Category: Philosophers

  • Matt to speak at the 2013 Evangelical Philosophical Society in Baltimore on Divine Commands re Abraham and Isaac

    This blog’s Matthew Flannagan has had his paper “Divine Commands and Biblical Authority: The Problem of Gen 22” accepted for the National Annual Meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society (“EPS”). The abstract for Matt’s paper is as follows:

    Evangelical Philosophical Society“One perennial objection to divine command meta-ethics is the possibility that God might command something abhorrent. Divine command theorists have responded that God is essentially good, as such, it is impossible for him to issue an abhorrent command. One challenge to this response, for those divine command theorists who accept a robust view of biblical authority, is the story of the binding of Isaac in Genesis 22. In this story God is said to have commanded human sacrifice; given that human sacrifice is abhorrent, and it is impossible for God to command the abhorrent, Biblical authority seems incompatible with the acceptance of a divine command theory.

    This paper responds to this challenge. First, I will argue that a careful reading of Genesis 22 in its literary context suggests God issued the command in a particular context. Second, drawing from discussions of the problem by Robert Adams Immanuel Kant, and Philip Quinn, I will discuss the circumstances under which a divine command theorist can rationally and coherently attribute a seemingly immoral command to an essentially loving and just God. I will argue that the context of God’s command in Genesis 22 is such that a divine command theorist can defensibly attribute it to an essentially good God without abandoning a robust view of biblical authority; the story of the binding of Isaac does not provide a divine command theorist with a defeater for belief in biblical authority.”

    The conference theme will be “Revelation and Authority.” The Plenary Speaker is Richard Swinburne of Oxford University. The draft copy of the ETS-EPS program is available here.

    Matt has also had a paper accepted for the Evangelical Theological Society’s Annual Meeting which is also in Baltimore around the same time – see Matt to speak at the 2013 Evangelical Theological Society in Baltimore on Feticide.

    As with previous years we will be fundraising to raise the $2,500 NZD to get him there . Donations greatly appreciated.

  • Matt to speak at the 2013 Evangelical Theological Society in Baltimore on Feticide

    This blog’s Matthew Flannagan has had his paper “Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique” accepted for the 65th Annual Meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society (“ETS”). The abstract for Matt’s paper is as follows:

    Abstract
    “Defenders of the permissibility of feticide commonly argue that killing an organism is not homicide unless the organism’s brain has developed enough for it to acquire sentience: the capacity for consciousness and the ability to perceive pleasure and pain. In this paper I critique one of the more sophisticated versions of this argument, proposed by David Boonin in
     A Defense of Abortion. First, I sketch some prima facie problems faced by any appeal to sentience. Second, I examine Boonin’s attempt to defend an appeal to sentience against these problems by constructing a modified future like ours (FLO) account of the wrongness of killing. I argue that Boonin’s modified FLO defence of sentience fails. Both his argument for the modified FLO account and his application of this account to feticide rest on ad hoc arbitrary manoeuvres, manoeuvres which mean that the modified FLO account is a plausible criteria for the right to life only if one already grants that feticide is not homicide.”

    Matt’s ETS paper will be based on his article “Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique” which was published in Ethics and Medicine – An International Journal of Bioethics Vol 25:2 (Summer 2009) 95-106. (You can download this article here).

    This year’s Annual Meeting will be held in Baltimore, Maryland, USA from 19-21 November 2013.

    ETS Annual Meeting Flyer

    This year’s theme is “Evangelicalism, Inerrancy, and the Evangelical Theological Society: Retrospect and Prospect”. Plenary speakers for this year’s meeting are Dr Donald A Carson (Research Professor at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School), Dr John M Frame (Professor of Systematic Theology and Philosophy at Reformed Theological Seminary), and Ben Witherington III (Jean R Amos Professor of New Testament at Asbury Theological Seminary).

