Category: Social Commentary

  • Statism and Wealth Re-Distribution

    A post by Glenn caught my eye the other day and I have not been able to stop thinking about it as despite knowing that Glenn knows what he is talking about in this field, I just am struggling to believe his numbers. It really is proof-positive of the socialist extent of Labour’s policies in practice and should serve as a warning to anyone tempted to vote Labour because they think the criticims levelled at Labour’s attempts to turn as many working people into beneficiaries dependant on the state as possible are exaggerated.

    I have reproduced some of it below as it warrants further exposure.

    Extract from New Zealand: Land of greed, envy and political stupidity (the election blog, part 1)

    Wealth re-distribution is at an almost unbelievable level at present. Take a family with one income earner. At current taxation levels, with an annual income of $40,000, that income earner will pay $7770.00 in PAYE (“pay as you earn”). This includes income tax plus 1.4% ACC (socialised accident compensation insurance). On the whole, that’s about 19.43%. If the earner works more hours or gets a more skilled job that pays more and the income is $70,000, the total PAYE is $18,090. That’s about 25.84%. It gets worse if you earn more than that.

    But it does not end there. Let’s add this to the mix: This family has four children below the age of 12. This means that this family will qualify for state welfare for those children. Use the calculators at www.workingforfamilies.govt.nz to check the figures for yourselves. Let’s imagine that there are two families with one earner in each, one earning 40K and the other earning 70K. I’ll be taking into account the payments received from the “working for families” welfare scheme as well as the accommodation supplement each of these families will qualify for. I’ve arbitrarily hypothesised that these two different families live in the same city that I live in, and pay the same amount of rent that my family pays. Taking all of the above into account, here is the weekly combined income from all sources – after tax – for these two families.

    Family 1, earning $40,000:
    Total after tax weekly income (including welfare payments) of $1018.27
    This family will pay $7770 in PAYE and receive $19,916 in state welfare. No, that is not a typo. Nineteen thousand, nine hundred and sixteen dollars of untaxed welfare payments.

    Family 2, earning $70,000:
    Total after tax income of $1208.27
    This family will pay $18,090 in PAYE and receive $10,920 in state welfare.


    Take a few moments to take this in: Family 2 earns $576.92 more than family 1 each week. For their extra effort or skill, they end up just $190 better off each week.

    The level of wealth re-distribution to minimise the difference in income between these two families is staggering. And yet, each of these families is a recipient of a sizable chunk of the re-distributed wealth of others. The first family effectively pays no tax at all and then receives a further cash bonus of $12,146. But even the higher earning family still receives well over half of the earner’s PAYE payments back.

    Who are the benefactors here? The benefactors are those without children who are trying to get by on $30,000 per year and not receiving a penny from working for families (but still qualifying for an accommodation supplement of about $60 per week). The other benefactors are those who receive none of these taxpayer funded handouts but who fund a huge proportion of them: those who contribute more tax because they earn more.

    Essentially, the financial landscape this creates is one where a family on a low to medium income with several children has little incentive to increase their salary/wages beyond around $36,000 (the level at which state handouts start to decrease). Even if they had a salary of $70,000, the difference in financial positions would not reflect this increase in earnings.

    That’s what I’m talking about when I talk about statism and wealth redistribution. It’s not just rhetoric without substance. It’s a real system that demonstrably penalises the high achievers, and for everyone else it serves as the great equaliser, making it seem like nobody’s earning more than anyone else. When everyone gets ahead – nobody gets ahead, nor is there any incentive to do so.

  • Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2

    In my previous post, Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1, I argued that liberals who support the non-initiation of force principle can support abortion only on two grounds;

    (a) the fetus is a person but its existence inside the mother without her consent constitutes a form aggression, and hence, the mother’s action of killing it is defensive; or,
    (b) a fetus is not a person.

    I will now address each of these in turn.

    Is the Fetus an Aggressor?
    Consider first (a), the contention that a fetus can be considered an aggressor because it is intruding upon a woman’s body without her consent; an intrusion grave enough to justify the use of lethal force. In this respect then, being subject to an unplanned pregnancy would be on par with being the recipient of a serious assault such as being raped or severely beaten.

    Frank Beckwith and Steve Thomas in Consent, Sex and the Pre-Natal Rapist, have demonstrated several problems with this claim. It leads to the conclusion that, in certain circumstances abortion is justified without the consent of the woman.

