Category: Talks

  • The Beatitudes: Part One

    Here is a talk I gave on the Beatitudes a few weeks ago. 

  • To Judge or not to Judge: Part Two

    Below is the second part of a talk I delivered at Crossroads Presbyterian Church.


    3. What Did Jesus Mean

    So if Jesus did not command us to refrain from judging others, what does he teach in this passage? I think Jesus is not, in this passage, telling us to “not judge.” He is instead telling us how to judge. He is contrasting judgments that are accurate, useful, and constructive with judgments that involve hypocrisy and grandstanding. He is telling us to avoid the latter so that we can effectively carry out the former.

    Several features bear this out. First, let’s look at the passage. The phrase translated in the NIV as, “Do not judge, or you too will be judged,” was originally written by Matthew in Koine Greek and then transliterated. What is stated is, “Do not judge that you be judged” (Matt 7:1, Interlinear Bible). Note the phrase “that.” In Greek this is not a disjunctive “or,” which suggests alternatives. It is a conjunction which spells out the result, and it is in thejudgementsubjunctive tense. What this means, in layman’s terms, is that the passage states: do not judge if that judgment results in you being judged yourself. This is a reference to a particular kind of judgment, not judging in general.

    This is clearly borne out when we look at the context, which states: “With whatever verdict you judge you will be judged.”

    Here is the point: when I make a judgment about someone else’s character, I implicitly reference a standard which applies to myself as well as to them. If I condemn my brother for stealing, I am assuming it is wrong to steal. That means I am admitting stealing is wrong. If I say an action is wrong and blameworthy, and practise that action myself, I have in essence admitted I am doing wrong and am worthy of blame. I stand condemned by my own words.

    Now let us return to the passage and look at the commandment “judge not” in context:

    3 “Why do you look at the speck of sawdust in your brother’s eye and pay no attention to the plank in your own eye? 4 How can you say to your brother, ‘Let me take the speck out of your eye,’ when all the time there is a plank in your own eye? 5 You hypocrite, first take the plank out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to remove the speck from your brother’s eye. 6 “Do not give dogs what is sacred; do not throw your pearls to pigs. If you do, they may trample them under their feet, and then turn and tear you to pieces.” (Matthew 7:2-6)

    Here the qualifications are evident. One is not to judge in a way that brings judgment on oneself. For (because) the standard one uses to judge others is the standard by which one’s own behaviour is measured. Jesus goes on to illustrate, with a sarcastic example, precisely what he is talking about: a person who nit-picks or censures others’ minor faults (taking the speck out of their brother’s eye) yet ignores the serious, grave, moral faults in their own life (the log in one’s own eye). This, as Jesus points out, is hypocrisy. His point is that such hypocrisy actually blinds the person’s ability to make competent moral judgments. This suggests that Jesus is focusing on a certain type of judging and not the making of judgments per se.

    In fact, Jesus condemns this type of hypocrisy so that we can judge correctly. Rather than engaging in the kind of judgment Jesus has condemned, a person should “first take the plank out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to remove the speck from your brother’s eye.” In other words, one should try to rectify the serious moral flaws in one’s own life precisely so one can assist others with theirs. Jesus’s point is that one needs to avoid hypocrisy in order to make constructive and effective moral judgments about others.

    Why is this? Two reasons.

    First, in order to teach people any subject or skill, you actually have to be proficient in that subject or skill. I am a theology teacher. I have had some success, and the reason I have had some success is because I am trained in the relevant disciplines. When I read an essay, I can give constructive feedback because I have spent decades reading theological writings, writing such articles, and thinking about theology. When a student writes, I can give constructive feedback because I have become so proficient and familiar with such writings that I can just see what is lacking or needed.

    Second, the nature of hypocrisy itself blinds people. People often think that a hypocrite is someone who doesn’t practise what they preach. This is incorrect. Anyone who has high moral standards will at times struggle and fail to live up to them due to weakness of the will. The Greek word translated “hypocrite” is actually the word for “actor.” A hypocrite is an actor on a stage who puts on a mask to play a role in front of others. Off stage they don’t play that role. A hypocrite is someone who is pretending—they want to appear virtuous by appealing to standards in front of others, telling them what is right and wrong, but they have no real commitment to those standards.

    So if your values are so warped that you only care about how you appear—what others think, and not what God, who sees all, thinks—your value system is distorted and you cannot make competent moral judgments. The key point is that we need to avoid hypocrisy precisely so that we have the discernment we need to make constructive judgments that will actually enable us to help both ourselves and others in making wise, as opposed to foolish, judgments.

    I think you see the same thing in the reference to “pigs and dogs” in verse 6. Dogs and pigs, to Jews, were unclean animals, and the terms were frequently used to designate people considered to be of low moral character who were “unclean” before God. In this verse Jesus is simply repeating the Old Testament teaching found in Proverbs 9:8, which states, “Do not rebuke a mocker or he will hate you; rebuke a wise man and he will love you.” The reason one is exhorted not to do this is because it fails to be constructive. It is not going to do any good. The implication again is that one should try to make constructive judgments rather than simply provoking anger.

