Category: Atheism

  • Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Secularism and “reasons” to be moral. Part two: Do unselfish reasons answer the question, “Why be moral?”

    ***

    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong discusses the following objection:

    “Harming others is sometimes in some people’s best interest, even considering probable costs. In those cases, some theists say that only a divine threat of Hell provides a reason to be moral. Since atheists and agnostics do not believe in God, they do not believe in divine retribution for sins, so they have to admit that sometimes some people could get away with immorality and then they have no self-interested reason to be moral. Does that mean that these people have no reason at all to be moral?”[1]

    He responds to this argument as follows:

    No. That conclusion would follow only if every reason had to be self-interested, selfish, or egoistic. There is no basis for that assumption. Many reasons are not based on self-interest. That should be common ground between theists and atheists… The fact that an act prevents harm to another person can be a reason for me to do that act. The fact that an act causes harm to another person can be a reason for me not to do that act. These facts are reasons, even if the other people are strangers. Crucially, these reasons are not self-interested. They are facts about the interests of other people, not me. These unselfish reasons can answer the question, “Why be moral?”[2]

    Here, Sinnott-Armstrong makes three points. First, the argument in question assumes that “all reasons are selfish.” Second, this assumption is false—“it should be common ground between theists” that there are also “unselfish reasons,” based on the fact that certain acts harm others. Third, these “unselfish reasons” can answer the question: why be moral?

    Do non-selfish reasons answer the question: “Why be moral?”

    I discussed the first point in a previous post. In this post, I will discuss the third: do the non-selfish reasons he appeals to answer the question “Why be moral?”

    In my previous post, I noted that the question “Why be moral?” can be understood in two ways. Armstrong’s interlocutor could be asking:

    (a) whether, in the given circumstances, we have a pro tanto reason to refrain from harm; or
    (b) whether, in those circumstances, we have decisive reasons not to harm.

    I also pointed out that interpreting the question in terms of (a) is idiosyncratic. The way the question is commonly used—and the most plausible understanding of it—is in terms of (b).

    Whether an appeal to unselfish reasons answers the question “Why be moral?” depends on how you interpret the question. If we interpret it in terms of (a), then the fact that an action harms another person would answer the question. Sinnott-Armstrong’s hypothesis is that the property of being morally wrong is constituted by the property of harming another person. Suppose the fact that an action harms another person provides a pro tanto reason not to do that action—in that case, we have a pro tanto reason not to do what is wrong.

    The problem is that this is an extremely weak and idiosyncratic rendition of the skeptical challenge. As Mark Murphy points out:

    It would be helpful if Sinnott-Armstrong had named an opponent here who thought that this was the real challenge for the nontheistic ethicist. The worry is not characteristically expressed by theistic ethicists in terms of whether there is any reason to do what is morally right in the absence of God; the worry is characteristically expressed in terms of whether there could be overriding, or decisive, reason to do what is all-things-considered morally required.[3]

    In my last post, I pointed out that in his writings on moral skepticism, Sinnott-Armstrong himself has noted that the “Why be moral?” question is not normally understood in terms of whether there is “sometimes some kind of reason to be moral.” Instead:

    “A more plausible and common version of practical moral skepticism denies, instead, that there is always an adequate (or non-overridden) reason to do what is morally required.”[4]

    If we interpret the question in terms of (b), Sinnott-Armstrong’s appeal to the fact that an action “harms” another person does not answer the question “Why be moral?” His interlocutor argues that if a secular meta-ethical theory is true, then certain kinds of practical dilemmas will occur. What is prudentially required will be an act that harms others. We will therefore have self-interested or prudential reasons to do the act, and unselfish reasons not to do it. If such dilemmas occur, we face a question: What reason is there to act unselfishly rather than in one’s self-interest? What reason do we have for always giving precedence to impartial demands in such cases?

    Murphy explains:

    “The worry is that there are different kinds of reason that can pull in different directions, and it is not obvious that there is any practical error in choosing against a more impartial point of view by going with the more partial point of view.”[5]

    If I face a dilemma between two options—doing an act that harms others or doing an act that is contrary to my own interest—pointing out that one option involves harming others doesn’t solve the dilemma. What we need is some reason for always treating the impartially based demands as having precedence. Sinnott-Armstrong provides no such reason. In fact, later in the chapter, he is candid that he cannot give any such reason. He writes:

    The fact that an act causes harm to others is a reason not to do that act, and the fact that an act prevents harm to others is a reason to do that act. There is, then, always a reason to be moral on this secular account. And often these reasons are adequate, because they are strong enough to make it rational (or not irrational) to be moral….
    Nonetheless, some people still wish for a reason that is strong enough to motivate everyone to be moral and also to make it always irrational to be immoral. I doubt that secular moral theories can establish that strong kind of reason to be moral. For people who really do not care about others, the solution is found in retraining or restraining rather than in theory. (emphasis mine)[6]

    Note what is being said here: Armstrong is saying that if the best secular accounts of morality are true, agents do not always have all-things-considered reasons to do what is morally right. Sometimes they will, and sometimes they will not. In these latter cases, people will have adequate—and possibly even conclusive—all-things-considered reasons to violate moral norms. The solution to this is an appeal to naked force. What we need to do is force these people to act in ways that they have sufficient or decisive reasons not to act.

    This seems an inadequate answer. Consider the following analogy: critics of monotheistic religions like Christianity, Judaism, or Islam often ask, “What reason do I have to adopt your religion?” This is not a question of belief but of action. Adopting a religion involves living a certain way. Skeptics ask: What reasons do I have to commit to faithfully following what you take to be God’s commands, especially when doing so often goes against my aims or interests?

    Imagine a theist responded to this as follows: “You don’t have compelling reasons to do this. In fact, you have good reason not to do this. The balance of reasons does not support such a commitment and may in fact be against it. However, if you don’t convert, I will persecute you.” Would any religious skeptic think their concerns had been answered?

    In the same way, I suggest that no one who was not already committed to secular morality would find Sinnott-Armstrong’s response here adequate.

    Later, Armstrong offers a different answer:

    Is this limitation a problem for secular accounts of morality? I doubt that, too. If we demand this extreme kind of reason to be moral, then we are bound to be disappointed. The solution to our disappointment is to give up this demand, not to imagine a higher power that we want to fulfill an illegitimate demand. Besides, this limit on secular theories would be a problem only if the alternative religious account could provide a better reason to be moral. It can’t. That is what I will show in the next section.[7]

    Here, Sinnott-Armstrong’s position appears to be twofold:

    First, the fact that a secular theory cannot answer the question “Why be moral?” is only a problem if religious theories can answer that question adequately. If they cannot, then this is a problem for all theories—and hence not a reason to favour one over another.