    Consider the following scenario. A young woman is involved in a car accident and is rendered unconscious by her injuries. She is brought to a hospital where, still comatose, she is examined by a doctor. While performing some tests, the doctor determines that the woman has been pregnant for several weeks. Furthermore, suppose that evidence comes to light to suggest that the woman is unaware of her pregnancy, perhaps her close friends know nothing of the pregnancy, her diary shows no knowledge of being pregnant, and so on.

    Adopting McDonagh’s understanding of pregnancy as morally equivalent to rape or assault, what is the doctor’s obligation to this unconscious patient? It would seem that, under these conditions, the doctor is morally required to perform an abortion to rid his patient of the ‘massive intrusion’ being imposed upon her by her unborn offspring. After regaining consciousness, the woman would have to be told that she’s undergone an abortion for a pregnancy of which she was not aware, for there was good evidence that no consent had been given and that she was under assault.[i]

    Beckwith’s point is that if the fetus is morally or legally on par with an aggressor who intrudes upon a woman’s body without her consent, such as a assailant or rapist then it would follow that in the case sketched above the doctor would be justified (and arguably would have an obligation) to abort despite the fact that no consent from the women had been obtained.

    Consider, that if one saw a person having sex with an unconscious woman and one knew the woman had not consented, it would be absurd to wait for the woman to wake up to see if she wanted to consent to sex. One would be obligated to intervene. “[T]he doctor in the midst of the situation, aware of the pregnancy in the absence of consent, must see it as the rape-in-progress of his unconscious patient. How could he do anything else but end the assault?”[ii]

    Now I assume that liberals would oppose the idea that any woman who both does not know she is pregnant and is unconscious should be subjected to an abortion without her consent. If this is the case then it is clear that they do not think that an unconsented to pregnancy constitutes an act of serious aggression.

    If the fetus is an unjust aggressor then liberals are committed to coercive abortions. If coercive abortions are not liberal then the fetus is not an unjust aggressor.

    Is the Fetus a Person?
    If the fetus is not an unjust aggressor then a liberal defense of abortion must be based upon (b), the idea that a fetus is not a person, a being that possesses the rights to life, liberty and property that liberals believe the state exists to protect.

    Now a fetus is clearly a human organism. After 14 days at least, it is an individual living being that is a member of the species homo sapiens. To justify abortion via (b), the liberal needs to tell us what property a human being possesses that grounds the right to not be subjected to the initiation of force, to not be killed. Further a liberal must also be able to plausibly maintain that a human organism does not acquire this property until after the fetal stage.

    Peter Cresswell takes the view,

    [T]he foetus is not yet a human being, but a part of a human being – the mother – who has rights over it. To be an actual, rather than merely potential, human being is, among other things, to be physically separate, which a foetus is not.

    This claim is erroneous. First the “parts of” relationship is transitive; if a brick is part of a wall and the wall part of a house then the brick is part of the house. If a fetus is part of a woman’s body it follows then that any organ that is part of the fetus will be part of the mother. A woman pregnant at eight weeks then possesses four arms, four legs and two brains. If the fetus is male, she will have both a vagina and a penis and be both male and female. Conclusions that are even more bizarre follow if the woman is pregnant with twins. She could have three faces, three brains, six arms, two penises and a vagina, three hearts, six kidneys and so on.[iv]

    Moreover, PC’s contention that “to be an actual human” one must be “physically separate” entails that conjoined twins are not human. Consider conjoined twins Bob and Scott. If Bob is a human being then since Scott cannot live independently of Bob, Scott must not be a human person (the converse is equally true).

    Yet it is difficult to see what property Bob has that Scott lacks which would justify considering one of them human and the other not simply because neither is dependant of the other. It appears then, that one would be forced to conclude that they both are and are not, human. Perhaps PC is simply giving a poorly worded defence of the viability criteria, which I have previously critiqued here.

    However, the usual liberal response is to ground the right to not be subjected to the initiation of force, to not be killed, in certain psychological capacities that human beings typically display; such things as sentience, rationality, self-awareness, autonomy, etc.

    Despite the pervasive appeal of this approach, it faces serious problems. Boonin notes that those who attempt to ground humanity in the amount of brain development an organism has face a dilemma. “Any appeal to what a brain can do at various stages of development would seem to have to appeal to what the brain can already do. Or to what the brain has the potential to do in the future.”[v]

    Either option leads to problems for a defender of the permissibility of abortion who does not also want to endorse infanticide. This is because “by any plausible measure dogs, and cats, cows and pigs, chickens and ducks or more intellectually developed than a new born infant.”[vi] Suppose, then, one takes the first horn and appeals to what the brain can already do. However, unless one wishes to affirm that cats, dogs and chickens are human beings, “appeals to what the brain can already do” will “be unable to account for the presumed wrongness of killing toddlers or infants.”[vii] Suppose, then, one takes up the second horn of the dilemma and appeals to “what the brain has the potential to do in the future;”[viii] Boonin notes that this will entail that feticide is homicide. “If [such an account] allows appeals to what the brain has the potential to do in the future, then it will have to include fetuses as soon as their brains begin to emerge, during the first few weeks of gestation.”[ix]