    I can appeal again to my experience as a teacher. When you teach five classes a day with over 25 students a class, you learn to be discerning. There are some students you will invest a lot of time in, giving constructive feedback, because you know they are motivated and will listen and want to improve. There are others you know are switched off and won’t listen or care no matter what you say. You don’t spend a lot of time giving constructive feedback to these students; sometimes doing so will simply provoke a confrontation that wastes your time.

    Just in case I have not belaboured the point enough, my interpretation is further reinforced by what follows these passages:

    15 “Watch out for false prophets. They come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ferocious wolves. 16 By their fruit you will recognize them. Do people pick grapes from thornbushes, or figs from thistles? 17 Likewise every good tree bears good fruit, but a bad tree bears bad fruit. 18 A good tree cannot bear bad fruit, and a bad tree cannot bear good fruit. 19 Every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire. 20 Thus, by their fruit you will recognize them. 21 “Not everyone who says to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ will enter the kingdom of heaven, but only the one who does the will of my Father who is in heaven. 22 Many will say to me on that day, ‘Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in your name and in your name drive out demons and perform many miracles?’ 23 Then I will tell them plainly, ‘I never knew you. Away from me, you evildoers!’” (Matthew 7:15-23)

    Here Jesus actually instructs his disciples to make moral judgments about others. He tells them to judge whether a person is a false prophet or not by their “fruit.” Anyone familiar with Old Testament prophetic literature (as Jesus’ hearers were) would know that fruit is a metaphor for character. Isaiah’s use of the metaphor is paradigmatic:

    1 I will sing for the one I love a song about his vineyard: My loved one had a vineyard on a fertile hillside. 2 He dug it up and cleared it of stones and planted it with the choicest vines. He built a watchtower in it and cut out a winepress as well. Then he looked for a crop of good grapes, but it yielded only bad fruit. 3 “Now you dwellers in Jerusalem and men of Judah, judge between me and my vineyard. 4 What more could have been done for my vineyard than I have done for it? When I looked for good grapes, why did it yield only bad? 5 Now I will tell you what I am going to do to my vineyard: I will take away its hedge, and it will be destroyed; I will break down its wall, and it will be trampled. 6 I will make it a wasteland, neither pruned nor cultivated, and briers and thorns will grow there. I will command the clouds not to rain on it.” 7 The vineyard of the Lord Almighty is the house of Israel, and the men of Judah are the garden of his delight. And he looked for justice, but saw bloodshed; for righteousness, but heard cries of distress. (Isaiah 5:1-7)

    The fruit looked for is such things as right conduct, justice, etc. Paul uses the same metaphor when he states that “the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control” (Gal 5:22-23a). Jesus makes it clear that he is utilising this metaphor. He goes on to stress that, in this context, the fruit of a prophet is whether he or she “does the will of my Father” and is not an “evildoer.” It is clear then that Jesus here is exhorting his disciples to make moral judgments about other people, to critically evaluate other people’s lives and actions, and to make judgments about their spiritual authenticity based on these judgments. All this would be very odd if it were wrong to judge.

    This is an important skill. In an age of people like David Koresh from Waco, Texas, or Jim Jones, or groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda who advocate terror in the name of God—or even the many contemporary secular political cults today—people need to be able to make discerning moral judgments about where to lay their allegiance, what is the will of God and what is not.

    So what is the take-home here? I think it is this: the church is called to go into all the world, make disciples of all nations, baptise them, and teach them to obey what God has commanded. Its role is to be a source of moral education, to help people answer the question: How should I live? by providing credible answers—answers that are true and helpful. People need these answers to make important decisions. God wants us to become proficient at this, to do it well, both by learning how to live well and by teaching others how to. That means we need to be able to make moral judgments.

    In this passage Jesus tells us how to do this. There are several things he says here:

    1. Learn to live well in your own life.
    2. Teach others out of this practice.
    3. Use discernment in reading your audience; know when to speak and when to be silent—when it is pearls before swine.
    4. Finally, avoid hypocrisy and grandstanding. You should be trying to live a life pleasing to God, not giving lip service to certain ideas in order to impress others with your virtue.

    Doing this enables you to make constructive judgments that enable the church to be salt and light in a world—a world so confused that it regularly expresses the moral judgment that you should not make moral judgments.

     

     

     

  • To Judge or not to Judge?: Part One

    Below is part one of a sermon I presented at Crossroads Presbyterian Church in Pokeno.

    “Do not judge, or youjudgement too will be judged. 2 For in the same way you judge others, you will be judged, and with the measure you use, it will be measured to you. 3 “Why do you look at the speck of sawdust in your brother’s eye and pay no attention to the plank in your own eye? 4 How can you say to your brother, ‘Let me take the speck out of your eye,’ when all the time there is a plank in your own eye? 5 You hypocrite, first take the plank out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to remove the speck from your brother’s eye.6 “Do not give dogs what is sacred; do not throw your pearls to pigs. If you do, they may trample them under their feet, and turn and tear you to pieces.”

