Tag: William Lane Craig

  • William Lane Craig and his Debate with Michael Tooley

    “Is God Real?” was the subject of the recent debate between William Lane Craig and Michael Tooley at the University of North Caroline on 24 March 2010. Whilst it is not available for free anywhere online, you can purchase it here, find reviews here, a pre-debate radio interview between the two here and of course the transcript of the first debate between these two back in 1994 is here.

    Hat Tip: I am Jonny King

    Dr Craig has written his own thoughts as to how the debate went in his Reasonable Faith newsletter:

    By contrast my debate the following evening at UNCC generated a lot of light but very little heat! My opponent for this debate on “Is God Real?” was Michael Tooley, a well-respected philosopher from the University of Colorado (Boulder). He has recently published a very complex argument against God based on examples of certain evils in the world. In preparation for the debate I worked through his argument carefully and prepared a four-point response. To read my critique of his argument click here. (I’m indebted to Timothy McGrew and Matt Flanagan for very helpful interaction!) Tooley also came well-prepared to the debate. Indeed, this was his undoing, for he had all four of his speeches (including “rebuttals”!) canned in advance. As a result, he was utterly inflexible and so didn’t respond to virtually anything I said in my rebuttals. It was as if I didn’t even need to be there! So the debate turned out to be pretty one-sided, with me replying to each of his relevant points and him just ignoring me and plugging ahead with his prepared speeches. While Dr. Tooley would, of course, disagree, I think Christian theism came away looking eminently reasonable and credible. [Emphasis added]

    Matt had emailed Dr Craig a modified version of his Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part I and Part II blog series prior to the debate. Matt’s piece criticises the main line of argument Michael Tooley used in his recent debate with Alvin Plantinga and he is currently seeking its publication.

  • Contra Mundum: Secular Smoke Screens and Plato’s Euthyphro

    In “Religion: A Barrier to Clear Thinking,” the final article in the award winning series of lay philosophy articles published in the Christchurch Press, Canterbury based Philosopher Simon Clarke addressed the question, “what is the biggest obstacle to thinking clearly about social and political issues?” Predictably he answered “Several answers suggested themselves but time and again I came back to the same thing: religion.” Clarke explained that “the fallacy of grounding morality upon religion was pointed out by Plato over two thousand years ago.” [1]

    Clarke was appealing to a famous argument that purports to show that ethics (what is right and wrong) is independent of religion. This argument is known by professional ethicists as “The Euthyphro Dilemma” or “Plato’s Euthyphro” and is named after a dialogue Plato wrote. The current version used against mono-theistic religions, such as Christianity, Islam and Judaism, is an adaptation (the original applied to poly-theistic religions, those religions that believe in many gods).

    The argument is usually framed in terms of a rhetorical question ‘are actions wrong because God prohibits them or does God prohibit them because they are wrong?’ As the question is framed, there are only two possible answers a person can offer.

    The first is to contend that actions are wrong because God prohibits them. This answer is said to suffer a debilitating problem, it makes morality arbitrary – anything at all could be deemed ‘right’ as long as God commanded it. Philosopher Michael Tooley has suggested this, “if God had commanded mankind to torture one another as much as possible, then it would follow that that action was obligatory. … many people, including many religious thinkers, are very unhappy with that consequence.” Therefore, the critics conclude, actions are not wrong just because God issues commands against them.

    The failure of the first answer means that the only possible way out is to claim that God prohibits actions because they are wrong; they are not wrong just because he prohibits them. This answer does not have the problems of the former. However, as Clarke points out, it entails that “there are independent standards for what we should do, independent that is of the dictates of religion.” Actions are wrong before God prohibits them. His commands simply tell us what is already wrong, quite independently of what he prohibits.

    This argument is something of a cliché in contemporary secular ethics and is found in almost every secular text book I have read (and will undoubtedly make its way into the Ethics section of the new NCEA Philosophy course). Typically “religious ethics” is mentioned and then dismissed with a short rendition of Plato’s Euthyphro. When I studied Philosophy Plato’s Euthyphro was one of the first things I was taught in first year Ethics. The lecturer spelled out the argument, contended that it showed “religious ethics” was mistaken/confused/ muddle-headed/whatever and from there would went on with the serious business of offering secular perspectives on topics such as abortion, affirmative action, euthanasia, homosexual rights and so on.

    Philosopher Peter Geach noted “In modern ethical treatises we find hardly any mention of God; and the idea that if there really is a God, his commandments might be morally relevant is wont to be dismissed by a short and simple argument that is generally regarded as irrefutable.” The short, simple argument he mentioned was, of course, Plato’s Euthyphro.

    Given this backdrop it is perhaps not so surprising that Clarke, after mentioning Plato’s argument, stated “… Plato’s pretty convincing demonstration has been ignored by the vast majority of people in the intervening millennia. Why are appeals to religion so common?”

    Despite the popularity of making claims like this, I still find them somewhat puzzling. Perhaps secular ethicists assume that theological ethicists have never read Plato or that, if they have, they have ignored him. In fact, the opposite is true. The last 40 years, in fact, has seen sustained defences of theological ethics including thorough refutations of Plato’s Euthyphro. These have been published in the philosophical literature at the highest levels – off the top of my head I can rattle off over 22 different articles and monographs which have offered rebuttals to Plato’s Euthyphro – yet secular ethicists and many textbooks blithely continue as though these answers had never been offered.

