laws and facts of physical science have all been discovered and these are now so firmly established that the possibility of their ever being supplanted on consequences of new discoveries is remote.”5 And of course we all know of the scientific theories that once enjoyed consensus but are now discarded: caloric theories of heat, effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism, theories involving the existence of phlogiston, vital forces in physiology, theories of spontaneous generation of life, the luminiferous ether, and so on.[1]

    Scientific consensuses then can and have been mistaken. In addition to this there is an important insight in the comment of the school board member who cost me employment. Given the fallibility of humans, even as a group, if God says something and the scientific community says something else then we have good reasons for thinking the scientific community is wrong and hence we do have a viable defeater for the testimony we have heard. God, understood as a all knowing, all powerful, perfectly good being, certainly is not mistaken and it is not as if he needs some scientists to enlighten him or correct his teaching.

    I think the correct response is to allow science and theology to mutually correct each other. Take the case of evolution and the Bible. One needs to ask just how likely is it, given the evidence, that evolution occurred? One also needs to ask just how likely is it that the interpretation of Genesis underlying creationism is correct? If it is more likely that a literal interpretation of Genesis is true than it is that evolution is true then we should reject evolution despite the consensus in favour of it. On the other hand, if there are reasons for thinking our interpretation of Genesis is mistaken and that the evidence for evolution is overwhelming then we should conclude that God is not teaching us that the world is only a few thousand years old.

    My own view is that there are good reasons for rejecting a literal interpretation drawn from what we have learned about ancient near-eastern texts from the same period. Evidence suggests that ancient genealogies did not function the way the literalist picture suggests and that much of early Genesis is a polemic against ancient near-eastern mythology rather than sober history. But my views are beside the point main point.

    My point is that I think as Christians we need to say that both science and theology are valid ways of knowing and that human theorising in both fields are fallible.

    There is a view in our culture which denies this, this is a view called scientism which claims, following Bertrand Russell, that whatever is knowable is knowable by the methods of science and what science does not tell us is not knowable. This is, however, a philosophical and theological view that rejects the existence of revelation. If we accept that God has spoken to humanity then we should not assume that God has not said something that is the basis for a legitimate critique of scientific claims or culture and if he has then we should not cower from offering such a critique despite the fact that the scientific community thinks otherwise. At the same time we should not embrace the kind of naiive theologising that reads the bible in English, ignores the fact that God’s word was mediated through human texts in different languages which essentially boils down to “God said it, that settles it” type thinking. Both approaches should be repudiated.

    Let me make a final comment in this area. If we are to gain an accurate picture of the world then we need to take into account all information we know that is relevant to the question. If we bracket some information which is relevant then the picture we will only be probable on “part of the evidence” and may not be probable when everything else is factored in. If one accepts that science is the only way of knowing this does not matter much. Nor does it matter much if we think that all that is at issue is what we find in the scriptures. But if we accept, as I think we should, that both are valid sources of information then theologians and scientists needs to take others insights into account. There might be areas of reality in which both make claims. If scientists proceed ignoring information from theology that is relevant to what they study and theologians ignore what scientists are saying when it is relevant to the issue both will end up with a distorted view.

    I think this picture applies to the issue of climate change. We have scientific claims about anthropogenic global warming being affirmed and contradicted in the media, in the pulpit, on talk-back radio, in the blogosphere and so on. Those of us who are not climatologists rely on testimony and we need to start being critical about whether much of what we hear is subject to defeaters. Similarly, the issue has moved beyond science into areas of ethics, public policy, laws and even pictures of eschatology. In these areas scientists are not experts and questions of theology and ethics, among other things, come into play and we need to have a method for negotiating this.

    [1] Alvin Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” in Robert Pennock Ed Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge, The MIT Press – Bradford Books, 2001) 785.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part I
    Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part II

  • Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part II

    This three-part blog series is essentially the talk I gave at the recent Clearing the Air Forum, which was entitled “Discovering Truth in the Synthesis of Science and Faith.” The audience was comprised of scientists, church leaders, journalists and other interested parties so this is a fairly lay introduction to epistemology.

