Category: Ethics

  • Wolterstorff, the Canaanites and Hyperbole: A Response to Ken Pulliam

    Critics of Christianity often ask how can a good and loving God command the extermination of the Canaanites as is taught the Old Testament? A clear assumption behind this question is that the Old Testament teaches that God did in fact command the extermination of the Canaanites, an assumption which is based on a straight-forward literal reading of some passages in Joshua and Deuteronomy. In an earlier blog series, Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites, I elaborated and defended the position of Nicholas Wolterstorff that such a literal reading of these passages is mistaken. The language of “leaving alive nothing that breaths” or “destroying” and other such language should be understood as hyperbole and hence is analogous to someone today saying after a ball game, “we totally slaughtered the opposition, we annihilated them just as coach told us to.”

    Ken Pulliam has taken issue with this defence so here I will respond to some of his criticisms. (I plan to address some of the other objections in future posts). Before doing so it is important to address some rhetorical tricks his article contains. To begin with Pulliam entitles his response “Grasping at Straws Part Eleven–Evangelicals Defend Genocide” and cites Wolterstorff and myself as examples. But neither Wolterstorff or I defended genocide, we argued that God did not command genocide. Moreover, referring to my argument, Pulliam states that I cited “external evidence of how other ANE nations reported their exploits of war [by citing] evangelical Kenneth Kitchen.” Now it is true that Kitchen is an evangelical and that I cite him, however, Kitchen is also a leading Egyptologist and I don’t just cite him I cite numerous examples of Ancient Near Eastern (ANE) reports of war where language similar to that used by Joshua and Deuteronomy are used hyperbolically. I also noted evidence that Joshua is written according to the literary conventions of such reports.

    Instead of addressing this evidence directly, Pulliam gives a series of arguments for the claim that the text is not hyperbolic but literal. One objection Pulliam raises is that this interpretation “fails to solve the other moral problems in the Hebrew Scriptures.” He asks, “are we to explain away all of the problems in the Old Testament by appealing to hyperbole?” The answer of course is no; it is hard to see why this is an objection. Why does an interpretation of one passage have to answer every question about every other passage in order for it to be plausible? Interpreting the first line of Pulliam’s post literally does not solve every problem I see in it should I, therefore, not take it literally?

    A second, objection Pulliam makes is that “it fails to take into account how these hyperbolic passages would be misused in the future by those who thought they were following divinely commanded principles.” Presumably Pulliam means that God, by allowing his word to be mediated through the literary conventions of ANE historiography, would forsee that future generations will misinterpret it. This, of course, is correct. Again, it is unclear why this means that the text should be taken literally. After all, it seems any language which God mediates his word through, whether literal or figurative, will have this implication. A message mediated through the more literalistic conventions of 21st century English, History and Moral Philosophy would be misunderstood by numerous people as well (his seems to be more a problem with verbal revelation per se rather than any particular interpretation of it).

    Pulliam’s other arguments are more on point. He argues that a hyperbolic interpretation “fails to appreciate that Judges 2:1-5 says that the Israelites did not obey the LORD in totally destroying the Canaanites, and that as a result, they will have problems for generations to come.” Pulliam poses a rhetorical question, “if the genocidal commands were never intended to be taken literally, why are the people scolded by Yahweh and told that their future problems will come as a result of their disobedience?” In fact, in articles which Pulliam refers to both Wolterstorff and I cite this passage and point out that, in fact, it says no such thing; it states,

    ‘I will never break my covenant with you,2 and you shall not make a covenant with the people of this land, but you shall break down their altars.’ Yet you have disobeyed me. Why have you done this?3 Now therefore I tell you that I will not drive them out before you; they will be thorns in your sides and their gods will be a snare to you.4

    Here Israel is criticised for disobeying an order to not make a covenant with the Canaanites and to destroy their altars. There is nothing at all present in these passages about extermination and genocide. Moreover, both Wolterstorff and myself pointed this out.

    Pulliam further objects that,

    One must ask if Wolterstorff’s opinion that Joshua uses “highly figurative” language is based on literary considerations or is it driven more by his need to solve the moral problems involved? He does not provide any direct parallels between Joshua and other literature which is clearly recognized as hagiographic and figurative.

