Category: Philosophers

  • The Battle of the Bills: A Review of the Craig – Cooke Debate

    My small idea of getting Dr William Lane Craig to have a debate at Auckland University ended up being an event that far exceeded my expectations. Despite the New Zealand Association of Rationalists and Humanists (NZARH) booking a larger lecture theatre at the last minute we still had to open up three additional lecture theatres with live video feeds and we still had people sitting on the floor! Question time had to be extended because of the interest. The range of people in attendance was excellent; hardened skeptics, evangelical Christians and everyone in between, young and old, high school students through to tertiary faculty.

    My experience within the tertiary sector and NZ Christiandom has lead me to believe that despite the secular and popular veneer one sees in New Zealand culture and often in the church, there is a real interest in questions about God, religion and morality. The reaction last night to a civil, rational, intellectual exchange over these issues confirms my suspicion that not only are people hungry for articulate and well thought out answers to these questions but that they can handle these answers coming in a sophisticated and academic manner; the trend of dumbing down these issues in order to be seeker friendly or to have lay appeal is misguided.

    Anyway to the debate; the moot was “Is God a Delusion?” Bill Craig opened by defining a delusion, in accord with the dictionary, as a false belief. He then contended (A) there are no good reasons for thinking atheism is true; and, (B) there are good arguments or reasons for believing in God.

    In support of (B), he summarised five arguments which he has defended in more detail in the Philosophical literature, very briefly they were: (i) the Kalam Cosmological argument (God is the best explanation for the origin of the Universe); (ii) The New Teleological argument (God is the best explanation for the fine-tuning of the Universe); (iii) The Meta-Ethical Moral argument for theism (God is the best explanation for the existence of objective moral norms); (iv) God is entailed by the best explanation of certain facts about the historical Jesus and his resurrection; and, finally, (v) a brief summary of Plantinga’s thesis that immediate experiences about God provide prima facie grounds for affirming that God exists.

    Cooke’s opening was disappointing. I am not saying this because I am a theist and he is not, I have read many skeptical Philosophers who provide brilliant and powerful arguments for atheism (Paul Draper and Michael Tooley are obvious examples) and although I disagree with them I think they provide challenging cases that I can respect. However, Cooke did not follow their lead. Instead Cooke opened by defining atheism as the claim that “we do not know what the word God means.” Cooke then went on to state he does not think Thiesm is false but is rather a distraction. His argument then appeared to consist of claims that the concept of God has evolved throughout history, that this belief has been used by some to commit atrocities and to not follow important social and political reforms. He stated that there are numerous other accounts of God and there are non-cognitive forms of Liberal Christianity which are more helpful to the humanistic aims he shares.

    Cooke also stated his distaste for a debate format where there were rebuttals. He alluded briefly to the problem of evil; however, he did not offer or defend any of the rigorous probabilistic arguments from evil proposed in the literature by people such as Tooley, Draper and Rowe. A crucial premise of many probabilistic arguments from evil is that God has no adequate reasons for allowing the evils which exist in the world. Craig (along with many Philosophers of Religion such as Wykstra, Plantinga, Van Inwagen, Tooley, Alston) has argued this premise is unwarranted as no reasons have been given for thinking the premise is true. The arguments on this topic are fairly detailed but not complex. Cooke did not offer a rebuttal but simply declared Craig’s position as distasteful.

    In rebuttal, Craig noted that Cooke’s definition of atheism was incorrect. He quoted from a standard philosophical encyclopedia a definition of atheism as the belief that God does not exist which is quite different to Cooke’s definition which is actually something more like verificationism. Craig also offered a definition of what he means by God so Cooke could be clear on the meaning of God for the purpose of the debate. Craig then pointed out that Cooke had not offered any arguments for atheism in his speech. He had dismissed a response to the problem of evil but had not argued for it.

    Much of the rest of Cooke’s speech was irrelevant as the question was not whether God had good political consequences but whether theism was true. Even if a belief is the result of social evolution over time, it does not entail that it is false (people’s understanding of democracy has evolved over time, it does not follow that democracy is mistaken because it has evolved and developed over time). Craig also noted that the truth or falsity of a belief is a separate issue from the conduct of those who hold to the belief. Similarly, the fact that a belief distracts some people from certain causes does not necessitate that it is false.