    There is an apocryphal story going around that goes as follows: A generation ago, the most well-known New Testament passage was John 3:16—“For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life.” However, now, in this current generation, the most well-known passage is Matthew 7:1—“Do not judge, or you too will be judged.”

    I don’t know if this is an accurate claim. However, it is an apocryphal story because it illustrates a widely held understanding of Jesus’ teaching. Today I want to offer a corrective. I will do three things. First, I will sketch what I take to be a common understanding of this passage. Second, I will give several reasons why I think this interpretation is mistaken—indefensible, in fact. Third, I will offer a different way of reading the passage, which I think is more accurate.

    1.A Common Interpretation.

    Let’s look first at how this passage is commonly understood. Several years ago, I gave a talk on moral relativism for Thinking Matters Tauranga. During that talk, I noted that relativism entails that one cannot apply the moral principles you (or your culture) accept to the practices of other people (or cultures). I was critical of this position, arguing that it suffers from all sorts of problems. Predictably, someone in the audience asked me a question about Jesus’ comments in the Sermon on the Mount:

    “Do not judge, or you too will be judged. For in the same way you judge others, you will be judged.” (Matt. 7:1–2)

    Notice the highlighted word “or” in this passage. It suggests a disjunction: there are only two options—either you refrain from judgement, or you fall under judgement.

    It is common to hear people interpret this passage as a commandment to not “judge other people.” The basic idea is this: judging other people is wrong; if you judge other people, God will judge you.

    In fact, it is common for people to use this statement as a kind of rhetorical club to silence Christian theological and moral critique of various cultural practices. When a particular practice is subjected to such critique, those who engage in the practice will complain they are being “judged,” that Christians are being “judgemental,” and that this is contrary to what Christ taught.

    I believe this is a misinterpretation of the passage. In fact, if one wants an example of the claim that it is wrong to make moral judgements about other cultures in Scripture, the most explicit example actually comes from the men of Sodom in the story of Lot. When the men seek to sodomise Lot’s visitors, Lot condemns what they desire to do as a “wicked thing.” Their response is recorded as follows:

    “Get out of our way,” they replied. And they said, “This fellow came here as an alien, and now he wants to play the judge! We’ll treat you worse than them.” They kept bringing pressure on Lot and moved forward to break down the door.

    Here, the men of Sodom objected that Lot is from a different culture, and yet he dared “play the judge.” In my view, Jesus was not defending the men of Lot’s behaviour in Matt. 7:1–2. I think we need to look closer at this passage that is so often cited.

     2. What Is Wrong with the Common Interpretation?

    Why do I think this common interpretation is mistaken? Several reasons.

    First, the claim that it is wrong to judge other people has absurd implications. Just think about it for a minute. If it is wrong to judge other people, then—since Hitler was another person—it is wrong to say that what he did was wrong. To say that his actions were wrong is to make a judgement about them and, hence, to judge him. Similarly, Martin Luther King Jr. was wrong to criticise racism, and William Wilberforce was wrong to make moral judgements about the slave trade. Taken consistently, the claim that it is wrong to judge entails that we should have no legal system, no laws, and no courts, as all these things involve judging certain conduct as wrong and condemning and punishing those who engage in it.

    Second, not only would these historical and contemporary cases of judging be wrong, but if it were sinful to judge others, then much of the Hebrew Scriptures—parts that purport to describe people faithfully following God’s will—are, in fact, exercises in wrongdoing. The prophets offer, in some instances, scathing moral critiques of (and hence make moral judgements about) the actions of Israel, Judah, and also surrounding nations such as Assyria and Babylon. Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Amos, etc., in uttering such judgements, were engaging in sin. It is not just the Hebrew Scriptures that are implicated in wrongdoing. The opening chapters of the book of Romans contain a moral critique of both the Gentile and Hebrew cultures of Paul’s day. Here is an excerpt:

    Furthermore, just as they did not think it worthwhile to retain the knowledge of God, so God gave them over to a depraved mind, so that they do what ought not to be done. 29 They have become filled with every kind of wickedness, evil, greed and depravity. They are full of envy, murder, strife, deceit and malice. They are gossips, 30 slanderers, God-haters, insolent, arrogant and boastful; they invent ways of doing evil; they disobey their parents; 31 they have no understanding, no fidelity, no love, no mercy. 32 Although they know God’s righteous decree that those who do such things deserve death, they not only continue to do these very things but also approve of those who practice them.

    Paul made harsh moral judgements about other people.

    In fact, if one seriously believes that judging is wrong and contrary to the will of God, then Jesus was a sinner. Jesus, after all, made some very harsh judgements about the Pharisees and Sadducees throughout the Synoptic Gospels. In Matthew’s Gospel, on seven occasions he says, “Woe to you, teachers of the law and Pharisees, you hypocrites!” He proceeds to offer scathing criticisms of their religious and moral practices.

