Category: Christian History

  • FETICIDE IN CHRISTIAN MORAL THOUGHT (Part Four) : Feticide in the Reformed Protestant Tradition

    In our last post we saw how Medieval Christian’s adopted the same position on abortion we saw developed in Alexandrian Judaism and by Patristic theologians. We also saw how this position found its way into European and English law.  Of course during the medieval period, Christian’s in Europe were Catholic.  However, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Protestant Reformation happened.

    I. Martin Luther

    In 1517 Martin Luther nailed 95 theses: propositions of protest, to the Wittenberg chapel door, sparking off a debate which would split Europe into religious factions. Luther began a movement known as Protestantism.  Protestants departed from several teachings that were advocated by the Roman Catholic Church during the Middle Ages.  These teachings predominately dealt with issues of whether a person is saved by faith or works and questions of authority and church government. There were however also some differences in opinion on certain moral issues such as divorce and celibacy.

    What is interesting however is that on abortion, the leaders of the Protestant Reformation came to essentially the same answer as their Catholic predecessors.

    In his writings, Luther addressed the issue of feticide briefly stating, “those who have no regard for pregnant women and do not spare the tender fruit are murderers and infanticides”[1].93  Luther claims that killing a fetus is both murder and infanticide.

    II. Philip Melanchthon (1497 –1560)

    A similar stance was taken by Philip Melanchthon. Melanchthon was a close companion of Luther and, next to Luther, was probably the most important leader in the Protestant Reformation and one of the first Protestant theologians. Melanchthon stated that on the forty-fifth day after conception a “fetus with formed distinct members begins to live” and he added, “souls are inserted into children about the forty fifth-day and then not only should it [the conceptus] be called an embryo but even an infant”.[2]   The reference to the forty-fifth day is probably a reference to the biological theories of ancient Greek philosophers which we looked when we studied  Alexandrian Judaism.

    III. John Calvin

    After Luther and Melanchthon, the next most important figure in the Reformation was John Calvin. Calvin established one of the most important schools of Protestant Theology in Geneva and wrote the most important defence of Protestant theology in the period.  In his Commentary on the Five Books of Moses. Calvin wrote that:

    [T]he fetus, though enclosed in the womb of its mother, is already a human being, (homo,) and it is almost a monstrous crime to rob it of the life which it has not yet begun to enjoy. If it seems more horrible to kill a man in his own house than in a field, because a man’s house is his place of most secure refuge, it ought surely to be deemed more atrocious to destroy a fetus in the womb before it has come to light.[3]

    This comment occurs in Calvin’s discussion of Exodus 21:22-25. The is the passage we looked at when we studied Alexandrian Judaism.  Calvin appeals directly to the law regarding a pregnant woman, which was cited by Alexandrian Jews, such as Philo, and Patristic writers like Jerome, Augustine.  Calvin concludes that killing a fetus in the womb is homicide.  Like these other writers, Calvin takes abortion to violate the fifth of the ten commandments. The quote above occurs in a commentary on the ten commandments specifically in the section that explains the meaning of the commandment “you shall not kill.”

    IV. Early Calvinists

    Calvin’s influence on later Protestants was immense. People who followed Calvin’s ideas were often called “Calvinists” or “reformed”. In England, a group of Calvin’s followers emerged who historians call “the Puritans” they wanted to reform the Church of England along much more Calvinist lines and make its liturgy less  Catholic.

    A leader of this group was a man called William Gouge (1575–1653) Gouge was the chairperson of a committee which drew up a document called “The Westminster Confession in 1640. The Westminster Confession was an official statement of Protestant belief and is still the official belief statement of Presbyterian and Reformed Churches today. Gouge wrote that it was a violation of the fifth commandment to abort “that which hath received a soul formed in it by God” and that “if it be unjustly cast away, shall be revenged”.[4]

    Calvinists understood the sixth commandment to forbid killing a human being without justification. Calvin had argued that “The sum of this Commandment is, that we should not unjustly do violence to anyone”.[5][Emphasis added]

    Calvin acknowledged that sometimes killing or violence are justified and in his commentary proceeded to justify homicide in certain situations based on the law itself. The conclusions that he reached were summarized in the Westminster Catechism under the question, “What is forbidden by the Sixth Commandment?” the answer was, “The sins forbidden in the Sixth Commandment are, all taking away the life of ourselves, or of others, except in case of public justice, lawful war, or necessary defence”[6] Seeing it makes no sense to punish a fetus for a crime or literally go to war with a fetus. These conclusions suggest that in the reformed tradition feticide can be justified, if at all, only under the justification of self-defence.


    [1] Ewald M Plass, What Luther Says: An Anthology, (St Louis, MO: Concordia Publishing House, 1959) 509, cited in G. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1

    [2] Melanchthon, “Definitio Animae Usitata in Eccesia,” Corpus Reformatorum 13, cited in G. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970).

    [3] John Calvin, Harmony of the Law, Vol. 3 http://www.ccel.org/c/calvin/comment3/comm_vol05/htm/TOC.htm.

    [4] W Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties, Eight Treatises 506, cited in G. Willams “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies 31:1 (1970).

    [5] Plass, What Luther Says, 509, cited in G. Willams, “Religious Residues and Presuppositions in the American Debate on Abortion” Theological Studies, 31:1 (1970).

    [6] Larger Westminster Catechism, question 136

  • PART THREE: FETICIDE IN CHRISTIAN MORAL THOUGHT (Part three) : The Medieval Period

    I teach NCEA Religious Studies, at level three, one standard is to “Analyse the response of a religious tradition to a contemporary ethical issue”. Officially students have to describe the response a religious tradition has made to a moral issue. Our school like a lot of schools looks at Christian responses to abortion. Because I did my PhD thesis on this very subject in the last year I have been going through my dissertation and simplifying, summarising and rewriting it into short sections I can use with my classes. Because there is some interest in this, I have decided to post some of these on MandM. I welcome any feedback or comments.

    In our last  post we looked at how Christian theologians who wrote during the Patristic period, the period from 90AD to 475 AD, addressed the question of abortion. Our survey suggested they adopted essentially the same position we saw earlier in Alexandrian Judaism and which is found in the Septuagint. In this next section, we will look at the medieval period. Historians date the medieval period from 500 AD -1500. AD, during this period Christian Theologians adopted pretty much the same stance they did during the Patristic period.