    Craig also pointed out contradictions in Cooke’s speech. Cooke had stated that he did not contend that theism is false but later on he had stated that God was a human invention. Craig also noted that merely pointing out that other theologians disagree with Craig’s cognitive theism and offer alternative accounts of God does not show Craig’s position is false. The existence of differing opinion on a matter does not render the matter false, the reasons offered are what must come under scrutiny.

    Cooke’s rebuttal of Craig was weak. Cooke responded briefly to the meta-ethical moral argument noting that theists and atheists are both aware of certain moral truths and should work together on certain worthy projects. This response, as Craig pointed out, confuses the question of whether an atheist can know moral truths with the question of whether atheism can provide an adequate meta-physical foundation for these truths. Cooke’s position that human beings have no real significance, that morality was simply an evolved convention of some sort, was, in essence, a concession of the meta-ethical argument.

    Cooke addressed the Kalam Cosmological argument and New Teleological argument by stating that he was not a cosmologist and neither was Craig. He also suggested Craig’s knowledge of the historical facts surrounding Christ were mistaken, that scholars disputed the alleged facts Craig appealed to. He suggested that Craig was not familiar enough with Gerd Ludemann whose later works Cooke himself had read.

    Unfortunately for Cooke, Craig was able to counter these claims. First, as noted Craig has studied contemporary cosmology; he did his doctoral work on the theological implications of big bang cosmology and has authored a book on it as well as several published articles. In addition, he has debated Gerd Ludemann and co-written a book with him and so could point out that Ludemann in fact did accept the facts he appealed to. Moreover, Craig could produce published review articles that surveyed the voluminous literature on the subject and the results showed that the consensus was as Craig had suggested. Craig also produced a fairly amusing illustration from Kai Neilson (perhaps more ironic given that Cooke frequently cites Kai Neilson in his debates) which illustrated the counter-intuitive nature of asserting that something could come out of nothing by nothing.

    Cooke did make another claim that Craig did not counter, which was that scientific discoveries are subject to change and so it is questionable to base theological claims on such an unstable foundation. This may be a valid point, the problem is it would appear to uncut a key motif of Cooke’s rationalism. After all, don’t rationalists promote science as a source of knowledge and often attack Christian belief because it allegedly conflicts with science?

    So in my opinion Craig was the clear winner. He offered five arguments, Cooke offered weak responses to which Craig adequately responded. Cooke at times refused to argue at all and kept trying to address side issues and did not really offer a case for atheism.

    Of course it needs to be noted in fairness, that in many respects this was a mismatch. Craig is one of the best Philosophers of Religion in the world. He has published hundreds of articles defending arguments for God’s existence in the philosophical literature and is an extremely experienced debater. Cooke is a historian of the history of free thought with little or no publications in this area. Some of Craig’s previous debate with philosophical heavyweights like Michael Tooley and Quentin Smith were less one-sided.

    I thought some of the real interesting issues and arguments came out in the Q&A. Robert Nola from the Philosophy department made an important point about the New Teleological argument noting that the fact that something is highly improbable does not mean it is irrational to hold to. Craig’s response was probably not as clear as it could be, he noted that the fine-tuning argument is not based merely on the claim that fine-tuning is improbable but rather that fine-tuning constitutes an improbable sequence of patterns. (Craig has made this point more thoroughly in the literature.)

    Ray Bradley, a retired Philosophy Professor, raised a version of the deontological problem of evil noting that God seems to violate certain moral duties such as do not kill. Craig’s response was that if one holds to a divine command (DCT) theory of ethics then right and wrong are constituted by God’s commands. From this, it follows that because God does not issue commands to himself, he does not have duties. If God has no duties then God cannot violate any.

    However, this is not the full story; one powerful objection to a DCT is to note that God could command abhorrent things like torture and hence a DCT would entail the counter-intuitive conclusion that torture is morally required. Divine Command theorists (like Craig and myself) typically avoid this objection by noting that God is perfectly virtuous and hence there are certain things he would not command. Bradley’s question could be rephrased in terms of whether a virtuous person would command or do these things and Craig’s initial response would not settle this but there are plenty of lines of thought in the literature which could.