    On at least one occasion, Jesus criticises the Pharisees for not judging people in the correct way. In John 7:21–24, Jesus states:

    Yet, because Moses gave you circumcision (though actually it did not come from Moses, but from the patriarchs), you circumcise a boy on the Sabbath. 23 Now if a boy can be circumcised on the Sabbath so that the law of Moses may not be broken, why are you angry with me for healing a man’s whole body on the Sabbath? 24 Stop judging by mere appearances, but instead judge correctly.

    The problems with this interpretation of Matthew 7:1–2 do not stop there. A little reflection will demonstrate that the claim that it is wrong to judge other people is itself incoherent. It is what philosophers call a performative self-contradiction. To claim it is wrong to judge others is to make a moral judgement—it is to judge that a particular action is wrong. Moreover, when a person announces this to other people, he or she is implicitly making a judgement about other people’s actions. To utter “it is wrong to judge others,” therefore, is to engage in judging others.


  • “Is Jesus the only Way?” talk at Newhope Community Church

    Recently, I gave a talk at New Hope Community Church in East Auckland. This talk was on the topic “Is Jesus the only way?  I attach it here. 

  • Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part Three:


    This year the New Zealand apologetics organization Thinking Matters ran a “Confident Christianity Conference” in Auckland. I was asked to speak at this conference on the topic. Does Morality Need God? Below is a slightly streamlined version of the talk I gave.

    This brings me to my second contention: If God exists, a divine command theory would provide a coherent account of our fundamental assumptions about moral requirements.

    I outlined four assumptions about the kind of requirements morality imposes upon us. These were

    1. Inescapability: moral requirements apply to us irrespective of whether following them contributes to any ends or aims we currently desire.
    2. Impartiality: moral requirements are justified from an impartial perspective.
    3. Authority: agents always have conclusive reasons to do what is morally required and never have sufficiently good reasons for doing what is morally wrong.
    4. Accountability: if something is morally required, we are guilty and liable to blame if we fail to do it and lack an adequate excuse.  

    I will make three points.

    First, If God exists, the assumption that wrongness is identical to the property of being contrary to God’s command would coherently account for all these assumptions. Consider the fact that moral requirements are “inescapable.” If God commands someone to do something, this command is addressed to them, regardless of whether it contributes to any ends or aims they currently desire. So, the imperative in question is inescapable.  Similarly, consider the impartiality of moral requirements. God is an all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially benevolent, and impartial agent. So what God commands is co-extensive with prescriptions that a benevolent, impartial person who was fully informed and reasoning correctly would endorse.  A command is also a paradigmatic example of a prescription that involves a demand for which we hold people accountable through standard practices such as blaming. That is how a command differs from other prescriptions, such as a piece of advice or a suggestion. So, if the property of being morally required is identical to the property of being commanded by God,  we would expect it to be true that we are accountable to moral requirements.

    Second, if God exists, the thesis that wrongness is identical to the property of being contrary to God’s command would vindicate the assumption that it is always in our long-term self-interest to follow impartial demands. A divine command theory entails that moral requirements are what we are accountable to God for doing. Unlike human beings, God’s commands are co-extensive with what is demanded from an impartial point of view, and people can never violate these norms secretly without being detected.  

    Third,  all attempts to refute a divine command theory have failed. It’s widely claimed that divine command theories were refuted by an argument called “The Euthyphro Objection.” This objection is named after a dialogue written by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato in the 4th century BC. Plato’s original argument is somewhat obscure and applied only to polytheistic religions (those religions that believe in many gods). However, the version used by philosophers today is an adaptation of Plato’s argument for use against monotheistic faiths. Critics of divine command theories appeal to three arguments loosely associated with Plato’s dialogue. These are (1) the anything goes objection, (2) the arbitrariness objection, and (3) the vacuity objection. I will address each of these briefly in turn.

    The Anything Goes Objection

    One objection is that a divine command theory makes morality arbitrary because anything at all could be right or wrong. King and Garcia explain the alleged problem in this way:

    [Divine command theory] implies that it is possible for any kind of action, such as rape, not to be wrong. But it seems intuitively impossible for rape not to be wrong. So [Divine command theory] is at odds with our common-sense intuitions about rape.[1]

    This objection assumes it is possible for God to command rape. Divine command theorists contest this assumption. They do not contend that moral requirements depend on the commands of just anyone. They base moral obligations on the commands of God conceived in a particular way. God is an all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially loving, just, immaterial person who created the universe on their conception. Given this, the claim that God could command people to perform a horrendous act like rape holds only if it’s possible for an all-knowing, loving, and impartial person to command rape. This is unlikely. The reason critics use examples like rape is that they view them as actions that no virtuous person could ever knowingly entertain. However, suppose, for the sake of argument, it is possible for a just and loving, omniscient person to command rape. Rape would only be commanded in situations where a just and loving person, aware of all the relevant facts, could endorse it– and under these circumstances, it’s hard to see how one could take for granted it was morally wrong.