    This again is simply a distortion of the situation. In my original post I gave a large number of direct parallels between Joshua and other literature which is both figurative and hagiographic (in Wolterstorff’s sense of the term). Given that I did this and that Pulliam has clearly read the post (he did link to it) one wonders why he claims no such parallels have been offered. Moreover, Wolterstorff, in the article he cites from, does provide several literary considerations for his thesis. It seems evident that several of Pulliam’s arguments involve simply ignoring what Wolterstorff and I have written and distorting the evidence.

    Equally puzzling is Pulliam’s argument, “If Joshua is hagiography, why shouldn’t one believe that the Gospels are as well? Why should one take their stories as literal history?” This is puzzling because my post addressed this. There is compelling textual evidence both from within the text itself and also via comparisons between Joshua and other ANE texts to suggest that it is hyperbolic. These parallels and textual considerations are not present with the gospels. Similarly, in his book Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks Wolterstorff discusses the genre of the gospels and cites comparisons with ancient Greek biographies to defend the claim that the gospels are ancient Greek biography. Again Pulliam’s response appears to be to ignore what those he criticises actually wrote.

    It is worth noting that this kind of argument relies on a peculiar assumption, that if one grants that one part of a text is non-literal then one cannot, non-arbitrarily, take any other part of the text as literal. Pulliam’s own writing falsifies this claim. He concludes that “Wolterstorff is more sophisticated than some of the other harmonization attempts we have seen, it is in reality just another case of grasping at straws.” Surely, his phrase “grasping at straws” is a non-literal figure of speech (I am assuming he did not mean to refer to real straws) does it follow then that we should not take anything else he says in his post literally?

  • Contra Mundum: Secular Smoke Screens and Plato’s Euthyphro

    In “Religion: A Barrier to Clear Thinking,” the final article in the award winning series of lay philosophy articles published in the Christchurch Press, Canterbury based Philosopher Simon Clarke addressed the question, “what is the biggest obstacle to thinking clearly about social and political issues?” Predictably he answered “Several answers suggested themselves but time and again I came back to the same thing: religion.” Clarke explained that “the fallacy of grounding morality upon religion was pointed out by Plato over two thousand years ago.” [1]

    Clarke was appealing to a famous argument that purports to show that ethics (what is right and wrong) is independent of religion. This argument is known by professional ethicists as “The Euthyphro Dilemma” or “Plato’s Euthyphro” and is named after a dialogue Plato wrote. The current version used against mono-theistic religions, such as Christianity, Islam and Judaism, is an adaptation (the original applied to poly-theistic religions, those religions that believe in many gods).

    The argument is usually framed in terms of a rhetorical question ‘are actions wrong because God prohibits them or does God prohibit them because they are wrong?’ As the question is framed, there are only two possible answers a person can offer.

    The first is to contend that actions are wrong because God prohibits them. This answer is said to suffer a debilitating problem, it makes morality arbitrary – anything at all could be deemed ‘right’ as long as God commanded it. Philosopher Michael Tooley has suggested this, “if God had commanded mankind to torture one another as much as possible, then it would follow that that action was obligatory. … many people, including many religious thinkers, are very unhappy with that consequence.” Therefore, the critics conclude, actions are not wrong just because God issues commands against them.

    The failure of the first answer means that the only possible way out is to claim that God prohibits actions because they are wrong; they are not wrong just because he prohibits them. This answer does not have the problems of the former. However, as Clarke points out, it entails that “there are independent standards for what we should do, independent that is of the dictates of religion.” Actions are wrong before God prohibits them. His commands simply tell us what is already wrong, quite independently of what he prohibits.

    This argument is something of a cliché in contemporary secular ethics and is found in almost every secular text book I have read (and will undoubtedly make its way into the Ethics section of the new NCEA Philosophy course). Typically “religious ethics” is mentioned and then dismissed with a short rendition of Plato’s Euthyphro. When I studied Philosophy Plato’s Euthyphro was one of the first things I was taught in first year Ethics. The lecturer spelled out the argument, contended that it showed “religious ethics” was mistaken/confused/ muddle-headed/whatever and from there would went on with the serious business of offering secular perspectives on topics such as abortion, affirmative action, euthanasia, homosexual rights and so on.