    In another exchange Bradley raised the issue of Hell noting that the book of revelation portrays this as a place of eternal torment in fire. Craig pointed out that such passages are in fact highly metaphorical and do not in fact say what Bradley thinks they do. Cooke responded by stating that Craig was being inconsistent he sometimes takes the bible literally and sometimes figuratively and Craig (who has a DTheol in New Testament studies) does not understand that the genre of the new testament is myth.

    In fact Cooke is wrong and Craig is right. Revelation has a particular genre, it is Jewish Apocalyptic and this genre is known to use special types of recognisable symbolism. Burridge has shown the gospels are written in the genre of greek biography and not myth. Moreover, the implicit assumption on Cooke’s part that when reading a piece of writing with multiple genres (such as the bible) one should either reads everything literally or everything figuratively is absurd. Even in every-day conversation one uses a mixture of both literal and metaphorical phrases and things like context and genre determine which reading one engages in. As Madeleine pointed out to me, one of her favourite books is a sci-fi fantasy novel that contains an index of characters and terms at the back. Despite the fact the index and the story are contained in one book, she would be in error to read the index figuratively or the story literally; it is not uncommon for one book to have more than one genre. Unfortunately in the short exchange, before an audience untrained in biblical hermeneutics, these points may not have been grasped. As a result I think Cooke came across the better in this exchange despite the fact he was wrong.

    Critical questions were raised about Craig’s theodicy as well. Craig’s position is that God allows certain evils because they are the best way to bring about greater good that otherwise would not be achieved. Some members of the audience found this counter-intuitive. Craig responded that the goods he envisaged infinitesimally outweigh the evil permitted. Craig’s position is utilitarian; one can allow (or cause) evil in order to bring about greater good. Of course utilitarianism is a sophisticated ethical theory and there have been numerous sophisticated defenses of a utilitarian framework in the literature but of course Craig was not able to go into it in sufficient depth last night.

    Overall the night was excellent, a huge turnout and a stimulating discussion of some really deep and important issues. As we left we heard people all around us discussing the ideas offered by both sides and lots of positive feedback about how much they had enjoyed the evening. NZARH arranged to have the event filmed and a copy should be online over the weekend.

  • Bill Craig’s Visit

    I need to apologize to my readers for blogging infrequently at present. I am extremely busy, with marking papers, setting exams, part time jobs, getting another paper published, and generally running a family of 6. I would like to share one project I have been working on over the last few months.

    Regular readers will note that occasionally I refer to the work of William Lane Craig. Craig is a Philosopher/Theologian of some caliber. He is currently a Research Professor of Philosophy at Talbot School of Theology in La Mirada, California. He holds a PhD from University of Birmingham (England) and a D.Theol from the University of Munich (Germany). William Lane Craig has authored or edited over thirty books including The Kalam Cosmological Argument; Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus; Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom; Theism, Atheism and Big Bang Cosmology; and God, Time and Eternity in addition he has written over a hundred articles in professional journals of philosophy and theology. He was President of the Evangelical Philosophical Society from 1996-2005 and is currently President of the Philosophy of Time Society. He also is one of the few professional Christian Philosophers at this level who also interacts at a more popular level. Craig also is a very proficient debater, he has debated every major skeptic and atheist in the US and UK including Michael Tooley and Anthony Flew.

    Any way a few months ago I heard that Craig was visiting New Zealand at a conference at Victoria University; several other really good Christian Philosophers were also at this conference. Trenton Merrick’s Thomas Flint, Peter Van Inwagen to name a few. Had the date not coincided with my 10th anniversary and my daughters 8th birthday I would have planned to attend. Nethertheless I let Craig’s presence in NZ slip to some acquaintances of mine in Palmerston North. Before I knew it they were organizing a nationwide speaking tour for him.

    Not to be pushed out, and letting Massey take all the thunder. I lobbied for Craig to visit Auckland and speak at the college where I speak part time. I also contacted the New Zealand Association of Rationalist Humanists (NZARH) and suggested that we stage a debate at Auckland Uni. My initial suggestion was to pit Craig against Lloyd Geering, but left it to them to decide who would be the most appropriate person to represent their position.