    I. Canon Law

    The period from 500-1000 AD is known as the early middle ages. During this time the church in Europe developed what is called Canon law. Canon law is a set of laws developed by church authorities to govern the church and its members. One thing that Canon law had to deal with was penance; suppose someone commits a seriously immoral action, how should the church respond, what penalties practices of confession and repentance, should be in place to deal with this such practices are known in Catholicism as penance.

    During the early middle ages, manuals about how penance should be applied were developed. Many of these manuals addressed abortion. Here are some examples:

    • Manual Canones Hibernenses (675 A.D.) refers to abortion as a sin but draws a distinction between an unformed embryo and a formed, fetus. While both incur a penalty, The latter is punished more severely.[1]
    • The Bigotian Penitential (8th Century AD) draws a distinction between an embryo in liquid form and a fetus with flesh and spirit. Both abortions are punished, but the latter is punished more severely. [2]
    • The Anglo-Saxon Penitentials (668-690 A.D.) associated with the then the Archbishop of Canterbury Theodore drew a distinction between an abortion before and after 40 days. Penances are imposed for both periods; however, the penance after 40 days is stricter.[3] 
    • The Penitentiale Discupulus Umbrensium, states that if abortion takes place before an embryo has a soul the penance will be a year or three forty-day periods [4]

    In 1000 AD Pope Leo began reforming canon law and attempted and get a consistent practice. A Bishop called Ivo de Chartres collected together various manuals which became the standard rules for the church. Ivo dealt with abortion under the heading of “Homicide” he cited various Patristic writers we mentioned in our last lesson such as Jerome and Augustine and argued that a formed embryo or fetus is a human being and hence killing is a form of homicide[5] Ivo’s position became the standard position in Medieval Canon law. Ivo’s position was adopted by Gratian (1160) and Gratian’s work on Concordia became the dominant text of Canon law until the nineteenth century.

    1. II. Medieval Theology

    Alongside Canon law, we can also examine what Theologians or Philosophers who taught at Universities wrote.

    1.Peter Lombard

    One of the most important Theologians of the middle ages was Peter Lombard. Lombard lived from 1095-1160 A.D. He is important because he wrote The Sentences which was the most widely used textbook in Medieval universities.  When discussing feticide, Lombard repeated the texts cited by Gratian and Patristic writers such as Augustine, Jerome and also quote from the Septuagint.[6]

    Because Lombard’s book was such a widely used , other scholars of the period wrote commentaries on it.

    • In his commentaries, Albert the Great (1206-1280) accepted Lombard’s position that killing a formed conceptus was homicide.[7]
    • In his commentary Bonaventure (1221-1274) also accepted Lombard’s position that killing a fetus was homicide.[8]

    2.Thomas Aquinas

    The most famous Theologian and philosopher of the middle ages was Thomas Aquinas (1225-1275). In his commentary the Sentences he accepted Lombard’s basic position.80 Later, in the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas quotes Exodus 21:22-25:

    He that strikes a woman with child does something unlawful: wherefore if there results the death either of the woman or of the animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide, especially seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow.[9]

    3.John of Naples

    A final theologian to note is fifteenth-century theologian John of Naples.  John wrote a book called Quodlibeta; in which he addressed the question “is it acceptable to give medical treatment to a pregnant woman if doing so will cause an abortion?”  John’s answer. If the drugs are provided for the purpose of destroying the embryo or fetus, then this is forbidden. On the other hand, if the drugs are provided to save the woman’s life from a fatal illness, then one can provide this treatment to her provided the fetus is not formed at the time.

    John was the first Theologian since Tertullian to explicitly address the question of whether abortion was acceptable to save a woman’s life. His position was taken up by later theologians and lead to a debate about under what circumstances abortion was acceptable if it saved a pregnant woman’s life.

    III. Medieval Law

    We will close our examination of the medieval period by looking at the law.

    1. Roman Law
    During the medieval period, Europeans followed Roman law. Roman law regarding abortion had developed as follows:

    • Roman dictator Sulla (81 BC) passed the Lex Cornelia a general law against selling and distributing poison.
    • Roman legal scholar Iulius Paulus applied the Lex Cornelia to cover drugs that cause an abortion:

    If anyone gives another a love potion or an abortion potion, even without an evil intention, since it is a source of bad example, he will be condemned to work in the mines if he belongs to the lower classes. If he belongs to the upper classes, he will be exiled and part of his property confiscated. But if the man dies, he will be punished with a capital sentence.[10]

    This became known as the Qui Abortionis law. The phrase “but if a man dies” probably referred to the death of the mother. However, during the medieval period, European lawyers began interpreting Roman law in accord with both the Septuagint and canon law. As a result, the reference to killing a man in the Qui Abortion was understood to include the killing of a fetus, 40 days after conception.

    2.English Common Law

    Canon law and medieval European law had an influence on English common law:  English common law is that part of English law which is based on custom.

    • Henry Bracton, (1210 – 1268 AD ) recorded English common law as stating: “If there is anyone who strikes a pregnant woman or gives her a poison which produces an abortion if the foetus be already formed or animated, and especially if it be animated, he commits homicide.” [11]
    • In 1290 an anonymous royal official wrote a book called Fleta according to this book:

    One is rightly a homicide who has pressed on a pregnant woman or has given her a poison or struck her to produce an abortion … if the foetus was already formed and ensouled… A woman also commits homicide if, by a potion or the like, she destroy the ensouled child in her womb. 89

    Bracton and Fleta tell us that killing a fetus was considered homicide in English common law.

    3.The Quickening rule

    The courts had difficulty applying these laws in practice. In English law, a person cannot be prosecuted for murder unless it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that they deliberately killed a human being. I was hard to do this in medieval times. Miscarriage sometimes happens naturally, and it is difficult to determine how long a woman has been pregnant and whether or not the child in her womb had died of natural causes. Two prominent legal cases in the middle ages   resulted in an acquittal because of an inability to prove

    These difficulties lead to the development of what is called the “quickening rule”. Quickening refers to the time when a woman first feels the fetus move inside her. English law treated any action which caused the death of a fetus after quickening a serious criminal offence.  But refused to treat it as murder unless the fetus was born alive and died from wounds which were obviously caused while the woman was pregnant. This way of applying the law was followed by the famous English judge Edward Coke (1552 –1634) and is recorded as the law of England by the judge William Blackstone 1723 – 1780) This remained the English law till the mid-19th century.