    I maintain that there is an answer to the Euthyphro dilemma, one that many have pointed out; it is to adopt the first of the answers I mentioned above, to contend that an action is wrong because God prohibits it. Contrary to popular claims, this option can succeed. The objections raised against it are not as debilitating as they are made out to be.

    The primary objection is that morality is made arbitrary; anything at all could be deemed ‘right’ as long as God commanded it – even atrocious commands. What is important to note here is that the objector assumes that it is possible that God could command atrocious things like ‘torturing people as much as possible.’ This assumption, however, seems very dubious. We need to remember that we are not taking about right or wrong as being based on the commands of just anyone, we are talking about these things being based on the commands of God. In the mono-theistic tradition that this line of argument seeks to criticise, God is typically defined as a being who is all knowing, all powerful, and is morally perfect.

    So, as the terms are defined, the claim that it is possible for God to command people to “torture one another as much as possible” is true only if it is possible for a morally perfect person to command such an atrocious thing. But this is unlikely. The very reason critics cite examples such as “torturing others as much as possible,” is because these actions are paradigms of conduct that no morally good person could ever entertain or endorse. The situation the critic envisages then is a situation which is impossible.

    Of course the critic could contend that he or she does not accept the existence of a being who is all knowing, all powerful, and is morally perfect. However, because those the critic is criticising do believe in such a being and also if the dismissal of theological ethics is to be based on an accurate understanding of what the various theological traditions actually believe and teach, and is not based on a caricature, then the sceptic must address what these traditions actually affirm.

    This answer typically generates a rejoinder. If some action is right or wrong because God permits or prohibits it then God cannot be said to be good in any meaningful sense. This answer renders the claim ‘God is good’ into no more than the claim that God obeys his own commands, if this is so, can God be said to have any duties at all?

    Philosopher William Lane Craig argues that “[duties] are not independent of God nor, plausibly, is God bound by moral duties, since He does not issue commands to Himself.” William Alston drew the same conclusion, “we can hardly suppose that God is obliged to love his creatures because he commands himself to do so!” William Wainwright suggests “the notion of commanding oneself to do something … is incoherent.”

    The rejoinder that, if God has no duties then he cannot be said to be good in any meaningful sense, has a grain of truth to it. If we are going to understand God’s goodness in terms of God having duties or obligations that he consistently fulfils then theological ethics, of the sort envisaged, has problems. However, it is not clear to me why the phrase ‘God is good’ should be explicated in terms of God having duties that He follows.

    Many theologians have suggested that one should not understand God’s goodness in this way. When God’s goodness is explicated in sacred texts like the Psalms or in official creedal statements such as the Westminster Confession of Faith it is often explicated in terms of God having certain character traits. To claim God is good is to claim that He is truthful, benevolent, loving, gracious, merciful, that He is opposed to certain actions such as adultery, murder and rape and so on. Now, even if God does not have duties, it does not follow that he cannot have character traits such as these. It is true that God may not be under any obligation to love others or to tell the truth or what have you, but that does not mean that He cannot love others or tell the truth. God does not have to have a duty to do something in order to do it.

    So there seems, on the face of it, nothing incoherent about contending that God is good, that he has certain attributes like being truthful, benevolent, loving and so on. It is not that theological ethicists have never read Plato or that they have ignored him – they have read him, found his arguments wanting and published responses explaining why – it is that some sceptics have never read the responses or they have chosen to ignore them.

    Perhaps these rebuttals do not work (though I think that they do) but even if I am wrong the onus is surely on the sceptic to demonstrate why. Simply ignoring them, misrepresenting the situation and then dismissing religion “as a barrier to clear thinking” is simply not good enough.


    [1] Clarke’s series “Clear Thinking” was awarded the Australasian Association of Philosophy Media prize in 2006.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the March 10 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

    RELATED POSTS:
    Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others?
    Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith
    Contra Mundum: “Bigoted Fundamentalist” as Orwellian Double-Speak
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: Confessions of an Anti-Choice Fanatic
    Contra Mundum: The Judgmental Jesus

  • Sunday Study: Two Forms of Inerrancy

    The discussion arising in response to my recent post Inerrancy and Biblical Authority, both on this blog and on some of the blogs that linked to it, got me thinking a bit more about this topic. I was reminded of an interesting comment made by Alan Rhoda regarding the doctrinal statement of the Evangelical Philosophical Society “EPS,”

    The Bible alone, and the Bible in its entirety, is the Word of God written and therefore inerrant in the originals. God is a Trinity: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, each an uncreated person, one in essence, equal in power and glory.

    In a discussion with Bill Vallicella of Maverick Philosopher on the meaning, Alan Rhoda distinguishes two accounts of inerrancy,

    It seems to me that the EPS statement is sufficiently vague to permit a few different readings.

