Category: Events

  • Madeleine and Matt to speak on “Being Good: Christian Virtues for Everyday Life” at the 2012 Evangelical Philosophical Society Meeting in Milwaukee

    Evangelical Philosophical Society

    I have had to revise my earlier statements about not going to the November 2012 academic conferences in Milwaukee on the grounds that when you are personally invited to participate in a panel discussion by Doug Geivett and Mike Austin at the Evangelical Philosophical Society (“EPS”) you do not say no 🙂

    (If I said “no” I think Andrew would throw things at me and AndrĂ© Z would egg him on)

    Matt has been invited to speak on the same panel too.

    Here is what we know so far:

    Being Good: Christian Virtues for Everyday LifeMike and Doug co-edited a book entitled Being Good: Christian Virtues for Everyday Life.  At the EPS meeting in Milwaukee in November 2012 there will be a panel discussion in one of the sessions offering critical discussion of the book and it’s themes. Matt and I are now scheduled to be participants in that panel.

    The panel will discuss different aspects of the book, such as, an analysis of a virtue in the book that a participant disagrees with by giving an extension of the book’s discussion of character in some way.

    Matt was already going anyway as his paper on Singer and Infanticide got through the blind review process and was accepted.

    I had thought I might not go as we in the process of radically changing how I earn money. I am about to swap my regular weekly income for a contract for services that will see me retain most of the money I make my firm but pay my own expenses (and still be supervised and under the umbrella of a firm as all baby-lawyers should be under the law). So this is both exciting as I will have more control over what I earn but it is also scary as there are no guarantees that I will earn consistently; imminent changes to how legal aid is to be paid make that even scarier. The theory is that in the long run I will make more than I was on my very low baby-lawyer income but it is yet to be tested. As I am the primary earner in our house there is a lot riding on this, including the extension to our mortgage to purchase this opportunity. Going to America is not a cheap exercise from New Zealand but we have providentially managed to find a way the last two years with a lot of help from our friends so I am going to stop worrying and focus on trusting in God to whom I am  grateful for this opportunity.

  • Matt to speak on Singer and Infanticide at 2012 Evangelical Philosophical Society Meeting in Milwaukee

    Every November there is about a two week period in America where a number of professional academic conferences are held where the best of the best in the field gather. For the last two years Matt has been either accepted or invited to speak at them (I was accepted to speak at them last year too but had a visa problem at the last minute so Matt went without me). Anyway, this year they are all being held in Milwaukee and I am happy to announce that Matt received this email last week:

    Evangelical Philosophical SocietyCongratulations!  Your paper proposal for the 2012 Evangelical Philosophical Society meeting in Milwaukee (14-16 November) has been accepted for presentation.

    …

    Since there were nearly twice as many proposals as spaces, many fine papers had to be rejected.  If for any reason you will not be able to present your paper after all, please inform the EPS program committee as soon as possible so that we can allow one of the alternates to fill the vacated slot.

    Again, congratulations, and we look forward to hearing your paper in Milwaukee!

    Sincerely in Christ,

    The EPS program committee

    Yay – so proud of him! The abstract he submitted for blind review was as follows:

    Peter Singer, Human Dignity, and Infanticide

    Christian theism has traditionally taught that human beings have equal dignity and worth, a moral status that separates them from other non-human animals. Peter Singer has famously argued that this teaching is problematic; human beings are not any more special than animals and doctrines of human dignity are indefensible.  He contend that killing a new-born infant is, in and of itself, no more problematic than killing a non-human animal such as a cow or a pig, and he defends the permissibility of infanticide.

    This paper will critically assess one important part of Singer’s position: his understanding of why it is wrong to kill.  In part 1 I will sketch Singer’s “desire account” of killing and its relationship to his own preference utilitarianism and project of animal equality. Following Don Marquis, I will argue that this “desire account” is subject to important counter examples. In part 2, I will note Singer’s attempts to modify his position so as to avoid these counter examples and suggest that these modifications undercut his arguments for animal equality. In part 3, I will suggest that, despite this, there is an important truth in Singer’s critique, one that Christian thinkers can appropriate in developing moral arguments for Christian theism.