    [1] Canones Hibernenses,1 Canons 6-8.

     [2] Penitentiale Bigotianum, 4.2, 2-4.

    [3] Penitentiale, 14, 24 also 27.

    [4] Penitentiale, 14, 24 also 27.

    [5] Ivo of Chartres, Decretum, 10 55-58.

    [6] Peter Lombard, Libri Sententiarium, Lib 4 d.31.

    [7] Albert, Commentarium, in L IV d. 31 a18.

    [8] Bonaventure, Commentarium in Librum IV Sententiarium, d 31 dub 4. 80 Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in Librum IV Sententiarium, d 31.

    [9] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II II Q64 Article 8. 82 Connery, Abortion:, 112.

    [10] Justinian, Digest 48. 19. 38. 5.

    [11] Henry Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England, 2: 341.

  • FETICIDE IN CHRISTIAN MORAL THOUGHT Part two : Feticide in Patristic Thought

    I teach NCEA Religious Studies, at level three, one standard is to “Analyse the response of a religious tradition to a contemporary ethical issue”. Officially students have to describe the response a religious tradition has made to a moral issue. Our school like a lot of schools looks at Christian responses to abortion. Because I did my PhD thesis on this very subject in the last year I have been going through my dissertation and simplifying, summarising and rewriting it into short sections I can use with my classes. Because there is some interest in this, I have decided to post some of these on MandM. I welcome any feedback or comments.

    In our last lesson, we examined how Alexandrian Jews responded to feticide at the time that Christian churches first started coming into existence. While Christianity and Judaism differ in many important ways, the evidence suggests that on the question of feticide and abortion early Christian communities adopted the same position that Alexandrian Jews already held.

    To show this, we will look first at the Patristic period. The word Patristic is used by scholars of early Christianity to refer to Christian theologians who lived between 90AD to 475 AD. When one examines the writings of the Patristics on the question of abortion, we find over and over the same two ideas:  first, that killing a formed embryo or a fetus violates the fifth commandment; secondly, an appeal to the Septuagint and the formed/unformed distinction.

    I. Feticide as a Violation of the Fifth Commandment.

    An important document for the study of early Christianity is The Didache. The word Didache mean’s “the teaching”. The Didache contrasts two ways of living, “the way of life” and the “way of death”. The “Didache” was a training manual for converts to Christianity which summarises for a new convert the basic teachings of the Apostles.       It is adapted from on manuals used by Jewish communities and used for instructing pagan converts to Judaism. This fact suggests the Didache is a very early Christian writing.  Early Christianity was Jewish, the first Christian’s being a sect of Judaism, as time went on, however, the church broke from Judaism, and more and more non-Jewish people became Christians.  Further evidence of an early date for the Didache is the primitive leadership structure of the church. The latter hierarchal structure of church leadership you find in the second century AD isn’t present instead – the Didache mentions a leadership structure of itinerant prophets and even mentions apostles. This suggests as are suggestive of a mid-first Century date for the document.[1] This would place the document within the same generation as the apostles. At the latest, the passage is dated Early-Second Century, less than a generation after the death of the apostles.

    There is a line in the Didache which says “you shall not murder a child by abortion nor kill that which is born”. This line occurs in a section which explains to the readers what the ten commandments require of Christians, and the prohibition on abortion occurs alongside various other commandments such as the fifth commandments prohibition of murder and the commandment against adultery. The Didache shows us that very early on, within at least a generation of the Apostle’s early Christian communities viewed the killing of a fetus as a form of homicide. It was considered to violate the fifth of the ten commandments.

    This community that produced the Didache were not alone in this. The position laid down in the Didache appears to have been widely accepted. Every theologian from the Patristic period who wrote on the question comes to the same conclusion. Here are some examples:

    • Athenagoras (133–190AD) called abortion murder and compared it to infanticide.[2]

     

    • Tertullian (155 – c. 240) calls it “speedier man-killing”[3]And states the Law of Moses condemns it.

     

    • Minucius Felix (150 and 270AD) see abortion it as “parricidium”[4]A Roman legal term for homicide.[5]

     

    • Cyprian (200 –258 AD) calls it murder and views violations of this command as more serious than violating the laws against idol worship.[6]

     

    • Hippolytus (170 – 235 AD) describes abortion as murder and, like adultery, as against God’s commands.[7]

     

    • The author of the Apocalypse of Paul (end of 4th century) describes feticide as “destroying the image of God” and as “contrary to God’s commandments”. [8]

     

    • Augustine (354 430 AD) says that Gods law declares killing a formed fetus as murder[9] and that abortion at any stage is a cruelty akin to infanticide.[10]

     

    • Jerome (347-420) declares feticide to be murder.[11]

     

    • Basil (330-379) classifies it as homicide alongside killing one’s spouse and killing a person in a highway robbery.[12]

     

    • Ambrose (340 – 397) views it as “taking away life before birth”.[13]

     

    • Chrysostom  (349 407 AD) states that abortion is “murder before birth” that abortionists turn a woman’s womb into a “chamber for murder” and in doing so “fight against His [God’s] laws”.[14]

    We mentioned Philo of Alexandria in the last section and mentioned how he appealed to Jewish teaching on abortion to reject the Greek and Roman practise of infanticide.  Like Philo, numerous, Early-Christian writers appealed to this teaching to offer arguments against infanticide.