    A couple of examples will illustrate this. Suppose the liberal appeals to sentience, the capacity for consciousness and the ability to perceive pleasure and pain. This criterion will mean abortion is permissible up to 24 weeks.[x] The problem is that this criterion also catches cats, dogs, cows, and chickens as well all. All of which are as sentient if not more sentient than new born infants and post-24 week fetuses.

    If the liberal draws the line at sentience, he/she will have to hold that farming, butchers shops, McDonald’s restaurants, Kentucky fried Chicken restaurants all engage in unjustified aggression against people because they kill sentient beings without their consent. Further, to remain consistent, the liberal will have to maintain a policy of outlawing all these industries and prosecuting those who engage in them for murder and cannibalism.

    Suppose the liberal appeals to more advanced psychological states such as self-awareness, rationality or autonomy. Such accounts of the grounding of rights will exclude the animals mentioned above and will exclude human fetuses. The problem is, according to this account, newborn infants are not persons either.

    In a definitive study of infanticide, Michael Tooley compiles an impressive array of neurological and physiological data that demonstrates that infants are not persons in this sense until some time after birth.[xi] The price of this line of inference is the reduction of newborn infants to the ethical level of cows. A newborn cow, and certainly a mature cow, is more person-like than an infant is. It is difficult to understand by this view why killing and eating infants is any more problematic than consuming a Big Mac.

    Of course the liberal can avoid this by claiming that it is the potential to acquire properties such as rationality, self-awareness, autonomy, not their actuality that matters. This will enable one to claim infants are protected by the non-initiation of force principle and will exclude animals. But the problem of course is that foetuses will also be protected by the non-initiation of force principle because fetuses also have the potential to possess these properties.

    In summation, liberal proponents of the non-initiation of force principle can only support abortion if they are willing to be inconsistent and arbitrary in their application of the principle or if they are willing to endorse not just infanticide but the eating of newborn infants or state mandated vegetarianism or coercive abortions. These policies are an anathema to most liberals; as such, abortion is not liberal.

    UPDATE: In response to comments below see Sentience Part 1 and Sentience Part 2.

    [i] Francis J. Beckwith & Stephen Thomas, “Consent, Sex, and the Prenatal Rapist; A Brief Reply to McDonagh’s Suggested Revision of Roe v Wade,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 17: 3 (2003): 4.
    [ii] Ibid, 6.
    [iii] Peter Creswell, “Not PC: Cue Card Libertarianism – Abortion”.
    [iv] Here I am influenced by Peter Kreeft, The Unaborted Socrates (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1983), 45-47 and Francis J Beckwith, Politically Correct Death, 124.
    [v] David Boonin, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 125.
    [vi] Ibid, 121.
    [vii] Ibid.
    [viii] Ibid.
    [ix] Ibid.
    [x] It is generally accepted that sentience occurs around 24 week’s gestation. There is some dispute over this and some scientists date sentience in the first 10 weeks of gestation.
    [xi] Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) Ch. 11.5.

  • Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1

    Laws permitting abortion on demand are often deemed to be liberal. Further, political liberals are frequently ardent defenders of such laws. I think these conclusions are mistaken. In a series of two posts I will provide some reasons why.

    Most contemporary liberals advocate a form of the harm principle, famously articulated by Mill in On Liberty,

    The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.[i] [Emphasis added]

    Mill here draws a distinction between other-regarding actions, actions that harm other people, and self-regarding actions, those that harm oneself. He argues that society, either by law or by social pressure, cannot justly regulate any action a person performs unless it is other-regarding; that is, it harms people other than the agent him/herself. As Mill’s position is typically interpreted harm is understood to be governed by the principle volenti non fit injuria (where there is consent, there is no injury) and hence refers to things done to other people without their consent. On this interpretation, self-regarding actions are those that people consent to and that harm no non-consenting, third party. As Mill himself notes, a self-regarding action is that “which affects only himself, or affects others with their free and voluntary, and undeceived consent”.[ii]

    The most common version of the harm principle is known as the non-initiation of force principle; Rothbard sums it up well,

    The libertarian creed rests upon one central axiom: that no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property of anyone else. This may be called the “nonaggression axiom.” “Aggression” is defined as the initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone else. Aggression is therefore synonymous with invasion.[iii]

    I do not subscribe to the harm principle or the non-initiation of force interpretation of it (I give some reasons why here). However, in this series of posts I will adopt it for the sake of argument so as to examine what follows for abortion. Abortion involves killing a fetus, usually by dismembering it. Moreover, the fetus does not consent to it. Hence if a Liberal is to support abortion he/she must do so for only one of two reasons. Either,

    (a) the fetus is a person but its existence inside the mother without her consent constitutes a form aggression, and hence, the mother’s action of killing it is defensive; or,
    (b) a fetus is not a person.