    Matt did not apply for any other of the conferences this year, although he was invited to give a paper at the Society for Biblical Literature but the session got cancelled. He and I are contemplating applying to Notre Dame’s annual conference on the week before, it’s theme this year is Justice so both of us could, and I still have enough time on my US Visa to go, but I am not sure if I have time to write a paper as my case-load is insane, so it might be just Matt. Anyway – yay Matt!

    Update
    Wow, already in receipt of donation offers to help get him there! We love you guys 🙂 We have just over $1.5k left over from blog donations and fundraising last time which constitutes the refunds from my aborted-lack-of-visa trip. I will price Auckland to Milwaukee and put up a fundraising widget in the sidebar soon – as with previous years accommodation options will be needed so Milwaukee readers if you have a couch talk to me 🙂

  • Is Ethical Naturalism More Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong: Part II

    This is the second part of the paper I presented to the Naturalisms in Ethics Conference at Auckland University last year.

    In my previous post, I noted that Robert Adams has argued that if God exists, then divine commands “best fill the role assigned to wrongness by the concept”.[1] He argues that if moral obligations are divine commands this explains the fact, that (i) “wrongness is an objective property of actions,”[2], (ii) it accounts “for the wrongness of a major portion of the types of action that we have believed to be wrong,”[3]   (iii) it “plays a causal role 
 in their coming to be regarded as wrong”,[4]  (iv) it explains how moral obligations constitute a “supremely weighty reason” for acting or refraining from an action,   and (v) he contends that DCT explains the intuition that moral duties comprise “a law or standard that has a sanctity greater than that of any merely human will or institution”.[5]

    Moreover, in my last post, I also argued that, for Armstrong to conclude his arguments call into question any theistic account of ethics, he must argue that his harm account of moral obligation provides a better explanation of all these features. Failing that, if his account doesn’t preserve these features of moral obligation, then he must provide us with a reason to suppose that they are not part of the concept of moral obligation. Or he must provide reasons for revising our concepts.

    In his monograph “Morality without God” he attempted to do this. It’s my contention that he has failed in this task.

    1. Social Requirements

    Let’s begin with (v), In “Morality without God”, Armstrong purports to address this line of argument, he claims that “the best line of argument-because it is the only argument is that moral laws require a lawgiver”[6]. He attributes to popular writer Dinesh D’Souza. He then proceeds to make short work of D’Souza’s argument.

    However, this is neither the best, nor the only argument offered in favour of a DCT. In subsequent articles and a monograph, Adam’s has developed (v) in some detail.[7] Adam’s proposes a “social requirement theory” of obligation whereby “being obligated to do something consists in being required (in a certain way under certain situations) by another person or groups of persons not to do it”[8]. Obligations are a kind of social relationship where one person makes a demand on another, failure to comply results ruptures in the relationship expressed in terms of blame, censure, punishment and alienation, which can be expiated by forgiveness. Adam’s offers a sustained argument that the role of guilt, censure, punishment, social inculcation, moral motivation, moral knowledge and forgiveness plays in our concept of obligation, make a social requirement theory plausible.[9] Nowhere in Armstrong “Morality without God” does Armstrong even (more…)

  • Thinking Matters Youth Conference

    This Saturday is the first, of hopefully many, Thinking Matters Youth Conference, the schedule is  below.  I am leading a breakout session on Moral Relativism

    WHEN: Saturday, February 18
    WHERE: Greenlane Christian Centre, 17 Marewa Rd, Greenlane, Auckland
    COST: $10


    Schedule:
    10am Registration
    10.30am Jeff Tallon – Is Science a Threat to Faith?
    11.30am Sean McDowell – Is Faith Blind? (via Skype)
    12.15pm Lunch
    1pm Breakout Sessions 1