    Second, he claims that a religious theory cannot answer this question either. In fact, he seems to think no theory can. The appropriate response, he suggests, is to give up the demand.

    In a future post, I will examine Sinnott-Armstrong’s reasons for these two claims. I will argue that they fail.


    [1] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 114

    [2] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 117

    [3] Mark Murphy’s, Morality Without God, available at https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/morality-s-without-god-s/ accessed 28 August 2025

    [4] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Practical Moral Skepticism, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/supplement.html accessed 28 August 2025

    [5] Mark Murphy’s, Morality Without God, available at https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/morality-s-without-god-s/ accessed 28 August 2025

    [6] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 117-118

    [7] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Morality Without God 118

     

  • Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Secularism and “reasons” to be moral. Part One:

    In his book Morality Without God, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that a secular account of the nature of moral properties—namely, that wrongness is constituted by the property of harming others—is preferable to a theistic account, in which wrongness is identified with the property of being contrary to God’s commands

    Chapter 6 is entitled “Why be moral?”
    In this chapter, Sinnott-Armstrong attempts to rebut the idea that secular meta-ethical theories—such as the one he proposes—cannot provide an adequate answer to this question.

    Sinnott-Armstrong begins his discussion by citing an argument that purports to show that secular accounts of morality cannot answer the question: why be moral? He summarises the argument as follows:

    “Harming others is sometimes in some people’s best interest, even considering probable costs. In those cases, some theists say that only a divine threat of Hell provides a reason to be moral. Since atheists and agnostics do not believe in God, they do not believe in divine retribution for sins, so they have to admit that sometimes some people could get away with immorality and then they have no self-interested reason to be moral. Does that mean that these people have no reason at all to be moral?”[1]

    He responds to this argument as follows:

    No. That conclusion would follow only if every reason had to be self-interested, selfish, or egoistic. There is no basis for that assumption. Many reasons are not based on self-interest. That should be common ground between theists and atheists… The fact that an act prevents harm to another person can be a reason for me to do that act. The fact that an act causes harm to another person can be a reason for me not to do that act. These facts are reasons, even if the other people are strangers. Crucially, these reasons are not self-interesting. They are facts about the interests of other people, not me. These unselfish reasons can answer the question, “Why be moral?”[2]

    There are some infelicities in the way this argument is described and set up. Sinnott-Armstrong’s version of the argument relies solely on the appeal to fear of Hell and divine retribution. He doesn’t, for example, couch the argument in terms of hope of eternal life. Moreover, in the paragraphs leading up to this one, he gives a sarcastic, literalistic reading of the Book of Revelation on the topic of Hell. These all rhetorically prime negative reactions in the reader; they also border on crude caricature.

    However, in this post and in future ones, I will focus on what I take to be the main thrust of Sinnott-Armstrong’s response to this argument. Sinnott-Armstrong makes three points. First, he argues that this argument is only sound if one assumes that “every reason” is “self-interested.” Second, he argues that this assumption is false. It should be granted by both theists and non-theists that there are “unselfish reasons” based on the fact that an action will “harm” (or benefit) other people. Third, he contends these unselfish reasons can answer the question of why they are moral.

    Does the argument assume that all reasons are selfish?

    Let’s look at the first point: does this argument assume that all reasons are selfish? That depends on how one interprets the phrase “reasons to be moral” and the rhetorical question “Why be moral?”

    When we talk of “reasons” to act, we can mean one of two things. Sometimes the word “reason” functions as a mass noun, referring to what we have decisive reasons to do—what we have reasons to do all things considered, when we consider everything that counts in favour of an action and against it. Alternatively, the word “reason” can function as a count noun, referring to what we have a pro tanto reason to do—what we have reason to do all else being equal. Here we ask whether there is anything that by itself counts in favour of the action.[3]

    An illustrative example: It is a rainy day, and I have to walk fifteen minutes outside to the bus. The fact I will get wet if I don’t take an umbrella is a pro tanto reason to take an umbrella. The fact that carrying an umbrella is cumbersome is a pro tanto reason against it. When I consider all the relevant factors—the burden of carrying the umbrella and the prospect of getting wet—I conclude that I have decisive, all-things-considered reasons to carry it.[4]

    Sinnott-Armstrong’s interlocutor asks: if we are not accountable to God for our actions, and harming someone promotes our long-term self-interest, what reason do we have to refrain from doing harm? He could mean two things:
    (a) He could be asking whether, in the given circumstances, we have a pro tanto reason to refrain from harm; or
    (b) He could be asking whether, in those circumstances, we have decisive reasons not to harm.

    If he means (a), then Sinnott-Armstrong’s criticism seems on point. The interlocutor is assuming that all reasons are selfish. He is saying that if it is not in our self-interest to avoid harming others, then there is no consideration of any sort at all against harming them. This follows only if all reasons are selfish.

    I suspect that this is how Sinnott-Armstrong interprets the argument in question. The problem is that this is a very idiosyncratic understanding of the question “Why be moral?” Normally, in philosophical discussions, this is not what is meant by the question.[5]

    Consider what  Sinnott-Armstrong himself writes in his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on moral skepticism. He writes about a form of skepticism known as “practical skepticism,” which asks the question:

    “Why be moral?” This question is used to raise many different issues. Almost everyone admits that there is sometimes some kind of reason to be moral. However, many philosophers deny various universal claims, including the claims that there is always some reason to be moral, that there is always a distinctively moral reason to be moral, and/or that there is always enough reason to make it irrational not to be moral or at least not irrational to be moral…
    Practical moral skeptics usually deny that there is always enough reason for moral action.[6]

    In a supplementary paper, he explains:

    What such practical moral skeptics deny is that I always have reason to do what is morally required… Practical moral skeptics do not deny that there is sometimes reason not to do what is morally wrong. After all, some wrongdoers are caught and punished. However, practical moral skeptics can still deny that there is always reason to do what is morally required or to avoid what is morally wrong.
    How much reason? Some practical moral skeptics claim that sometimes there is no reason at all to do what is morally required. If all reasons are self-interested, this means that sometimes doing what is morally required does not serve the agent’s interest in any way. That extreme position would be refuted if doing what is morally wrong always creates even a slight risk of some negative repercussion. A more plausible and common version of practical moral skepticism denies, instead, that there is always an adequate (or non-overridden) reason to do what is morally required. To establish this position, practical moral skeptics need only one case where there is overriding reason not to do what is morally required. (emphasis mine)[7]

    So, according to Sinnott-Armstrong himself, if we interpret the rhetorical question “Why be moral?” charitably—in a way that reflects how the question is commonly used—it is not a denial that agents lack any pro tanto reasons to do what they are required to do. Instead, the interlocutor is challenging the idea that agents always have decisive reasons to refrain from harm when doing so is contrary to their self-interest.