    Philosopher Peter Geach noted “In modern ethical treatises we find hardly any mention of God; and the idea that if there really is a God, his commandments might be morally relevant is wont to be dismissed by a short and simple argument that is generally regarded as irrefutable.” The short, simple argument he mentioned was, of course, Plato’s Euthyphro.

    Given this backdrop it is perhaps not so surprising that Clarke, after mentioning Plato’s argument, stated “… Plato’s pretty convincing demonstration has been ignored by the vast majority of people in the intervening millennia. Why are appeals to religion so common?”

    Despite the popularity of making claims like this, I still find them somewhat puzzling. Perhaps secular ethicists assume that theological ethicists have never read Plato or that, if they have, they have ignored him. In fact, the opposite is true. The last 40 years, in fact, has seen sustained defences of theological ethics including thorough refutations of Plato’s Euthyphro. These have been published in the philosophical literature at the highest levels – off the top of my head I can rattle off over 22 different articles and monographs which have offered rebuttals to Plato’s Euthyphro – yet secular ethicists and many textbooks blithely continue as though these answers had never been offered.

    I maintain that there is an answer to the Euthyphro dilemma, one that many have pointed out; it is to adopt the first of the answers I mentioned above, to contend that an action is wrong because God prohibits it. Contrary to popular claims, this option can succeed. The objections raised against it are not as debilitating as they are made out to be.

    The primary objection is that morality is made arbitrary; anything at all could be deemed ‘right’ as long as God commanded it – even atrocious commands. What is important to note here is that the objector assumes that it is possible that God could command atrocious things like ‘torturing people as much as possible.’ This assumption, however, seems very dubious. We need to remember that we are not taking about right or wrong as being based on the commands of just anyone, we are talking about these things being based on the commands of God. In the mono-theistic tradition that this line of argument seeks to criticise, God is typically defined as a being who is all knowing, all powerful, and is morally perfect.

    So, as the terms are defined, the claim that it is possible for God to command people to “torture one another as much as possible” is true only if it is possible for a morally perfect person to command such an atrocious thing. But this is unlikely. The very reason critics cite examples such as “torturing others as much as possible,” is because these actions are paradigms of conduct that no morally good person could ever entertain or endorse. The situation the critic envisages then is a situation which is impossible.

    Of course the critic could contend that he or she does not accept the existence of a being who is all knowing, all powerful, and is morally perfect. However, because those the critic is criticising do believe in such a being and also if the dismissal of theological ethics is to be based on an accurate understanding of what the various theological traditions actually believe and teach, and is not based on a caricature, then the sceptic must address what these traditions actually affirm.

    This answer typically generates a rejoinder. If some action is right or wrong because God permits or prohibits it then God cannot be said to be good in any meaningful sense. This answer renders the claim ‘God is good’ into no more than the claim that God obeys his own commands, if this is so, can God be said to have any duties at all?

    Philosopher William Lane Craig argues that “[duties] are not independent of God nor, plausibly, is God bound by moral duties, since He does not issue commands to Himself.” William Alston drew the same conclusion, “we can hardly suppose that God is obliged to love his creatures because he commands himself to do so!” William Wainwright suggests “the notion of commanding oneself to do something … is incoherent.”

    The rejoinder that, if God has no duties then he cannot be said to be good in any meaningful sense, has a grain of truth to it. If we are going to understand God’s goodness in terms of God having duties or obligations that he consistently fulfils then theological ethics, of the sort envisaged, has problems. However, it is not clear to me why the phrase ‘God is good’ should be explicated in terms of God having duties that He follows.