    My lobbying has come to fruition, On June the 16th and 17th William Lane Craig will visit Auckland. He will give a public lecture at BCNZ on the evening of the 16th (in LR1) at 7:00 pm where he will critique the arguments put forward in favour of atheism by zoologist Richard Dawkins. On Tuesday 17th of June 2008 at 7:00 pm he will square off against Bill Cooke from NZARH at the Owen G Glenn building (Lecture Theatre OGGB5) in a public debate at Auckland University. The moot is ‘Is God a Delusion? John Bishop the HOD at Auckland’s Philosophy department has generously agreed to moderate this debate. Auckland’s Philosophy department have also suggested he present a paper to their department but I have yet to hear back from them about this yet.

    Anyway, if my readers enjoy my blogs then they will probably find both these events quite interesting. I suspect we will also have an interesting audience at these events given some of the differing people who have told me they are interested in attending.

  • Well Done Glenn

    I write this post to offer my sincerest congratulations to my good friend Glenn People’s (who runs an excellent blog here). Today Glenn Graduated from the University of Otago with a PhD in Philosophy for his research thesis entitled Religion in the Public Square. Glenn’s thesis was an examination and critique of the thesis, propounded by numerous contemporary liberals such as Robert Audi and John Rawl’s that religious premises should be excluded from public discourse and debates about public policy.

    Glenn and his wife Ruth have been good friends of Madeleine and I for some years. I met Glenn when I was doing my Masters in the Philosophy department at Waikato Uni. At that stage Glenn was a music student at the Waikato Polytechnic with a keen interest in Theology. Since then we have followed each other around the country, I followed Glenn to BCNZ in 2000 where he did his BD and followed him to Otago Uni in 2002. Oddly enough there was a kind of symmetry in our careers. Glenn did a Bachelors and Masters in Theology before switching to Philosophy. My under grad and masters were in Philosophy before I switched to Theology. We also both began in Waikato moved to Henderson and then to Otago,. We always joke that he and Ruth will now follow us to Auckland so the circle is completed.

    Apart from our similar interests Glenn and his family have been close friends and confidents Madeleine and I really miss the time we spent with them in Dunedin and the mutual support we could offer each other as PhD students struggling to provide for a family on Otago University Scholarships.

    Anyway, I wont prattle on, Glenn it’s your day today, congratulations, its good to see all the hard work has come to fruition. I hope you and Ruth enjoyed the pomp and hype of the ceremony and your achievements were given the honour and recognition they deserve. We wish you continued success and look forward to the next time our paths cross.

  • Patrick Nowell Smith on Divine Commands

    In a widely-anthologised essay Morality: Religious and Secular. Patrick Nowell Smith offers a influential criticism of “religious morality” It is clear from his definition of religious morality that it is Voluntarism ( or a Divine Command Theory of Ethics) he has in mind. Smith states that the religious moralist has “assumed that just as the legal propriety of an action is established by showing it to emanates from an authoritative source, so also the moral propriety of an action must be established in the same way; the legal rightness has the same form as moral rightness, and may therefore be used to shed light on it.” He goes on to state “ … Morality, on this view, is an affair of being commanded to behave in certain ways by some person who has a right to issue such commands; and once this premise is granted, it is said with some reason that only God has such a right” Smith’s critique then should be interpreted as a critique of Voluntarism.

    Readers of this blog will know I have considerable sympathy for Voluntarism. I have defended it against some common objections in previous posts. So it will not suprise anyone that, despite the popularity of Smith’s essay, I think his criticisms fail. Here I wish to comment on two lines of argument he proposes.

    1. One major contention Smith makes is that “religious morality is infantile” Smith’s thesis is that a Voluntarist possesses an ethical consciousness that is frozen or arrested at the pre-critical stage of a child. A mature adult whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly would have outgrown it.

    In arguing for this thesis, Smith draws upon the theories of moral development proposed by Piaget. According to Piaget, children start out with a view of morality that Smith labels deontological, heteronomous and realist. Children view morality as obedience to certain rules (deontology) which hold because an authority figure, usually the parent, has promulgated them (heteronomous) and wrongdoing is perceived as any external action that violates these rules (realism). This view of ethics is appropriate for small children; however, as they mature and become more rational their consciousness changes. They begin to see the point of certain rules and understand the reasons behind them and the function of such rules. This is the stage where ethics become in Smith’s words “autonomous”. Instead of just accepting a parent’s word for it the child learns to figure these things out for him/herself.