    The strongest is what’s known, I think, as verbal plenary inspiration (VPI). This is the view that each and every word used in the Biblical originals is exactly the word that God wanted used. Hence, since God is infallible, the Bible is inerrant. (VPI is the position of the Chicago Statement.)

    A weaker, and I think more defensible view, may be called didactic plenary inspiration (DPI). This is the view that whatever the Biblical originals were intended to teach is inerrant. It is not necessary that the particular words of the Bible be chosen by God so long as the particular message that God wants to convey gets across. (VPI entails DPI, but not vice-versa.) If one accepts this view, then the question to be asked with respect to a Biblical text is “what was it intended to teach?” Is Genesis 1, for example, intended to teach that the world was created in six 24-hour days? Or is it, perhaps, a kind of literary framework intended to teach the absolute superiority of Yahweh over all other gods? Or perhaps its purpose isn’t primarily didactic at all, but something primarily evocative like poetry?

    My point is that since the EPS inerrancy statement does not specify the primary locus of inerrancy (whether the words, the teachings, or something else) it permits a flexible range of approaches to Biblical interpretation.

    Rhoda suggests two different ways of understanding the doctrine of biblical inerrancy; one that follows from affirming verbal inspiration and another that follows from didactic inspiration.

    To see how DPI works consider a legal analogy, suppose that I want to write up a last will and testament. I approach a lawyer and tell set out precisely what I want put in my will. The lawyer then drafts a document that contains the provisions I stipulated but expresses them in standard legal terms and in accord with standard legal conventions and phrases e.g. “I, Matthew Flannagan, being of sound mind, hereby decree that…”

    The document expresses, in first person, my will regarding my assets and property so I can be said to be its author, a court will call it my will as will my surviving family. However, I did not write it. The form, exact wording, turns of phrase, sequencing, choice of font and paper, etc are the lawyers’. Given that the will was drafted in New Zealand, in 2010 it will be in New Zealand English and drafted in accord with the styles and conventions of the statutes and precedents applicable to New Zealand wills and testaments. Nevertheless, as the content of the document express my wishes, despite my lack of authorship, it is a faithful expression of my will. Something like this picture of inspiration is suggested in Exodus 4:10-16.

    Now it is important to note that a DPI model of inerrancy does not mean that people reject the entire biblical text as mythical and figurative stories, which illustrate theological and moral truths and assert nothing about space-time history. If the message is articulated through the literary and rhetorical conventions of human beings then a plausible interpretation, as opposed to a strained one, will take these conventions into account. When this is done, it is implausible to conclude everything in scripture is myth.

    Take, for example, the genre of ancient biography, as mentioned in my previous post. This genre does not intend to affirm as true every detail it records but rather seeks to give an accurate picture of the person the biography is about. This still requires that much of what it records is true; no one would interpret biographies about Alexander the Great to read that they did not teach that he was king of Macedon, son of Philip, who conquered Persia, fought in the battle of Gaugamela, etc. Similarly, if Jesus did none of the things recorded in the gospels and said nothing at all remotely resembling what they attribute to him then these accounts do not give an accurate picture of him.  However, the genre of ancient biography does not require that Jesus’ teaching on divorce be presented verbatim, in precisely the same order or using exactly the same words in the various synoptic gospels. Neither does it require that every temporal or geographical detail mentioned within them is taught as correct.

    Many historical books intend to teach historical claims. The Old Testament teaches, among other things, that Israel went into exile as a result of disobedience; it also teaches God lead the Israelites out of slavery in Egypt. These texts are, as far as I can tell, historiographies. Admittedly they are ancient near eastern “ANE” historiographies and the fact that the genre of ANE historiography uses hyperbole, lack of precision, a degree of historical reconstruction, etc needs to be taken into account. Nevertheless, as are historiographies they intend to teach us the significance of events that occurred in the past.

    Now a person would not take an Egyptian history as entirely figurative. One should take it to teach that a particular event happened. It is true that one should recognise the hyperbole present, the theological/political message the text affirms but this would not be taken to be all that the author teaches. Ramses’ campaigns into Syria are intended to tell us that the campaigns actually happened, that the battles actually occurred even if they use hyperbole, rhetoric and historical reconstruction to articulate a political/theological message over and above the mere reporting of history. Hence, DPI does not necessitate a licence to de-historicise the text or embrace biblical minimalism.

    Of course, there are other books and literary forms in scripture, such as the parables or the apocalyptic, which are not intended to be read as history. Then there are the early chapters of Genesis or the books of Job and Jonah, where it is not clear that the text intends to teach that the events actually occurred in history and where it seems more likely that these were stories were meant to convey theological and ethical truths. What is needed when reading these texts is attention to the genre. Conclusions about what a text teaches must be based on defensible claims about the literary style and the context of the text in question.

    DPI, therefore, is not the same as the view that scripture is infallible in faith and morals but not in history. It may simply be that at certain junctures scripture intends to teach us something about the past. On the other hand, DPI does allow for certain types of errors that a more verbal account may not allow for. Here are two examples. The first is one I alluded to in my previous post, cases where the form or way the message is articulated presupposes error. Consider Jesus’ comments in Matt 15:18-19, “But the things that come out of the mouth come from the heart, and these things make a man unclean. For out of the heart comes evil thoughts, murder, adultery, sexual immorality, theft, false testimony, slander.” Some scholars take, as metaphoric, references to the heart as the seat of the will, emotions, intellect. However, others suggest that ancient cultures literally believed the heart was the seat of psychological states like this and conclude that these texts reflect and presuppose a false and erroneous view of anatomy. I am inclined to think that even if these scholars are correct, little of interest follows.