    Suppose we interpret Sinnott-Armstrong’s interlocutor in terms of (b). In that case, he is arguing as follows: if there are cases where harming another is in our self-interest, then we will not always have all-things-considered reasons to refrain from harm. This argument does not assume that all reasons are selfish. Even if there are unselfish reasons based on the fact an action harms others, these reasons will not always be stronger or weightier than the selfish reasons we have to the contrary. One can accept that we have a pro tanto reason to do an action and also admit that when one considers everything that is relevant—for and against—the total balance of reasons does not support it.

    We can conclude our discussion as follows: Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim—that his interlocutor’s argument rests on a false assumption, namely that all reasons are selfish—is true if one interprets the question “Why be moral?” in an idiosyncratic and uncharitable way, contrary to how the question is typically used. However, if the question is interpreted charitably, in line with its usual philosophical usage, then  Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim is false.


    [1] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Morality Without God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 114

    [2] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Morality Without God 117

    [3] See Stephen Darwall, “What Are Moral Reasons?” The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 12 (2017): 2. Available at https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/What%20Are%20moral%20reasons.pdf accessed 28 August 2025

    [4] See Stephen Darwall, “What Are Moral Reasons?” 2-3

    [5] This point is made by Mark Murphy’s review, Morality Without God, available at https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/morality-s-without-god-s/ accessed 28 August 2025

    [6] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Moral Skepticism, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/index.html accessed 28 August 2025

    [7] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Practical Moral Skepticism, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/supplement.html accessed 28 August 2025

  • Is Theism Incompatible with the Pauline Principle? Comments on James Sterba’s Argument from Evil

    My paper, “Is Theism Incompatible with the Pauline Principle?” has been published in a special issue of Religions, devoted to the topic Do We Now Have A Logical Argument From Evil? The abstract is as follows:

     

    This paper criticises James Sterba’s use of the Pauline principle to formulate a logical version of the problem of evil. Sterba’s argument contains a crucial premise: If human agents are always prohibited from doing some action, God is also prohibited from doing that action. This implies that the Pauline principle applies to both Divine and human agents. I argue that any Theist who affirms a divine command theory of ethics can consistently and coherently deny this premise and its implication. If a divine command theory is coherent, a theist can affirm that the Pauline principle governs human agents’ actions but not God’s actions. I will also criticise Sterba’s criticisms of a divine command theory and argue that they fail.

     

    Enjoy.

  • Dawkin’s dilemma: How not to answer the question “Why Be Moral?”

    In his bestselling book, the God Delusion, Richard Dawkin’s responds to the question: “If there is no God, Why be good?”Richard Dawkins

    Posed like that, the question sounds positively ignoble. When a religious person puts it to me in this way (and many of them do), my immediate temptation is to issue the following challenge: ‘Do you really mean to tell me the only reason you try to be good is to gain God’s approval and reward or to avoid his disapproval and punishment? …If you agree that, in the absence of God, you would ‘commit robbery, rape, and murder’, you reveal yourself as an immoral person, ‘and we would be well advised to steer a wide course around you’. If, on the other hand, you admit that you would continue to be a good person even when not under divine surveillance, you have fatally undermined your claim that God is necessary for us to be good.[1]

    Dawkin’s thinks someone who asks “if there is no God, why be moral?” is assuming that the Gods approval is the only reason they to do good. He attacks this assumption with a dilemma. Either this assumption is true, or it is not true. If it is true, the questioner reveals themself to be an immoral person. He is someone who refrains from theft, murder and rape only because God will punish him. We should shun and avoid someone like this. If the questioner’s assumption is not true, then the claim that there is no reason to do good without God is undermined. The fact he would continue to do what is right, even if God did not exist shows that he does have reason to do good even if God does not exist. 

    I think each step of this response is mistaken. 

    First, is it true that this question presupposes that threat of divine punishment is the only reason anyone has to refrain from immoral behaviour? I think the answer is clearly no.

    The question “why be good?” or “why be moral?” This question has a long history in western thought question going back at least as far as Plato’s republic. John Tilly explains that according to the standard interpretation of the question, it involves: 

    A request for a justification for giving precedence to moral reasons for action when such reasons conflict with other reasons (e.g., those of self-interest). Whenever moral reasons recommend one course of action and nonmoral reasons recommend another, why should I favor the first set of reasons? What argument could persuade me to do[2]

    This simple question has proved difficult to answer. So much so that, the 19th-century Philosopher Henry Sidgwick declared it to be “The profoundest problem in ethics”. During the 17th-19th[3] centuries, several philosophers argued this recalcitrant problem posed difficultly for any purely secular understanding of morality. Thomas Reid’s (1710–1796) summary is typical.

    What about cases where concern for our happiness on the whole conflicts with a concern for duty? This is a merely imaginary conflict; there can’t actually be any such opposition between the two leading principles. While the world is under a wise and benevolent administration, it’s impossible that any man should be a loser by doing his duty. So every man who believes in God, while he is careful to do his duty, can safely leave the care of his happiness to his Maker. He realizes that his most effective way of attending to his long-run happiness is by attending to his duty. But consider the case of an atheist who wrongly thinks his virtue is contrary to his happiness on the whole. … this man’s dilemma is without remedy. It will be impossible for him to act so as not to ·seem to himself to· contradict a leading principle of his nature. He must either sacrifice his happiness to virtue, or his virtue to happiness, and he has to decide whether it is better to be a fool or to be a knave! [4]

    Reid points out that the “why be moral?” challenge presupposes the existence of a dilemma: what duty requires contradicts what my long-term happiness requires. Because the “the world is under a wise and benevolent administration” Reid thinks such dilemmas are “imaginary”. They never, in fact, occur. However, they would occur if, contrary to fact, God did not exist. So, if atheism is true, some answer to this dilemma is needed if morality’s rational authority is to be vindicated.

    Nothing in this line of argument assumes that the only reason Reid has to do good is divine reward or punishment. Reid speaks of a dilemma between “two rational governing principles in the constitution of man.” [5]. A dilemma occurs when one has two options, both of which are problematic. We do have powerful moral reasons independent of our self-interest demanding us to do what is right. But we also have powerful prudential reasons pointing the other way. For Reid, Divine sanctions mean that prudential reasons never really point the other way. But they are not the only reasons in the equation. Reid is not atypical in this. Someone who asks, “if there is no God, why be good?” need not assume the only reason he or anyone else has for doing good is divine reward or punishment.

