This year the New Zealand apologetics organization Thinking Matters ran a “Confident Christianity Conference” in Auckland. I was asked to speak at this conference on the topic. Does Morality Need God? Below is a slightly streamlined version of the talk I gave. This brings me to my second contention: If God exists, a divine command theory […]
Entries Tagged as 'Ethical Theory'
Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part Three:
September 8th, 2022 3 Comments
Tags: Anything goes Objection · Arbitrariness Objection · Divine Command Theory · Euthyphro Dilemma · God and Morality · Graham Oppy · Nathan L King · Plato
Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part Two:
August 29th, 2022 Comments Off on Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part Two:
This year the New Zealand apologetics organization Thinking Matters ran a “Confident Christianity Conference” in Auckland. I was asked to speak at this conference on the topic. Does Morality Need God? Below is a slightly streamlined version of the talk I gave. I outlined four assumptions about the kind of requirements morality imposes upon us. These […]
Tags: Bruce Russell · Dualism of Practical Reason · Henry Sidgwick · Stephen Layman · Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part One
August 24th, 2022 Comments Off on Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part One
This year the New Zealand apologetics organization Thinking Matters, ran a “Confident Christianity Conference” in Auckland. I was asked to speak at this conference on the topic. Does Morality Need God? Below is a slightly streamlined version of the talk I gave. “If God does not exist, then everything is permissible.” These words from Ivan […]
Tags: Divine Command Theory · God and Morality · John Stuart Mill · Peter Singer · Robert Adams
Evil, limited, and Indifferent deities: The Horrendous Deeds Objection Redivivus?
November 22nd, 2021 2 Comments
www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3zSoGqKdEk
Last week, I was scheduled to present the above paper at the Annual Meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society at Fort Worth, Texas. Unfortunately, Auckland’s lockdown prevented this, and the paper had to be cancelled due to the logistics involved. I did, however, pre-record the talk, so it is available below: Abstract: A common objection […]
Tags: Divine Command Theory · Horrendous Deeds Objection · Jason Thibodeau
Can a Divine Command Theory Vindicate the Objectivity of Morality: Huemer on Observer Independence, part two
September 12th, 2021 Comments Off on Can a Divine Command Theory Vindicate the Objectivity of Morality: Huemer on Observer Independence, part two
In my last post, I discussed Michael Huemer’s argument that a divine command theory cannot vindicate the objectivity of moral requirements. As I interpret him, the argument is: [1] Our commitment to morality presupposes that moral requirements are objective. [2] Moral requirements are objective just in case there obtain facts about what is right and […]
Tags: Alvin Plantinga · Divine Command Theory · John Foster · Michael Huemer · Objectivism · Robert Adams
Can a Divine command theory account for the objectivity of moral requirements? Brink and Appraiser Independence.
August 24th, 2021 Comments Off on Can a Divine command theory account for the objectivity of moral requirements? Brink and Appraiser Independence.
David Brink has objected to a divine command theory of ethics by contending such theories cannot vindicate the objectivity of ethics. Brink begins by defending a particular conception of the objectivity of ethics and then argues that a divine command theory fails to meet that conception. Brink writes: Our commitment to the objectivity of ethics […]
Tags: Chris Meyers · David Brink · Objectivism
Does the Incommensurability of Prudential and Impartial rationality avoid the dualism of Practical Reason?
August 14th, 2021 Comments Off on Does the Incommensurability of Prudential and Impartial rationality avoid the dualism of Practical Reason?
I have been discussing the dualism of practical reason. As I understand it, this is an inference from three premises: [1] We always have most reason to do what is morally required [2] An act is morally required if and only if it is impartially demanded: demanded by rules justified from a perspective of impartial […]
Tags: Derek Parfit · Dualism of Practical Reason · God and Morality · Henry Sidgwick · Peter Bryne · Stephen Layman
A common objection to belief in the God of the Bible is that a good, kind, and loving deity would never command the wholesale slaughter of nations. In the tradition of his popular Is God a Moral Monster?, Paul Copan teams up with Matthew Flannagan to tackle some of the most confusing and uncomfortable passages of Scripture. Together they help the Christian and nonbeliever alike understand the biblical, theological, philosophical, and ethical implications of Old Testament warfare passages.