    In the first few centuries after Christ, Christianity was viewed with suspicion and Christians were often falsely accused of all sorts of horrible things. One accusation was that Christians engaged in infant sacrifice. Athenagoras, for example, responded to this accusation by saying Christians couldn’t support killing infants because; “we say that those women who use drugs to bring on abortion commit murder, and will have to give an account to God for the abortion”.[15] If killing a fetus was murder then infanticide must be as well. Christians “are in all things always alike and the same, submitting ourselves to reason, and not ruling over it”.[16]  Tertullian responded to the same accusation by noting that for Christians, infanticide is  “murder” because Christians “may not destroy even the fetus in the womb”.42 Minucius Felix responded by turning the tables arguing that it was, in fact, the pagans who practised infanticide of which because killing a fetus was merely to “commit a parricide before they bring forth”.[17]

    II. Formed/Unformed Distinction and the Septuagint

    In addition to seeing feticide as a violation of the fifth commandment, numerous, early Christians followed Philo in basing this conclusion upon the Septuagint and the formed/unformed distinction found in Greek Philosophy. Here are some examples:

    • Tertullian (155 – c. 240) stated “The embryo, therefore, becomes a human being in the womb from the moment that its form is completed. The law of Moses, indeed, punishes with due penalties the man who shall cause abortion.”[18]
    • Jerome (347-420) wrote, “The seed gradually takes shape in the uterus, and it [abortion] does not count as killing until the individual elements have acquired their external appearance and their limbs”.[19]

     

    • Lactantius (250 – 325) argued that a fetus is formed on the 40th day and it is this stage when it is ensouled and a full human being.[20]

     

    • Gregory of Nyssa (335–395) wrote “ [J]ust as it would not be possible to style the unformed embryo a human being, but only a potential one, assuming that it is completed so as to come forth to human birth, while as long as it is in this unformed state, it is something other than a human being.”[21]

     

    • Cyril of Alexandria: (376 – 444) cites the Septuagint and argues a fetus becomes human at 40 days when it acquires form.[22]

     

    • Ambrosiaster (366 and 384) argues that a human soul is infused into a fetus when the conceptus is formed, and hence abortion of a formed fetus is homicide [23].

      By the end of the Patristic period, two church councils adopted policies on dealing with the killing of a fetus. The councils of Elvira and Ancyra, held in 305 A.D. and 314 A.D. respectively. The Council of Elvira declared that a woman had an abortion to cover up an affair could not be re-admitted to full communion for the rest of her life. The reason the council gives for this is that the woman has committed a double sin; she has not just committed adultery she has made this worse this by committing homicide as well.[24] This practice reflected the very harsh discipline that existed in the Early Church where serious sins committed after baptism were not forgiven. This harsh discipline was relaxed by the council of Ancyra only a few years later. Those who attended  Ancyra referred to the earlier practice (reflected in Elvira)  and ruled “more humanely” and required only 10 years penance before one could be received back into the fold.[25]

    It seems safe to say that, throughout the patristic period, almost every Christian theologian who addressed the question of feticide did so by articulating two basic premises [1] that God has commanded people to refrain from killing a human being, and [2] that a fetus, or a formed embryo, is a human being.

    However, we should be careful about interpreting these statements to mean that the early church condemned abortion absolutely in every single possible situation. There some evidence that Christain’s also permitted abortion in those rare circumstances where a woman’s life was in danger. The only Christian writer to address this situation was Tertullian. Tertullian refers to a situation where a child gets “twisted” in the womb and cannot be delivered alive without killing the mother. He describes the process of killing it with strong negative language as “a criminal deed” “infanticide” “robber in the dark” and “cruelty” however he also describes it as a “necessary crime” and “necessary cruelty” While Tertullian isn’t clear, many scholars think Tertullian here assumes that when continuing the pregnancy will kill the mother abortion is a necessary evil.

    We can summarise the early churches position then as follows:

    Premise: [1] Killing a human being without justification violates the law of God.

     

    Premise: [2] A formed embryo (i.e. a fetus) is a human being.

     

    Premise: [3] In the case of feticide (at least in the majority of cases) insufficient or no justification is forthcoming.

     


    [1] John Robinson, Redating the New Testament, (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 1976), 324-27.

    [2] Athenagoras, A Plea for the Christians, 35.

    [3] Tertullian, Apology, 9.8.

    [4] Minucius Felix, Octavius, 30.

    [5] John Noonan, Contraception: A History of its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians, (Cambridge, MA:

    The Bellknap Press of Harvard University, 1965), 91. Noonan notes that ‘parricidium’ was the specific Latin term for the unlawful killing of a close relative such as a parent or brother.

    [6] Cyprian, Letters, 48.

    [7] Hippolytus, Refutation of all Heresies, 9.7.

    [8] Apocalypse of Paul 40.

    [9] Augustine, Commentary on the Heptateuch, 2. 80.

    [10] Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence, 1.17.

    [11] Jerome, Letters, 22.13 and 121.4.

    [12] Basil, Letter CLXXXVIII, 8.

    [13] Ambrose, Hexameron, 5.18.58.

    [14] Chrysostom, Homily 24 on Romans.

    [15] Athenagoras, A Plea for the Christians, 35.

    [16] Ibid. 42  Tertullian, Apology, 9.8.

    [17] Minucius Felix, Octavius, 30.

    [18] Tertullian, Treatise on the Soul, Ch VII.

    [19] Jerome, Letters, 121.4.

    [20] Lactantius, De Opifico Dei, 12, 17.

    [21] Gregory of Nyssa, On the Holy Spirit Against Macedonius

    [22] Cyril of Alexandria, De Adoratione in Spirtu et Veritate, 8.

    [23] Ambrosiaster, QQ Veteris et Novi Testamenti, 23.

    [24] John Connery, Abortion: The Development of the Roman Catholic Position (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1977), 47-48

    [25] Ibid., 48-49.

  • On alleged Victim’s of Church abuse… “Can you blame them?”…. “Yes I can”

    Can you blame them? This was the rhetorical question I heard recently, posed by a speaker at a Conference of religious studies teachers that I attended.  The answer to the question was supposed to be No, and most of the audience seemed to take this to be the correct answer. Nor is this atypical It’s not the first time I have heard the same sort of rhetorical methods employed nor is it the first time I have seen this response.

    No doubt readers will wonder what this question was in response to so let me spell out the context. The speaker was articulating various demographics about the growth of religious belief and practise in contemporary Australia. While doing so he told the following story:  A woman and her family had been actively involved in a church for many years, however later in her life, her marriage ended in divorce. When this happened the woman was told she was no longer welcome in the church. Her family left. The speaker then passionately told us how her children all now are emphatic that organised religion does more harm than good. After relaying this story he then fired off the rhetorical question ” And who can blame them?”

