Category: Philosophers

  • Contra Mundum: Consenting Adults and Harm

    In debates over abortion, homosexual conduct, euthanasia, prostitution, drugs, those who call themselves liberals often mount the same basic argument; a socially or morally permissive stance is necessitated towards such practices because people have a right to choose do what ever they like with their own bodies. As John Stuart Mill put it in his book On Liberty:

    “The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.” [Emphasis added]

    John Stuart Mill

    Here Mill articulates the harm principle. He makes a distinction between other-regarding actions, actions that harm other people, and self-regarding actions, those that harm oneself. He argues that society, either by law or by social pressure, cannot justly regulate any action a person performs unless it is other-regarding; that is, it harms people other than the agent him/herself.

    As Mill’s position is typically interpreted, harm is understood to be governed by the principle volenti non fit injuria (where there is consent there is no injury); it refers to things done to other people without their consent. Mill states that a self-regarding action is one “which affects only himself, or affects others with their free and voluntary, and undeceived consent”.

    Mill intended his principle to be criteria as to what should and should not be made a criminal offence; he did not consider it criteria for determining what is right and wrong. Yet many contemporary liberals appear to use it in this latter way. They contend that as long as the action involves only consenting adults it is morally permissible. It is often asserted in our society, as though it were self-evident, that people have a moral right to do whatever they like with their own bodies.

    I think this claim is far from self-evident. Irving Kristol famously proposed this counter-example in a 1971 article in New York Times Magazine:

    “[T]he plain fact is that none of us is a complete civil libertarian. We all believe that there is some point at which the public authorities ought to step in to limit the “self-expression” of an individual or group even where this might be seriously intended as a form of artistic expression, and even where the artistic transaction is between consenting adults. A playwright or theatrical director might, in this crazy world of ours, find someone willing to commit suicide on stage, as called for by the script. We would not allow that-any more than we would permit scenes of real physical torture on the stage, even if the victim were a willing masochist. And I know of no one, no matter how free in spirit, who argues that we ought to permit gladiatorial contests in Yankee stadium, similar to those once performed in the Coliseum of Rome-even if only consenting adults were involved.”

    The examples Kristol gives are all cases where any person of common sense would condemn the act but where all the victims consent to be harmed.

    In his book Harmless Wrong Doing: Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Liberal Political Philosopher Joel Feinberg considers Kristol’s objection as the most important and potentially-devastating counter-example to the harm principle and he spends considerable energy attempting to circumvent it. He offers four responses. Here I will argue that these responses fail.

    First, Feinberg questions whether such cases are really cases of consensual homicide. He suggests (more…)

  • Jesus: The Cold Case a Guest Post by Glenn Peoples

    Glenn Peoples shares his thoughts on TV One’s recent episode Jesus: The Cold Case.

    Jesus: The Cold Case

    Like a number of others tonight I have just watched Jesus: The Cold Case on TV One, presented by Bryan Bruce. Here are my thoughts on what I have seen. First off, who is Bryan Bruce?

    Bryan Bruce

    Bryan Bruce is an award winning producer, writer & director who lives in Wellington, New Zealand. He has a MA in Sociology, Psychology & philosophy from Canterbury University. A former musician and schoolteacher, he began his television career in 1984 as front person and writer for a TVNZ arts show. Since then has won awards for Best Director and Best Factual Writer and his work has made the finals of several international festivals, including the New York Television Festival and the prestigious Banff Awards.

    The overarching message that Bryan Bruce is gravitating towards in this documentary is that the biblical and subsequent Christian message on who killed Jesus, namely, “the Jews” in some broad sense, is false, and what’s more it is responsible for centuries of great evil.

    Something that strikes the viewer quite early on is that Bruce quite simply doesn’t believe that the Gospels accounts are true in general terms. “Many,” he says, “now believe that the Gospels contain more fiction than fact.” Throughout the documentary we hear from a number of academics who lend their credibility to the various claims Bruce makes.