    Only if one of these two options is adopted, can a liberal support the non-initiation of force principle and permissive abortion legislation and remain consistent.

    Failed Avoidance Tactics
    At this juncture it is worth noting that two very common tactics of avoiding this conclusion fail. The first is to defend abortion, as Rodney Hide tried to at the recent Family First Forum, on the basis of the perceived positive social consequences of ‘liberal’ abortion laws. In popular political discourse, and in some feminist writings, abortion is defended on consequentialist grounds; it is argued that abortion prevents unwanted children, children who are likely to be poor, abused, neglected or engage in crime. It is hailed as a solution to over-population and the existence of handicapped people. It prevents adult and teenage women from falling into economic hardship and stress and enables them to complete their education, pursue their careers and so on.

    The problem with this line of argument is that this is only cogent for liberals if they assume that abortion does not violate the non-initiation of force principle. If abortion does violate this principle then allowing abortion on these grounds would be tantamount to saying that people can engage in aggression (as Rothbard defines it) they can initiate lethal force against others provided doing so brings about positive consequences, like lower crime rates, less child abuse, lower population rates, access to education and employment, etc. This conclusion contradicts the non-initiation of force principle which states that one cannot justly pursue social utility by violating an individual’s right to life, liberty or property; the very basis of their opposition to socialism.

    The second avoidance tactic is to appeal to slogans such as “you can’t force your morality onto others, you can’t legislate morality”. The problem with these claims is that the non-initiation of force principle is itself a moral principle and liberals believe the state should enforce this principle and should defend people against others who would violate it. This forces a dilemma upon liberals who cite this slogan; either the claim “you can’t force your morality onto others” applies to the non-initiation of force principle or it does not. If it does, then abortion involves an unjust imposition of morality onto another only if you assume it is not the initiation of force. If it does not, then liberalism as a doctrine collapses as the state has no duty to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens from aggression. In fact, it entails the conclusion that acts of aggression such as rape and murder should be decriminalised alongside abortion.

    It follows then that the liberal cannot rationally avoid the question. If one is to both support ‘liberal’ abortion laws and hold to the non-initiation of force principle, one must do so either on (a) or (b) above. I think neither is terribly defensible. I will address (a) the fetus is a person but its existence inside the mother without her consent constitutes a form aggression, and hence, the mother’s action of killing it is defensive; and, (b) a fetus is not a person, in my next post, Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2.

    [i] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Penguin Classics, 1985), 69.
    [ii] Ibid. 71.
    [iii] Murray N Rothbard, For A New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto (New York: Collier Books, 2002) 23.

  • Guest Post: Laidlaw College’s Mark Strom Responds to Critics

    Some weeks ago I wrote a review on the launch of Laidlaw College. I commented on the new vision for the future and my own reflections and frustrations of studying at its previous incarnation, Bible College of New Zealand.

    The comments section of this post saw the eruption of strong sentiment and criticism of Laidlaw College. The level of tension evident in what was said and the volume of readers concerned about the issue was quite surprising; our site stats record that this entry is one of our most read and most commonly Googled-for blog posts. Under fire was the seriousness of Laidlaw’s commitment to its new stated vision, its ability to commit to it and the employment process around the appointment of one of the new heads of department.

    As we are not party to the hiring practices of Laidlaw and as I was an unsuccessful candidate for the position that came under fire, we did not feel it appropriate to participate in the discussion. However, given the nature of some of the claims made, we have granted Dr Mark Strom, Principal of Laidlaw College, a right of reply.

    Matt

    Mark Strom’s Response:

     

    I’m delighted that the changes at Laidlaw have drawn so much interest. I’m also amazed that so many people (claim to) know (alleged) relationships between institutions, the intentions of board members, the processes of faculty appointments, my motives, the extent of faculty members’ knowledge, and so much more.


    Perhaps I can clarify one or two things.

    First of all, a big thanks to Matt and Madeleine for their very fair and balanced comments on Laidlaw. I personally appreciate encouragement and support from fair-minded friends able to be constructively critique and provoke us to push on.