    Smith goes on to argue that these same features of heteronomy, realism and deontology are present in “religious morality” or, more specifically, Voluntarism. Consequently, Voluntarism reflects a childish way of viewing ethics, one not worthy of a grown-up, educated adult.

    Smith’s analogy between Voluntarism and childish morality ignores a fundamental dis-analogy between the case Piaget describes and that of the divine/human relationship. As Richard Mouw has pointed out, Piaget views the transition from heteronomy to autonomy as corresponding to the time when a child begins to be on an increasingly-equal footing with his or her parents. The infantile stage of morality is appropriate while the child is in infancy because of its limited rationality and knowledge. In this state the child is unable to make decisions as competently as the adult, hence it relies on and defers to the judgement of adults. However, as the child grows equal to the parent in these respects he or she ceases to rely on parental judgement. He or she is now just as competent to answer these questions as his or her parent is and so his or her thinking becomes autonomous.

    Consequently, Piaget’s model of development applies to situations where the subordinate is temporarily in a stage of inferiority to the authority but is undergoing a process of growth towards equality. It is when this equality is reached that the authority relationship is no longer appropriate. However, the relationship between adult humans and God is fundamentally different. Adults are not growing into divinity so that when mature they will equal God in rationality and knowledge. Rather, they are permanently in a state where they are inferior to God in these respects. In this context the failure to reach a moral consciousness that is equal to God’s is not a sign of arrested development and the infantile charge loses its sting. It is inappropriate for adults to behave like children but not inappropriate for them to fail to think like God.

    2.Another argument Smith utilises appeals to the epistemic priority of moral principles over theological ones. Smith offers an argument that is “familiar to philosophers but of which the force is not always appreciated”. The argument essentially points out,

    [W]e must be persuaded independently of his goodness before we admit his right to command. We must judge for ourselves whether the Bible is the inspired word of a kind and benevolent God or a curious amalgam of profound wisdom and gross superstition. To judge this is to make a moral decision, so that in the end, so far from morality being based upon religion, religion is based upon morality.

    In Philosophical Problems and Arguments. James Cornman and Keith Lehrer express the same argument.

    Consider what we would do if we read that Moses had returned with such commandments as ‘make love to thy neighbor’s wife,’ ‘steal thy neighbor’s goods,’ and ‘take advantage of thy parents.’ We would decide that what-ever was revealed to Moses, it was not the will of God, because these are immoral commandments. We do not justify that something is moral by showing it is God’s will, because the only available way to evaluate conflicting claims about what God wills is by finding which one is in accordance with what is moral.

    This objection notes that in order to know whether a given action is, in fact, the type of thing God has commanded, one first needs to know whether the act is wrong. Therefore, ethics is prior to, and independent of, theology.

    This objection again confuses the question of epistemological priority with the question of metaphysical independence. What these examples show is that we can know certain ethical truths prior to and independently of our knowledge of theological truths. However, it does not follow from this that deontic principles are metaphysically independent of, or non-identical to, theological ones. Consider the following analogy. In order to know that a clear liquid in front of me is water I need to examine its atomic structure to see if it is H20. It would not follow from this that water is not H20. Similarly, the fact that in certain contexts one needs to examine the moral appropriateness of commands to ascertain whether they are from God or not does not make it follow that wrongness is not the property of being contrary to God’s commands.

  • Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar

    David Farrar of Kiwiblog weighs in on the abortion debate. I have met David a couple of times and worked with him on several issues and I have a lot of time for him but on this issue we disagree. Given how widely read Farrar’s blog is, and seeing the ethics of killing a fetus was my PhD thesis topic, I will endeavour to spell out why I think he is mistaken.

    David Farrar writes:

    Now my personal position on abortion is it should be legal, safe and preferably rare. As cessation of brain activity is what effectively marks death, I tend to regard life as the start of such brain activity (as measured by ECG, not just electrical activity) which is at around 20 weeks.