    One of the immediate worries about the presentation is that although we’re led to believe that the presenter is applying rigorous criminal investigation methods to the case, to those familiar with the world of biblical scholarship, his list of authorities suggests otherwise:

    • Emeritus Prof. Geza Vermes (Oxford)
    • Emeritus Prof John Dominic Crossan ( St Pauls)
    • Prof. Elaine Paigels (Princeton)
    • Bishop John Shelby Spong (USA)
    • Prof. Lloyd Geering (New Zealand)
    • Dr Helen Bond ( Edinburgh)
    • Prof . Israel Hershkovitz (Tel Aviv)
    • Dr Shimon Gibson (London)

    Does this read like the list a careful investigator consults if he wants a decent shot at getting to the unvarnished truth, rather than a somewhat partisan perspective?

    According to Vermes, Jesus was resurrected in the hearts of his followers, but not literally from the dead.

    Crossan claims that Jesus’ followers had a kind of spiritual visionary experience
    Paigels writes that early Christians didn’t believe in physical resurrection at all, seeking instead a state of spiritual knowledge and enlightenment Spong says that Jesus’ resurrection had nothing to do with him coming back to life, but with the subjective – but real – experiences in the hearts of his followers.

    Lloyd Geering, who himself does not believe in any such being as God, claims that the body of Jesus remained buried and that the story of his resurrection was a later story concocted on the basis of a re-reading of the Old Testament.

    Now of course this isn’t a documentary on the resurrection, but the pattern is somewhat striking. It looks fairly clearly as though the presenter has intentionally stacked the witness stand with those hostile to the Christian story. It will hardly come as a surprise that, given such a uniform and narrow sample, the testimony will (rather gleefully!) point away from the traditional version of events surrounding the death of Christ. We might just as easily consult the faculty of Dallas Theological Seminary and claim that using rigorous scrutiny, we have reached the conclusion that the biblical portrait of Jesus’ death is, well, inerrant! Given that those consulted would be placed at one extreme of the spectrum on whether or not we can generally trust the Gospel accounts or the teaching of the early Christian movement, the interests of balance would surely call for less radical voices, the likes of Craig Evans, James Dunn, Luke Timothy Johnson or N. T Wright. One example – Lloyd Geering is quoted as assuring viewers – completely unchallenged – that the details of the crucifixion was no more than what people “imagined” had probably taken place. When it comes to the story of the resurrection, Geering is explicit – Jesus was probably buried by the Romans and that was that. No tomb, no stone rolled away, and no angels. Geering laughs, “the very fact that you’ve got angels [in the story] shows that we’re dealing with myth, not history.” There was not a single challenge raised. Not even an innuendo that Geering’s view isn’t the scholarly consensus. This was said just minutes after the narrator told us that the Gospel was more fiction than fact.

    This type of concern rears its head among a more sceptical audience when the evangelical likes of Lee Strobel seeks to do just what Bryan Bruce is doing: Apply critical scrutiny to the facts concerning the life of Christ. And yet we frequently hear the complaint that Strobel consults only committed and usually conservative Christians, people who are unlikely to disagree strongly with each other – or with Strobel. I would hope, then, that this same type of sceptical, professedly critical audience will likewise regard Bruce’s offering as a biased, selective survey of a very thin slice of the scholarly community. For example (more…)

  • Does Moral Commitment Presuppose Belief in Providence?

    John HareLast week I had the privilege of hearing Professor John Hare, of Yale Divinity school, speak on God and morality at the Naturalisms in Ethics and APRA conferences. One idea Hare proposes, which fascinates me, is that commitment to morality presupposes belief in what he calls “strong providence” the position that “the world is so ordered that a person’s own virtue is consistent with her own happiness, whether other people are virtuous or not.”[1]

    Here is one line of argument he gives for this conclusion:

    “Consider the fact that we try to teach our children to be moral. We also want them to be happy. If we thought that being virtuous would make them miserable, we would be more ambivalent about teaching them virtue than we actually are. But many people persevere in the attempt to bring up their children to be morally good people even though they do not think their children will be living in a society in which most of their fellows are morally good people. … What lies behind such perseverance is surely a belief that the world is so ordered that when their children grow up, they can be both morally good and happy, and that this is secured not by general human virtue but by something else. The nature of this something else is often, I think, left indeterminate.”[2]

    This example is interesting because it focuses not on one’s own happiness but on the happiness of others. Appeals to self-interest and one’s own happiness are often dismissed as corruptions to moral motivation. In Hare’s example, one is concerned about the happiness of others, in particular one’s children, so the concerns he highlights are altruistic as opposed to egoistic.