    Matt has also had a paper accepted for the Evangelical Philosophical Society’s Annual Meeting which is also in Baltimore around the same time – see Matt to speak at the 2013 Evangelical Philosophical Society in Baltimore on Divine Commands re Abraham and Isaac.

    As with previous years we will be fundraising to raise the $2,500 NZD to get him there . Donations greatly appreciated.

  • Sam Harris on Divine Commands: Part I

    William Lane Craig v Sam HarrisIn a previous post, Divine Commands and Pyschopathic Tendancies, I said I would look in more detail at Sam Harris’ charge that Divine Command Theories (“DCT”) of meta-ethics are psychopathic. In this, and in several forthcoming posts, I will attempt to deliver on that promise.

    In Harris’ debate with William Lane Craig at Notre Dame, transcript here, Harris offered three direct lines of argument against a DCT. (I say direct lines because many of Harris’ rebuttals did not address DCT at all; rather he engaged popular objections to Christian doctrines about exclusivism and hell.) The first direct argument was as follows:

    “According to Dr Craig’s Divine Command theory, God is not bound by moral duties; God doesn’t have to be good. Whatever he commands is good, so when he commands that the Israelites slaughter the Amalekites, that behavior becomes intrinsically good because he commanded it.”

    Here Harris makes three claims.  First he argues that according to a DCT God does not “have to be good”. Second, he infers from this that God can therefore make any action at all intrinsically good. Third, he alludes to an incident in the book of Samuel where, on the face of it, God commands the killing of the Amalekites.

    Turning to Harris’s first claim, according to DCT a person has a duty to a person to do some action only if that person is commanded by God to do it. As God does not issue commands to himself he is not bound by moral duties. Harris infers from this that “God doesn’t have to be good”.

    Whether this is inference is sound depends on what Harris means by “have to be good”. There are at least two possible things he could mean by this.

    Sometimes when we say someone does or does not “have” to do something, we mean they are not morally obligated to do it. When I tell my children they have to tell the truth, for example, I am saying they have a duty to tell the truth. In other contexts however, when we say that someone does or does not “have” to do something we mean it is possible for them to do it.

    If Harris, in saying “God does not have to be good”, means God is not under an obligation to be good then his inference is sound; if God is not bound by duties then he obviously does not have an obligation to be good. This, however, does not entail that it is logically possible for God to lack goodness.

    If, on the other hand, Harris’ claim that “God does not have to be good” carries the implication that it is possible for God to do evil then it is a a flat out straw man.

    Craig’s position is that (more…)

  • Peter Singer on Human Dignity and Infanticide: Part One

    This is the first section of the paper I presented to the the Evangelical Philosophical Society Annual Meeting in Milwaukee two weeks ago. Several people have asked me to post it on MandM. It will appear as a two-part post series.

    Christian theism has traditionally taught that human beings have equal dignity and worth, a moral status that separates them from non-human animals. Peter Singer has famously rejected this teaching, holding that human beings are not any more special than animals and doctrines of human dignity are indefensible.  He contends that killing a new-born infant is, in and of itself, no more problematic than killing a non-human animal such as a cow or a pig and defends the permissibly of infanticide under certain conditions.

    Peter SingerThis paper will critically assess one important part of Singer’s position: his understanding of why it is wrong to kill.  In I I will sketch Singer’s “desire account” of killing and its relationship to his own preference utilitarianism and project of animal equality. Following Don Marquis, I will argue in II, that this “desire account” is subject to important counter examples. In III I note Singer’s attempts to modify his position so as to avoid these counter examples and suggest that these modifications are problematic. In IV, I will suggest that, despite this, there is an important truth in Singer’s critique, one that Christian thinkers can appropriate in developing moral arguments for Christian theism.

    I. Preference Utilitarianism and the desire account of the wrongness of killing
    Classical Utilitarianism conjoins three theses. First, the maximisation thesis; an action is right if and only if it maximises overall net benefit:  net benefit being the total amount of  benefit accruing to individuals as a consequence of the action, minus any harms resulting. An action maximises net benefit when the consequences of performing it constitute a higher net benefit than that associated with any alternative action.