    Farrar’s argument here appears to consist of two premises (some which are more implicit than explicit). They are [1] If the loss of a property results in something going out of existence then the acquiring of the same property results in it coming into existence [2] the loss of a functioning brain (measured by an EEG) results in living human being to go out of existence and [3] A fetus acquires functioning human brain (measured by a EEG) at 20 weeks. Now [1] and [2] entails that a living human being comes into existence when it receives a functioning brain measured by EEG, and this conjoined with [3] entails that a living human being comes into existence at 20 weeks

    I think Farrar’s argument is unsound because [1] is clearly false. Consider a functioning car. A functioning car ceases to exist as a functioning car when it looses a motor. Does it follow that then that all a car needs to become a functioning car is a motor? No, More than just a motor is needed to get a car to function, one needs petrol, a driver, wheels etc. The loss of a motor will stop it functioning but the presence of a motor is not enough to make it function. The point is that often there can be a series of properties each of which is necessary for something to exist but none by themselves enough to make the object exist. Something can be necessary for X but not in and of itself sufficient for X. Farrar’s argument confuses these separate things, it assumes that if something is necessary for X ( its absence causes X to not exist) then its sufficient for X (its presence causes it to exist) and this is simply an error.

    There is however an analogue of Farrar’s argument which has more promise and it has been proposed by ethicists such as Goldenring, Hans Martin Sass and Baruch Brody. This argument suggests that we already have criteria which we use after birth to determine whether a human body on a life support system is a living human being or merely human tissue (a corpse). This is the famous “Brain Death criteria”. According to this criteria if a human body posses a functioning human brain then it is a living human being and killing it (by harvesting its organs for example) constitutes homicide. On the other hand if it does not have a functioning human brain then it is dead, it is not a living human being and one does not commit homicide if one slices it up.

    These ethicists suggest that we apply this criteria to pre born situations. Early in the pregnancy a rudimentary human body emerges. The uterine environment is moreover analogous to a life support system. We want to know whether this body constitutes a living human being or a mere tissue. They suggest we apply the Brain death criteria. If the fetus posses a functioning human brain then it is a living human being and killing it is homicide. If it does not then abortion only destroys human tissue.

    So, suppose I be charitable and reconstruct Farrar’s arguments along these lines. Do we have an argument that a fetus is not human until 20 weeks gestation?

    No, the reason is that Farrar appears to not understand the brain death criteria. According to this criteria a human body is dead (as opposed to alive) if it posses a brain that has irreversibly ceased to function. It’s not enough that there be no brain function it must also be the case that such function will not come into being in the future. For reasons like this, many ethicists like Goldenring, Sass and Brody who appeal to the Brain death criteria conclude that a fetus is a human being from very early in the pregnancy around 6-8 weeks gestation. The reason is simple, around this time a fetus has developed a rudimentary brain, it posses some function and full function will come about in the future through natural brain development. Hence the fetus cannot be said to have irreversible lack of brain function.

    The application of brain death criteria then in fact brings about precisely the opposite result to what Farrar contends. It leads to the conclusion that at the time most abortions occur a fetus is a living human being and abortion is homicide.

  • The Body Snatchers and the Problem of Pluralism

    As I was driving around Auckland this morning talkback was rife with people discussing the recent body snatchers case; an estranged father, against the wishes of both the deceased and her next of kin stole his daughters body and buried it in a family plot. Of course I remember the furor over the previous case, and my thoughts now are as they were then.

    What people seem unaware of, or at least have not articulated clearly, is that the controversy over this case is symptomatic of a deep problem with the popular liberal response to pluralism. Let me elaborate.

    The problem of Pluralism is this: we have in New Zealand people who hold to and live in accord with various differing “comprehensive views” as Rawls called them. A comprehensive doctrine can be theistic like Islam or Christianity or it can be secular like certain forms of Naturalism; Marxism, Liberal rationalism, humanism etc. However such views function as religions in that they answer fundamental questions such as who are we, what is the nature of good, what is real, etc. Now the problem such plurality creates is this: How does one maintain peace and order in a society characterized by radical disagreement over these fundamental questions? Each group believes (and cannot but believe) that their view is true and the others mistaken. Failure to find a solution to this problem can be deadly people can and have killed each other over these questions.

