Category: Social Commentary

  • Just Nuke BP’s Oil Leak

    Milo Nordyke, one of the masterminds behind US research into peaceful nuclear energy in the 1960s and ’70s and Viktor Mikhailov, a Physicist who served as a Russian Minister of Nuclear Energy, agree on a comparitively cheap solution for BP’s oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico – just nuke it. In what admittedly sounds like the plot to a blockbuster hollywood film, the Special Report: Should BP nuke its leaking well? opens with,

    His face wracked by age and his voice rasping after decades of chain-smoking coarse tobacco, the former long-time Russian Minister of nuclear energy and veteran Soviet physicist Viktor Mikhailov knows just how to fix BP’s oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico.

    “A nuclear explosion over the leak,” he says nonchalantly puffing a cigarette as he sits in a conference room at the Institute of Strategic Stability, where he is a director. “I don’t know what BP is waiting for, they are wasting their time. Only about 10 kilotons of nuclear explosion capacity and the problem is solved.”

    …

    Mikhailov has had a distinguished career in the nuclear field, helping to close a Soviet Union program that used nuclear explosions to seal gas leaks. Ordinarily he’s an opponent of nuclear blasts, but he says an underwater explosion in the Gulf of Mexico would not be harmful and could cost no more than $10 million. That compares with the $2.35 billion BP has paid out in cleanup and compensation costs so far. “This option is worth the money,” he says.

    As gung-ho and ‘Bruce Willis’ as it sounds the idea actually seems to have some merit. In addition to the cost being comparitively cheap (if BP sold the rights to Hollywood they might even cover the cost of the nuke) the article goes on talk about the environmental impact.

    Nordyke too believes the nuclear option should be on the table. After seeing nine U.S. nuclear explosions and standing behind the control board of one, he estimates that a nuclear bomb would have roughly an 80 to 90 percent chance of successfully blocking the oil. According to his estimates, it would have to be an explosion of around 30 kilotons, equivalent to roughly two Hiroshima bombs or three times as big as Mikhailov’s estimate. The explosion would also need to remain at least 3 to 4 miles away from other offshore wells in the area.

    The bomb, says Nordyke, would be dropped in a secondary well approximately 60-70 feet away from the leaking shaft. There it would create a large cavity filled with gas. The gas would melt the surrounding rock, crush it and press it into the leaking well to close it shut.

    Although the BP well is thousands of feet deeper than those closed in the Soviet Union, Nordyke says the extra depth shouldn’t make a difference. He also says that so far below the ground, not much difference exists in onshore or underwater explosions — even though the latter have never been tried.

    Nordyke says fears that radiation could escape after the explosion are unfounded. The hole would be about 8 inches in diameter and, despite the shockwave, the radiation should remain captured. Even in the case of radiation escape, he says, its dispersed effect would be less than that of floating oil patches.

    The article concludes that despite support for some sort of explosive solution even coming from quarters as unlikely as Bill Clinton (well, ok, maybe ‘just blowing it all up’ as a solution is not that unlikely for Clinton) the idea is highly unlikely to be implemented for the obvious reasons that managing the outcry towards the proposed solution would probably be worse than the outcry towards the oil spill. In short, it ‘aint going to happen but let’s cut to Mikhailov for the final scene:

    “Still,” he says, momentarily hard to see through a cloud of smoke from his cigarettes, “I see no other solution for sealing leaks like the one in the Gulf of Mexico.”

    The problem, he goes on, is that “Americans just don’t know enough about nuclear explosions to solve this problem … But they should ask us — we have institutes, we have professionals who can help them solve this. Otherwise BP are just torturing the people and themselves.”

    Hat Tip: Zwinglius Redivivus

  • Buckle your Belts as the ETS Arrives

    The Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) comes into force today.  It is still not clear who we’ll be trading anything with (that implies that there are other parties in the scheme) but what is clear is that we are now all paying, dearly, for the controversial science and policies that many of us reject.

    Winter just got a lot colder in our house.

  • Contra Mundum: Secularism and Public Life

    Legal scholar Stephen Carter stated,

    One good way to end a conversation – or start an argument – is to tell a group of well educated professionals that you hold a political position (preferably a controversial one such as being against abortion or pornography) because it is required by your understanding of God’s will. In the unlikely event that anyone hangs around to talk with you about it, chances are that you will be challenged on the ground that you are intent on imposing your religious beliefs on other people. And in contemporary political and legal culture, nothing is worse.