    In my first post, Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part I, I set out some basics about epistemology, I now want to turn to one particular way we know things: testimony. Nicholas Wolterstorff defines paradigmatic cases of testimony as: believing X on the say so of someone else Y. There is a highly influential tradition of epistemology which is sceptical or critical of beliefs based on testimony.

    Testimony
    In his Essay on Human Understanding John Locke argued that one had a duty to not believe any proposition merely on the authority of another person. One should trust the testimony of another only if one has:

    (a) good reasons for thinking that the testifier is reliable; or,
    (b) good reasons for believing the truth of the proposition itself.

    Taking another persons word for something in the absence of independent evidence is irrational. Locke hinted that such gullibility was socially dangerous, tied up with intolerance, authoritarianism and oppression.

    Something like this lurks in contemporary culture and is often encapsulated in quotes such as “think for yourself.” The problem is that a little reflection shows that this view of testimony is mistaken.

    CAJ Coady summarises the problem, if one is going to have evidence for the reliability of a testifier then this evidence will either include some other testimony or it will be based upon sources apart from testimony. The first option is obviously a non-starter, any evidence based on testimony will have to, by Locke’s position, be shown to be reliable by further testimony and so on, ad infinitum, until we reach some non-testimonial source. However, if we embrace the second option and we exclude what we know by way of testimony from our evidence base then we will have so little to go on that such grounds will be almost impossible to come by.

    To demonstrate this consider an example from Greg Dawes in a paper he wrote on faith,

    Very many of our beliefs are held on the basis of testimony. (In this context I shall sometimes refer to these as beliefs held on the basis of authority.) Does e=mc2 represent the rate at which matter can be transformed into energy? I believe so, although I would not have the faintest idea how to demonstrate its truth I have it on good authority that it is true…Of course, there is a sense in which I do believe this on the basis of evidence. I have reasons to believe in the trustworthiness of the sources from which I gained the information.[1]

    Like Locke, Dawes suggests that a non-physicist such as himself can rationally believe e=mc2 because he has reasons to believe that his sources are trustworthy. I believe this last comment is incorrect. Consider, for example, what reasons he could offer for believing that the source of his information was reliable? Presumably, it would be because the author of the book where he read it or the person who told him the information was a physicist. Nevertheless, how does Dawes know this? He could have read the person’s qualifications off a faculty list, off the dust-jacket of the book or have been told them by the person in person but in each case he is relying on testimony and so, in the absence of further reasons, he cannot believe these sources. Suppose, however, Dawes was to investigate thoroughly and locate the address of the university where the degree in physics was claimed to be awarded in order to travel there and personally check the original records. Yet again, he will be relying on testimony in the form of an address list and records. He also would have to have trusted the testimony of maps and road signs in getting to the institution in question.

    Consider then what Dawes would have left to go on if he did not use testimony. He could not rely on any information that he himself did not observe first-hand. This would exclude any information about events prior to his own lifetime, any events in his own lifetime that he did not remember witnessing first-hand and any event that happened in a place other than where he was at the time. Nothing read in journals, books, heard in lectures, taught to him by his parents or teachers could be used. Nothing heard on the news, read on the computer, told over the phone or reported on in the media could be included. Almost everything he had learnt through his entire education would be excluded because nearly all of it is based on testimony. It seems, then, that if Dawes were really to comply with the epistemic standards that he laid down, he could not rationally believe in e=mc2. It appears he is mistaken in thinking that one needs to have reasons for thinking a given authority is reliable in order to be warranted in believing in testimony.

    I think this example shows that this is not isolated. What we know, by way of being told by others, accounts for a huge and pervasive amount of what we believe. Everything I know about other places, other times, everything learned at school, university, from my parents, friends, books, newspapers, television, etc is based on testimony. If I were to try to verify any of these beliefs without first relying on some other piece of testimony, I would be unable to. The kind of critical attitude where one deplores believing things on faith or on the say so of others is un-viable. As social beings with a limited perspective in time and space, and with limited areas of speciality, we need to trust the testimony of others for most of what we know.