    In New Zealand the answer popularly given is “tolerance”. One should allow each person to believe and act in accord with whatever view they think is correct and no one should be compelled to adopt some form of enforced orthodoxy. However there is one immediate problem with this response. Sometimes believers in different comprehensive doctrines will interact with one another. Hence, there needs to be rules or norms governing the relationships between believers of different “comprehensive doctrines” and the obvious difficulty is that these different groups frequently disagree over precisely what the correct norms or rules which constitute our duties are.

    This is the case in the body snatchers incident. One group of people come from a community in which individual autonomy is an important value (this btw reflects certain religious and philosophical beliefs articulated in the late middle ages). Under this understanding of the world, when a person dies the individual who died can, prior to death decide ( within reason) how their body is to disposed of. Moreover certain relatives, become next of kin and aquire the responsibility to carry the deceased’s wishes out. The problem is that people from other cultures have quite different understandings of the world. I am not an expert on Maori culture and so will not try and elaborate. But the idea seems to be that individual autonomy is subordinated to the wider family and certain traditions which this family are required to uphold. Hence the wider community decides where one is buried in accord with their traditions regardless of the individual in questions wishes. Moreover there are different understandings of what constitutes membership in the relevant group. One group tends to think that if one is not brought up within a culture or does not conciously adopt it they are not part of a group that embodies this culture. Another however believes that mere biological lineage determines ones membership in the culture.

    In this case a person dies. According to group A the deceased is not part of group B and the right thing do do is X. According to group B, she is a member of group B and the right thing to do is Y. Y however is incompatible with X only one of the two options is possible. I maintain that there is no *culturally or religiously neutral* way of adjudicaticating this dispute. At the end of the day we must decide which view of the world is correct and side with the solution they propose.

    This case shows up the popular liberal response to the problem. The popular response is to suggest that the no group can impose the norms they believe in upon another group. Instead, norms governing relationships between practioners and believers of different comprehensive doctrines should be governed of norms that all reasonable people can accept regardless of their religious or quasi religious beliefs. This idea is often described as “public reason” the notion that there is a set of premises which are accepted implicitly by all reasonable people from which public policy regarding what rights everyone has can and coercive laws enacted can be decided.

    The problem, which this case shows, is that public reason is something of a myth. If one defines a “reasonable person” broadly there is simply does not exist a set of principles which is both accepted by all reasonable people and also sufficiently “thick” and comprehensive to provide a basis for answers to public policy questions. On the other hand if one defines “a reasonable person” narrowly to exclude radical disagreement the very concept of a reasonable person will depend on the truth of a particular comprehensive perspective for its plausibility. The debate over Gods existence is a good example. Alvin Plantinga has argued, correctly I think, that if God exists and created men in his image and then revealed himself to them, much of what Christians believe is probably rational. If however God does not exist, its probably a delusion. However, its impossible to come to an answer on the rationality of theism without presupposing a stance on the ontological question of its truth. In fact it’s difficult to see how one can come to an understanding of what constitutes a *reasonable person* if without appealing to premises specific to some comprehensive doctrine about what exists and what sort of beings people are.

    That’s what’s seen in this case. We have two very different views of understanding the world. Each one if true entails that a certain course of action is mandated. If certain notions of individual autonomy then the body snatchers are wrong. If one does not they are not. The problem is according to a popular conception of liberal democracy the state has to be neutral with regard to differing faith or quasi faith positions. It should not privilege any group by writing its views into law and demanding that the others who don’t accept the tradition live in accord with them. The state therefore can do nothing one way or the other. Interestingly that is precisely whats happend.

    There is a solution to this. It’s an older view, and it’s far less palatable to many modern or post modern people, but it has the advantage of being correct. On this view the whole popular liberal idea of tolerance is a chimera. In his book Reason in the Balance Berkeley Law professor Philip Johnson argues that while liberal societies do not (and I would add should not) have established Churches they must always have a defacto “established religious philosophy.” By religious philosophy Johnson means “a way of about ultimate questions” and by saying its esthablished he means not that “dissenters are subject to legal punishment” but that “it provides the philosophical basis for law making and public education”. People who dissent will be tolerated within reasonable limits and what constitutes a “reasonable limit” will be determined by the esthablished religious philosophy.