    I am inclined to think there is something to Hare’s argument.  I do think that if we thought being virtuous would make our children miserable then a lot of parents might be less disposed towards bringing up their children to be pursue good. Most I talk to agree;  it is hard to comprehend how a loving and caring parent could teach children to be virtuous if doing so would result in their unhappiness. However, our practice of trying to teach our children to be moral suggests we do not believe being virtuous and being happy are incompatible.

    This has me wondering, does commitment to morality as an institution, where we attempt to follow its precepts and encourage them in others, commit us to assumptions about some kind of moral providential order to the world? What would happen to morality if we rejected this? Would there be something sadistic about inculcating moral virtue in our children or encouraging it in others?


    [1] John Hare Moral Faith and Providence, a paper presented at the 1996 Annual Wheaton Philosophy Conference, accessed 27 December 2010.
    [2] Ibid.

    Don’t miss hearing John Hare speak in Auckland next week, he is not in New Zealand for long. All the following events will be held at the University of Auckland and are open to the public, click on the links to get the details:

     

  • A Godless Public Square: Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life? @ Auckland Uni

    Mon 1- Friday 5 August marks Jesus Week. A number of events will be held on the University of Auckland campus of which we are part of including this one brought to you by the Evangelical Union and Thinking Matters:

    Godless Public Square

    A Godless Public Square:

    Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life?

    A Jesus Week Panel Discussion
    7-9pm Wednesday 3 August
    Lib B28 (Library Basement) University of Auckland

    Christian theological convictions ought to impact the whole of life both in the private and public spheres; this is what the idea of an “undivided life” means, Jesus is Lord of all aspects of our lives.

    Yet this consequence of Christian faith conflicts with a pervasive contemporary attitude: the view that that religion is fundamentally a private matter. It is accepted that a Christian is free to utilise theological convictions when they make decisions about their own life but in a pluralistic society it is increasingly deemed inappropriate to bring such convictions into public discussions about morality, law, politics, economics, education, scholarship and so on. The desire to influence society with Christian ideals or to convert others to the faith is viewed by many as an intolerant desire to impose one’s private views onto others.

    It is widely accepted that theological convictions can govern churches and the private lives of believers yet we are told that the public square – government, public policy, the courts, the academy, education, business, arts, media, etc – should be secular only.

    This event looks at this issue. The conversation will span Theology, Philosophy and Law led by a panel made up of Christian representatives from each discipline along with you the audience.

    Up for discussion are issues like:

    – Is it wrong for Christians to impose their ‘private’ religious beliefs onto others?
    – Is secularism the neutral perspective it is claimed to be?
    – Are public expressions of religion regulated by law?

    Bring your own questions and ask them at the Q & A session.

    This is a free event open to the public, which will be lay friendly – a university degree is not necessary in order for you to attend!

    Panel:

    Moderator:

    RSVP on Facebook here (or just turn up with your friends)

  • Ethics: What Does God have to do with it? @ Auckland University

    World class Ethicists John Hare (Yale Divinity) and Mark Murphy (Georgetown Philosophy) are in town for the Naturalisms in Ethics Conference and the Meeting of the Australasian Philosophy of Religion Association at the University of Auckland where they will be speaking along with New Zealand’s top Ethicists.

    We leaped on the opportunity to organise the following event, brought to you by the University of Auckland Department of Philosophy and Thinking Matters Auckland:

    Ethics: What does God have to do with it?