    An analogue here would be a person who reads a 12th century account of a battle that is recorded to have occurred at “sun rise”. We know that 12th century people literally believed that the sun rose, in accord with the accepted pre-Copernican cosmology of the day. Hence, it is plausible to think that the human authors of these texts took the phrase “sun rise” to literally mean that the sun rose. Despite this, I think it would be a mistake to suggest that the phrase “the battle took place at sunrise” is false because of Copernicus’ discoveries. While the text presupposes an erroneous view of cosmology, it clearly does not intend to teach us pre-Copernican cosmology; all it teaches is that a battle occurred at dawn and it uses pre-Copernican cosmology to express this point. What the text teaches is true if the battle occurred and it occurred at dawn. It would be false if the battle occurred at another time of the day or never occurred at all.

    I am inclined think that the references to heart, kidneys, etc in the scriptures function in an analogous way to the word “sunrise” in medieval texts. I would say the same thing about references to the “four corners of the earth” or “the waters above and below” even if the original human writers understood these to be literally true. The cosmology in question is presupposed by the text abut is not what the text is trying to teach us. The author uses these phrases them to teach something else and it is what the author taught not the author’s mode of presentation that matters.

    A second example of an error that would be allowed under DPI would be where scripture affirms or states something which is unrelated to what is being taught. An example would be Paul’s instruction to Timothy in 2 Tim 4:15, “When you come, bring the cloak that I left with Carpus at Troas, and my scrolls, especially the parchments.” Suppose, for the sake of argument, Paul did not leave his cloak at Troas, perhaps he thought he had but in reality he had left it somewhere else. I am inclined to think this kind of error would make absolutely no difference to whether what Paul teaches in 2 Timothy is true or not. As the point of this letter is not to give an apostolic teaching on whether there is a cloak in Troas.

    Paul’s teaching is authoritative because he is an apostle, what he teaches as an apostle is true. It does not follow from this, that every personal conversation, remark, Paul ever made in his life or every memory he had was without error. It’s rather that what he taught in the function of an apostle has divine authority. It seems to me that while the letter to Timothy expounds apostolic teaching and instruction and the whole book letter is therefore authoritative, the specific passage in v 4:13 records a personal aside Paul gives to Timothy regarding some property he left at Troas. To interpret Tim 4:13 as a divine command to collect Paul’s cloak, or a prophetic or apostolic utterance that a cloak existed in Troas seems to me to be excessively pedantic and implausible, hence I myself see nothing about the divine authority of scripture threatened by a discovery that there was no cloak in Troas. All it would show us was that Paul’s memory was not perfect, which we already knew.

    So DPI is compatible with certain sorts of errors in the text provided they are not what the text teaches. Of course none of this means that scripture contains these errors. There may well have been a cloak at Troas. References to “the waters above,” “heart,” etc may be phenomenological language, the point is that even if these references do presuppose or  contain errors of a certain sort this does not really make any difference to the claim that whatever scripture intends to teach is true. Other examples could be given but I think you get the point.

    I suspect something like what Alan Rhoda calls didactic plenary inspiration is the view I was elaborating in my previous post. It also appears to be the view defended (at least in some places) by William Lane Craig and something like it is the view expounded by Alvin Plantinga. I also suspect that Glenn Peoples holds this view; although Glenn considers himself to not be an inerrantist he would probably, on Rhoda’s classification, be a particular kind of inerrantist, one that rejected VPI and instead asserted DPI.

    On the other hand, the sceptics I referred to in my previous post (people like Tooley, Fales, Brink, Loftus, etc) in their critiques, work with a fairly strong VPI view of inerrancy. John Loftus’ speaks of Jesus’ reference to “the heart” and how this reflects a primitive view of anatomy, Fales states that certain books may contain the genre of myth and Tooley suggests that Genesis contains a story in which God wipes out the human race. This suggests that they think that every word, illustration or literary convention used to teach us about God must itself be without error. If I am correct, then what sceptics attack is one particular version of inerrancy. They may or may not be successful in this attack but attacking one version of a doctrine does not show that all versions are false, and in this case many leading defenders of Christianity do not hold the version under attack any way.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Inerrancy and Biblical Authority

    RELEVANT CONVERSATIONS:
    Basic Inerrancy
    @ First Things (also at Parableman)
    Inerrancy again – a blog about a blog about a blog about a blog
    @ Beretta
    The Pitfalls of Literalism
    & Plantinga on Inerrancy @ The Church of Jesus Christ

  • Antony Flew v William Lane Craig debate “Does God Exist?”

    In 1948 Bertrand Russell and Frederick Copleston debated the existance of God on the BBC radio. That debate was considered the definitive debate of that generation.