    Carter puts his finger on an important perspective which is pervasive in contemporary liberal societies. This is the view that citizens of liberal democracies may justly support the implementation of a law only if they reasonably believe themselves to have a plausible secular justification for that law. Further, they must be willing to appeal to secular justifications alone in political discussion. The upshot of this perspective is that it is perceived to be unjust to support or advocate for laws for theological or religious reasons.

    I will refer to this position as secularism, the commitment to the position that the public square should be secular. The secularisation of political culture is, of course, an implication of accepting this position.  Richard Rorty described it as,

    The happy, Jeffersonian compromise that the Enlightenment reached with the religious. This compromise consists in privatizing religion — keeping it out of … “the public square,” making it seem bad taste to bring religion into discussions of public policy.

    My experience as a New Zealand citizen is that secularism is widely held and taken for granted in our culture by media, politicians and popular culture. I also think, perhaps predictably, that secularism of this sort is questionable.

    Let me begin by pointing out that several writers have observed that prima facie there is something unfair or discriminatory about secularism. Contemporary critics of secularism, Christopher Eberle and Terence Cuneo, note that it entails “There is an important asymmetry between religious and secular reasons in the following respect: some secular reasons can themselves justify state coercion but no religious reason can.”

    Another critic, Philip Quinn, observes that secularists impose “burdens on religious people” that they nowhere suggest “imposing on nonreligious people.” Secularists do “not propose that nonreligious people must be sufficiently motivated by adequate religious reason for their advocacy or support of restrictive laws or policies. The lack of symmetry is striking.”

    This raises an obvious question, why the asymmetry? On the face of it secularism appears to privilege secular ideologies and doctrines in public debate whilst relegating religious or theological perspectives to the private sphere.  What is the basis for this? Two reasons are typically offered and neither is terribly compelling.

    The first is that it is dangerous to allow theological or religious concerns into public debate. Defenders of secularism raise the specter of the wars of religion that tore Europe apart during the 17th century or they mention episodes such as the Inquisition and Crusades, which are said to be consequences of allowing religious reasons to influence public and political life. It is argued that the only way to keep social peace and prevent the kind of violence that Europe witnessed is to ensure religious reasons do not influence public life and that all political discussions take place on secular terms.

    This argument assumes that appeal to religious reasons is the cause of religious wars and appeals to secular reasons protect us against such wars. Writing in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Eberle and Cuneo note that the religious wars of the 17th century were caused not by the appeal to religious reasons per se but rather by the violation of religious freedom. Moreover, they note that even in the 17th century, religious persecution was typically justified on secular grounds. They go on to observe that religious freedom is not necessarily safeguarded by secularising public debate. They note that many “secularists have a long history of hostility to the right to religious freedom and, presumably, that hostility isn’t at all grounded in religious considerations” In addition, they note correctly that some of the most important defences of religious persecution and defences of religious tolerance, such as those proposed by John Locke and Pierre Bayle, appealed to explicitly theological grounds.

    Yale philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff makes a similar point, he notes that much of “the slaughter, torture, and generalised brutality of our century has mainly been conducted in the name of one or another secular cause–nationalism of many sorts, communism, fascism, patriotisms of various kinds, economic hegemony.” He also stated that “many of the social movements in the modern world that have moved societies in the direction of liberal democracy have been deeply and explicitly religious in their orientation.” Wolterstorff cites examples such as the abolitionist, civil rights and various other resistance movements as examples.

    The assumption that secular reasoning is always tolerant and religious reasoning is always intolerant does not survive scrutiny. Particular types of religious reasons in particular political contexts can lead to wars and abuse, whereas appealing to other types of religious reasons in other contexts can be beneficent. The same is equally true of secular reasons. Certain types of secular reasons can be dangerous in particular contexts and other types of secular reasons are not. To single religious reasons out as being ‘too dangerous to be aired in public’ and insisting on a default to secular reasons seems ad hoc and unjustified.