    Second, people are right that Laidlaw still has a very long way to go. Our best over 86 years has been very significant. But did we become somewhat captive to a dualistic piety and its attendant culture(s)? Yes. Was this true of everyone and everything at college? No. Are we genuinely imagining, articulating, designing and making concrete something more holistic and engaged? Yes. Are there gaps between what we espouse and what we deliver? Yes. Is the trajectory clearly toward teaching, researching and championing real integration of thought and culture around a critically-informed evangelical theology at the highest standards of academic quality, intellectual rigour and serious faith? Yes, yes, and yes. This is our commitment. Piece by piece we are rethinking things and taking decisions that move us toward this. And we’ll take all the constructive criticism we can get from people who can imagine what a difference Laidlaw College could make to New Zealand and beyond, and who will give us room to try, to fall short, to grow and just maybe to succeed.

    Third, a few comments on details raised by respondents.

    Matt is right to note that evangelical organisations sometimes do not follow through on significant reforms. Like every other western institution, two legacies shape us: a Classical tradition that (for the greater part) censured change; and a Judeo-Christian tradition that introduced the appalling innovation (to classical minds) that one could break with conformity and be transformed by a radically changed mindset. Centuries of dialogue, intrigue, enmity and plagiarism between the traditions, overlaid by wave upon wave of Christian convention, has bequeathed an uneasy juxtaposition of conformity and innovation to evangelical institutions and leaders. I know this only too well within myself.

    I am loathe to comment on a colleague (and Rod will be appalled that I have defended him). Were there other candidates? Yes. Were some better qualified as per degrees and writings? Yes. Were these the only criteria for the appointment? No. The following competencies were crucial. First, an ability to see the disciplines of theology through the lens of the Bible’s own narrative structures and in particular the NT witness that the story and its great themes have reached their culmination in Jesus Christ. In other words, to read Christology not as one of many loci of Christian theology, but as that which makes theology Christian. [Barth surely had that right.] Second, an ability to model the teaching of theology as engaged in matters of historical, intellectual and public discourse, ie. worldviews and their impact on society. Third, an ability to inspire teaching around these themes. Fourth, an ability to model a realistic and effective mentoring of students as they seek to choose patterns of personal and public response to God and his world that reflect an integrated faith grounded in the historic gospel. Fifth, the maturity and gifts to nurture a relational culture between academics. Rod was a very strong choice on all these criteria.

    Has Laidlaw reached its full potential as an academic institution? Not by a long shot. Do we have some fine scholars with impressive PhDs and publishing records? Yes. Do we need more of both? Absolutely, and we will seek them. Respondents may be interested to know that earlier this year we completed a faculty restructure process. Three faculty chose not to apply for new roles. All others were rehired under improved conditions for the express purpose of completion of PhDs and the generation of peer-reviewed research publications. Eleven already have PhDs. Six are underway on their PhDs (some nearing completion). Two have begun advanced studies (with highest grades) to progress into PhD studies: one in philosophy at the University of Auckland, and one in ancient history at Macquarie University. We have set the bar high for ourselves, and we have embarked on an ambitious programme of making good on these aspirations. These things do not happen overnight.

    The conspiracists may be interested to know that the Laidlaw board represents a very healthy mix of theological perspectives (within a broad evangelical consensus) and political and economic perspectives, and we enjoy spirited banter and debate on these things. The board ‘relationship’ with Maxim amounts to a few friendships. And why wouldn’t there be?! Many respondents have noted there are far too few individuals and groups in NZ prepared to engage in serious thought and action on matters that shape society. So when you find some, you engage. Do we always agree? Far from it. Do you shun the dialogue because someone has caricatured your dialogue partner (even in this blog)? I choose not to. Ignorant caricatures are one thing, but when someone writes “that Laidlaw, like many other NZ Christian organisations has been captured by Maxim institute and appointments are being made not on academic ability but from the approved Maxim checklist”, this is a stupid comment. Plain stupid…and offensive. If it were naming an individual, it might be considered defamatory. There is no agenda. There is no captivity. There is no list. This comment is ignorant, untrue and offensive to the good people of Laidlaw and of Maxim. [On a personal note, had I voted in the last Australian election (I’m an Aussie), I would have voted for Rudd – I doubt that fits the assumptions of the conspiracists.]