    Testimony Beliefs as Basic Beliefs
    For this reason the idea that one cannot accept something on the say so of testimony until it is verified is problematic. Instead I am inclined to accept a different picture of the role that testimony and faith in authorities should play in our knowledge. The picture that testimony beliefs are properly basic beliefs.

    To see what I mean by this consider the following point by Roy Clouser,

    If everything needs to be proven then the premises of every proof would need to be proven. But if you need a proof for every proof, you need a proof for your proof, and a proof for your proof of a proof and so on-forever. Thus it makes no sense to demand that everything be proven because an infinite regress of proofs is impossible.[2]

    Clouser notes that the appeal to evidence, in the form of premises from which one infers a conclusion, have to terminate somewhere if we are to avoid being sceptical about everything.

    The terminus is a set of ultimate premises called basic beliefs, which are those beliefs that form the foundation of our knowledge. We are justified in believing them independently of any argument or proof for them.

    If this seems counter-intuitive consider that there are plenty of things we believe that are not based on arguments. Our belief in the existence of the past or our belief that it is wrong to rape women or our belief that other people exist or that basic axioms of logic are true are not based on inferences to the best explanation so that they are rationally believed because they explain some phenomena better than all alternatives. It is rather that these beliefs are part of the background data that we use to assess proposed explanations against.

    Usually basic beliefs are grounded in some form of experience. We recognise these as true because we experience or see them to be true. For example, I see that the basic axioms of logic are self-evident, I remember the existence of a past event, I intuitively see that rape is wrong and think anyone who does not see this is simply morally blind. I see the chair in front of me, I hear the car outside and so on. These beliefs function as fundamental premises that we argue to other theories from.

    It is important to note that while we are justified in believing basic beliefs in the absence of evidence for them, their justified status can be defeated if we gain good reasons for rejecting these beliefs. For example, on a Tuesday evening I have a vivid experience of my brother entering my room, I form the basic belief that “my brother is in my room.” The next morning I hear that my brother was out all evening. I also discover that the medication I took the night before has hallucinatory side effects. The basic belief, grounded in my perceptual experience of observing my brother entering the room on Tuesday night is defeated. There are two ways basic beliefs can be defeated, undercutting defeaters involve a reason a person acquires which, when added to their stock of beliefs, gives them reasons for thinking that the source of the basic belief is unreliable – my discovery of the hallucinatory side effects is an example of this. Rebutting defeaters, on the other hand, are reasons one acquires for thinking the belief itself is false. My discovery that my brother was not home is a rebutting defeater, if he was not home then he was not in my room.

    The picture I want to suggest is that in many circumstances beliefs held on the basis of testimony function as basic beliefs. When a person, whom we take to be a competent authority, affirms a proposition P then in the absence of defeaters we are rational in accepting P. We do not need to prove that what the person says is true before we can accept it and nor do we have to prove that they are a reliable authority before we have to accept it. We do, however, have to take seriously any purported defeaters we are confronted with. We have to take seriously evidence we have that the authorities in question are not actually a reliable guide in the area in which they are speaking and we have to take seriously arguments given against what we accept.

    Translating this into a current context, contrary to what is often thought, most of our knowledge of scientific facts is, in fact, on the basis of testimony. As a child I ask questions, why does this happen? what caused this? and so on, my parents tell me answers and I believe them. I go to school and I am taught science and later physics and chemistry, I go to university and attend lectures, I read text books, I might do some experimental work myself but it is in the context of what I have already learned from testimonial sources. I read about studies scientists have done in journals and I believe what is written in these journals. Despite the bravado of self-professed free thinkers, our  acquisition of scientific knowledge is pervasively shot through with faith – faith in authorities, faith that others are being honest to us and are trustworthy and so on. It can be no other way. Hence, to believe some fact about the world merely because another has told you it is true is not irrational but in fact a sensible thing to do.