    However, let’s suppose for the sake of argument they did assume this. Dawkin’s attempted rebuttal of this assumption fails. Consider Dawkin’s discussion of the dilemmas first horn.

    “If you agree that, in the absence of God, you would ‘commit robbery, rape, and murder’, you reveal yourself as an immoral person, ‘and we would be well advised to steer a wide course around you’.[6]

    Dawkin objects that anyone who answers “yes” reveals themselves to be an immoral person. That may be true. But it is also irrelevant in this context. Remember what the question is: Dawkin’s interlocutor asks the question “Why we should always do what is morally right when it contradicts our self-interest?”. To answer, “because if you don’t, you are acting immorality” misses the point. Dawkin’s interlocutor knows it is immoral to act contrary to immorality. He is instead asking why he should side with morality and not self-interest in the first place.

    An illustration might help here. Imagine that a religious sceptic was asking “If God exists, why should I do what he says”? I doubt Dawkin’s would consider the response “because God tells you to and if you don’t, you aren’t following God” to be a satisfactory answer. The question is “why to obey God?”, answering “because God tells you to”  begs the very question at issue.

    The same thing is true when the question is “if there is no God, why be good”. Dawkin’s interlocutor is asking “if God does not exist, why always do what is required by morality”? The response “if you don’t you are immoral” begs the question in the same way. Just as the theist cannot cite God’s commands as a reason for obeying God’s commands, the atheist cannot cite moral requirements as a reason for obeying moral requirements.

    So Dawkin’s treatment of the first horn misses the point. What about the second horn? Dawkin’s writes.

    If, on the other hand, you admit that you would continue to be a good person even when not under divine surveillance, you have fatally undermined your claim that God is necessary for us to be good.[7]

    This confuses two separate questions. The original question was “why should you be good, without God”. The questioner doubts we always have reasons to do always what is right. However, this doubt is compatible with admitting that one would continue to do what is right without God. What you should do and what you would do are not the same thing. Dawkin’s argument here was anticipated and responded to by Henry Sidgwick :

    It was no use to say that if I was a moral hero, I should have formed a habit of willing actions beneficial to others which would remain in force, even with my own pleasure in the other scale. I knew that at any rate, I was not the kind of moral hero who does this without reason; from blind habit. Nor did I ever wish to be that kind of hero: for it seemed to me that that kind of hero, however admirable, was certainly not a philosopher. I must somehow see that it was right for me to sacrifice my happiness for the good of the whole of which I am a part.[8]

    Sidgwick accepts that if I am a highly moral person, I will have formed a habit of doing good actions. These habits will mean I will have a strong disposition to continue doing good when I believe it is not in my self-interest. But, this does not show that I really do have a reason for doing this. I could be just acting out of blind habit and prior commitment to morality. One possible response to the question, “why be good?” is to admit there is no reason and affirm we “must simply decide between the moral life and its alternatives.” [9] People can sometimes make arbitrary non-rational leaps of faith where they commit to some form of life without reason or rational grounds. If people never did this, the whole raison d’être for writing The God Delusion is undermined. The fact that morally upright people admit that they would always do what is right in the absence of God. Doesn’t show they have reasons to do so.

    Lets recap: Someone asks a serious sceptical question about Dawkin’s beliefs. His response is first to express outrage at an “ignoble.” [10] question and claim it is a “conversation stopper.” [11]. Then he paints a very uncharitable and inaccurate picture of the person who dares ask this ignoble question. Suggesting that religious believers who raise this sceptical challenge reveal themselves to be selfish egoists, amoral people we should consider shunning. When the believer objects that he isnt, in fact, an amoralist, Dawkin’s takes that as evidence the believer doesn’t really accept the sceptical challenge. The subtext is that anyone who really harboured this doubt about secular morality is a dangerous psychopath we are well-advised to keep away from. 

    For the reasons spelt out above, none of this count as a good answer to the question: why be moral without God” There may, or may not, be a good answer to this question. But if there is Dawkin’s doesn’t provide it. This seems to be more a case of passive-aggressive rhetorical bullying than substance. He responds to a sceptical question, not by answering it. But with sarcastic outrage, an insinuation the questioner is dangerous, evil, and should be shunned for asking the question. These are the kind of tactics one expects from cult leaders or so-called religious fundamentalists. One doesn’t expect it from someone who is supposed to be a proponent of rational scientific free inquiry. 


    [1] Richard Dawkin’s, The God Delusion (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2006) 226-227

    [2] John Tilley, “Two (Faulty) Responses to the Challenge of Amoralism” available at https://www.pdcnet.org/wcp20-paideia/content/wcp20-paideia_1998_0044_0248_0253 accessed 26/1/21 

    [3] Examples include Rene Descartes, John Locke, George Berkeley, John Gay, John Brown, Edmund Law William Paley, Thomas Reid, and Immanuel Kant, perhaps most famous for pressing this difficulty is Henry’s Sidgwick.

    [4] Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, III iii. viii, 4 see http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/reid1788essay3part3.pdf accessed 12 January 2020

    [5] See, Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, III iii. viii, 4 seehttp://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/reid1788essay3part3.pdf accessed 12 January 2020

    [6] Dawkins, God Delusion, 227

    [7] Dawkins, God Delusion, 227

    [8] See, Henry Sidgwick “Method of Ethics” Preface to the sixth edition.

    [9] See Tilley, Two (Faulty) Responses to the Challenge of Amoralism” available at https://www.pdcnet.org/wcp20-paideia/content/wcp20-paideia_1998_0044_0248_0253 accessed 26/1/21

    [10] Dawkins, God Delusion, 226

    [11] Dawkins, God Delusion, he has no answer to the question and hence nothing to say. 

  • The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Response to Erik Wielenberg (Part three)

    In Part One, I expounded the Psychopath objection to divine command meta-ethics (DCM) that has recently been defended by Erik Wielenberg. Wielenberg argues as follows:

    R1) If God commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes an obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.

    [1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise) 

    [2] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued no divine commands. (from 1 and R)

    [3] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT). 

    [4] But there are no psychopaths who have no moral obligations. 