    Second, , the thesis of equal consideration: a benefit or harm to any one individual is counted as having equal weight to a similar sized benefit or harm to any other individual.

    Third, the thesis of hedonism: on this account, benefits and harms are understood in terms of pleasure and pain. Something benefits an individual or is good if it causes him pleasure and harms him if it causes pain.

    Peter Singer is a preference utilitarian. Preference utilitarians accept both the maximisation and equal consideration theses however reject hedonism in favour of a desire fulfillment or preference satisfaction view of the good. Something is good for an individual if he desires or prefers it, and it is bad if contrary to his preferences or desires.

    Singer uses preference utilitarianism to reject the doctrine that human beings have equal dignity and worth, a moral status that separates them from non-human animals.  Sentient animals clearly have desires; they can suffer and feel pain and desire not to. The equal considerations thesis entails that in so far as these desires are similar to those of human beings the suffering of an animal must be considered equal with that of a human being.

    However, in terms of actual as opposed to potential psychological capacities, some human beings have a comparable mental life to that of animals.   A new born human infant’s psychology is primitive. David Boonin notes “by any plausible measure dogs, and cats, cows and pigs, chickens and ducks are more intellectually developed than a new born infant.” [1]  This means that the desires of a new born infant are similar to those of other animals.

    Singer illustrates this point in a discussion of animal experimentation. (more…)

  • Contra Mundum: Dawkins and Secular Hypocrisy

    Richard DawkinsWhen I was a non-Christian I was forever hearing about how Christians are hypocrites. When I converted to Christianity at 17, one thing that struck me is how often these charges were often a case of the pot calling the kettle black. While there is undoubtedly some hypocrisy within the church, it is also pervasive outside it. Secular culture often contains absurd ironies and hypocrisy which are conveniently ignored.

    A great example was the media fiasco over William Lane Craig’s visit to the United Kingdom last year. Craig is distinguished philosopher known professionally for his work in philosophy of time and philosophy of religion. Alongside his scholarly work, he has also developed a reputation as a prolific public speaker and debater, debating many of the world’s leading sceptics. His combination of scholarly ability and effective debating skills has earned him a reputation as one of the world’s foremost Christian apologists.

    “Apparently, having two PhD’s, authoring over 100 papers, and writing 30 books on a topic makes you unqualified to speak on it, but being the star of the 80’s TV series “Growing Pains” does.”

    Craig’s visit to the UK attracted media attention when Richard Dawkins, author of the best selling “God Delusion”, publically and resolutely refused to debate him. Dawkins publically stated earlier of his critics that “he did not care” who they were, he would “dialogue” with them and “win the argument”. He also had publically debated numerous critics significantly less qualified than Craig, notably Ted Haggard. These facts, alongside Dawkins implausible and inconsistent reasons lead to accusations of cowardice and hypocrisy from other academics such as Daniel Came a philosophy professor at St Hugh’s College Oxford.

    In the UK newspaper the Guardian Dawkin’s gave two reasons for his refusal. According to Dawkins, Craig “parades himself as a philosopher, but none of the professors of philosophy whom I consulted had heard his name”. Dawkins omitted to mention that this was not the first time he had publicly denigrated Craig’s scholarly credentials. On a previous occasion  Daniel Came,  had e-mailed him stating:

    “Professor Craig has a PhD in philosophy and a PhD in theology. He is Research Professor in Philosophy at Talbot University. He has published more than thirty books and over a hundred papers in reputable peer-reviewed journal. Given your passionate and unconditional commitment to truth, I can only think that you were not aware of Professor Craig’s credentials when you made the above reference.”

    So Dawkins claim that no philosopher he had consulted had ever heard of Craig was less than honest. A less charitable person might describe this as simply slander.