    • Stream 1: Is morality relative and does it matter? – Matt Flannagan
    • Stream 2: How can one religion be “right” and the others “wrong”? – Trevor Mander
    • Stream 3: Why doesn’t God do something about the evil in the world? – Ben Carswell
    • Stream 4: Does God get mad when we doubt? – Jason Kumar and Dominic Bnonn Tennant
    1.45pm Breakout Sessions 2 (repeated)
    2.30pm Tim McGrew – Is the Bible Reliable? (via Skype)
    3.30pm Q&A Panel – Jeff Tallon, Ben Carswell, Matt Flannagan, and Trevor Mander
    4.15pm Conference closes
  • Back from San Francisco: A Belated Report

    MandM has been quite of late, this is because Madeleine and I have been very busy.  With moving house in the midst of Christmas and New Years and Madeleine working part-time in a law firm and so on, we’ve had little time to blog. We are now set up, to some extent, and so this post will be a belated comment on my recent trip to San Francisco.

    In November I flew to San Francisco where I attended I attended the  Meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society (ETS), The Annual Meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society (EPS), The Evangelical Philosophical Society Apologetics Conference and The Annual Meeting of the Society for Biblical Literature (SBL) and American academy of religion.(AAR). While I would love to give detailed commentary on each session, to do so would require several blog posts of inordinate length, instead I will simply summarise what went down.

    I arrived in San Francisco at around 4pm  on the 15th. I presented my first paper at 8:30am the next morning. My paper was a critique of Walter Sinnott Armstrong’s arguments against divine command theory meta-ethics. Armstrong contends that the nature of moral obligation is best explained by identifying moral obligations with the natural property of harming others without justification, and, focusing largely on Craig’s work, argues this is superior to divine command ethics. I argued: (a) his argument fails to note the conditional nature of Craig’s (his main target’s) contention that if theism is true moral obligations are best explained as divinecommands (b) Armstrong’s does not provide a better account of moral objectivity (c) Armstrong’s account is not more economical than a divine command theory. (d) Even if it were an economical account, it does not explain various features of obligation such as (i) the social nature of moral obligations (ii) the fact that moral obligations constitute a decisive reason for acting and (iii) the specific moral content of obligations; as well as a divine command theory. All in around 30 minutes!!! The paper was very well received, with several people asking me to forward them a copy. I plan to get it published later this year.

    The rest of the morning was filled with me hearing various papers on moral theory and philosophy of religion all of which were interesting and stimulating. These panellists all shared similar perspectives yet were astutely critical of each other’s arguments. Particularly interesting was the dialogue between Baggett and Craig. Some of the issues here were technical and deserve further discussion so I plan to blog on this dialogue in more detail in the future. But in sum: Craig has defended a counterfactual: if God did not exist then moral obligations would not exist. Baggett  argued for various reasons that this is too strong; if God, the creator and sustainer of the universe, did not exist, the universe would not exist. To make sense, Craig’s claim needs to envisage a compossible world, which is like the actual world in all respects except that God does not exist, if it’s like the world in all other respects however, then it has all the features of the world God has created – and hence the resources for something like moral obligations to exist. Instead, Baggett contended, one should argue that a world with God provides a better explanation of the nature and existence of moral obligations than a world without God does. This means the theist does not have to argue, with Craig, that there is no adequate secular account of the existence of moral obligations, only that a divine command theory is more plausible than such accounts. Both Craig and Baggett made telling points which I will have to elaborate on some other time. highlight of Wednesday was the afternoon session. A panel discussion of David Baggett and Jerry Wall’s new book “Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality”. This book is the latest defence of divine command theory ethics, recently published by Oxford University Press. Baggett and Walls sketched briefly the content of the book and Paul Copan and William Lane Craig offered critical commentary, to which Baggett and Walls responded.

    Thursday started with an excellent critique of evolutionary (more…)

  • More Mistakes: A Rejoinder to Randal Rauser

    For those who aren’t aware, there has been something of a “debate”, but what I’d prefer to refer to as an “in house discussion” between Randal Rauser (Professor of Historical Theology at Taylor Seminary) and myself.