    Fifty years later, to commemorate this debate, a debate re-examining the arguments for and against the existence of God was arranged between William Lane Craig and Antony Flew before 4,000 students at the University of Wisconsin in 1998.

    Flew has since, famously, become a theist but at the time he was one of the world’s leading atheists so this is a great engagement of minds. This debate is now online. Watch and enjoy.

    Hat Tip: Many thanks to Josh Darville who sent us this link via Twitter.

  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part II

    In my last post, I discussed Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument from harm. I concluded by suggesting that his conclusion missed the point and failed to address the conditional, defended by William Lane Craig that, if theism is true then there exists a sound foundation for moral duties. In this post I will argue that the same problem afflicts Armstrong’s two major arguments for his harm-based account of wrongness.

    Armstrong’s Arguments for the Superiority of the Harm-Account
    The same failure to actually address the contention at hand is evident in the two main arguments Armstrong musters in favour of the harm-based foundation. These arguments are

    (a) The harm account is more economical than a divine command theory;
    (b) The harm account makes moral obligations more objective than a divine command theory does.

    Economy and Simplicity
    Of his first argument, Armstrong writes,

    The secular view is also preferable on grounds of simplicity. Like the secular view, the divine command theory must recognise harm and its relevance to morality. Then the divine command view adds a new supernatural level to its theory of morality. That added complication brings no benefits for the objectivity of morality, as I have just argued. We should prefer simpler views when we have no reason to complicate matters. Hence, we should prefer the secular view.[1]

    Armstrong appeals to Ockham’s razor, multipicandum sunt praetor necessitatem, entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. The idea is that if two theories can explain the phenomena equally well then the one that postulates the least entities is the preferred one.

    This principle is the basis of Armstrong’s critique. He notes that both his own secular view and the divine command theory both explain the objectivity of moral obligation equally well. The divine command theory, however, does so by adding “a new supernatural level [God]” and so the harm based account is preferable.

    “there are cases where rape is gravely wrong and yet no one is harmed or if they are, the harm is minimal and yet the action remains gravely and seriously wrong”In response to this argument I will make two points. First, even if the divine command theorist does add “a new supernatural level” his theory does not follow that Ockham’s razor automatically means it is a less preferable theory. Ockham’s razor tells us that if two theories can explain the phenomena equally well then the one that postulates the least entities is the preferred one. For Armstrong’s objection to be cogent, he needs to argue that his own harm based account explains the existence and nature of moral obligations better than a divine command theory. Armstrong does not do this; all he does s show that both theories explain the objectivity of moral properties equally well. However, objectivity is only one feature of moral obligations that a viable ontological foundation must explain. Showing your theory explains one feature as well as a rival theory does is a long way from showing it explains all features as well.

    This is important, because one of the arguments made by defenders of divine command theory, such as Robert Adams, is that it can explains all the features of moral obligation better than its rivals. Adams maintains divine commands “best fill the role assigned to wrongness by the concept”.[2] He notes that divine commands explain, not just the fact, that “wrongness is an objective property of actions,”[3] they also account “for the wrongness of a major portion of the types of action that we have believed to be wrong,”[4] and “play a causal role … in their coming to be regarded as wrong.”[5] In addition, Adams argues that they account for the intuition that our moral duties comprise, “a standard that has a sanctity greater than that of any merely human will or institution”.[6]

    In other articles Adams has noted that divine commands capture the intuition that moral properties such as rightness and wrongness are “non-natural in the sense that they cannot be stated entirely in the language of physics, chemistry, biology, and animal or human psychology,”[7] and also, the idea that “having an obligation to do something consists of being required (in a certain way, under certain circumstances), by another person or group of persons, to do it”.[8]

    Stephen Layman has argued that theism explains the overriding nature of moral obligations, that to have a duty to do something entails that one has decisive reasons for doing it; reasons that override any non-moral reasons to the contrary. Moreover, Layman argues that secular views do not explain this feature of moral obligation anywhere near as well as theism does.[9] Now these arguments may not be successful but given that theists have made them, Armstrong owes us an argument showing they are not; especially if he is going to conclude that his arguments call into question, not just Craig’s arguments, but the “arguments for a religious view of morality” of “other theists” and that these other theists cannot “avoid all the problems in Craig’s account without leaving traditional Christianity far behind.”

    There is a second, more important problem, with Armstrong’s appeal to Ockham’s razor. This is that when one takes into account the dialectical context of Armstrong’s argument it is not clear that the divine command theory does violate Ockham’s razor. Plantinga articulates this point in a recent paper he presented before the American Philosophical association; he argued

    Suppose we land on a planet we know is inhabited by intelligent creatures. We come across something that looks exactly like an arrow-head complete with grooves and indentations apparently caused by the process of shaping and sharpening it. Two possibilities suggest themselves, that it acquired these features by erosion or that it was intentionally fashioned by the inhabitants. Someone with a couple of courses in philosophy might suggest that the former hypothesis is to be preferred because it posits fewer entities than the latter. He’d be wrong of course, since we already know that the planet is inhabited by intelligent creatures, there is no additional Ockhamistic cost in assuming these structures were designed.[10]

    Plantinga’s insight is correct. He goes on to note that if we did not know the planet was inhabited by intelligent beings and the erosion hypothesis was not significantly less probable then an appeal to Ockham’s razor, in favour of the erosion hypothesis, would have “teeth”. However, if one already knows that the planet is inhabited by intelligent beings then we do not violate Ockham’s razor by appealing to the existence of these beings to explain the existence of grooves and indentations on what appears to be an arrow-head.