    Dawkins concern about Craig’s alleged lack of scholarly credentials also seems odd seeing that he (Dawkins) had earlier accepted an invitation to debate actor Kirk Cameron.  Apparently, having two PhD’s, authoring over 100 papers, and writing 30 books on a topic makes you unqualified to speak on it but being the star of the 80’s TV series “Growing Pains” does qualify you. It’s also ironic that Dawkins would accuse Craig of lacking scholarly credentials on the matter given that he (Dawkins) is a biologist and not a philosopher of religion.

    Dawkins next excuse was that Craig is “morally unfit” to debate him.  To substantiate this he cites not from any of Craig’s scholarly writings. But two blog posts Craig had written on with the conquest of Canaan. At face value  the early chapters of the book of Joshua portrays God as commanding the killing of every man women and child in Canaan. I say “appears”, here because latter sections of the book of Joshua and its sequel in judges proceed on the assumption this never occurred, and studies into ancient conquest accounts of this genre have noted the widespread use of literary hyperbole whereby victories are described in sweeping rhetoric of killing absolutely everyone when in reality they were (more…)

  • Singer on Matthew Flannagan in “Peter Singer Under Fire: The Moral Iconoclast Faces His Critics”

    Yesterday Matt went the library and did a little reading for his upcoming Evangelical Philosophical Society paper “Peter Singer, Human Dignity, and Infanticide“ and he discovered that email exchange he’d had with Peter Singer in 2006 had resulted in a few paragraphs in Singer’s book Peter Singer Under Fire: The Moral Iconoclast Faces His Critics.

    Here is a screen shot of what one sees when one uses the “search inside this book” function:

    Peter Singer Under Fire: The Moral Iconoclast Faces His Critics

    Matt does not feel that Singer accurately portrayed his counter example but the substance Singer presents of it is correct. Singer’s response to Matt seems to be that Matt is right in principle but in practice it would never be an issue.

  • Madeleine and Matt to speak on “Being Good: Christian Virtues for Everyday Life” at the 2012 Evangelical Philosophical Society Meeting in Milwaukee

    Evangelical Philosophical Society

    I have had to revise my earlier statements about not going to the November 2012 academic conferences in Milwaukee on the grounds that when you are personally invited to participate in a panel discussion by Doug Geivett and Mike Austin at the Evangelical Philosophical Society (“EPS”) you do not say no 🙂

    (If I said “no” I think Andrew would throw things at me and André Z would egg him on)

    Matt has been invited to speak on the same panel too.

    Here is what we know so far:

    Being Good: Christian Virtues for Everyday LifeMike and Doug co-edited a book entitled Being Good: Christian Virtues for Everyday Life.  At the EPS meeting in Milwaukee in November 2012 there will be a panel discussion in one of the sessions offering critical discussion of the book and it’s themes. Matt and I are now scheduled to be participants in that panel.

    The panel will discuss different aspects of the book, such as, an analysis of a virtue in the book that a participant disagrees with by giving an extension of the book’s discussion of character in some way.

    Matt was already going anyway as his paper on Singer and Infanticide got through the blind review process and was accepted.

    I had thought I might not go as we in the process of radically changing how I earn money. I am about to swap my regular weekly income for a contract for services that will see me retain most of the money I make my firm but pay my own expenses (and still be supervised and under the umbrella of a firm as all baby-lawyers should be under the law). So this is both exciting as I will have more control over what I earn but it is also scary as there are no guarantees that I will earn consistently; imminent changes to how legal aid is to be paid make that even scarier. The theory is that in the long run I will make more than I was on my very low baby-lawyer income but it is yet to be tested. As I am the primary earner in our house there is a lot riding on this, including the extension to our mortgage to purchase this opportunity. Going to America is not a cheap exercise from New Zealand but we have providentially managed to find a way the last two years with a lot of help from our friends so I am going to stop worrying and focus on trusting in God to whom I am  grateful for this opportunity.