    The discussion so far can be found here:

    My initial article was Randal Rauser’s Mistake: A Defense of Calvin’s Doctrine of Election

    Rauser’s response: Calvinism and the Arbitrary Camp Director Revisited: A Response to Andrew

    Andrew and CalvinBefore I begin, I should point out that I have been on the Kapiti coast for the last week at a TSCF (Tertiary Student Christian Fellowship, a cousin of Inter-Varsity) retreat where I was without internet. Hence it’s only in the last day that I’ve learned that Professor Rauser has kindly taken the time to respond to my initial article. So I apologize for my delayed response.

    I would also like to point out that while my intention was to provoke Rauser’s response, it was not to be rude, and I apologize if that’s the impression he has received. I have a great deal of respect for Rauser, particularly given (as I pointed out in my last article) that he is a Professor of Historical Theology with an obvious background in analytic philosophy, while I am a mere undergrad with far more ambition than actual ability. The last thing that I want is for this discussion to devolve into the kind of vitriol that plagues almost all other web based discussions of the philosophy of religion and/or theology. I say this, largely because I fear (from the tone of his response) that he has received the impression of ill intent on my part.

    Secondly, I appreciate that Rauser took the time to respond to my article, and I appreciate that he also took the time to counter my personal testimony with that of his own.

    Randal Rauser and ArminiusBut now to specifics: How does Rauser respond to my claim that the arbitrariness objection (at least if it is to be an objection) begs the question against Calvin’s doctrine of election? On the face of it, he doesn’t seem to challenge my point that God may not be acting unjustly if we are undeserving of salvation. To the contrary, Rauser seems to admit for the possibility that the tortures may be justly deserved. But if that’s the case, then, as I tried to point out in my first post, there’s no real injustice or immoral state of affairs that obtains if God so desires to instantiate those punishments. Paradoxically though, Rauser refers to my theology as “brutal” and “morally incoherent”. Both of these terms, emotionally provocative as they are, seem to suggest that there is something nasty, horrible, evil (whatever negative adjective your heart desires) about a God that selects some for salvation while selecting others for damnation. But if, as Rauser seems to allow, the tortures are justly deserved, then none of those adjectives can rightly be said to stick. After all, if the tortures are justly deserved, and God decides to carry out those tortures, then God can only be said to be doing what the demands of morality and/or justice require. So wherein does the moral incoherence obtain?

    But according to Rauser, I would still be missing the point. After all, he (Rauser) says, the Camp Director Analogy was not intended to show that God, given Calvinism, is “unjust”, but rather that He cannot be seen as “maximally loving”. I see no real reason to deny Rauser the liberty to make this distinction, but its relevance is, at best, unclear.

    Thankfully, Rauser does seem to hint at one possible way in which we could interpret this as an objection. He seems to engage in something of a pair-wise comparison between two possible scenarios that are supposed to be relevantly similar to the Arminian and Calvinist conceptions of election respectively.

    • Scenario 1: The director arbitrarily selects some children for beatings and others for loving rehabilitation.
    • Scenario 2: The director selects all children for loving rehabilitation.

    According to Rauser, were God to bring about scenario 2, we would state that He is more loving were he to bring about scenario 1. There are three things that I have to say to this (more…)

  • Want to see Matthew Flannagan debate John W. Loftus in America?

    Dr Matthew Flannagan v John W LoftusAs you all know, Matt and I are going to the US to speak at 4 conferences in November. John W. Loftus is aware of this and in a comment on this blog has suggested a debate between himself and Matt during the 3 days we have spare between conferences – ideally for us 14 Nov. We have had some email discussion with him about this including agreeing that the topic for debate will be something around Loftus’ Outsider Test for Faith, maybe, “Is Christianity True?” or something like that.

    A couple of groups within the Christian Apologetics Alliance have indicated keeness to see it happen, we have even had small pledges of money towards helping it happen, but so far no one has been able to say “yes, we will organise it” and we need that to happen asap or we are just going to run out of time. So, can you organise it can you offer support towards anyone organising it? Do you want to see it happen? (If it happens it will be videoed)