     Arbitrariness

    A pervasive objection is that divine command theories make morality arbitrary because that nothing is right or wrong prior to God’s command; God can have no reasons for issuing one set of commands instead of another. Oppy explains the objection.

    Could it have been, for example, that murder, rape, lying, stealing, and cheating were good because God proclaimed them so? Surely not! But what could explain God’s inability to bring it about that murder, rape, lying, stealing and cheating are good by proclaiming them so, other than its being the case that murder, rape, lying, stealing, and cheating are wrong quite apart from any proclamations that God might make?[2]

    However, this is implausible. Suppose God has character traits such as being essentially loving and impartial. In that case, God can and would have reasons for prohibiting actions like rape, murder, or cheating, quite apart from whether these actions are antecedently wrong. Antecedent to any command on God’s part, these actions won’t have the property of being morally prohibited. But they could still have other properties such as being cruel or harmful or unjust or detrimental to human happiness— or being expressions of hatred, for example. And a loving and impartial God could prohibit these actions because these actions have these non-moral properties.

    Divine command theories do not entail that morality is arbitrary. If anything, the opposite is the case. A divine command theory entails that actions will be wrong in virtue of certain non-moral properties those actions have. Non-moral properties would provide an informed, loving, and impartial person with reasons to prohibit those actions.

     Vacuity Objection

    A third objection is that divine command theories entail that the doctrine of the goodness of God is rendered vacuous. Someone can only be morally perfect if he has duties and acts in accordance with them. But, seeing God does not issue commands to himself, a divine command theory entails that God has no obligations. Consequently, God cannot be God.

    This objection assumes that God’s goodness should be explicated in terms of God faithfully discharging his duties. But there is no reason why we must understand God’s goodness in this way. In Christian creeds like the Westminster Confession, God’s goodness is understood as possessing certain character traits, such as being loving, impartial gracious, merciful, long-suffering, truthful, forgiving, etc. If God’s commanding an action makes it required, God cannot have an obligation to do these things; that does not mean God does not do them. God does not have to have a duty to do something in order to do it.

    To recap: unless we assume that prudential and impartial commands never conflict, we cannot account for our fundamental intuitions about morality. Second, secular accounts of the kind of accountability we have to morality undermine this assumption. Fourth, a divine command theory would, if true, both vindicate this assumption and coherently account for our fundamental assumptions about morality.  Finally, standard objections against a divine command theory fail. The conclusion is this. If we assume God exists, a divine command theory can coherently and defensibly account for these fundamental assumptions in a way a secular theory cannot.


    [1] Nathan L King, “Introduction”, in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 11.

    [2]  Graham. Oppy, Best Argument against God (Hampshire: Palgrave Pivot, 2014), 44.

  • Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part Two:

    This year the New Zealand apologetics organization Thinking Matters ran a “Confident Christianity Conference” in Auckland. I was asked to speak at this conference on the topic. Does Morality Need God? Below is a slightly streamlined version of the talk I gave.

    I outlined four assumptions about the kind of requirements morality imposes upon us. These were

    1. Inescapability: moral requirements apply to us irrespective of whether following them contributes to any ends or aims we currently desire.
    2. Impartiality: moral requirements are justified from an impartial perspective.
    3. Authority: agents always have conclusive reasons to do what is morally required and never have sufficiently good reasons for doing what is morally wrong.
    4. Accountability: if something is morally required, we are guilty and liable to blame if we fail to do it and lack an adequate excuse.  

    We can now turn to my first contention: secular accounts of morality cannot coherently account for these assumptions. I will make two points in support of this.

    The first is that unless prudential and impartial requirements never conflict, we won’t be able to account for these assumptions coherently.[1] Why think this? Suppose it is not always in one’s long-term self-interest to comply with impartial demands. Sometimes a particular type of practical dilemma will occur. Impartial demands will conflict with prudential requirements. When they do, we face the question: What reason is there to act impartially rather than in one’s self-interest? What reason do we have for always giving precedence to impartial demands in such cases? [2]

    One cannot answer this question by pointing out that we have impartial reasons to follow such rules based on the fact that other people will benefit or be harmed by our actions. The question, after all, is why I should give impartial reasons precedence in such cases. Nor can it be answered by appealing to my interests or because the case is one where morality and such things conflict. Many philosophers have argued that no answer is forthcoming. Three examples will illustrate the problem:

    Example #1. Ms. Poore has lived many years in grinding poverty. She is not starving but has only the bare necessities. She has tried very hard to get ahead by hard work, but nothing has come of her efforts. An opportunity to steal a large sum of money arises. If Ms. Poore steals the money and invests it wisely, she can obtain many desirable things her poverty has denied her: a well-balanced diet, decent housing, adequate heat in the winter, health insurance, new career opportunities through education, and so on. Moreover, if she steals the money, her chances of being caught are very low, and she knows this. She is also aware that the person who owns the money is well off and will not be greatly harmed by the theft. Let us add that Ms. Poore rationally believes that if she fails to steal the money, she will likely live in poverty for the remainder of her life. In short, Ms. Poore faces the choice of stealing the money or living in grinding poverty the rest of her life.[3]