    [5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)

    In my last post, I contended this argument is crucially ambiguous; the word “obligation” occurs in both R1 and [3] and [4]. However, one can use the word “obligation” in an objective and a subjective sense. Objective obligatoriness (or rightness or wrongness) is the deontic status that an action has in virtue of its actual circumstances and consequences” By contrast, “Subjective obligatoriness (or rightness or wrongness) is the deontic status an action has in virtue of the agent’s beliefs about its morally relevant circumstances and consequences” (Smith (2010), 4)

    I contend that the distinction between objective and subjective obligation makes trouble for the Psychopath Objection. For the argument to be logically valid, and avoid committing the fallacy of equivocation, the word “obligation must be used the same way in both premise [R] and premise [4]. When one examines Wielenberg’s argument; however, we find this is not the case. If we interpret the word obligation in the “subjective sense” premise [4] is not justified by the evidence Wielenberg offers. By contrast, if we interpret obligation in the objective sense, then [R] is unjustified.

     The Subjectivist Interpretation

    Let us begin first by interpreting [R] and [4] in the subjective sense:

     (R1 Subjective) If God’s commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes a subjective obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.

     

    [1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise) 

    [2*] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued commands that generate no subjective obligations. (from 1 and R) .

     [3*] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no subjective moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT). 

    [4S] But there are no psychopaths who have no subjective moral obligations. 

    [5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)

    If we interpret [4] in terms of [4S], then Wielenberg must contend not just that Psychopaths have objective obligations’ but also that they are subjectively obligated to refrain from immoral activity. He must hold that Psychopath’s act contrary to their own non-culpable recognition of what morality requires. The data he cites, however, does not support this. Consider the following examples, which Wielenberg cites to support premise [1] 

    The mainstream view of psychopaths in contemporary psychology and philosophy has it that they have significant neurological deficits that leave them with an absent or significantly diminished capacity for love, compassion, and guilt. They are often described as lacking conscience and are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands…(emphasis added) (Wielenberg (2018), 5)

    ‘Since their dysfunctional conscience does not stimulate moral feelings, psychopaths do not become aware of the constraints required to understand that they have obligations. Their conscience does not make them responsive to the constraining power of morality’..(Emphasis added) (Ibid., 6)

    About one in twenty-five individuals are sociopathic, meaning, essentially, that they do not have a conscience … The intellectual difference between right and wrong does not bring on the emotional sirens and flashing blue lights, or the fear of God, that it does for the rest of us. … ‘[Psychopaths] do not appear… to be aware of the need to justify actions which infringe moral rules … [and] do not really understand the concept of morality’… ‘Psychopaths do not merely behave contrary to moral standards . . . but seem in some sense not even to understand the notion of a moral standard in any “serious” sense. (Emphasis added) (Ibid., 5-6)

     

     Even more, telling is the conclusion Wielenberg draws from this data.

    Notice that the problem here is not that DCT implies that psychopaths are not responsible for their immoral actions. There are robust philosophical debates about the extent to which psychopaths are legally or morally responsible for their actions (see, e.g. Malatesti & McMillan (2010) ). ….However, as far as I can tell, all parties to these debates would accept the claim about psychopaths upon which the argument of this article depends: psychopaths cannot grasp the authority and force of moral demands. As Erick Ramirez puts it, ‘psychopaths are said to suffer from moral blindness. Philosophers disagree on whether this moral blindness exempts them from responsibility for their bad behavior’ (Ramirez (2013), 244). As this remark suggests, the moral blindness of psychopaths is widely taken for granted – and that moral blindness of psychopaths is the foundation of the central argument of this article. Accordingly, the problem for DCT that I have advanced here is not that it implies that psychopaths violate moral obligations but are not (legally or morally) responsible for doing so; rather, the problem is that DCT implies that psychopaths have no moral obligations to violate in the first place. (Wielenberg (2018), 8)

    This data, if accurate, undermines the claim that Psychopaths have subjective obligations. The evidence does not-unequivocally support the idea that they do what is wrong, given what they non-culpably believe about the situation. Wielenberg concedes Psychopaths are “morally blind” may “lack a conscience” “do not understand the concept of morality” and “lack the constraints necessary constraints required to understand that they have obligations.” His claim they have obligations carries no implications that they are culpable of their actions or culpably act contrary to what they discern to be obligatory. Consequently, [4S] is unjustified. [4] is only justified if Wielenberg is using obligation in the objective sense. 

    Objectivist Interpretation

    This leads us to consider next an “objectivist” interpretation of the argument.

      (R1 Objective) If God’s commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes an objective obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force. 

     

    [1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise) 

    [2**] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued commands that generate no objective obligations. (from 1 and R) .

     [3] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no objective moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT). 

    [4O] But there are no psychopaths who have no subjective moral obligations. 

    [5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)

     

    If [4] is interpreted in terms of [4O], then [4] is plausible. Even if Pscyopath’s suffer from “a moral blindness” which prevents them from recognising their objective obligations, it is implausible to think Psychopaths lack objective moral requirements. 

    The problem is that now (R1 Objective) is no longer plausible. We saw above that Wielenberg argues for R by contending that standard responses to the promulgation objection rely on it. Wielenberg argued:

    A distinctive feature of DCT is that a given human being has moral obligations only if a divine command is somehow communicated to that human being. This aspect of the theory is emphasised by many proponents of the theory. For example, Adams writes: ‘A command does not exist or have any force unless it is issued – that is, unless, it is in some way communicated’ (R. Adams (1999), 263). In defence of this position, Adams memorably remarks that ‘[g]ames in which one party incurs guilt for failing to guess the unexpressed wishes of the other party are not nice games. They are no nicer if God is thought of as a party to them’ (ibid., 261) (Wielenberg (2018), 2)

    He immediately continues:

    Stephen Evans similarly emphasises the importance of divine communication in this passage:

    A law that was passed in secret and never revealed to anyone would hardly be binding on the citizens of a state. It is true that it is often said that ignorance of the law is not a valid excuse for not obeying the law, but this principle surely assumes that the law in question is a matter of public record and that the individual who should obey the law could have known about it. Something similar must hold for moral laws as well. (Evans (2013), 37) 

    In accordance with Adams’s view that ‘[i]n order to exist, a command… .must be communicated to those who are subject to it’ (R. Adams (1999), 263), I shall henceforth use ‘command’ to mean obligation-bestowing command. On this usage, no divine command is issued unless it imposes some moral obligation on those to whom it is issued (Ibid.)

    This argument does not, however, seem plausible if by R we mean (R1 objective). On the face of it, Adam’s and Evan’s are using the word “obligation” in the subjective sense in these paragraphs. 