    The fear of religious wars is not the only argument typically offered for the secular public square. The main reason offered for secularism is that religious reasons are not accessible to all people. Auckland Law Professor Paul Rishworth observes, “some have contended that the nature of religious belief is such that, while it may be integral to individual autonomy and development, it has no proper role in public policy debates and that these ought to be conducted exclusively in secular terms that are equally accessible to all.” [Emphasis added]

    Something like this is also evident in defences of secularism. Leading secular Philosopher Michael Tooley states, “For it is surely true that it is inappropriate, at least in a pluralistic society, to appeal to specific theological beliefs of a non moral sort… in support of legislation that will be binding upon everyone.” Robert Audi, one of the leading defenders of secularism, states “as advocates for laws and public policies, then, and especially for those that are coercive, virtuous citizens will seek grounds of a kind that any rational adult citizen can endorse as sufficient for the purpose.” [Emphasis added]  In essence, because not everyone in society accepts the existence of God or some theological perspective on life then it is unjust to base laws governing their conduct on theological or religious grounds.

    This argument is deeply flawed. If taken consistently it would require not just the exclusion of religious reasons but the exclusion of any reasons that were controversial and not accepted by all people. The problem is that many secular justifications and ideologies are also controversial in the same way. Quinn makes the point,

    If the fact that religious reasons cannot be shared by all in a religiously pluralistic society suffices to warrant any exclusion of religious reasons for advocating or supporting restrictive laws or policies, then much else ought in fairness also to be excluded on the same grounds.

    He goes on to note,

    Indeed, it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some citizens of a pluralistic democracy. And if justification of restrictive laws or policies can be conducted only in terms of moral considerations no citizen of a pluralistic democracy can reasonably reject, then in a pluralistic democracy such as ours very few restrictive laws or policies can be morally justified, a conclusion that would, I suspect, be welcomed only by anarchists. [Emphasis added]

    I agree with Quinn. There is special pleading going on whereby theological beliefs are rejected on certain grounds, while secular ones are not, even though the same grounds and reasons, consistently applied, should lead to the rejection of secular beliefs.

    On examining secularism and the main arguments for it, it certainly is not evident that a just or fair society will have a secularised public square. To insist this is the case prima facie seems to favour secular views of the world for no adequate reason. Contrary to what some maintain, secular reasons, like religious reasons, can be used to justify atrocities and human rights abuses. Further, like religious reasons, secular reasons are frequently controversial and not shared by all intelligent people. Of course, secularists might consider religious views of the world to be false but then, of course, religious people consider secular views of the world to be false and given the diversity of secular moral theories on offer they cannot all be true (some are at odds with each other) so why single out religious views? The question remains as to why morality requires that public discussions privilege secular perspectives by requiring that all such discussions are engaged in on secular terms.  I suspect we will be waiting a long time for an answer.

    [In this article I acknowledge being influenced by my wife Madeleine Flannagan’s supervised research paper “Religious Restraint and Public Policy” which she wrote under the supervision of Professor Rishworth, the Dean of the University of Auckland’s School of Law.]

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the June 10 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

    RELATED POSTS:
    Contra Mundum: Richard Dawkins and Open Mindedness
    Contra Mundum: Slavery and the Old Testament

    Contra Mundum: Secular Smoke Screens and Plato’s Euthyphro

    Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others?
    Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith
    Contra Mundum: “Bigoted Fundamentalist” as Orwellian Double-Speak
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: Confessions of an Anti-Choice Fanatic
    Contra Mundum: The Judgmental Jesus

  • Contra Mundum: Richard Dawkins and Open Mindedness

    The bold statement “Richard Dawkins opens minds” leaped out at me from the newsletter sitting on the University of Auckland’s Law Library counter. The article went on to sing the praises of Richard Dawkins and mentioned his book The God Delusion. On reading the piece one could be forgiven for concluding that Dawkins’ works are a paragon of the open minded assessment of ideas.

    Now Dawkins is a Zoologist and I, not being a Zoologist, would not presume to assess his work on Zoology. What is interesting, however, is that much of Dawkins’ most famous work is not on Zoology; it is on Theology and specifically Philosophy of Religion. That field of Philosophy which critically analyses religious questions, such as, the veracity of arguments for and against God’s existence. Having some background in these fields I find it a little surprising that an Auckland University publication would contend that his work is open minded because it is evidently not.

    In The God Delusion Dawkins’ main argument against the existence of God alludes to Fred Hoyle’s famous claim that the probability of something as complex as life evolving by blind chance was less likely than a fully-functional Boeing 747 being created by a hurricane blowing parts around in a junk yard. Dawkins writes, “However statistically improbable the entity you seek to explain by invoking a designer, the designer himself has got to be at least as improbable. God is the Ultimate Boeing 747.” Dawkins has made the same line of argument elsewhere “God, or any intelligent, decision-making calculating agent, is complex, which is another way of saying improbable.” In The Blind Watchmaker he argues,

    Once we are allowed simply to postulate organized complexity, if only the organized complexity of the DNA/protein replicating machine, it is relatively easy to invoke it as a generator of yet more organized complexity”. But of course any God capable of intelligently designing something as complex as the DNA/protein machine must have been at least as complex and organized as that machine itself.