    The question has been raised about whether “we really need a Christian liberal arts college”. I am on record as being against the idea. Like doctoral mentor, Emeritus Professor Edwin Judge of Macquarie University, I always read the early Christians’ distinctive innovations and interactions with Greco-Roman society and thought as evidence for arguing against the idea of a distinctively Christian educational institution. Our forebears showed no sense of need nor ambition to establish Christian structures as alternatives to those of their societies. That evidence and line of inference is still suggestive to me for the modern context. Personally I have long argued against the establishment of university type programmes in Christian colleges. In my opinion, a public university education has afforded both a better education (greater breadth and less cloistered) and a stronger platform for progression into places of influence.

    However, more recently I have come to a different place. Since 2006 I have found myself arguing in favour of this College offering a small number of first class qualifications equal to or better than the best New Zealand universities (yes that is an audacious goal – but closer than some might think in some areas; yes we have a long way to go). My shift of argument has 3 pillars:

    1. I am alarmed at the loss of faith among undergraduate students (some student workers estimate it is as high as 70-80% of students by the end of their programmes). This trend includes Maori and Pacific Island students. I have come to believe the College can and should address this tragedy through the provision of first class tertiary education grounded in a biblical worldview.

    2. I believe the reductionism of knowledge in university programmes has diminished their intellectual and academic rigour and integrity (not of course in every case). I believe in time this diminishes public discourse to the detriment of the nation. I have come to believe Laidlaw can offer a credible alternative education capable in time of influencing public discourse through literate and articulate graduates. Are we there? No. This is an audacious goal that will not come quickly, easily or cheaply.

    3. I believe Laidlaw should prepare (particularly young) women and men more deliberately for leadership in society, as well as in the churches. I have come to believe Laidlaw can equip such leaders for society most effectively through first class qualifications in education and the humanities (we are moving towards a School of Humanities with a PPE style BA degree: philosophy, politics, economics). I believe these qualifications offer appropriate ‘generalist’ educations for placing leaders of faith within education, media, business, health, social services, arts, politics and community leadership as well as continuing to serve the churches. My experience advising heads of corporations (commercial and government) confirms the sense that many employers are frustrated by the narrowness of many bright young university graduates of law, accountancy, commerce, business and engineering. Many are looking for classics and PPE grads. [This was confirmed earlier this year by the global managing partner of one of the world’s highest profile consultancies when I spoke at their global partners conference.]

    My argument for Laidlaw becoming such a College is not a reaction to ‘liberal’ humanism, nor an apologetic for a retreat into a Christian ghetto. On the contrary, I want to argue for a turning of the tables on the assumed hegemony of public universities over higher education. Most of the famed European and American universities began as colleges teaching a breadth of knowledge unified by theology as the core discipline. In short, they started like us. Over time almost every one of these institutions abandoned this theological and epistemological core. In the USA in particular this has prompted the rise of the Christian liberal arts college. [Yes, you may well hear echoes of Wolterstorf, Plantinga and others, as well as my own teacher of many years ago, Cornelius Van Til (and no, I am not a card-carrying VanTillian). By the way, Nick Wolterstorf enthused with me about the vision of Laidlaw when I visited him last year. And yes, that is name-dropping to counter some respondents’ assertions that no one knows or has read anyone.]

    The current education situation seems unnecessarily polarised: it seems we either accept the hegemony of the public university over intellectual discourse; or we retreat into the parallel universe of the Christian college. I no longer accept these as the only options. The time may be propitious for quietly, slowly building a credible alternative to university education on behalf of a nation: an alternative grounded in the theological worldview of historic Christianity, free of the dualistic legacies of traditional piety, and genuinely world-engaging and world-serving in the quality and openness of its teaching, mentoring and research and its contribution to public discourse. As Madeleine points out, this will require and make possible new engagements between Laidlaw College and the public universities.

    To all this talk of excellence I hasten to add our gospel commitment to strength-in-weakness and wisdom-in-foolishness. God delights in nullifying the “things that are” by the “things that are not”. Personally, I am a university drop-out who went on to consult to CEOs of major commercial and government institutions; I am a labourer who earned a PhD in the history of ideas; I am a spare parts salesman who become a principal. Some of the finest young men and women whom we seek as our students dropped out of school, did poorly at school, and generally do not think themselves capable of the kind of academic and personal formation we are seeking to make a reality. So in all our plans for “lifting the bar” we are working hard to establish a dignified, high-quality, effective pathway for those who would otherwise be overlooked.

    We don’t for one moment think any of this can be done easily or quickly. If this is a worthy task, it is a commitment to a generation.

    The notes about William Lane Craig are a bit of a mystery to me. I certainly know who he is (recall my VanTillian heritage). So do others at Laidlaw. I do recall hearing about it late. That happens. It had far more to do with poor communication (perhaps by us) than with ignorance or reluctance. We will endeavour not to make another “academic faux pas of this magnitude”.