    Something analogous occurs here. Craig is arguing that if theism is true then there is a plausible ontological foundation for moral obligation in divine commands. He is not, then, proposing the theory in a context where people do not know whether God exists, nor is he proposing it in a context where people do not know that divine commands exist that are co-extensive with moral duties. Rather, he is proposing it in a context where one assumes, for the sake of argument, that theism is true and asks what theory best explains the nature of moral obligation given these assumptions.

    Once this is realised, however, it is far from clear that the theist is adding “a new supernatural level.” Rather, the existence of a supernatural element is already granted. The question, then, is how best to understand this element’s relationship to morality.

    Armstrong’s appeal to Ockham’s razor seems to presuppose a dialectical context whereby both theist and non-theist start from an agnostic perspective and try to work out the best foundation for the nature of moral obligation given the shared information available to both of them. The problem is that Craig was not arguing for his theory in that context. His argument is that if theism is true then a sound foundation exists. To rebut the contention that Craig actually defends, Armstrong needs to show that if God exists such a foundation does not exist. This, however, is precisely what he does not do.

    Objectivity
    The same problems afflict Armstrong’s appeal to objectivity. Armstrong states,

    This secular foundation makes morality objective. If what makes rape morally wrong is the harm to rape victims, then whether rape is wrong does not depend on whether I or rapists believe that rape is wrong. It also does not depend on whether any one wants to rape. Regardless of any-one’s desires and moral beliefs, rape causes harm to the victim, and that harm makes rape wrong. This secular foundation, thus, makes morality every bit as objective as the divine command theory.[11]

    Armstrong here shows that with regard to the objectivity of duties the harm-based account and the divine command theory are on par. However, he then argues that, in fact, the divine command theory fails to explain the objectivity of moral duties.

    If God did not think that rape was morally wrong, then God would not command us not to rape, and then rape would not be morally wrong, according to this theory. … In contrast, the secular harm-based view makes morality independent even of what God thinks. If God somehow thought that rape was not morally wrong, and if God forgot to command us not to rape, or even if God commanded us to rape, none of that would make any difference. Rape would still be morally wrong, because it would still harm rape victims.[12]

    I think Armstrong is mistaken here. Theism, as Craig defines it, includes the claim that God is omniscient; hence, even if rape is wrong in virtue of the harm it causes and not because of any divine commands, it still would be impossible for rape to be wrong independently of God thinking it is wrong. An omniscient being only believes true propositions and never believes false propositions; hence, it is impossible for rape to be wrong and God to not believe that it is wrong.

    Once this is realised, it is clear that Armstrong’s examples assume that theism is false. He puts forward situations where God forgets to issue commands or where God mistakenly believes rape is not wrong. This can only occur if God is not omniscient and, hence, theism is false. However, Craig is not arguing that a divine command theory is plausible if theism is false. His claim is that if God exists then there is a sound ontological basis for moral duties.

    Does Harm Explain the Wrongness of Rape?
    My final criticism directly challenge the harm account. Throughout his critique, Armstrong, contends that rape is wrong because of the extreme harm it causes rape victims. Despite its initial plausibility, I am inclined to think this account of the wrongness of rape fails. This is because there are cases where rape is gravely wrong and yet no one is harmed or if they are, the harm is minimal and yet the action remain gravely and seriously wrong.

    Take the following case, a doctor is performing surgery on a woman. He puts her under general anaesthetic and she falls unconscious. Then, prior to performing surgery, he has intercourse with her. He does so using a condom. He takes care to be gentle. The physical harm to his patient is minimal. The patient is unconscious; she is unlikely to ever be aware of what has occurred; the risk of psychological trauma is not present. Hence, it is implausible to suggest that the doctor has caused extreme harm to the patient, yet his actions are clearly rape and it is also clear that what he has done is gravely and seriously wrong. Hence, what makes the action wrong cannot be the extreme harm done to the rape victim.

    This example can be strengthened when we compare it to another proposed by Robert Adams.[13] Adams asks us to imagine the case of a person whose doctoral dissertation is destroyed by a computer hacker. We would consider the sabotage of the computer a reprehensible act but nowhere near as serious a crime as the rape committed by the doctor in the previous example. Despite this, it is not implausible to suggest that the person who has had their doctoral research destroyed suffers more “discernible harm” than the person who awakes from surgery never knowing she has been raped and continues on with life oblivious to it.

    What this shows is that the grave wrongness of rape does not depend on the extreme harm it causes, because even when there is no extreme harm present the act remains gravely wrong. Rape remains a very serious wrong, relative to other wrongs, even when the harms of these other wrongs outweigh it. For this reason, I am inclined to think that far from being “obviously correct” Armstrong’s harm-account of moral obligations is implausible.