    Many theologians have suggested that one should not understand God’s goodness in this way. When God’s goodness is explicated in sacred texts like the Psalms or in official creedal statements such as the Westminster Confession of Faith it is often explicated in terms of God having certain character traits. To claim God is good is to claim that He is truthful, benevolent, loving, gracious, merciful, that He is opposed to certain actions such as adultery, murder and rape and so on. Now, even if God does not have duties, it does not follow that he cannot have character traits such as these. It is true that God may not be under any obligation to love others or to tell the truth or what have you, but that does not mean that He cannot love others or tell the truth. God does not have to have a duty to do something in order to do it.

    So there seems, on the face of it, nothing incoherent about contending that God is good, that he has certain attributes like being truthful, benevolent, loving and so on. It is not that theological ethicists have never read Plato or that they have ignored him – they have read him, found his arguments wanting and published responses explaining why – it is that some sceptics have never read the responses or they have chosen to ignore them.

    Perhaps these rebuttals do not work (though I think that they do) but even if I am wrong the onus is surely on the sceptic to demonstrate why. Simply ignoring them, misrepresenting the situation and then dismissing religion “as a barrier to clear thinking” is simply not good enough.


    [1] Clarke’s series “Clear Thinking” was awarded the Australasian Association of Philosophy Media prize in 2006.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the March 10 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

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    Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith
    Contra Mundum: “Bigoted Fundamentalist” as Orwellian Double-Speak
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: Confessions of an Anti-Choice Fanatic
    Contra Mundum: The Judgmental Jesus

  • Sovereignty and The Treaty of Waitangi

    In the Theory of Morality, Alan Donagan has a concise discussion of the morality of contracts. At one point he makes the following plausible argument,

    Obviously, the normal conditions of the existence of a contract are not fulfilled if the promisee misunderstands what the promiser intends. … a promiser is morally bound to perform whatever he believed his promisee to have understood him to promise. He cannot reasonably do less; for he should have corrected any misunderstanding he was aware of. And not even his promisee can fairly claim that he has knowingly bound himself to do more.[1]

    Donagan here notes that when two parties enter into a contract they are bound by the terms of the contract because they agreed to them. Given this, they are only bound to do what they agreed to do, or what it is reasonable to assume that they agreed to do, given the circumstances. They cannot be required to do more than this as they did not agree to do more and could not reasonably have been expected to forsee needing to do more.

    I think these points are fairly obvious; however, they have implications that are often less obvious. Today is Waitangi Day in New Zealand. One common argument proposed in the debate around the Treaty of Waitangi is that in the Maori translation, under Article 2, the Crown promised,

    … to protect the chiefs, the subtribes and all the people of New Zealand in the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship over their lands, villages and all their treasures.[2]

    Now there is some debate about whether the phrase translated “chieftainship” (tino rangatiratanga) entails the idea of sovereignty or self-determination in this context or whether it simply conveys an idea of property rights.

    Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the former is correct. The fact that the Maori translation promises Maori sovereignty does not mean that the Crown promised this. In order for the Crown to be bound in this manner, the Crown would have to have believed (or been in a position where it was reasonable for them to have believed) that they were promising various Iwi (tribes) “sovereignty” in this sense. This clearly was not the case. The crown thought that they were merely promising what the English translation affirms they were:

    Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession;[3]

    It is clear that, under the English version, the Crown intended to guarantee Maori property rights in their land and it promised to protect these rights. Any promise of sovereignty was due to a translation error or not speaking Maori fluently. The representatives of the Crown could not have reasonably believed they were doing anything else. They relied in good faith on a translator to put their terms accurately into Maori and had no reason for thinking he had done anything other than this; hence, the Crown did not agree to provide Maori sovereignty and so did not promise it under the Treaty. It may be that some leaders mistakenly thought they did, but they were mistaken. Whatever the Maori version says, the Crown is not bound by it.

    I can think of two objections to this line of argument. The first, as Madeleine tells me, is the contention that the majority of Iwi signed the Maori version and under international treaty jurisprudence, where there is a conflict in translation the version that the majority of the parties signed is the valid one.

    This argument, however, misses the point. It is not that I am claiming that the English version is valid and the Maori one is not. I am quite willing to grant that the Maori version is valid, the point is that the Crown is morally bound only to do what they reasonably believed they were agreeing to do when they accepted the terms of the Treaty and the terms they believed they were agreeing to were those contained in the English version of the Treaty.