    This has ended up a lot longer than I intended when I started. I’d like to frame my final comments (for now) around a thought I muse upon:

    I wonder how many respondents have lead significant institutions and been charged with effecting large-scale structural and cultural change? Or let me put it another way: a lot of people who point out our inadequacies, nonetheless join us in longing for high calibre Christian scholarship that has broken with the captivity of dualism to play a significant role in influencing a nation, society and church, with the gospel. I wonder if these people have the foggiest idea what it takes to position a traditional institution to deliver on such a desire.

    In other words, the ease with which people offer their opinions on what we should or shouldn’t have done at Laidlaw to this point is remarkable. Having been charged with being naïve, it seems only fitting to turn the table.

    Changing an 86 year old institution takes imagination, courage, humility and patience. Fortunately I am surrounded by people with far more of each than I possess. The pace at which we have instituted change has been mind-bogglingly fast for some, and too slow for others. One must honour a heritage and its continuing rich contributions even as one frames a vision that calls for radical changes. You cannot go from financial uncertainty to fully funded PhDs, new faculty and facilities overnight. Governance must be tightened. Financial reporting must be reworked. Deficits must be turned into surpluses. Assets must be reexamined. Accrediting and funding agencies must be given time to appraise and support the new directions. Cultures must begin to shift.

    Those expecting overnight adoption of the conventions and facilities of fine public universities will be deeply disappointed. Public lectures putting theological reflection on the table for the first time for hundreds of people will be viewed as populism. Hiring people with outstanding capacity to forge new trust and integration of gospel, culture and faith will be viewed as far less important than getting impressive CVs. Those with an eye to the long term will recognise strategy; the laying of further foundations (in addition to the fine existing legacies) upon which a great institution can be reimagined and redesigned by people in whom is combined an acuity and humility that will welcome scholars and students who exceed them.

    Can Laidlaw “see past their discovery of the basics”? I think so.

    Will people who read theology and philosophy beyond the popular, and who long for change within churches and evangelicalism and academies and public discourse in New Zealand, give us room to try, to fail, to grow, and just maybe to succeed? Time will tell.

    The Tall Poppy Syndrome is a pernicious, cowardly trait. Laidlaw College seeks an end to its hold over the imaginations and wills of New Zealanders. The fact that we have named a big vision makes us a target. We welcome the support of those with the faith, heart and guts to back something that just might make a difference.

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  • More Reasons to not Vote Green: Population Control gets a Global Warming Twist

    The blogosphere is abuzz with the Greens new Family Policy which

    “proposes setting a level of population New Zealand could sustain and leaving room within that for climate change refugees from Pacific Islands.

    They also want parents educated about the impacts of population growth when they are planning their family size and how far apart to have children.”

    The myraid of problems that scream from those two sentences is so large I am not sure where to begin.

    National, ACT and the Maori Party are declaring it a step in the direction of China’s one child policy.

    Rodney Hide, making a carbon credits joke, said “that perhaps if parents planted a field of trees, they might be able to have twins.”

    David Farrar makes the point that New Zealand already has a declining population rate and has done for some time anyway which makes one wonder why issue the policy?

    Zen Tiger quotes from Frog Blog “Do we as humans have a ‘right to breed’?” this reminded me of other crazy lefty ideas like Jim Flynn’s Thoughts on Contraception.

    Keith Locke, at a loss to understand why most New Zealanders would react negatively to the policy, claims they have been misinterpreted:

    “There is no way the Green Party would ever dictate to any parent how many children they should have, … Every child is a loved and wanted child. It would also be racist to try to dictate family size, given that the various ethnic groups in our society have different birthrates.”

    There are two problems in the above quote that are not being criticised about the blogosphere that I will highlight here.

    The every child is a loved and wanted slogan is ambiguous. It could mean that every child that comes into existence, no matter how it comes into existence, is loved and wanted, or, it could mean that every child that is unwanted should be taken out of existence. Both these situations would lead to every child being wanted.

    The statement is a eugenicist slogan promoted primarily by family planning movement which advocate the latter interpretation and promote the latter interpretation via abortion, contraception and sterilisation, campaigning against unplanned pregnancy. Now, I am not opposed to contraception or sterilisation or people knowing how to prevent unplanned pregnancy. My problem is that this organisation is opposed to all and every unplanned pregnancy, even those within stable, married, well-positioned-to-provide families. Dig a little on Family Planning and you find they are a sinister organisation whose roots are in eugenics, we have posted previously on the odiousness of family planning here.