    Had I been less polite I would have stated: “I can”. I think I can blame them. I have heard similar stories over the years from various speakers and must admit to being less than keen on the enthusiastic apologetic self-flagellation that Christian’s often engage in over such stories. Here is why

    First, is a matter of facts and evidence. One thing I have learnt is that when people have had an acrimonious dispute one should always be hesitant to jump to judgement. In any dispute, especially one involving divorce, parties on both sides will have conflicting stories. Both will claim to be unjustly aggrieved, and sorting out what happened isn’t always easy. In this context, I am reminded of a conversation I had with a family law judge once over dinner. The judge talked about both parties in a dispute expressing “their truth”. Piquing my interest, we got into a discussion about whether he believed the truth was relative. On clarification, however, it became apparent the judge wasn’t affirming relativism instead he was expressing a fact he had observed from years on the bench. When emotions run high and loyalties are betrayed or tested people tend to rationalise, deceive themselves, to minimise their own behaviour and maximise that of others. His point was that the different parties often sincerely believe their own stories. They are convinced what they say is true. Despite the fact that it can’t be. It’s the truth as they see it, even if we might see that it is selective with the facts and distorted.  I don’t doubt the judge’s observation that this is common.  In light of this, I think we need to be very careful before we judge that a church or church leadership group has acted appallingly in such a dispute. This isn’t to say Churches never act in inappropriate ways, or make pastoral or theological howlers. It’s just the point that, even though they do, we shouldn’t immediately accept as credible every accusation that they have the as unvarnished truth. Before we rush to judgement, we should try and work out whether the claim is credible.

    In this particular case there are many questions one would need to ask, for example, how did the divorce occur? Did one spouse commit adultery, was there violence or desertion, and from which spouse? Moreover, if the woman was a member of the church isn’t it at least likely that her husband is as well?

     In light of these questions, one can immediately see the situation could be more nuanced than it appears. Suppose the woman had committed adultery, deserted her husband, the church was offering pastoral support to her devastated husband. She was turning up every Sunday with the new man and refusing to acknowledge a problem. In this sort of situation, one can easily sympathise with the churches decision. On the other hand, if the man was a womanising wife beater and the pastoral team were taking his side because “wives should submit to their husbands” the picture is different. The point is I’d want to know more about the picture  before I rushed to judgement and said: “who can blame them?”

     It shouldn’t need to be said. But it’s simply not true that every time some angry person tells a story about their disputes with a church are that the church is in the wrong and the disputant is in the right. Sometimes it’s the case, and sometimes it isn’t. We owe church leaders more respect and justice than to simply believe without question every single accusation made against them, and to join in sympathetic outrage with every accusation. If we rush to judgement, it’s actually us who are behaving appallingly. So while I am quite sure that church leaders can and sometimes do act in bad ways, accusations still need to be substantiated.

    But let’s suppose the story is accurate. The church leadership did behave badly and kicked someone out unjustly. I still think we must answer the speaker’s rhetorical question in the affirmative.  Here is why: Note what the speaker said, he said that upon being treated this way the family concluded that organised religion does more harm than good. They didn’t want to be associated with an institution that behaves this way. So they will have nothing more to do with “religion”.

    But hang on! Can’t a person be legitimately questioned for drawing this kind of conclusion? What has happened is that one church has done one hurtful or offensive thing on one occasion. How can a person justifiably extrapolate from this that religion does more harm than good? Or even that this is normal or typical for churches per se.  To do this, a person would need to look at a representative sample of actions performed by various religious organisations over history. Looking at all the hurtful things religious institutions have done over the centuries and all the beneficial things they have done. There would need to be some weighing of these against one another. And only when this was done could one justifiably conclude that religion causes more harm than good.

    To suggest that because an organisation has hurt you and your family, you can, therefore, make a judgement about all religious institutions and their total effect on society and history is, frankly, absurd. It is obviously a bad inference. Moreover, this type of judgment is one we would out rightly condemn as stereotypical or bigoted if it occurred in a different context.

    Here is an example: suppose a woman’s husband was in the world trade tower on September 11, 2001. As a result of the attack that morning he is killed, and she is overcome with grief. We would feel justified empathy with her,  situation, it’s awful, and she has clearly been wronged, unjustifiably widowed by someone else’s criminal conduct. Does it follow however that we can now justifiably go along with her families claim that all Muslims are terrorists and complicit in such behaviour? Obviously not, to do this would, in fact, to sanction stereotyping and to put it bluntly bigotry.

    Or, to use another example, suppose someone is walking home and is attacked by an African American male. He is beaten and hospitalised and dies from the mugging. The victim’s family are angry in a fit of rage they declare that African American males are a scourge and want nothing to do with any African American men they do more harm than good? What would we say?  “Can you blame them?” I think we can and would; we would call this racial prejudice.  I think we would understand the anger and sympathise with their pain, but we would also recognise that this pain and anger has twisted or warped their perspective so that they are promoting, without evidence, harmful generalisations about others. And we would want to challenge those generalisations.  Of course, this may need to be done in a sensitive and tactful way. But the fact we are sensitive and tactful doesn’t mean we grant what they say is justified. It isn’t. They have allowed their rage and anger to become pathological and bigoted and this isn’t blameless.

    One might wonder why I am harping on about an anecdotal story I have heard in a talk. Here is why: the story I heard and the response I witnessed to it is, I think, representative of something common. Throughout many years at Bible college, University, and witnessing general culture I have often seen people react this way to claims about abuse on the part of religious leaders, and it bothers me that people react this way.

    My studies have taught me that there are in popular culture false narratives about religious people and religious institutions.  Some of these narratives are so notorious historians have given them names The black legend, the myth of a dark ages, the Whig view of history, the conflict thesis, myths about the Crusades in their own way these different narratives are deep in popular psychology and they tell a narrative about the role of religious institutions in our society and history. These narratives are also false. But, their falsity isn’t often appreciated in popular culture. It’s also worth noting these narratives can be harmful. A few years ago I studied the terror that occurred during the French revolution, and it was eye opening how some of these sorts of narratives were used to murder people. The idea of religion as an institution which inevitably oppresses the downtrodden was a well-known Marxist trophe[1]and it was used to justify the slaughter of thousands.  Obviously, not everyone who believes these things is going to kill, but we need to call a spade a spade. A false narrative based on selective and stereotypical reasoning is still a false narrative, and if such a narrative can and has been harmful, we need to be candid about this, it can be used this way. Sticks and stones break bones and names can hurt you.