    Moreover, this argument appeals to international law. International law recognises that the Crown is the legal sovereign of New Zealand as it has been a stable de-facto government, recognised as such, by the majority of its citizens.

    A second objection is to note reciprocity; just as the Crown was not bound by what it reasonably believed it was agreeing to, so too the various Iwi are only bound by what they reasonably believed they were agreeing to. If one grants for the sake of argument that “tino rangatiratanga” means sovereignty, then Iwi were not bound to relinquish this sovereignty over to the Crown. They believed, quite reasonably given the translation they had, that they were not promising to relinquish sovereignty to the Crown but rather to maintain it.

    If this were the case the problem still arises that today in New Zealand, in 2010, the Crown is Sovereign. We do not have independent tribal nations that hold sovereign political power over their lands. All land in New Zealand is under the sovereignty of parliament and is subject to English common law and NZ statutes. Hence, the question is not whether Iwi are required to relinquish sovereignty to the Crown under the Treaty as, for better or worse, justly or unjustly, they have done so. The question today becomes, whether, after 170 years of the Crown being sovereign, Iwi should attempt to gain this sovereignty back? On this issue the Treaty is silent. It says nothing about what various parties are entitled to if another party misunderstood the agreement.

    The question then of Maori sovereignty is not a question of the Treaty at all. It is simply a question of morality in general. The real question is this, if one lives under a de-facto government that has been sovereign in practise for 170 years and if this government is relatively just then should one continue to defer to its sovereignty?

    I think the answer to this question is yes. I believe that when a stable de-facto government exists and has existed for over a century and when there is an absence of gross abuses of human rights then its sovereignty should be recognised as legitimate by the citizens of that nation. I will not further advance this argument here but I will simply note that whatever the answer to this question it seems reasonable to say that the Crown never promised sovereignty to Maori and claims that it did are based on the mistaken idea that a person can be bound by the terms of a contract which he or she both did not agree to and could not reasonably have been expected to have agreed to – to expect anything else is nonsense.


    [1] Alan Donagan The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977) 91.
    [2] “Treaty of Waitangi” Kawharu Translation Article 2.
    [3]
    “Treaty of Waitangi” English Version Article 2.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Maori and Pakeha are Not Partners to the Treaty of Waitangi

  • Tune in to Marae Tomorrow

    Yesterday Matt and I participated in filming a debate on the Treaty of Waitangi. The moot was “That the Treaty of Waitangi is holding NZ back.” There were four panelists, Stephen Franks, Tim Wikiriwhi, Matthew Hooten and Hana O’Regan and an active audience, of which Matt and I were asked to be members of to represent blogging New Zealand (apparently they considered David Farrar but decided we’d be more interesting on the basis of Matt’s blog post, Maori and Pakeha are Not Partners to the Treaty of Waitangi).

    The audience, who comprised a range of commentators, Members of Parliament and even activist John Minto, were expected to comment and ask questions, which we dutifully did. Who knows if we’ll make the editing room cut, or how what we said will play on screen (it always feels different in the moment to how it looks on air I find)  – one way to find out I guess!

    The debate will screen on Marae tomorrow morning, Saturday, 6 Feb, from 8:00am – 9:30am on TV One.

    Here is a brief rundown of our thoughts:

    • Speaker of the Day goes to Stephen Franks for presenting the best case and for managing to use terms like “fake treaty”, “bogus” and “spurious” whilst still managing to come across calm, pleasant and reasonable.
    • The Most Inflammatory award goes to Tim Wikiriwhi – you can read his transcript at Not PC. The award was for his  student-politician-styled-delivery coupled with claims later on in the debate that there had not been a single past injustice towards Maori, which earned him shocked and awed hissing. (That aside his message was good and his historical claims were fascinating.)
    • Best Impersonation of Peter Dunne award goes to Matthew Hooten for trying to take the middle ground and please everyone whilst effectively saying nothing but sounding profound.
    • The Loonie Leftie Why–Didn’t–Her–Over-Sized–Tiki–Explode? award goes to Hana O’Regan for (and it was hard to pick a winner from the many incoherent and internally inconsistent examples she had on offer) arguing for the confiscation of property  (tax dollars) to support the promotion of Maori language “because it is beautiful” [so too is the NZ countryside] citing the Treaty as justification for said confiscation of property (I kid you not!). We both called her on this in the Q&A.
    • Funniest Moment was when the producer decided that our paper voting forms didn’t look so good on camera so had the audience pretend to push invisible electronic voting buttons and to vote multiple times so that the camera could grab a range of shots. Shane Taurima, the host, completely lost it with laughter when he delivered the instructions to the audience to push the green button for the affirmative and the red button for the negative “on the small electronic device you see before you” and he had to re-shoot it. (Then they decided to have us vote with the paper ballots).

    I must note that at the beginning of the debate the audience was asked for a show of hands as to who was for the motion and who was against it. At the outset less than 5 people were for the motion. This is an important consideration to factor into the voting results announced at the end of the debate. As Stephen said to me afterwards, I think the for’s won it as they gained votes and the againsts lost them.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Maori and Pakeha are Not Partners to the Treaty of Waitangi

  • Contra Mundum: The Judgmental Jesus

    Few things are thought to be more morally pernicious than the practice of judging others. Sometimes this is given a theological spin with people citing the Sermon on the Mount “Do not judge, or you too will be judged. For in the same way you judge others, you will be judged, and with the measure you use, it will be measured to you.” (Matthew 7:1-2).

    It is common for this imperative statement to be used as a kind of rhetorical club to silence moral critique of various cultural practices. When a particular practice is subjected to such critique those who engage in the practice will complain they are being “judged.” If the alleged judgers are Christian, the claim that “judging is contrary to what Christ taught” is typically added to the charge.

    I think this is a misrepresentation of the passage and an affront to common sense. I will address the latter point first. The claim that it is wrong to judge other people is problematic; it is so problematic that it is amazing that anyone gives it credence. For example, if it is wrong to judge other people then since Hitler was another person, it is wrong to say that what he did was wrong. To claim that his actions were wrong is to make a judgment about them and if judging is wrong then it is wrong to judge Hitler. Similarly, Martin Luther King Junior was wrong to criticise racism and doing so judged the actions of racists and William Wilberforce was wrong to make moral judgments about the slave trade as in doing so he was judging slave owners. Taken consistently, the claim that “it is wrong to judge” entails that we should have no legal system, no laws and no courts as all these things involve judging others by deeming certain conduct as wrong.

    The problems with this interpretation of Matthew 7:1-2 do not stop there. A little reflection will demonstrate that the claim that it is wrong to judge other people is incoherent. To claim that it is wrong to judge others is to make a moral judgment; in making the statement one is judging that a particular action is wrong. Moreover, when a person announces this to other people he or she is implicitly making a judgment about other people’s actions. To utter that it is wrong to judge others is to engage in judging others. This kind of thinking can easily induce a kind of intellectual vertigo, it is analogous to the person who states, in English, “I can’t speak a word of English” or a person who tries to convince you of the truth of the claim “there is no truth.”

    Fortunately, one does not need to attribute to Jesus such absurd, incoherent, platitudes because it is doubtful that Jesus meant anything quite so stupid. Several factors bear this conclusion out. First, one should note that the claim, “do not judge, or you too will be judged,” occurs as part of the Sermon on the Mount. In this Sermon, Jesus regularly used hyperbole to vividly illustrate a point. One should note that interpreting these hyperboles too literalistically leads to obvious absurdities. For example, Jesus states, when referring to the act of looking at another person’s spouse with lust, “If your right eye causes you to sin, gouge it out and throw it away” (Matthew 5:9). It is evident that Jesus is not advocating self-mutilation but simply making his point about not lusting in a vivid, hyperbolic fashion. Similarly, he commands people to, “do good deeds before men,” (Matthew 5:16) but a few verses later he tells us, “not to do good deeds before men.” (Matthew 6:1). Taken in a strictly literalistic sense this is a contradiction. However, a reading of the context shows these apparently opposing statements are simply vivid illustrations of the same point; one’s good deeds should be motivated by a desire to honour God, to do the right thing and not by a desire to advance one’s own reputation. In light of such contexts the phrase, “do not judge,” should be seen for what it is, a hyperbolic statement illustrating the point elaborated in the surrounding verses.