    So when Keith Locke used this statement which interpretation did he mean? Given the context of the policy, I think we can safely assume the latter.

    The second issue is the Green’s definition of racism the reasons they cite for why if they were in fact dictating how many kids families should have it would be wrong. Lets have a closer look at Keith Locke’s statement:

    “It would also be racist to try to dictate family size, given that the various
    ethnic groups in our society have different birthrates.”

    His argument essentially is that ethnic groups have different birth-rates so to impose one birth-rate, to disagree or be at odds with another ethnicity’s viewpoint on this subject, is racist. Racism according to the Greens is defined as disagreeing with the cultural values of another. I don’t agree with the cannibalism practices of some ethnicities – guess I am a racist.

    Further, the only reason he offers as to why “the Green Party would ever dictate to any parent how many children they should have” is that to do so would be racist. The fact that such a dictum would be nanny-statist, eugenicist and is so far out of the realm of the proper role of the state that it is just plain, outright, wrong seems to be lost on him; but why am I not surprised?

  • Cambridge Tornado

    Old friends Roger and Donna were woken in the night by the tornado that tore through Cambridge last night and realised that their back fence and two trees were gone. This was their backyard:

    The tree took out their fence and their neighbour’s roof:

    When they went outside there was debris everywhere and there was a massive Oak tree down across the road – gift wrapped in the neighbours tin roof!

  • Election Lollies: Labour Vote Buys with Student Allowance

    Socialism is an easy disease to catch. Labour roll out their election bribe for students and our daughter Sheridan (Sherry) gets excited. She starts Uni in March and at that point will have to quit her part-time job as the hours will conflict with her studies.

    For a 16 year old she earns a fair amount of money. Being homeschooled has meant she has had the flexibility to work when other teenagers would be in school; she does her school work in the morning, works the lunch rush at a local cafe, heads to the paddock to ride her horse (which she bought and maintains on her own income), then has band practice (she bought the drum kit, electric and bass guitars for the band out of her earnings), then shops on Trade Me for T-shirts and CD’s or goes to the movies or the mall with her friends.

    Given how used she is to her cashflow being rather lush and the freedom and fun it brings she is not excited about the impact on her wallet that starting Uni will mean. Like most households we earn more than the threshold so Sherry does not qualify for the student allowance.

    At the point she realised how her financial situation was going to change, she had a teenage moment of refusing to go to Uni. That lasted the length of the next shift when I casually asked her how her life long career as a kitchen hand was going, she had just been complaining about how sore her feet were. She got the point. “No way am I working this hard for such a pathetic hourly rate for the rest of my life. All the adults at work, for whom this is their career, tell me they wish they could have gone to University.”

    Wisdom is erratic with teenagers. Only a few short months later she hears a news headline that Labour are going to raise the student allowance threshold. Of course when the details came out she realised that she would not be benefiting from it as even when the first threshold kicks in its still set too low to help her.

    I pulled her up on her disappointment. I reminded her of her anger on receiving her first pay check from her first paper-run, she was in tears because she had not realised just how much tax would come out of it when she had pre-spent it in her head – we had tried to tell her. She ranted for days about the injustice of being taxed at age 13 without the possibility of even voting for 5 more years. I asked her to think about her friends at the cafe who, like her, work hard for not much and even less after tax. She got it. They work hard, their feet hurt, the work bores them but unlike her they don’t get to dream of being whatever they want. Their reality is her part-time, short-term job. They don’t have the skills she has to lift herself higher, why should they have to pay for her education?

    If she wants to get the letters after her name that will be her ticket to leave serving coffee to the realm of one of those jobs you do before you get a real job, then she has to foot the bill. The public already pay a huge part of the real cost anyway, the majority in fact, but they are not the only beneficiaries of a skilled workforce, those that gain the ability to sip the lattes on their lunch break from their highly paid jobs need to cough up some of it too.

    The average student loan is less than ¼ of 1 years post-tertiary wage. It’s hardly the life-long debt we are led to believe.

    Sherry doesn’t need the student allowance anyway; we will pay for her Uni fees and provide for her living costs and a bus pass to Uni. We have had 16 years to plan for this and we want her to stay at home til her brain is fully developed anyway – even if it adds a few grey hairs. Our family and friends will give her ample chances to pick up some spending money with the odd babysitting job. She’ll be ok. Not being able to add a CD to her collection every week and buying her jeans from the Warehouse instead of the Lee Jeans shop for the next few years won’t kill her and it certainly doesn’t justify adding to the tax burden of her current workmates.