    This argument contains three premises. First, that theism (belief in God) is justified by “postulating” God to explain the existence of organised complexity. Second that the God appealed to by theists is complex. Third, that the existence of complex beings are highly improbable. These lead to the conclusion that “God is the Ultimate Boeing 747” and hence “almost certainly does not exist”. The problem with this argument is that all three premises rest on caricatures and misunderstandings of contemporary theology and ignorance of contemporary philosophy of religion. I will explain.

    Dawkins contends that God is postulated to explain organised complexity. There are two problems with this contention. First, Dawkins assumes that God is rationally believed only if his existence is inferred by some kind of argument for the best explanation of a given phenomenon. However, not all beliefs are justified on the basis of some kind of argument of this sort. Our belief in the existence of the past, our belief that it is wrong to rape, our belief that other people exist or that basic axioms of logic are true are not based on inferences to the best explanation. It is not that they are rationally believed because they explain some phenomena better than all alternatives, it is rather that these beliefs are part of the background data that we use to assess proposed explanations against. These things are true because we immediately experience them as true. I have the experience of remembering the existence of a past event. I intuitively perceive that rape is wrong. I experience the basic axioms of logic as self-evident and so on. Such beliefs are called properly-basic beliefs.

    Since the late 1970’s an extremely important movement within Philosophy of Religion, known as the reformed epistemology movement, has offered detailed and rigorous defences of the contention that, for theists, belief in God can be properly-basic. This position has been defended by leading philosophers of religion such Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Peter Van Inwagen and others. Now, of course, it is possible that this movement is mistaken but Dawkins surely owes us an argument to this end as opposed to his simply assuming it and ignoring the counter evidence.

    Second, among those theists who do defend God’s existence on the basis of some argument for the best explanation, very few do so on the basis that God explains “organized complexity”. Richard Swinburne, the leading proponent of such arguments, argues that God explains the existence of laws of nature, religious experience, the origin of the universe and the continued existence of the universe. Swinburne does not postulate God to explain “organised complexity”. Similarly, William Lane Craig, a leading defender of theism, suggests that God explains the origin of the universe, the existence of morality and the fine tuning of the laws of nature. Again, Craig makes no appeal to “organized complexity”. In 2009 The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology was published which contains the most up to date versions of the 11 most definitive arguments used to defend the existence of God in the literature today. Not one of them involves an appeal to “organised complexity”. While the cogency of arguments for the existence of God that do not involve “organized complexity” remains open to substantive debate, it is undisputed that these arguments exist. Dawkins’ picture of God as a postulate to explain organised complexity is a crude caricature of theistic scholarship.

    To be fair Dawkins attempts to address some of these other arguments elsewhere in the book. However, here again much of his writing consists of caricature. He attacks five arguments proposed 800 years ago by Thomas Aquinas as being representative of the current case for theism and completely ignores the vastly more sophisticated and vigorous versions being defended in the literature today. Ironically, Dawkins quite severely misunderstands Aquinas’ arguments and attributes to him a position no Aquinas scholar would accept as accurate. However, even if his account were accurate, critiquing theism by attacking the arguments of one 12th century theologian is a bit like me attacking evolution on the basis of the evidence for it gathered in the 12th century and ignoring any of the scientific developments of the last 800 years. Such ineptitude would not be tolerated in the scientific world and should not be seen as de rigueur just because the topic is religion.

    Dawkins’ second contention fares little better. Dawkins states that “A God capable of continuously monitoring and controlling the individual status of every particle in the universe cannot be simple” this seems to be because,

    The corners of God’s giant consciousness are simultaneously preoccupied with the doings and emotions and prayers of every single human being—and whatever intelligent aliens there might be on other planets in this and 100 billion other galaxies.

    There are several problems here. First, as Craig has noted, this confuses whether what God thinks about is complex with whether God himself is complex. Second, as Plantinga has noted, in The Blind Watchmaker Dawkins states that something is complex if it has parts that are “arranged in a way that is unlikely to have arisen by chance alone.” However, the concept of God employed by most theists is of an immaterial being that does not have material parts so by Dawkins’ own definition God is not complex (unless one assumes that God is a material being but theists almost unanimously maintain that God is an immaterial being).