    Second, when one seeks out this context one can see quite clearly the point being made. The phrase translated in the NIV as, “do not judge, or you too will be judged,” was originally written by Matthew in Koine (a Greek dialect). The Interlinear Bible gives the literal translation here as, “do not judge that you be judged.” In other words, do not judge others in a way that leads one to put oneself under judgement. The surrounding words support this conclusion,

    For in the same way you judge others, you will be judged, and with the measure you use, it will be measured to you. ″Why do you look at the speck of sawdust in your brother’s eye and pay no attention to the plank in your own eye? How can you say to your brother, ‘Let me take the speck out of your eye,’ when all the time there is a plank in your own eye? You hypocrite, first take the plank out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to remove the speck from your brother’s eye.″ Do not give dogs what is sacred; do not throw your pearls to pigs. If you do, they may trample them under their feet, and then turn and tear you to pieces. (Matthew 7:2-6)

    Here the qualifications are evident. One is not to judge in a way that brings judgment on oneself. The reason for this (“for”) is that the standard one uses to judge others is the standard that one’s own behaviour will be measured by. Jesus goes on to illustrate, with a sarcastic example, precisely what he is talking about; a person who nit-picks or censures the minor faults of others (taking the speck out of their brothers eye) who ignores the serious, grave, moral faults in their own life (the log in one’s own eye). His point is that such faults actually blind the person’s ability to be able to make competent moral judgments. This suggests that Jesus is focusing on a certain type of judging and not the making of judgments per se.

    In fact, the conclusion that Jesus does not mean to condemn all judging of others is evident from the proceeding sentences in the above quote. Rather than engaging in the kind of judgment Jesus has condemned one should “first take the plank out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to remove the speck from your brother’s eye.” In other words one should try to rectify the serious moral flaws in one’s own life precisely so one can assist others with theirs. One needs to avoid hypocrisy in order to make constructive and effective moral judgments about others. This would make no sense if Jesus meant to condemn all judging by this passage.

    The reference to “pigs and dogs” in verse 6 further bears this out. Dogs and pigs, to Jews, were unclean animals and the term was frequently used to designate people considered to be of low moral character who were “unclean” before God. In this verse Jesus is simply repeating the Old Testament teaching to “not rebuke a mocker or he will hate you: rebuke a wise man and he will love you” (Proverbs 9:8). The implication, again, is that one should try to make constructive judgments rather than simply provoking anger. Constructive judgments involve making judgments.

    Just in case I have not belaboured the point enough, my interpretation is further reinforced by what follows after these passages. While reading a passage in its context is not the strength of many popular critics of Christianity, immediately after the cited passage Jesus goes on to warn about the dangers of religious charlatans, which he, rather judgmentally, refers to as “ferocious wolves” in “sheep’s clothing” (Matthew 7:15). In the age of Osama Bin Laden, David Koresh and Jim Jones the danger of such charlatans needs little further elaboration.

    In exhorting the requisite discernment, Jesus actually instructs his disciples to make moral judgments about others. He tells his disciples to judge whether a person is a false prophet or not by their “fruit.” Anyone familiar with Old Testament prophetic literature, as Jesus’ hearers were, would know that “fruit” is a metaphor for character. Isaiah’s use of the metaphor is paradigmatic; Isaiah famously described Israel as a vineyard that did not bear fruit. In the metaphor, fruit quite clearly referred to such things as right conduct, justice, morality, etc. Paul uses the same metaphor when he states that “the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control” (Galatians 5:22-23a). Jesus makes it clear that he is utilising this metaphor. He goes on to stress that in this context the fruit of a prophet is whether he or she “does the will of my Father” and is not an “evil doer.” It is clear then that Jesus here is exhorting his disciples to make moral judgment about other people, to critically evaluate other people’s lives, choices and actions and to make judgments about their spiritual authenticity based on this evaluation. All of this would be very odd if Jesus thought it was wrong to judge.