    In NZ the established religious philosophy ostensibly includes the proposition that killing non combatants in war is wrong hence Al Qaeda does not gain religious tolerance in NZ. In Saudi Arabia the established religious philosophy considers apostasy intolerable. In some “progressive” quarter’s today believing and teaching that homosexual conduct so violates the sensibilities of liberal orthodoxy that it cannot be tolerated. In each case we have a accepted orthodoxy and tolerance of dissenters limited by the values of the orthodoxy in question.
    In his book Foreordained Failure, Steven Smith demonstrates that there is no such thing as a right to freedom of religion which is upheld by some traditions and opposed by others. Instead there is a spectrum of views about religious tolerance that comes in degrees; no state tolerates all religious sects and very few states tolerate none. He notes that Aquinas, Cromwell, Locke and Mill all advocated and defended forms of religious tolerance. However, each disagreed as to which religions such tolerance should apply to and the proper limits upon those they disagreed with. Smith argues further that these differing accounts of freedom of religion all depended upon comprehensive views to justify them and one cannot adjudicate between them without appeal to such views. Attempts to articulate a right to freedom of religion from a neutral or public stance are quite hopeless.
    That’s what we have in this case. I think that those who stole the body should be prosecuted because I believe that the ideas about individual autonomy undergirding those who complain are correct and I think tolerance of diversity should not extend to allowing others to violate norms based on these ideas. Our political climate needs to stop hiding behind slogans of “tolerance” and “respect for diversity” and admit that it supports a particular religious orthodoxy and here are the limits on dissent. Then we can debate whether the orthodoxy is true. If we continue to hide behind the façade of “tolerance” and “respecting and celebrating all diverse view points” it will not be able to do anything in these situations.
  • Mayra Veronica and the Troops in Iraq: Where the Islamists Have a Point

    I am a fan of Bill Vallicella’s blog. A few days ago I found a post of his which is worth reproducing [link to post now broken Jan 2011]. He led with a picture of a scantily clad and busty Mayra Veronica and wrote:

    Don’t expect any more ‘eye candy’ on this site, but now that I have your attention I want to make a serious point. The well-endowed lass a picture of whom you see to the left has a name as beautiful as her body, Mayra Veronica. She was a guest on the O’Reilly Factor last night. She supports the troops in Iraq by going there and meeting with them, hugging and kissing them (that’s what she said!), signing photographs and posters, and distributing calendars. The ‘pin-up girl’ is of course nothing new — our fathers and grandfathers gawked at Grable — but one has to ask how much we have to teach the Iraqis. Islamic culture is in many ways benighted and backward, but it is not clear that our trash culture is much of an improvement. If they think that our decadent culture is what democracy is all about, and something we are trying to impose on them, then we are in trouble.

    Militant Islam’s deadly hatred of us should not be discounted as the ravings of lunatics or psychologized away as a reflex of envy at our fabulous success. For there is a kernel of insight in it that we do well to heed. Sayyid Qutb (Milestones, 1965, emphasis added): “Humanity today is living in a large brothel! One has only to glance at its press, films, fashion shows, beauty contests, ballrooms, wine bars and broadcasting stations!Or observe its mad lust for naked flesh, provocative pictures, and sick, suggestive statements in literature, the arts, and mass media! And add to
    all this the system of usury which fuels man’s voracity for money and engenders vile methods for its accumulation and investment, in addition to fraud, trickery, and blackmail dressed up in the garb of law.”

    A wild exaggeration in 1965, the above statement is less of an exaggeration today. But setting aside the hyperbole, we are in several ways a sick and decadent society getting worse day by day. On this score, if on no other, we can learn something from our Islamist critics. The fact that a man wants to chop your head off does not mean that he has nothing to teach you. The decadence of the West is a huge and many-sided topic. I’ll mention just two trends. One is the degeneration of popular music, especially black music. There is a huge difference between Sam Cooke and the rap ‘artists’ popular today. Another is the drive to push all vestiges of religion out of public life. Since religion is the means whereby most people learn morality, the assault on religion is also an assault on morality.

    Of course, when I say that there is something to be learned from our Islamist critics, that in no way implies that their actions can be justified. They are murderous terrorists who need to be hunted down and killed, and the governments that support them need to be toppled. What I am opposing is a certain thoughtless attitude that says, “They are demons, I don’t want to understand them, and I shut my ears to everything they say.”