    This misrepresentation is made all the more pertinent by the fact that for centuries theists have been offering rigorous and sophisticated arguments that God is not in fact complex but is simple. While these arguments may not be successful, Dawkins still needs to actually provide reasons for rejecting them. To simply assert that God is to be conceived in a way that no one conceives Him and to ignore the numerous arguments to the contrary seem more like a child who asserts his position and then puts his hands over his ears and repeats “I am not listening” than it does a serious critical evaluation of another’s position.

    Dawkins’ final contention, that the existence of complex beings is improbable, is similarly confused. Suppose one grants that God is “the Ultimate Boeing 747” and that God’s existence is as statically improbable as the complexity it is invoked to explain. Little in fact follows from this. This is because what is improbable in the Boeing 747 analogy is that the plane came into existence by chance. If God is “the Ultimate Boeing 747” then the conclusion to be drawn is only that it is improbable that God came into existence by chance. This, however, provides us with no reason for thinking that God does not exist. No theist holds that God came into existence by chance, theists hold that God is eternal. Here, again, Dawkins attacks a concept of God nobody holds to and hence is caught jousting with a straw-man.

    On examining Dawkins’ central argument what one discovers is not an open-minded, informed, careful examination of the contemporary debate over the existence of God. Nor does one find a carefully researched assessment of theism. Instead one finds Dawkins simply ignoring what theists mean by God. He ignores how they conceptualise God and ignores the arguments and discussions they have actually made. The theism Dawkins dismisses apparently assumes that God is a material being with parts, that He came into existence by chance and is postulated merely to explain organized complexity. The actual arguments proposed in defence of theism that have been put forward in the literature are not addressed at all.

    Some Auckland University academics might consider such tactics to count as open-minded but I do not. In my view an open-minded honest assessment of religion requires accurately representing what theologians say and teach. It means endeavouring to read and understand their position and offer informed and critical responses to these positions. Ignorance and caricature is not open-minded scholarship.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the May 10 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

    RELATED POSTS:
    Contra Mundum: Slavery and the Old Testament

    Contra Mundum: Secular Smoke Screens and Plato’s Euthyphro

    Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others?
    Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith
    Contra Mundum: “Bigoted Fundamentalist” as Orwellian Double-Speak
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: Confessions of an Anti-Choice Fanatic
    Contra Mundum: The Judgmental Jesus

  • Lest we Forget: Why My Poppy is Red

    I was asked today why my poppy was red and not white.

    The answer is simple really.

    They died so that we could be free and I deeply respect and appreciate that and cannot fathom those who do not.

    RELATED POST:
    ANZAC Day: Lest we Forget or Have we Already?

  • Guest Post: Does Tax Exemption for Churches Directly Cost Taxpayers?

    Bethyada of True Paradigm offers us this guest post. I find it interesting because I wrote some thoughts about the New Zealand Association of Rationalist Humanist’s position on the issue of religious trusts having tax exemption in Equality or Hegemony: NZARH and Religious Trusts back in 2008. There I pointed out that humanist trusts that engage in the equivalent of evangelism for humanism are also tax exempt and promoted by the very same organisation. Anyway, Bethyada writes:

    Ken Perrott wrote about several objections he had to religious charities, specifically churches, being tax exempt. This was in response to my thoughts on proposed tax law changes. Initially he made the unlikely (or perhaps hyperbolic) proposal of how to significantly reduce the tax burden,

    Remove the classification of religion as a charity. That is allow charitable tax exemption only for genuine charity. Not for teaching of supernatural dogma.

    Given that most churches make little surplus money, and taxes are on the profits of a company, this revenue stream is going to be very small. Charities are not able to make large amounts of money and spend it as they wish, they must put the money back into the charity’s cause.

    Ken did also raise a related issue about the cost of charities being born by others. Philosophically I have sympathies with the potential issue he identifies; I object to both covering costs for other people that they should cover, and funding groups that promote ideology I disagree with. I can appreciate that an atheist would object to his money being used for Christian evangelism, much in the way that I object to my money being used to promote humanism. However I am not certain that churches are that costly.