    Moral judgment of religious leaders, of oneself, of the organisations one is contemplating joining, of people one considers associating with, of the political leaders one supports at the ballot box and broader issues in wider culture is a task essential to both authentic spirituality and the competent navigation of everyday life.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the February 10 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

    RELATED POSTS:
    Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others?
    Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith
    Contra Mundum: “Bigoted Fundamentalist” as Orwellian Double-Speak
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: Confessions of an Anti-Choice Fanatic

  • Chai Feldblum: “We Should not Tolerate Private Beliefs”

    In “Diatribe: To All Da Haters” (originally entitled “Queers and Destiny: Who Hates Who”) an article published a few years ago in Critic (the student magazine of Otago University) I wrote the following:

    … If teaching that homosexual conduct is wrong is akin to racism or propagation of apartheid, then the aforementioned religious organisations are the moral equivalent of the Ku Klux Klan. Those who propagate such arguments need to reflect on the implications of what they affirm. Imagine a society where the local synagogue or Mosque is treated as though it were the local Klan headquarters. Or where Muslim students are perceived and treated the way we currently relate to white supremacists. It is not difficult to see that the widespread dissemination and acceptance of this argument would lead to an atmosphere of pervasive religious intolerance – such intolerance is the very antithesis to what many of those protesters ostensibly claim to stand for.

    The solution to intolerance is tolerance. Tolerance of those ideas you may fervently disagree with and recognition of another’s right to freely hold and express them. Tolerance requires one to respond to disagreement with rational persuasion, not vilification. This cuts both ways.

    I was widely vilified and ridiculed for my comments and denounced as hate filled and bigoted. It is interesting to compare what I said with the comments of Chai Feldblum, the Georgetown University law professor nominated by Obama to serve on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

    Just as wYes we can!e do not tolerate private racial beliefs that adversely affect African-Americans in the commercial arena, even if such beliefs are based on religious views, we should similarly not tolerate private beliefs about sexual orientation and gender identity that adversely affect LGBT [lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender] people,” the Georgetown law professor argued…

    For those who believe that a homosexual or bisexual orientation is not morally neutral, and that an individual who acts on his or her homosexual orientation is acting in a sinful or harmful manner (to himself or herself and to others), it is problematic when the government passes a law that gives such individuals equal access to all societal institutions.

    Of course those religions that believe homosexual conduct is sinful include Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, evangelical Protestantism, many neo-orthodox Protestants, Islam, Orthodox Jews, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witness’s, Seventh Day Adventists and so on. So presumably, if we are to take Feldblum at her word, none of these groups should be tolerated in Obama’s society and all should be denied equal access to societal institutions.

  • The “Three Strikes Bill” Moves Forward

    I am cautiously optimistic at today’s announcement that the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill a.k.a. the “Three Strikes Bill” will be moving forward as part of the government’s legislative program. In my post Three Strikes: Proportion and Protection, which was published in the New Zealand Law Students Association publication LEX, I argued that the “apparent inconsistency” identified by the Attorney General, per his statutory obligation under section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act on the basis that the Bill affronts the proportionality doctrine, was able to be argued around on the basis that criticisms of the Bill along these lines confuse appropriate force for punishment with defensive force.

    Given this, provided the select committee does a good job on assessing submission and making recommendations and parliament carefully considers these we have the potential to finally have much tougher sentences on recidivist offenders of heinous and violent crimes. Regular readers will remember that, as documented in The Deal is Signed: New Zealand Has a New Government, part of the confidence and supply agreement that the National Party made with the ACT Party back in November 08 following New Zealand’s last general election was that National agree to introduce ACT’s “Three Strikes Bill” and support it to Select Committee, so this news was fairly inevitable.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Three Strikes: Proportion and Protection
    Published – Three Strikes: Proportion and Protection
    The Deal is Signed: New Zealand Has a New Government