    Consider Adam’s first, Adam’s repudiates a “picture of divine-human relations, one in which the wish of God’s heart imposes binding obligations without even being communicated, much less issuing in a command.” This is because “Games in which one party incurs guilt for failing to guess the unexpressed wishes of the other party are not nice games. They are no nicer if God is thought of as a party to them.” In this passage, the phrase “binding obligation” is being used synonymously with “incurring guilt”. The problem he is addressing is that that one cannot incur guilt unless one non-culpably knows what is required. This best fits the concept of a subjective obligation. 

    We can say similar things about Evan’s. Evans states that a law “passed in secret” would not be “is binding” on citizens. However, he explains what he means next sentence; it is about whether someone has a valid excuse due to non-culpable ignorance. Evans is talking about an obligation of which one is not culpably ignorant and so incurs guilt for violating. So, Evan’s is plausibly talking about a subjective obligation. 

    Conclusion

    My conclusion, therefore, is that Wielenberg’s latest round in the dialectic on divine command meta-ethics is unsuccessful. His new Psychopathy objection commits the fallacy of equivocation. When he claims that God’s commands, do not impose an obligation unless the commandee is capable of recognising the requirement as both authoritative and as having imperative force he uses the word objective either in a subjective or objective sense. If he has in mind the former, then the very data he cites does not support his claim that Psychopaths have moral obligations. If he uses the word in an objective sense, then divine command theorists are not committed to denying Psychopaths have moral obligations.


    Adams Robert Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics [Book]. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1999.

    Evans C Stephen God and Moral Obligation [Book]. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.


    Smith Holly
    The Moral Clout of Reasonable Beliefs [Book Section] // Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics / book auth. Timmons Mark. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2010. – Vol. 1.

    Wielenberg Erik Divine command theory and psychopathy [Journal] // Religious Studies. – 2018. – pp. 1-16.

  • Is Naturalism simpler than Theism? Some reflections on Graham Oppy’s “Best argument against God”

    In Best Argument Against God (BAAG) Graham Oppy sketches a sophisticated argument for atheism. Oppy’s conclusion is the result of applying a particular method to the question of God’s existence. He contends that question of Gods existence should not be determined by examining the arguments for and against the existence of God. Instead philosophy of religion :“is concerned with the clash between theistic and atheistic worldviews (or theories),” The correct way to proceed is: “(1) to develop the best theistic and atheistic theories; (2) to assess the liability of these best theories to internal defeat; and (3) to make an assessment of the comparative theoretical virtues of these best theories, paying attention to simplicity, fit with data, explanatory scope, predictive accuracy, and the like.”[1] The putative data being such things as that “there is something rather than nothing; there being a universe; there being natural laws; there being cosmic fine-tuning; there being rational, conscious agents; there being moral laws; there being dictates of conscience; and so forth.”[2]

    Oppy argues that when this method is followed, there is a good reason to reject the existence of God. He contrasts Theism with naturalism:     the view that “that causal reality is natural reality” and “no supernatural causes exist”.  Looking at how each worldview accounts for such things as the existence of the universe, fine-tuning, morality and various other “putative data”.

     While Oppy thinks both theism and naturalism can provide defensible, coherent theories and that fit the data; naturalism is a preferable worldview because it is simpler. One theoretical virtue we use to asses’ theories is simplicity: “If everything else is equal, we should prefer the more simple theory to the less simple theory.”[3] Oppy argues that  “prior to the introduction of data, naturalism trumps theism on the grounds of simplicity and that none of the data that we consider favours theism over naturalism.”[4]

    I think Oppy claim that “prior to the data naturalism is simpler than theism” is mistaken. It is this claim that I will discuss in this post.

     Oppy’s argument for the simplicity of naturalism 

    Let’s begin by asking why Oppy thinks naturalism is simpler than Theism? Oppy’s argument is succinct:

    Naturalism is simpler than Theism: it postulates fewer kinds of entities, fewer kinds of primitive properties and fewer kinds of primitive principles. According to Theism, there are two kinds of entities – natural and supernatural – whereas according to Naturalism, there is only one kind. According to Theism, there are two kinds of causation – natural causation and supernatural causation – whereas according to Naturalism, there is only one kind.[5]

    There are three ideas here: First,  Oppy claims that [1] According to naturalism there is only one kind of entity and one kind of causation. Natural entities and natural causes.   By contrast [2] theism postulates two kinds of entities and causes, natural and supernatural. Third, Oppy thinks [3] the fact theism postulates more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism means naturalism is simpler. I think each of Oppy’s premises is questionable.

    Criticism of Oppy’s argument

    Does Naturalism postulate only one kind of entity?
    Let us begin with [1] the claim that according to naturalism there is only one kind of entity and one kind of causation. There are two potential problems here.

    First, this conclusion is incompatible with Oppy’s own definition of naturalism. Oppy defines naturalism as follows: “Naturalism says that causal reality is natural reality: the domain of causes is nothing more nor less than the natural world.”[6]  However, according to this definition, naturalism is simply the denial of supernatural causation. It says nothing whatsoever about whether non-natural entices or properties exist, such entities and properties are perfectly possible, provided they don’t enter into causal relationships.

    This brings me to the second problem, let’s suppose for the sake of argument naturalism did contend that only natural properties and entities exist.  This wouldn’t mean that only one kind of entity or property existed. Oppy states:

    Any suitably elaborated naturalism will hold that some features of the natural world are primitive – not susceptible of further explanation – whereas other features of the natural world are fully explained in terms of those primitive features. Thus, for example, some naturalists suppose that all of the primitive features of the natural world are physical features – i.e. features that lie in the proper domain of the discipline of physics. Other naturalists suppose that there are features of the natural world – for example, the psychological states of human beings – that cannot be fully explained in terms of the fundamental physical properties. The key point to note is that all naturalists suppose that there are no supernatural causal properties[7]

    Here Oppy here suggests that when he refers to natural features, properties and he isn’t using this word to refer to one kind of thing, such as material or physical things. Rather the natural world consists of multiple different primitive properties.

    Does theism postulate two kinds of entities and two kinds of causes?

    This brings us to [2] Oppy’s claim that theism postulates two kinds of entities and causes, natural and supernatural. I think this is false. theism is the claim that God exists, hence according to theism a supernatural being with supernatural causal powers exists. But theism by itself, prior to the data, entails nothing about the existence of natural entities or natural causes.

    Nor is this a picky pedantic point because there are prominent forms of theism which affirm neither the existence of natural entities or natural causes. Let’s look first at the question of “natural entities” Some theists notably George Berkeley and Jonathan Edwards have been idealists. According to idealism, the only things that exist are immaterial minds or souls.  Physical objects are purely phenomenal: a physical object is a collection of sensations a mind has such as a perception of shape, colour, a feeling of texture, a smell, and a there is no underlying material substratum to such objects which exist only as sensations in immaterial human or divine minds.    Of course, Idealism has always been a minority view. Most theists today realists: they believe that physical objects do have an underlying substratum, distinct from mental sensations, which exists in space and time and God creates and sustains material objects in being.