    [1] Ibid, 107.
    [2] Robert Adams “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1(1979) 74.
    [3] Ibid, 74.
    [4] Ibid, 74.
    [5] Ibid, 75.
    [6] Ibid, 75.
    [7] Robert Adams “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief” 117-18.
    [8] Robert Adams “Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation” 262-63.
    [9] C. Stephen Layman “God and the Moral Order” Faith and Philosophy 19 (2002) 304-16; “God and the moral order: replies to objections” Faith and Philosophy 23 (2006) 209-12; “A Moral Argument for The Existence of God” Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 49-66.
    [10] I transcribed this from Plantinga’s paper to the American Philosophical Association, “Science and Religion: Where the Conflict Really Lies” http://www.mandm.org.nz/2009/04/alvin-plantinga-v-daniel-dennett.html.
    [11] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” 106.
    [12] Ibid, 107.
    [13] Robert Adams Finite and Infinite Goods 107.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part I
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part II
    Maverick Philosopher on the Historical Atrocities Argument

  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I

    This is the first of a two-part series where I examine a recent argument criticising religious ethics by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.

    In many of his publications and debates William Lane Craig has defended the contention that if theism is true then there exists a sound foundation for moral duties. In a recent article, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has criticised this contention. Armstrong has claimed that his criticisms do not just call into question Craig’s argument for a theistic based system of ethics, he contends that his arguments are conclusive against any theistic account of ethics which is compatible with Christianity. He states, “Other theists might try to give better arguments for a religious view of morality. I don’t see how they could avoid all the problems in Craig’s account without leaving traditional Christianity far behind.”[1]

    Before discussing Armstrong’s critique it is important to define a few key terms; this will become important later on. First, by theism, Craig means, belief in a necessarily existent, all powerful, all knowing, perfectly virtuous, immaterial person who created the universe. By foundation, he means, an ontological or meta-physical foundation. The ontological grounding he has in mind is that of “informative identification;”[2] an example of this is the way “we explain the nature of water by identifying it with H20 or explain the nature of heat by identifying it with molecular motion.”[3] Craig argues that if theism is true then one can informatively identify moral obligations with divine commands; hence, providing a plausible and defensible foundation for moral obligations.

    “his arguments display a conflation of epistemic and ontological questions”Armstrong’s critique begins by noting that Craig defends “traditional divine command theory.” Armstrong contends that such a position is “incredible”[4] and subject to a “cavalcade of devastating objections.”[5]

    Two initial points are worth making. First, the position Craig defends is not a “traditional divine command theory” but rather a version of the modified divine command theory defended by Robert Adams,[6] more recently by William Alston[7] and Stephen Evans[8], also I have defended it here.

    This theory affirms that the property of being wrong is identical with the property of being contrary to God’s commands in much the same way that water is identical with H20. Second, many of the “devastating objections” consist simply of a repetition of the tired old lines always used against divine command theories; most of these objections have been subjected to rigorous criticism in the literature on divine commands over the last 30 years by people such as Philip Quinn,[9] Edward Weirenga,[10] Robert Adams,[11] William Wrainwright[12] and again by me[13]. Armstrong does not address any of these criticisms; he merely repeats the standard arguments without even mentioning, much less, addressing the problems noted by these authors. In fact, in several places, his arguments display a conflation of epistemic and ontological questions which is a common error as I have argued here.

    Armstrong’s Argument from Harm
    Putting these niggles to one side, however, Armstrong’s main line of argument is fairly novel.[14] He states,

    There is a much more plausible foundation for morality. It seems obvious to me, and to everyone who does not start with peculiarly religious assumptions, that what makes rape morally wrong is the extreme harm that rape causes to rape victims.[15]

    Armstrong suggests that Craig’s conditional, if theism is true then there exists a sound foundation for moral duties, is mistaken because a more plausible foundation exists for our duties, one that is independent of God’s commands. The wrongness of actions can be founded in the harm caused by immoral actions such as rape. Armstrong provides two arguments as to why this harm-based or secular account of the nature of wrongness is superior to a divine command theory.

    (a) The harm account is more economical than a divine command theory;
    (b) The harm account makes moral obligations more objective than a divine command theory does.

    In my next post I will address arguments (a) and (b). I will leave you with the thought that it is worth noting that Armstrong’s conclusion misses the point. He contends that everyone who does not start with peculiarly religious assumptions will see that the harm-based foundation is more plausible than a divine command theory. Nothing in Craig’s contention contradicts this. Craig’s contention is that if God exists then there is a sound basis for moral obligations. The sound basis he identifies is divine commands. Craig, then, was not arguing that a divine command theory was the most plausible theory in the absence of religious assumptions, Craig argues that in the absence of religious assumptions it is Nihilism, not divine command theory, which is the most plausible account of moral obligation. Craig’s contention is that a divine command theory is plausible if one grants such assumptions. Armstrong’s conclusion actually has no bearing on the contention he is attempting to refute.