    So when the speaker asks, “can we blame them” I answer “yes we can” In all walks of life people suffer, have disputes and can be unjustly treated, does this justify them in generalising about whole groups of people? No, it doesn’t. The fact the topic is religion doesn’t change this fact.


    [1] Compare for example Karl Marx’s “religion is the opium of the people’ Mao Tse Tung’s “Religion is Poison” and  the title of Christopher Hitchen’s  bestselling “God is not Great How Religion Poison’s Everything” (emphasis mine)

  • Divine Command Theory and Utilitarianism forgotten bedfellows? Paley’s Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (part two)

    In my last post, I explained the position of Theological Utilitarianism as expounded in William Paley’s The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. I pointed out The Principles was first published in 1785, four years before Jeremy Bentham published An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In this post, I want to look at the influence Theological Utilitarianism had in the 18th and 19th centuries. Was Paley expounding some novel idiosyncratic position? Or was he simply repeating a fairly mainstream position on the relationship between Gods law and happiness which had been around for decades?

    1. The influence of Theological Utilitarianism in the 18thand 19th centuries

    Theological Utilitarianism sounds novel to contemporary ears. But it wasn’t an innovative position in the late eighteenth century. Paley notes in the preface that he is a “compiler” of earlier writers of moral theory. Schneewind, states that the theory he proposed was in fact “an assemblage of ideas developed by others and is presented to be learned by students rather than debated by colleagues. “[1] Some trace theological utilitarianism back to the divine command theory of John Locke[2]  However, the earliest clear exponent of this position appears to be George Berkeley’s sermons in 1712.[3]

    It is worth looking at Berkeley in some detail.  According to Berkeley, things are “denominated good or evil” as “they are fitted to augment or impair our own Happiness” Good or Evil. On the other hand, “Moral Goodness” consists in a “Conformity to the Laws of God.” Berkley articulates the relationship between moral and non-moral goodness as follows:

    For Laws being Rules directive of our Actions to the end intended by the Legislator, in order to attain the paleyKnowledge of God’s Laws, we ought first to enquire what that end is, which he designs should be carried on by human Actions. God is a Being of Infinite Goodness. it is plain the end he proposes is Good. But God enjoying in himself all possible Perfection, it follows that it is not his own Good, but that of his Creatures. Again, the Moral Actions of Men are entirely terminated within themselves, so as to have no influence on the other orders of Intelligences or reasonable Creatures: The end therefore to be procured by them, can be no other than the good of Men. But as nothing in a natural State can entitle one Man more than another to the favour of God, except only Moral Goodness, which consisting in a Conformity to the Laws of God, doth presuppose the being of such Laws, and Law ever supposing an end, to which it guides our Actions, it follows that Antecedent to the end proposed by God, no distinction can be conceived between Men; that end therefore itself or general design of Providence is not determined or limited by any Respect of Persons: It is not therefore the private Good of this or that Man, Nation or Age, but the general well-being of all Men, of all Nations, of all Ages of the World, which God designs should be procured by the concurring Actions of each individual. Having thus discover’d the great end, to which all Moral Obligations are Subordinate; it remains, that we enquire what Methods are necessary for the obtaining that End.[4]

    When Berkeley says God is  infinitely good, he like Samuel Clarke seems to mean that God  has “an unalterable disposition to do and to communicate good or happiness.”[5] [6] God’s goal in issuing the commands he does is the happiness, impartially considered of all human beings.

    Berkeley proceeds to note two ways that God could promote this happiness. One would be “without the injunction of any certain universal Rules of Morality, to to oblige “every one upon each particular Occasion, to consult the publick Good, and always to do that, which to him shall seem in the present time and circumstances, most to conduce to it.”  The second is  “by enjoining the Observation of some determinate, established Laws, which, if Universally practised, have from the Nature of things an Essential fitness to procure the well-being of Mankind” Berkeley argues that “”there lie several strong Objections.” Berkeley then anticipates the “self-effacing” objection to act utilitarianism arguing that anyone committed to promoting the happiness of others wouldn’t promulgate act utilitarianism as a decision procedure. Public endorsement and acceptance of the rule “do whatever maximises utility” would probably not maximise utility. Consequently, Berkeley concludes that God has followed the second method.

    Stephen Darwall suggests that the best way to interpret Berkeley is to distinguish between his meta-ethical theory and normative theory. His meta-ethical theory attempts “to answer metaphysical questions of what goodness and rightness themselves, respectively, are.” On the other hand, his normative theory “concerns what actions or things are good and right.” Meta-ethically Berkeley is a divine command theorist “moral goodness consists” consists in a “Conformity to the Laws of God”. However, Berkeley’s normative theory was rule-utilitarian, God commands “Laws, which, if Universally practised, have from the Nature of things an Essential fitness to procure the well-being of Mankind”.[7]

    A position very similar to Berkeley is hinted at in Butler’s writings[8] but is expounded more clearly in the writings of, John Gay [9] John Brown, and Abraham Tucker.   It’s clear that Paley clearly draws upon this earlier tradition.  In the preface to The Principles Paley acknowledges that he is attempting to compile and articulate the positions of John Gay, and Abraham Tucker. Book II chapter 1 of The Principles proposes a line of argument that closely resembles the argument of John Gay “Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”.

    Similarly, Paley’s emphasis on rules is, as we saw, found in Berkeley’s Passive obedience and performs the same function. Berkeley’s initial advancement of this distinction and advocacy of rule utilitarianism was part of a broader argument to argue against violent resistance to the state during the Jacobite agitation in Ireland. He was concerned that people were advocating the violation of certain negative rules of the law of nature such as: “do not commit adultery”, “do not steal”, “don’t rebel against the government”, whenever they perceived doing so would further the public good. Paley uses the distinction for similar purposes, to respond to the objection that utilitarianism allows people to break with impunity moral rules against theft and murder whenever they perceive it will make people happy.