    The point, however, is that theism is part of and compatible with both idealism and realism. Whether a Theist postulates the existence of distinct natural entities or not depends on how he accounts for some of the purported data particularly the data that: “there is something rather than nothing; there being a universe; there being rational, conscious agent’s”. Prior to the data, theism affirms only that a supernatural being exists.

    The same point can be made regarding “natural causation”.  Whether there exists natural causes distinct from God’s supernatural causation has been, and is, a matter of dispute amongst Theists. Many theists have advocated concurrentism. Concurrentism is the view that God created the material world with certain natural causal powers and He sustains it in existence, moment by moment, and concurs with the causal transactions that take place in it.  According to concurrentism, while distinct natural properties have natural causal powers exist, they do so by God͛’s creating and sustaining activity, and they require God ͛ s concurring causal activity to operate.

    By contrast, occasionalists have denied the existence of distinct natural causes. All causation is reducible to the supernatural causation of God.    If objects, like fire, appear to cause another object, like cotton, to burst into flame, this is because God has decreed that when a fire is placed next to cotton, cotton will burn.  Natural causation does not involve powers inherent in nature; it occurs because there is a pre-existing law of nature that dictates that when certain events happen, other events will follow.  These laws of nature just are divine decrees.  The result is that all so-called natural causation is really divine causation.  God is the only and sole cause in nature. [8]

    Theism itself a part of and compatible with both concurrentism and occasionalism. Whether a theist postulates the existence of distinct natural causes or not depends on how he accounts for some of the purported data particularly the data that “there are laws of nature”.  Prior to the data, theism affirms only that a supernatural being exists.

    1. If theism postulates more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism, does it follow that naturalism is simpler?

    This brings us to Oppy’s third claim: that if theism postulates more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism does, then naturalism is a simpler worldview. This to contradict the criteria of simplicity which Oppy himself explicitly offers.  Oppy elaborates the criterion of simplicity as follows:

    (a) Simplicity: If everything else is equal, we should prefer the more simple theory to the less simple theory. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer (and less complex) primitive entities. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that invokes fewer (and less complex) primitive features. If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that appeals to fewer (and less complex) primitive principles.[9]

    This doesn’t say that all else being equal we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer entities.  It states that “If everything else is equal, we should prefer the theory that postulates fewer (and less complex) primitive entities.”Oppy thinks that on any view of the world there will be features which are ‘primitive’; features that are “not susceptible of further explanation” whereas other features of the world are “fully explained in terms of those primitive features” and it is the number, and complexity of primitive features not the number of features per se that is relevant to simplicity.

    Consequently, even if theism does postulate more kinds of entities and causes than naturalism does, it doesn’t follow naturalism is simpler.  This will only follow if Theists hold that these additional types of causes and entities are primitive. This, however, is not the case.  As Oppy himself states, according to theism “God is the cause of the existence of the natural world, and the source or ground or origin of most – if not all – of its significant features.”[10]  Consequentially, the natural causal order isn’t a primitive unexplained entity.


    [1]  Graham Oppy “What Derivations Cannot Do” Religious Studies (2015) 51, 328

    [2] Oppy, “What Derivations Cannot Do”, 51

    [3] Graham Oppy. The Best Argument against God (Palgrave Pivot) (p. 18). Palgrave Macmillan. Kindle Edition

    [4] Oppy, Graham. The Best Argument against God (Palgrave Pivot) (p. 18). Palgrave Macmillan. Kindle Edition.

    [5] Ibid 19

    [6] Ibid 19

    [7] Ibid, 13

    [8] Both within Islamic and Christian intellectual circles there was a rigorous metaphysical debate between concurrentism and occasionalism.  Various Islamic philosophers such as al-Ash͛ari (873-935) founder of the influential Asharite school of Islamic philosophy, and Al  Ghazali  (1055-1111),  all expounded occasionalism.  It was also embraced by Christian theologians, such as Nicholas of Autrecourt (1300-1350).  Pierre d’Ailly (1351-1420), and Gabriel Beil  (1420-1495). George Berkeley, (1685 – 1753) Nicholas Malebranche (1638 – 1715). More recently, it has been defended by John Foster and Alvin Plantinga.

    [9] Oppy, Best Argument against God, 14

    [10] Ibid, 12

  • Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and NCEA Religious Studies: Part Four

    This is a talk I gave to the New Zealand Association of Philosophy Teachers annual conference at St Cutherberts College in September this year. Several people have asked me to make this talk available.

    I have broken my talk up into four parts. Part One introduces what philosophy of religion. In part two I will outline two movements within analytic philosophy during the early to mid-century which I think resulted in religious beliefs not being taken very seriously within philosophy and philosophy of religion taking a fairly minor role. Part three will look at some responses to these movements offered in the late 20th century and how they changed the philosophical landscape. Part four will look at the question of “how to do philosophy of religion” comparing the methods used by two different atheist’s J L Mackie and Graham Oppy, and how this relates the National Certificate of Educational Achievement Standards. This post will contain part four.


    How to do Philosophy of Religion: A tale of Two Religious Skeptics

    I think the demise of verifications and the questioning of evidentialism then changed the landscape of philosophy of religion dramatically.  A good way of highlighting the change is to compare the work of two philosophers who probably have made the most rigorous cases for atheism in the last fifty years.

    The first is J L Mackie’s work “The Miracle of Theism” published in 1982. Mackie’s work was for many years the definitive defence of atheism in Philosophy; I quoted Mackie above, let’s look again:

    If it is agreed that the central assertions of theism are literally meaningful, it must also be admitted thatJohn_Leslie_Mackie they are not directly verified or directly verifiable. It follows that any rational consideration of whether they are true or not will involve arguments . . . [i]t [whether or not God exists] must be examined either by deductive or inductive reasoning or if that yields no decision, by arguments to the best explanation; for in such a context nothing else can have any coherent bearing on the issue. (Mackie, Miracle of Theism, 4-6;)

    The second, atheist I want to look at is Graham Oppy; Oppy is a philosopher at Monash University, his book Arguing about God, is rightly hailed as the best contemporary attack on the theistic arguments and he is, in my view, the leading defender of philosophical atheism writing today.  Here is what Oppy says in an article “What Derivations can do” published in 2015.