    Consider an example, I am in my car listening to the radio and Keisha Castle-Hughes is on air talking about climate change. The media are praising her for her brave efforts to educate the public. How should I respond? In this instance I am inclined to think that I face some defeaters. I know Castle-Hughes is an actor and has no real expertise in the area in which she is talking. I also know that actors are good at being very convincing at playing a role, which is not real. I know Castle-Hughes is quite young and is unlikely to have had a very substantial science education, much less time to specialise in climatology. I know the media are notoriously unreliable, journalists tend to be very political, their deadline give them limited time to research and they are not experts in science at all. In this instance, I think that I have real reasons to be sceptical of what Castle-Hughes is saying. Even if what she is saying, in fact, is true, I should not believe it just because she says so.

    Here is another example. I read a book by Richard Dawkins. He claims that the evidence quite conclusively suggests there is no God. Now in some places Dawkins offers arguments and I can assess these using my ability to reason deductively but in other places he simply tells his readers things. He puts forward various arguments for God’s existence, which he says these are representative of the case for theism, he attributes these to Thomas Aquinas, talks of first-cause arguments and the like. This is a bona fide, scientist with a professorship at Oxford. His specialty is zoology.

    However, accurately representing Aquinas’ arguments for God requires knowledge not in zoology but in medieval philosophy. A knowledge of what arguments have been put forward for theism, which are the most representative, which are the best, requires knowledge of a discipline called philosophy of religion. Dawkins’ position as a zoologist means his knowledge is in a very different field. Hence, his being a scientist gives me no reason to accept his work on Aquinas.

    This underscores an important point. If a person has some bone fide authority in a field it means he has authority in that field, it does not mean he or she has any authority in another field. Scientists qua scientists are experts in science, not morality, public policy, law, ethics, theology and what have you. Similarly, pastors are trained in biblical exegesis and theology, their knowledge, therefore, is in those fields and not science. One of the problems with the rise of the Internet is that people can get information on any subject any where from any source. In this context it is important to examine carefully whether we have good reasons for questioning whether the source is authoritative.

    It is not a bad idea to make our starting place be that we will accept what we are told by authorities but we should not always end there.

    In my final post in this series, Part III, I will look at what we should do when authorities clash.

    [1] Greg Dawes, “Faith and Reason”, a paper presented to the University of Otago Theology and Religious Studies Faculty. This is contained in Dawes, Philosophy of Religion (so far unpublished) 34.
    [2] Roy Clouser  Knowing With the Heart (IVP: Downers Grove, 1999) 69.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part I
    Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part III

  • Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part I

    This three-part blog series is essentially the talk I gave at the recent Clearing the Air Forum, which was entitled “Discovering Truth in the Synthesis of Science and Faith.” The audience was comprised of scientists, church leaders, journalists and other interested parties so this is a fairly lay introduction to epistemology.

    I was asked to address the epistemological issues around the climate change debate from a Christian perspective. In some ways I feel significantly under qualified to address this issue, I have no degrees in or knowledge of climatology, I am a theologian with an interest in Philosophy of Religion. Despite this, my research into religious epistemology has led me to some conclusions as to how faith and science should relate and how those of us who are Christians should respond to scientific challenges or purported scientific challenges to our theological beliefs. I’ve also gained some understanding on the role of testimony and the way believing things on the basis of authority figures in our knowledge. So, given this, I would like to share a few of my conclusions with you.

    What is Epistemology?
    Epistemology is one of those technical terms that often makes peoples eyes glaze over but it is important to grasp what it is. You may know it as “ways of knowing” or “the theory of knowledge.” Human beings are knowers, we like to gain accurate information about the world, about morality, about God and a whole host of other subjects.