    In fact, the proximate source for Paley’s stress on rules appears to be Abraham Tucker. Tucker. Wrote

      As we cannot upon every occasion see to the end of our proceedings, he [the moralist] will establish certain rules to serve as landmarks for guiding us on the way.  These rules, when he has leisure and opportunity for mature consideration, he will build on one another, erecting the whole fabric upon the basis of the summum bonum before described.  (Original emphasis)[10]

    Similarly, Paley’s argument that God wills the happiness of his creatures and so the commands God issues must be coextensive with promoting the happiness is ubiquitous in the tradition that preceded him. This argument is s found in Berkeley, Gay, and Brown Louden also documents the same argument occurs in Adam Smith and Joseph Butler [11]

    Finally, Paley’s exposition of this tradition was very influential. The principles became required text at Cambridge university Schneewind points out “utilitarianism first became widely known in England through the work of William Paley.[12] Paley, not Bentham being its most well-known exponent.  Similarly, Smith points out that Paley’s writings were once as well known in American colleges as were the readers and spellers of William McGuffey and Noah Webster in the elementary schools.[13]

    In fact, Paley’s influence is still seen clearly in John Austin’s work on Jurisprudence, in the early and late nineteenth century.  Mill himself appeals to the tradition:

    We not uncommonly hear the doctrine of utility inveighed against as a godless doctrine. If it be necessary to say anything at all against so mere an assumption, we may say that the question depends upon what idea we have formed of the moral character of the Deity. If it be a true belief that God desires, above all things, the happiness of his creatures, and that this was his purpose in their creation, utility is not only not a godless doctrine, but more profoundly religious than any other. If it be meant that utilitarianism does not recognise the revealed will of God as the supreme law of morals, I answer, that a utilitarian who believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom of God, necessarily believes that whatever God has thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals, must fulfil the requirements of utility in a supreme degree. …Whether this opinion is correct or not, it is superfluous here to discuss; since whatever aid religion, either natural or revealed, can afford to ethical investigation, is as open to the utilitarian moralist as to any other. He can use it as the testimony of God to the usefulness or hurtfulness of any given course of action.[14]

    Mill here explicitly rejects the idea that Utilitarianism does not recognize the revealed will as the supreme law of morals, and uses a line of argument very similar to Paley, whose writings Mill was aware of, to argue the contrary.

    Consequently, Utilitarianism then wasn’t a new or novel theory of ethics proposed by secular thinkers such as Hume and Bentham in the late 18th century. Nor did it develop in response to or in opposition to a conception of morality based divine commands or divine laws. Divine command theorists, in fact, had been advocating Theological Utilitarianism for decades before Bentham, and the popularity of utilitarianism in Anglo-American thought had a good deal to do with the popularity of theological utilitarianism.


    [1]J B Schneewind Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002) 446.  Paley was, therefore, summarising an already existing, popular, school of thought.

    [2] See for example A. P. Brogan “John Locke and Utilitarianism” Ethics 69: 2 (1959), 79-93.

    [3] See Berkeley’s A Discourse on Passive Obedience (1712) and dialogues I-III of the   Alciphron (1732). Berkeley had included a systematic treatise on moral theory in the draft of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), but the manuscript was lost, leaving historians to piece together his theories from his occasional writings.

    [4] Passive obedience: or, the Christian doctrine of not resisting the supreme power, proved and vindicated … In a discourse deliver’d at the College-chapel. By George Berkeley, M.A. Fellow of Trinity-College, Dublin. Available at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ecco/004899015.0001.000/1:3?rgn=div1;view=fulltext

    [5] Clarke, Demonstration, Prop. XII; in Works, vol. II, p. 572.

    [6] Robert Louden notes this conception of God’s goodness was common in the 18th century and similar arguments can be seen in Smith and Butler see Robert Louden “Butler’s Divine Utilitarianism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12:3 (1995):265–280

    [7] See Stephen Darwall “Berkeley’s Moral and Political Philosophy,” in, The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, Kenneth Winkler, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)

    [8] Robert Louden “Butler’s Divine Utilitarianism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12:3 (1995):265–280

    [9] John Gay “Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality” in Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, being Selections from Writers principally of the Eighteenth Century, vol. 2 [1897] available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/bigge-british-moralists-vol-2 accessed 26 Aug 2016

    [11] Robert Louden “Butler’s Divine Utilitarianism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12:3 (1995):265–280.

     [12] Schneewind, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant 446.

    [13] Wilson Smith “William Paley’s Theological Utilitarianism in America” The William and Mary Quarterly Third Series, 11:3 (1954) 402–424

    [14] John Stuart Mill “What is Utilitarianism” available at https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/m645u/chapter2.htm

  • Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and NCEA Religious Studies: Part one

    This is a talk I gave to the New Zealand Association of Philosophy Teachers annual conference at St Cutherberts College in September this year. Several people have asked me to make this talk available.

    I have broken my talk up into four parts. Part One introduces what philosophy of religion. In part two I will outline two movements within analytic philosophy during the early to mid-century which I think resulted in religious beliefs not being taken very seriously within philosophy and philosophy of religion taking a fairly minor role. Part three will look at some responses to these movements offered in the late 20th century and how they changed the philosophical landscape. Part four will look at the question of “how to do philosophy of religion” comparing the methods used by two different atheist’s J L Mackie and Graham Oppy, and how this relates the National Certificate of Educational Achievement Standards. This post will contain part one.

    First, I want to thank the association for asking me to speak, seeing I have been teaching in the secondary sector full time for only a  couple of years so I am not sure I have a lot to share with you and feel very much like I have more to learn from you.

    I have been asked to talk about the contemporary philosophy of religion.  In my talk this morning I will focus on three things. First, I will talk about what philosophy of religion is. Second, I will talk a little bit about its history but focus on recent developments in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Finally, I will link some of these things with the current National Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA) Standards in Religious Studies. I hope what I say is helpful to you.