    [1] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 114.
    [2] Mark C Murphy “Theism, Atheism and the Explanation of Moral Value” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 127.
    [3] Ibid.
    [4] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” 106.
    [5]Ibid, 108.
    [6] Robert Adams Finite and Infinite Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979) 66-79; “Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation” Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987) 262-275. [7] William Alston “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed. Michael Beaty ( Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 303-26.
    [8] C. Stephen Evans Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
    [9] Philip L Quinn Divine Commands and Moral Requirements (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1978); “Divine Command Theory” in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory ed Hugh LaFollette (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing Co, 1999) 53-73; “Theological Voluntarism” in The Oxford Handbook to Ethical Theory Ed David Copp (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 63-90.
    [10] Edward Weirenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry into the Divine Attributes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989) 215-27. See also, “Utilitarianism and the Divine Command Theory,” American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984) 311-318; and “A Defensible Divine Command Theory” Nous 17 (1983) 387-408.
    [11] Robert Adams “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness” in Divine Commands and Morality ed Paul Helm (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981) 83-108; “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979) 66-79; Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief” in Rationality and Religious Belief ed C F Delaney (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979) 116-140.
    [12] William Wrainwright Religion and Morality (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2005).
    [13] Matthew Flannagan “The Premature Dismissal of Voluntarism” in Colloquium: The Australasian Theological Review (forthcoming).
    [14] I say “fairly novel” because a very similar objection was raised in Don Marquis’s seminal essay, “Why Abortion is Immoral” The Abortion Controversy: 25 Years after Roe v Wade, A Reader eds Louis Pojman and Francis Beckwith (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1998) 345.
    [15] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” 106.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part II
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part I
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part II
    Maverick Philosopher on the Historical Atrocities Argument

  • Maverick Philosopher on the Historical Atrocities Argument

    In making their case against theism many of the “new atheists” (indeed many of the old) commonly appeal to historical atrocities allegedly committed by believers in God. I was discussing this phenomena recently with Doug Geivett in the aftermath of the Craig v Hitchens debate. I cited the need for Christian apologists to rebut not only the contention that theism is false but also the contention that it is oppressive and dangerous. I proposed that someone of the calibre of Rodney Stark should address the sociological claims about the effect of religion on society to supplement the defences of its truth by scholars such as Bill Craig, Alvin Plantinga, etc. The full (ongoing) discussion can be found within the comments thread here.

    Yesterday I discovered this gem on the same topic on one of my favourite blogs of all time, Bill Vallicella’s Maverick Philosopher, (in fact the inspiration for MandM). I have reproduced a little below to whet your appetite and have furnished the necessary link to finish the meal. Enjoy.

    Extract Taken From:
    Is Religion the Problem? Why Isn’t Belief As Such the Problem? The Special Pleading of Some Atheists

    One of the arguments against religion in the contemporary atheist arsenal is the argument that religious beliefs fuel war and terrorism. Rather than pull quotations from such well-known authors as Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris, I will quote a couple of passages from one of the contributors to Philosophers Without Gods, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. His piece is entitled “Overcoming Christianity.” After describing his movement from his evangelical Christian upbringing to a quietistic rejection of Christianity, Sinnott-Armstrong tells us how he became an evangelical atheist:

    My quietism ended when current events taught me the dangers of religion. I had always known how religions, including Christianity, led to wars in the Middle East, Ireland, and so on. Many wars, of course, are not based on religion. Even religious wars result from non-religious forces as well. Nonetheless, it is hard to deny that many wars have been and continue to be fueled in large part by religious beliefs. It is no coincidence that terrorists are so often motivated by religion, since it is hard to get non-religious people to volunteer as suicide bombers. (76)

    It is true that people holding religious beliefs have used, and are using, their religious beliefs to justify war, terrorism, and such other evils as forced conversions and inquisitions. No reasonable person can deny this. But what Sinnott-Armstrong (S-A) says above in the second sentence is that religions lead to wars. Does he really want to say that religions lead to wars? All religions? Buddhism? I understand that there are some Buddhist terrorists. But surely a professional philosopher such as S-A can see the difference between (i) Some Buddhists are terrorists and (ii) Buddhism causes war and terrorism. If a Buddhist is a terrorist, this is an accidental fact about him; there is nothing in the essence of Buddhism that enjoins terrorism. No Buddhist qua Buddhist is a terrorist. It escapes me how the doctrines, precepts and practices of Buddhism cause war, terrorism and kindred evils. Similarly for Christianity. Plenty of atrocities have been committed by people who identify themselves as Christians. But that is not to say that the characteristic doctrines, precepts and practices of Christianity cause war, terrorism and the like. It is rather the opposite: when the doctrines and precepts of Buddhism and Christianity are acted upon they tend to mitigate human savagery.

    And then there is the case of Gandhi whose principle of ahimsa (no-harm) derives from his Hinduism. Hinduism as understood and practiced by him surely did not lead to war and terroism. Did he perhaps not understand the principles of his religion? So it cannot be religion as such that causes war and terrorism. The central teachings of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity are anti-war and anti-terrorism.

    So one of the mistakes that people like Sinnot-Armstrong make is that they confuse the doctrinal content of a religion with the behavior of some of the religion’s adherents. … read the rest here [the comments are worth looking at too]


    RELATED POSTS:
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I