    Sometimes we do this task well and sometimes we do it poorly. A person, for example, who believed the moon was made of green cheese on the basis that he had resolved to believe this if a coin-toss came up heads (and it had in fact come up heads) has believed poorly. The way he believes is irrational, it does not count as knowledge, his belief is unjustified and so on. Epistemology involves asking questions such as, what is it to have knowledge, what is it to be justified? The idea is to help gain clarity as to what knowledge is, how we ought to believe and so on.

    The subject and literature is vast and I cannot really do it justice here, so I will just give some basics.

    Since the time of Plato it has been widely acknowledged that knowledge involves at least two things: belief and truth. I have found that scientists often get irritated when they are told that their knowledge is a form of belief. This, however, is based on a verbal confusion. In epistemology to believe something is to simply think that it is the case, it is to assent to a proposition. I believe that the sky is blue if I think that the sky is blue; if I do not think this, if, in fact, I think that the sky is over-cast and grey then I do not believe that the sky is blue.

    What is meant by truth is defined best by Aristotle, “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.” A belief is true if what you think is the case actually is the case. My belief that the sky is blue is true if the sky is blue and it is false if it is not blue but some other colour such as green. Truth is determined by facts about the world, the way things are; the point of being a knower is that one tries to match what one believes with reality. Knowledge involves achieving this match.

    My knowing P then involves at least two things:

    [1] I believe P
    [2] P

    The problem is that while these two conditions are necessary for knowledge they are not sufficient. Suppose I decide to choose beliefs about a particular subject matter on the basis of a coin-toss. Every time I throw a heads I will affirm the proposition and every time I throw a tails I will deny it. If such a method were employed I would, at least sometimes, form true beliefs but I would not have knowledge as my grasp of the truth would be the result of a lucky guess. Some third condition (or conditions) are needed.

    One of the biggest issues in epistemology today involves working out what this third condition is. The normal starting point in the discussion is the idea that knowledge is a justified true belief, I know when I believe P, that P is the case and that I am justified in believing P.

    [1] I believe P
    [2] P
    [3] I am justified in believing P

    At the same time it is also widely acknowledged that this position is incomplete. In a short but very important paper Edmund Gettier put forward a series of counter examples to the idea that knowledge is justified true belief. Consider the following. You are watching the All Blacks beat the Spring Boks on Sky TV and so you justifiably believe “the All Blacks beat the Spring Boks.” As it turns out, Sky has mucked its coverage up and the game you are watching is a repeat of a previous Tri-Nations win. Coincidentally, however, the All Blacks are playing the Spring Boks this very night and they win the game. Your belief is true and justified, yet it is not knowledge. Something more is needed to turn justified true belief into knowledge.

    Much of the debate in the contemporary epistemology is about how best to fix this problem and arrive at an answer as to what is needed to be added to true belief to make it into knowledge. Broadly speaking, accounts of knowledge fall into two schools, internalist and externalist.

    The internalist school emphasises properties that are internal to the consciousness of the knower, conditions the knower could be aware of on reflection – such things as appearing to be true, not having any reasons to think something false or reasons for thinking something false that are not outweighed by other reasons. It involves being coherent, believing responsibly and not carelessly and so on. These are all things that the knower can be aware of in an important sense.

    Externalist positions, on the other hand, emphasise conditions that the knower may not be aware of and may be unable to become aware of. Such things as basing one’s beliefs on what is, in fact, a reliable method or cognitive process, having properly functioning cognitive faculties, the belief being caused by the truth in question or tracking the truth in the right way. Frequently one cannot demonstrate the truth of these conditions for the obvious reason that we need to use our mind and belief sources to conduct such a demonstration in the first place. What is important on this view is that these sources are actually reliable, that they work properly, hook up to truth in the correct way and so on.

    The basic point is that despite slogans such as “you are entitled to believe whatever you like” not all beliefs are equal. We should aim to believe what is true, there are good and bad ways of believing, being rational involves trying to avoid the latter and seek the former.

    In Part II I look at testimony and authority and in Part III, I look at what to do when authorities clash.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part II

    Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part III