    What is Philosophy of Religion
    What is the philosophy of religion? Charles Taliaferro at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines it as “thephilosophy-of-religion philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts involved in religious traditions.” He adds “Philosophy of religion also includes an investigation into the religious significance of historical events (e.g., the Holocaust) and general features of the cosmos (e.g., laws of nature, the emergence of conscious life, widespread testimony of religious significance, and so on)”[1] Chad Meister at The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines it as “ the philosophical study of the meaning and nature of religion. It includes the analyses of religious concepts, beliefs, terms, arguments, and practices of religious adherents.”[2]

    The History of Philosophy of Religion

    Now, Philosophy of religion has a very long history, going back to the Pre-Socratics. And it was an integral part of medieval philosophy, Augustine, Aquinas, Anselm, Abelard, Scotus, Ockham and so forth worked in the tradition of “faith seeking understanding”. They used philosophy as a conceptual tool to reflect upon, analyse, refine, the religious faith that they held and develop philosophically informed models of core religious doctrines, they also used it to respond to objections and critique rival views and develop arguments for the own for theological models they supported. Some of these reflections proved very fruitful.  The Islamic-Christian dialogue over Aristotle’s understanding of causation and how it related to miracles, and Gods causal activity in the world, for example, is profoundly influential on latter accounts of causation by people like David Hume and the concepts of laws of nature used by early modern scientists.

    Perhaps lesser appreciated is the role of philosophy of religion during the enlightenment.  There is an unfortunate tendency in the history of philosophy not to appreciate the religious context in which important key thinkers of the enlightenment operated. Descartes cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am), for example, comes from Augustine’s response to sceptics about religious knowledge in the city of God Book 11: 26. Descartes immediately follows this up of course with an appeal to his own version of the ontological argument, proposed famously by Anselm of Canterbury.

    Or consider John Locke, according to Locke’s associate James Tyrell, the impetus for Locke’s “Essay on human understanding” was a conversation  he, Locke and four others had on the topic of “the principles of morality and revealed religion.” Locke’s attempt to develop a comprehensive empiricist understanding of knowledge was an attempt to answer the question of faith and reason, a topic he explicitly addresses in the last section of the book. (Incidentally, it’s a section often skipped in contemporary courses on Locke.)

    Or consider what a widely used textbook refers to as the “revolution in ethics” which occurred in the 18-19th centuries. Which the author, James Rachels, contends is due to Hume, Bentham and Mill. Rachel’s refers to as “A new conception of ethics”… “Morality, he [Bentham] urged is not a matter of pleasing God,  nor is it about following abstract rules, Rather, morality is nothing more than the attempt to bring about as much happiness as possible into the world”.[3]

    Rachel’s is, of course, talking about utilitarianism. However, his characterisation of the history is quite selective. In 1715, some 74 years before Bentham, George Berkley had defended a rule utilitarian conception of ethics[4]Berkeley was a divine command theorist hat moral rightness, and wrongness consists in agreement and disagreement, respectively, with the will of God.  Because  God’s purposes were benevolent a God’s aim was to maximize the happiness of his creatures, so one could assume that whatever rules maximized happiness were those enjoined by God. Berkley used this theoretical account of God and morality to attempt to reconcile his Irish Anglican commitment to passive obedience with loyalty to the Glorious revolution during Jacobite uprisings in Ireland. Berkley’s “theological utilitarianism” was adopted by people like John Gay, Abraham Tucker and compiled by William Paley. Paley’s textbook defending this way of looking at ethics was the standard text at Cambridge and widely influential several years before Bentham published his defence of utilitarianism.

    I could go on; my point is that Philosophy of religion has a long and prestigious history, even during the enlightenment and an important part of educating students about our history and the history of concepts that undergird much of the modern world involves acknowledging these connections rather than ignoring them.

    [1] Charles Taliaferro “Philosophy of Religion”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philosophy-religion/

    [2] Chad Meister, “Philosophy of Religion” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://www.iep.utm.edu/religion/

    [3] James Rachels The Elements of Moral Philosophy, (Random House: New York, 1993) 80

    [4] For explication see Stephen Darwall, “Berkeley’s Moral and Political Philosophy” Kenneth Winkler (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley. Cambridge University Press. (2005) see also C. D. Broad, “Berkeley’s Theory of Morals” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 23-24 (1953):  72-86.

     

  • God or Natural Law: A False Dichotomy

    A few weeks ago someone showed me a newspaper article entitled “New theory could prove how life began and disprove God”, which was published in the UK newspaper The Independent. Now I have, of course, heard media pronouncements of the nature published in this article frequently, reporters often seem to have a knack for making provocative pronouncements about the theological and philosophical implications of various theories (and one can usually take such prouncemants with a grain of salt), but this one caught my attention because of the unstated premise it contained. This premise is, I think, common in discussions about religion and science, which makes it worth addressing in its own right.

    Michelangelo's 'God Creates Adam

    The author’s commentary opens as follows:

    “A new theory could answer the question of how life began – and throw out the need for God. A writer on the website of Richard Dawkins’ foundation says that the theory has put God “on the ropes” and has “terrified” Christians. It proposes that life did not emerge by accident or luck from a primordial soup and a bolt of lightning. Instead, life itself came about by necessity – it follows from the laws of nature and is as inevitable as rocks rolling downhill. …”

    According to the author, the ‘new theory’ proposes that life arose from non-life by “natural necessity”, that is: according to the laws of nature. Interestingly, the author assumes the fairly standard account of ‘laws of nature’ whereby they are more than just regularities, they involve a kind of necessity that explains or grounds regularities.  The author draws the conclusion from the new theory that God does not exist.

    Now the author is not exactly clear on why this conclusion follows. One argument he seems to grope towards is that the new theory provides all sorts of problems for belief in God because someone on Richard Dawkins’ website says it does.  I suspect, however, that – apart from simple affirmations of faith in Dawkins blog – the author has something a bit more sensible in mind in his thinking.

    The premise is that: life arose from non-life, according to the laws of nature; the conclusion is that: God did not create life. The unstated assumption seems to that: if you can explain something by natural law then it follows that God did not do it.  Implicit in the reasoning is the assumption that appeals to natural law and God are rival and incompatible hypothesises; the truth of one excludes or rules out the other.

    I think anyone familiar with the history of theological thought should find this assumption odd. For (more…)