    Example 2: A young woman has her heart set on getting into medical school. If she gets in, through hard work and dedication she will graduate and become a good physician. However, even after much study she has been unable to score high enough on the MCATs to be admitted to any medical school. She finds herself with an opportunity to cheat that will ensure her an MCAT score that is high enough to gain admittance to some medical school and so to eventually fulfill her lifelong dream. Her patients will not be harmed by being treated by an incompetent physician because she will not be an incompetent physician once she receives the necessary training. At most the only person who will be harmed is the person denied admittance to medical school because this young woman will take one of the available places and so leave one less slot to be filled. Assume that this person will only be slightly harmed and that somehow the young woman knows all this. It would be wrong for this young woman to cheat to get into medical school, but why isn’t it true that if she does not care about cheating, then what she has most reason to do is to cheat if she knows she can get away with it?[4]

    Example: 3 Suppose your son has robbed a rich man of his jewels, the police are after him, and he asks you to help him escape to Brazil. You know you can arrange things so that neither of you will get caught. You also know that if he is caught he will be sent to prison and his life will be ruined, but if he escapes, he will have a good life in Brazil. It would be wrong of you to help him escape, but why isn’t it true that what you have most reason to do is to help your son escape justice?[5]

    Cases like this suggest that, if impartial and prudential requirements conflict, agents don’t always have reasons to give precedence to the former. However, this means the total reasons in favor of doing what is impartially demanded will not always be stronger than the reasons against acting. Consequently, agents will not have conclusive reasons to do what they are morally required to do.

    We can summarize the conclusion here as an inference from three intuitively plausible premises:

    [1] Moral requirements are inescapable demands justified from an impartial perspective

    [2] agents always have conclusive reasons to do what is morally required

    [3] If there are cases where impartial and prudential requirements clash, then either (a) agents have reasons to always give precedence to impartial demands in such cases or (b) agents do not always have conclusive reasons to follow impartial demands.

    [4] agents do not always have reasons to give precedence to impartial demands in such cases.

    If these premises are all correct, we must either embrace the assumption that impartial and prudential demands never conflict or embrace a contradiction. We cannot claim both those moral requirements are inescapable and impartial and claim that agents have conclusive reasons to follow them. 

    Second, secular accounts of the kind of accountability we have to morality would, if true, undermine this assumption. They entail that impartial and prudential requirements do sometimes conflict. I noted earlier that if something is morally required, we are accountable for doing it. Historically, many understood this in terms of accountability to God. However, God cannot play that role in a secular theory. What does? Atheist philosopher Walter Sinnott Armstrong answers: “human beings” do. “We each have the authority to hold people responsible for violating moral duties. If my neighbor steals jewelry from his grandmother, then surely, I have the authority to criticize him and his action…You do, too.” [6] “Morality is enforced verbally by public condemnation or socially by ostracizing violators.” [7]. In addition, “we all have the authority to vote for representatives who enforce moral norms through formal institutions, such as by legal punishments…. We collectively have the authority to impose such sanctions.” [8]

    These kinds of sanctions might account for our being accountable to moral requirements. However, they are insufficient to ensure that it is always in everyone’s self-interest to comply with impartial requirements. The” norms enforced through legal punishments,” “public condemnation,” or “social ostracization” are often not justified from an impartial point of view. Laws often endorse or permit unjust practices that fail to take the interests of a segment of society into account. The accepted mores of the groups people belong to, such as nations, and gangs, often are designed to advance the interests of the group over and above those of others. The mores we legally and socially enforce are often unjustified by facts and sound reasoning. The laws of a society can and often do persecute people who act impartially. There are familiar cases where a person becomes a member of a social group where acting immoral enhances their social status, whereas doing what is right results in social ostracization.

    Even if these norms were co-extensive, agents would not be held to account in cases where a person can violate these norms secretly without being detected. There also will be cases where whatever sanctions are incurred will be more than offset by the benefits gained by non-compliance. There will be many cases where a person knows that it is extremely unlikely they will be caught, and the risk of punishment or sanction is more than outweighed by the benefits one receives from disobeying.[9]

    In summary, unless we assume that prudential and impartial commands never conflict, we cannot account for our fundamental intuitions about morality. Second, secular accounts of the kind of accountability we have to morality undermine this assumption. This means that secular accounts of morality cannot coherently account for our fundamental assumptions about morality.


    [1] The argument from this section is influenced by the argument proposed by Henry Sidgwick (1900) The Methods of Ethics Book IV, chapter VI available at https://www.gutenberg.org/files/46743/46743-h/46743-h.htm#Page_496 and also John Gay (1731) The Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality available at https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/wollaston-british-moralists-vol-2#lf1368-02_head_022  I adapt their ideas in my own way. David Brink develops a similar line of argument; see David Brink, “A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Morality” and also “Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority, and Supremacy” in In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. (Oxford University Press, 1997). 255–291 

    [2] See, for example, David Brink, “Self-Love and Altruism” Social Philosophy & Policy 14 (1997) 123.