    Ethics: What Does God have to do with it? 
    A Conversation with Three Christian Philosophers

    7pm Tuesday 26 July
    Room OGGB4/260-073 (Owen Glenn Building)
    University of Auckland

    The question of the relationship between religion and morality has long been the subject of discussion and debate in western culture. Some philosophers and theologians contend the two cannot be separated; theological beliefs about God and the afterlife are needed to explain the existence and nature of moral obligations, and to ground motivation to live a moral life.

    Others contend the opposite. They claim that morality is entirely independent of religion and that religion encourages immorality. Questions have also been raised as to whether religion adds anything to morality in terms of its ideas about atonement, forgiveness and moral faith which are lacking in secular views.

    This panel brings together several of the world’s leading Christian thinkers on this question to discuss issues such as:

    – Why do we have to do what is right?
    – Can someone be a ‘good’ person without belief in God?
    – What role do grace and forgiveness play in morality?

    Bring your own questions and ask them at the Q & A session.

    This will be a free, lay friendly event open to the public – a university degree is not necessary in order for you to attend!

    Panel:
    Prof John Hare – Yale Divinity School
    Prof Mark Murphy – Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University
    Dr Glen Pettigrove  – Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland

    (Click on each of their names – they are each seriously cool!)

    Moderator:
    Dr Matthew Flannagan

    RSVP on Facebook or just turn up – bring your friends. This is soooo not to be missed!

  • The Australasian Philosophy of Religion Association Conference @ Auckland University

    The Australasian Philosophy of Religion Association (APRA) conference will be running at the University of Auckland from 16-17 July and will feature this blog’s own Matthew Flannagan and our good friend Glenn Peoples.

    The APRA conference is an annual event usually taking place over two days in mid July. Speakers include:

    More information at APRA’s website (which includes registration information) or at the Facebook Event page.

    Matt’s paper, “Armstrong on Divine Commands” will be chaired by John Hare of Yale Divinity School. Matt’s abstract is below:

    Abstract for: Armstrong on Divine Commands

    In several debates and addresses, William Lane Craig has defended the conditional,

    1. If God exists then a divine command theory provides a plausible account of the nature of moral obligation.

    In support of 1, Craig has appropriated the divine command theory of Robert Adams. He has identified the property of being morally obligated to do X with the property of being commanded by God to do X. Recently, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has contended Craig’s conditional is “incredible” and that the divine command theory is “vulnerable to a cavalcade of devastating objections.” Armstrong has claimed that his criticisms do not just call into question Craig’s argument for a theistic based system of ethics; he contends that his arguments are conclusive against any theistic account of ethics compatible with Christian theism. I will argue that none of the objections Armstrong raises are persuasive, much less “devastating”; and that most of them have, in fact, been anticipated and addressed by defenders of divine command theories.

  • Naturalisms in Ethics Conference @ Auckland Uni

    The Naturalisms in Ethics conference will be running at the University of Auckland from 14-15 July and will feature this blog’s own Matthew Flannagan.

    Here is the blurb from organiser Chris Tucker’s page (which includes registration information – see also the Facebook Event page):

    ‘Naturalism’ is a multiply ambiguous term—hence the title Naturalisms in Ethics— but it is related to a range of questions concerning the relationship of morality to science, evolution, biology, religion, and natural properties (whatever those are). Many otherwise disparate moral theories have been labeled as ethical naturalisms, including virtue ethics (both neo-Aristotelian and neo-Humean), moral functionalism, Cornell realism, and natural law theories. Some potential paper topics include the following (but the list is hardly exhaustive):

    • What are the different types of ethical naturalism?
    • Why should we endorse/reject ethical naturalism or some specific version thereof?
    • What can science or evolution tell us about morality, moral psychology, or the rationality of moral judgments?
    • Are naturalistic accounts of morality better off than theistic ones?

    Speakers include:

    Matt’s paper, “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong” will be chaired by Erik Wielenberg of DePauw University. Matt’s abstract is below: (more…)