    Now tax exemption is not a direct cost, it is a refusal to tax. When Ken was asked what was the cost to him, his initial reply was twofold: religious charities were using publicly financed resources and they have a responsibility to share society’s financial burden. Interestingly Ken was happy to subsidise genuine charities. Interesting in that I am not certain I support the use of government money in supporting any charities, religious or non-religious.

    Ken’s more detailed response can be read here. He covers several areas. His complaint is

    1. Religious organisations can get charity status and tax exemption but science, reason, or atheist organisations cannot register as charities;
    2. Churches do not pay rates, thus these services are covered by other people;
    3. Individuals can manipulate the system to their benefit;
    4. Charities offer fringe benefits;
    5. Charities have an unfair commercial advantage;
    6. Some religious people are morally corrupt; and
    7. Forced tithing has been important to the survival of the church.

    I think the main issue is around item 2, but I will briefly address the others.

    Item 1 is untrue. About 15% of the more than 25,000 charities in New Zealand are religious in nature. The criteria for charities are

    • the relief of poverty
    • the advancement of education
    • the advancement of religion
    • any other matters that are beneficial to the community.

    There are plenty of charities in New Zealand that are involved in scientific research. Schools can be charities. Neither is tax exemption restricted to charities: some sports groups have tax exemption and some of them can also request charity status.

    Item 3 is not unique to charities. Trusts can be misused, and some companies shift profit around the world to minimise tax. Simplifying tax law and minimising tax take are more likely to counter this problem.

    Item 4 is irrelevant. Companies do this too. Individuals can allow people to stay with them and not charge board, though other people may have to. This is an issue of envy, not justice.

    Item 5 could be a problem if true. It would need to be confirmed. Claims by business of unfair advantage may be an attempt to gain their own advantage, not necessarily because there is a legitimate unfair advantage. Offering my free services to any company, charity or not, is not an unfair commercial advantage, I am allowed to do what I want with my time.

    Item 6 is true, but completely irrelevant.

    Item 7 is irrelevant to New Zealand. It is more an issue in Europe. And I agree, forced tithing with money compulsory collected by the government and forwarded to the relevant church should not be compulsory based on your stated religion/ denomination. Preferably it should not be collected by the state at all. Some church organisations may struggle if this occurred, but that is not necessarily a bad thing.

    Returning to the main issue, item 2: churches getting services that are paid for by others. This includes services that local and national government supply, the first via rates, the latter via taxes. Ken argues,

    Churches, religious organisations, trusts, etc., are not paying their fare share of social costs – streets, rubbish, defense, health, emergency services, fire service, etc. Everything our taxes/rates are used for. The fair share my secular science and reasons organisation would have to pay.

    Now I think that many of these things should be funded by the people using them. Rubbish does not need to be run by council, nor does water supply, or sewage. However the system is that these things are provided by council currently. So I agree that it is reasonable for the charities to pay towards these things, but let’s review specifics.

    The costs should only be those that relate directly to the organisation and its property, not the people in it. This is because the individuals who are paid by the charity pay their own tax at the normal rates. So health costs for a person who works for a charity are contributed to from his personal tax. The organisation does not have any health costs. Conversely, if a church calls the police about vandalism to their property, then they are using this service as an organisation. So fire, police, water, sewage, rubbish are real costs incurred by the charity which if not paid by the charity are then covered by others. Health, defence, social welfare, retirement, education, are not costs that a church incurs and are covered by the individual tax of its workers. I have left off roading as it is mixed, though on balance is a minimal cost, and almost certainly covered by fuel taxes.

    Charities do pay rates. Yes it is reduced to a nominal amount and may not cover the full cost of amenities, but they contribute toward it.

    Charities can claim sales tax, but if they hold an event that they charge for they have to pay sales tax.

    So the legitimate costs of charities associated with their tax exempt status are small. These categories (such as water) are not significant costs to government.

    But how much do religious charities save government? The amount of food, counselling, shelter given to people in- and outside the church is enormous. It would easily dwarf any savings they make from not having to pay their contribution to say policing, and probably decreases policing costs indirectly.

    Not that I think churches shouldn’t pay for water and rubbish. Ideally these would not be managed by the council anyway, and then everyone including the church would have to pay private providers who could choose whether or not they wished to discount charities. And everyone would pay the true cost, and likely pay much less. But the situation is that the direct costs of religious charities to the state is minor, and completely offset by the savings they provide.

    RELATED POST:
    Equality or Hegemony: NZARH and Religious Trusts