    [3] This example comes from C. Stephen Layman’s “God and the Moral Order” Faith and Philosophy, 23 (2006): 307

    [4]  This example comes from Bruce Russell’s “Two Forms of Ethical Skepticism,” in Louis Pojman, Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings (New York: Wadsworth, 1998), p. 595.

    [5] Ibid 595,

    [6] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 98.

    [7] Ibid, 98.

    [8] Ibid,

    [9] These last two paragraphs summarize the argument of Henry Sidgwick in “The Method of Ethics” see Book II, chapter V.  available at https://www.gutenberg.org/files/46743/46743-h/46743-h.htm#Page_162 accessed 25/8/22

  • Thinking Matters Talk: Does Morality Need God? Part One

    This year the New Zealand apologetics organization Thinking Matters, ran a “Confident Christianity Conference” in Auckland. I was asked to speak at this conference on the topic. Does Morality Need God? Below is a slightly streamlined version of the talk I gave.

    “If God does not exist, then everything is permissible.” These words from Ivan Karamazov in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers of Karamazov express a widely held intuition that moral requirements depend upon God’s existence. Most contemporary ethicists today would dismiss this intuition. In this talk, I will argue their dismissal is premature. I will defend what philosophers call a divine command theory of ethics. The thesis that moral wrongness is (identical to) the property of being contrary to God’s commands.[1] Where God is understood, in orthodox fashion, as a necessarily existent, all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially loving and just, immaterial person who created and providentially ordered the universe. 

    Note three things about this thesis:

    First, it is a thesis about the nature of moral requirements. It is not a thesis about the nature of goodness. The concept of “good, is ambiguous, as is seen by the following statements “I had a really good dip in the spa pool last night,” Or “going on a low carb diet is good for you.” Or “Carlos the Jakal was a good hitman.” The concept of the morally obligatory, or morally required, is not identical to the concept of what it is good to do. It might be good, even saintly, for me to give a kidney to benefit a stranger, but it is not an act I am obliged to do.[2] 

    Second, my thesis is that the property of being morally required is “identical” to the property of being commanded by God.  I am not saying that people cannot know what is right and wrong unless they believe in God. Nor am I claiming that the word “wrong” means “contrary to God’s command.” These are distinct claims. Consider light; Light is identical to a certain visible range of the electromagnetic spectrum. But obviously, that isn’t the meaning of the word “light.” People knew how to use the word “light” long before discovering its physical nature. And they knew the difference between light and darkness long before they understood the physics of light. Analogously, we can know the meaning of moral terms like “right” and “wrong” and know the difference between right and wrong without being aware that the moral requirements are God’s commands.[3]

    Third, this is a thesis about the relationship between God and morality. It is not a claim about the relationship between the bible and morality. The thesis I laid out does not mention any sacred text such as the Bible, Quran, Hadith, Torah, or Talmud. While many divine command theorists accept that God has revealed his commands in an infallible sacred text, some do not. The claim that God’s commands are contained in some sacred text is not part of or entailed by a divine command theory itself. It is the result of other theological commitments they have. One could consistently be a divine command theorist without holding this. Divine command theories are ecumenical; they have had advocates within the Christian, Islamic, Jewish, and even deist traditions.

    Having clarified my thesis, I will defend three contentions.

    • Secular accounts of morality cannot coherently account for our fundamental intuitions about moral requirements.
    • If God exists, then a divine command theory can coherently account for our fundamental intuitions about moral requirements.
    • Standard objections to divine command theories fail.

    I. Four Assumptions about Moral Requirements

    But first, what do I mean by fundamental assumptions? Moral theories are tested, in part, by how well they account for various assumptions about morality implicit in our moral thought and practice. [4] I will begin by listing four plausible assumptions about the type of requirements morality imposes upon us.

    One is that moral requirements are inescapable: they apply to us irrespective of whether following them contributes to any ends or aims we currently desire.  Consider a criminal who stands in the dock convicted of a crime; he openly admits the crime, is unrepentant and informs us that he wanted to kill and torture. Doing so did not frustrate any of his desires. Does our moral condemnation of him depend on us assuming he does not have statistically abnormal desires so that we withdraw this judgment when we discover he really does desire to kill and maim?  Moral requirements can’t be escaped or begged off by noting they don’t fulfill one’s goals or ends. [5]

    Second moral requirements are requirements that are justified from an impartial point of view. Peter Singer explains:

    The ‘Golden Rule’ attributed to Moses, to be found in the book of Leviticus and subsequently repeated by Jesus, tells us to go beyond our own personal interests and ‘love thy neighbour as thyself’ – in other words, give the same weight to the interests of others as one gives to one’s own interests. The same idea of putting oneself in the position of another is involved in the other Christian formulation of the commandment, that we do to others as we would have them do to us. The Stoics held that ethics derives from a universal natural law. Kant developed this idea into his famous formula: ‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.’ Kant’s theory has itself been modified and developed by R. M. Hare, who sees universalisability as a logical feature of moral judgments. The eighteenth -century British philosophers Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith appealed to an imaginary ‘impartial spectator’ as the test of a moral judgment, and this theory has its modem version in the Ideal Observer theory. Utilitarians, from Jeremy Bentham to J. J. C. Smart, take it as axiomatic that in deciding moral issues ‘each counts for one and none for more than one’; while John Rawls, a leading contemporary critic of utilitarianism, incorporates essentially the same axiom into his own theory by deriving basic ethical principles from an imaginary choice in which those choosing do not know whether they will be the ones who gain or lose by the principles they select…. One could argue endlessly about the merits of each of these characterisations of the ethical; but what they have in common is more important than their differences. They agree that an ethical principle cannot be justified in relation to any partial or sectional group. Ethics takes a universal point of view[6]

    Third moral requirements have practical authority: agents always have conclusive reasons to do what is morally required and never have sufficiently good reasons for doing what is morally wrong. Someone has conclusive reasons to act in a certain way when the reasons in favor of acting, taken together, are stronger than any set of reasons we may have to act in some other way.  If we don’t always have conclusive reasons to do what is right, having total allegiance to morality will be arbitrary and, at worst irrational.   We will have no more reason to do what is right than wrong. Or doing the right thing will be doing what we have a most reason not to do.[7]

    Moral requirements are supposed to answer questions about what we are to do. They are considerations that guide our actions.  When we learn something is wrong, that tells us what we are not to do. They cannot do this if we lack conclusive reasons to do what they say.  Suppose you and I are discussing whether it is my duty to donate to the red cross. You convinced me it is my duty to do so. The red cross knocks on my door. I refuse to donate. I suspect this would puzzle you; didn’t I concede that I had a duty to do it? If I responded with “yes, I am persuaded it is my duty to do it, but that doesn’t mean I have reasons to do it,” I suspect you would think I was missing something. I would deny moral requirements have any authority or claim on my behavior and don’t address the question, “what ought I do?”.[8]

    Or suppose you heard that I had resigned from my high-paying job. You think I am nuts. How am I going to provide for my family? Why would I give up the career I always dreamt of? I tell you, I discovered the firm was engaging in unethical business practices, and I had to resign to avoid being complicit. On hearing this, wouldn’t it now make sense that I did this? I was justified in doing so. If you do, you are assuming that the fact an action is wrong justifies my refraining from doing it.[9]

    Fourth, a final assumption is that if something is morally required, we are accountable for doing it in an important sense.  John Stuart Mill famously stated,

    “We do not call anything wrong unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it—if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures, if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. This seems the real turning point of the distinction between morality and simple expediency.”[10]

    There is a conceptual link between something being morally obligatory and something being blameworthy. If we do what is morally wrong without excuse, others can legitimately blame us, and guilt is warranted. Moral requirements conceptually are demands people make upon one each, which we can hold each other accountable through demanding an excuse, practices of blaming, criticizing, and guilt.

    Robert Adams asks us to imagine a situation in which there are compelling reasons to support you not walking on the lawn. However, these reasons give you no grounds for feeling guilty if you do, and they provide no reasons for other people to make you feel like you must stay off the lawn or to blame and reproach you for doing so. Adams concludes that while there would be a sense in which you ought not to walk on the lawn, you have no obligation not to do so.[11]

    So, whatever property moral wrongness is, it is the property of being prohibited by certain standards: standards that are inescapable and justified from an impartial point of view. The fact these standards prohibit an action means agents have conclusive reasons not to do the action in question. Agents are also accountable for actions doing actions prohibited by these standards. Others can blame and sanction me if I act contrary to them without an adequate excuse. A plausible thesis about the nature of moral wrongness should account for these facts.

    In my next post, I will defend my first contention: that secular accounts of morality struggle to coherently account for these four assumptions.


    [1] Robert M. Adams, “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again,” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979): 76.

    [2] Example from C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 16.

    [3] This illustration comes from William Lane Craig see “Is Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural? The Craig-Harris Debate” available at  https://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/debates/is-the-foundation-of-morality-natural-or-supernatural-the-craig-harris-deba/) accessed 19 August  2022.

    [4] The implicit method here is described in Richard Joyce’s “Theistic Ethics and the Euthyphro Dilemma,” Journal of Religious Ethics 30 (2002): 68-69;”

    [5] Richard Joyce, “Mackie’s Arguments for an Error Theory,” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/moral-error-theory.html, accessed 20/4/17).

    [6] Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 11

    [7] This argument is adapted from C. Stephen Layman’s “God and the Moral Order” Faith and Philosophy, 23 (2006): 306- 307

    [8] This example comes from Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 1994) 6

    [9] This example comes from C Stephen Layman’s “A Moral Argument for The Existence of God” Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 53-54

    [10] John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, chapter 5 available at https://www.utilitarianism.com/mill5.htm accessed 23 August 2022

    [11] Robert M. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 238.