    Philosophy of religion should not be about the standard array of ‘arguments for and against the existence of God’. Indeed, philosophy of God should not be about the standard array of ‘arguments for and against the existence of God’. In so far as philosophy of religion – or philosophy of God – is concerned with the clash between theistic and atheistic world-views, the proper way to proceed is: (1) to develop best theistic Oppyand atheistic theories; (2) to assess the liability of these best theories to internal defeat; and (3) to make an assessment of the comparative theoretical virtues of these best theories, paying attention to simplicity, fit with data, explanatory scope, predictive accuracy, and the like (  Oppy “What Derivations Cannot Do” Religious Studies (2015) 51, 328

    The contrast between these two writers is illustrative.

    Mackie focuses on the fact that the claim that God exists isn’t verifiable. He acknowledges the collapse of verificationism: despite not being directly verifiable the central assertions of theism are meaningful. However, he does think this lack of verifiability places a burden of proof on the Theist. The Theist is required to produce arguments for Gods existence. Deductive, abductive, inductive, arguments presumably from premises which ultimately are verifiable in this way.  Oppy, by contrast, doesn’t focus on whether the claim “God exists” is verifiable. His focus is on this belief, embedded in broader philosophical theories, verification, when it occurs, is applied to theories.

    An even clearer contrast is over evidentialism.  Mackie affirms evidentialism. He contends that “any rational consideration” of the question of God’s existence depends on the Theist providing “deductive, abductive, inductive arguments for Gods existence. “Nothing else can have any coherent bearing on the issue. Oppy however explicitly repudiates this he states Philosophy of religion should not be about the standard array of ‘arguments for and against the existence of God.”

    Instead, Oppy suggests that the important question is what happens when people utilise theological assumptions in philosophy. Theists and atheists will reason from their prospective presuppositions and construct theories which attempt to answer important philosophical questions. Questions such as “why is there something rather than nothing?” “why are there and what are laws of nature”? “what are moral obligations” and so forth? Philosophy of religion is about how defensible these theories are. Can they be defended against objections, do they provide coherent answers to these questions, and how do the answers they give compare with each other.

    Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and NCEA Achievement Standards.
    You’ll probably guess my sympathies lie with Oppy, and it’s at this point that I think it’s interesting to look at the NCEA standards for Religious Studies

    One barrier to doing Philosophy in secondary schools is the fact there are no nationally recognised qualifications for the subject. There is an absence of any standards for philosophy under NCEA. Many people in this organisation have been lobbying for the government to introduce philosophy as a NCEA subject and I support this cause.

    However, I want to suggest that if one looks at the standards which already exist for NCEA religious studies. There is already in the curricula plenty of scope for doing contemporary Philosophy of religion. In fact, if you move away from an excessive focus on the arguments for and against Gods existence and ask about religious and secular theories, NCEA asks and requires students to engage in contemporary philosophy of religion. The most obvious is the final achievement standard for level 3 NCEA:

    Analyse the key beliefs of a religious tradition and a secular worldview in relation to ultimate questions

    This sounds very much like the method Oppy refers too. Here students are asked to look at secular and religious worldviews and the theories they offer in response to critical philosophical questions. They are told to analyse these views: to discern their key premises and assumptions. When one looks, however, at the Merit and Excellence criteria for this standard it asks students to do work out the implications of these different answers, and to evaluate them, that sounds very much like Contemporary Philosophy of Religion.

    Similarly, in level Three, NCEA asks students to analyse a religious tradition(s) in Aotearoa New Zealand.  And analyse the response of a religious tradition to an ethical issue. Here, again, students are asked to analyse, to work out the assumptions and presumptions, assess the implications significance and evaluate the case for and against particular theories about right and wrong this is all contemporary philosophy of religion.

    Of course, there are challenges to doing philosophy of religion under NCEA. NCEA classifies Religious Studies as a subset of the social sciences, and some moderators tend to interpret the words analyse or implications in more sociological senses. But, if we understand what it actually is to analysis a religious tradition or its response to an ethical issue or how it answers an ultimate question, then we are doing philosophy.

    And I think this applies not just to level three religious studies where the standards require analysis. Consider the level two standard.  “Explain the key beliefs within two religious traditions in relation to a significant religious question.” This uses the word “explain” however the standard defines a significant religious question. As questions regarding ” life after death, the nature of God, the existence of suffering, good and evil, the nature of the human being.” To get an achieved they have to compare how traditions answer these questions. But For merit and excellence, they are asked to ask questions about the significance and what are the implications of these views. This is asking students to engage in philosophical reflection: its asking, if these answers were true what follows, what difference would it make why is it important and so on.

    Even the more descriptive level 1 standards have this, level 1, for example, asks students to “Describe key beliefs of a religious tradition” this sounds purely descriptive however to gain a merit and excellence students are asked to think through the significance of these beliefs, to look at links between the beliefs and to ask questions about their implications. Done well, this has the potential to foster a lot of philosophical reflection on the beliefs in question.

    Conclusion

    So in conclusion, Philosophy of religion involves “the philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts involved in religious traditions”. This has been done by assuming a default position of religious scepticism and examining the arguments for and against religious beliefs or asking if religious beliefs are verifiable and meaningful and the temptation is for this to be the modus operandi in philosophy courses in secondary school.

    I am suggesting a different approach. Today Philosophy of religion is much broader; it involves looking at the answers religions have offered to some of the most profound philosophical answers, developing these as charitably and defensibly as possible and seeing if they can stand against objections. Finally, it involves asking whether religious views of the world answer these questions in a better and more plausible way than secular views do. Interestingly, as worded, this is the sort of questions  NCEA  Religious Studies achievement standards ask of students.

    This means there is plenty of scope for doing Philosophy of religion as part of Religious Studies programs. It is my hope that those of us who want to see philosophy taken seriously in the secondary sector can, where appropriate, use the current NCEA   standards to develop religious studies programs, which ask students to take these questions seriously. To get them to understand clearly various religious perspectives on various issues, to wrestle with them, significance and implications, to compare them to alternative religious or secular theories, and to critically consider the answers given.

    I think this is an important part of a general education. Today’s students grow up in a philosophically pluralistic society, moreover, at a certain point in anyone’s life they will be confronted with different answers to very pressing existential questions, questions which are unavoidable, people will want to know who they are and how they should live. Avoiding these questions or allowing people to be uninformed and ignorant of how others answer them isn’t education. To allow people to be informed about different question’s and to think through carefully and honestly what these answers are, there significance and implications, and to critically evaluate them is in my view what Philosophy at the secondary level should be all about. So, I suggest that Philosophy programs at secondary school start to take seriously religious studies and religious studies take seriously philosophy of religion.