Tag: Christian History

  • Common Historical Myths About the Church

    This post is part update, part recycle.

    Earlier on in this blog’s life, I ran a small series of posts last year on common historical myths about the Church that  are so pervasive in society that most Christians fall for them. Anyway, after receiving some correspondence, I have updated this post, More on the “Dark Ages” and Other Propaganda.

    [I hope I am being mysterious enough to make you want to check it out – especially you Bethyada]

    RELATED POSTS:
    The “Dark Ages” and Other Propaganda
    More on the “Dark Ages” and Other Propaganda
    Things They Don’t Teach you in Public Schools…
    The Flat Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Guest Post: Dan Brown’s History of Science

  • Weight Watchers and the Historical Atrocities Argument

    We’ve all heard the slogan that atheism is superior to theism because of all the atrocities committed in the name of religion. If you flick through the pages of the new-atheist publications by the likes of Dawkins, Hitchens, Loftus, Harris, et al you’ll probably find some version of this assertion in each.

    Setting aside the dubious factual claims and the fact that I could list a stack of atheist atrocities that could outnumber the theist ones just from the last century alone, there is another way of addressing the slogan. If a person joined Weight Watchers, got the points book, the pamphlets explaining how the program works and began attending weekly meetings to fellowship with others on the same journey but instead of following the instructions began to bend the rules, invent new ones and ignore others and as a result began to gain weight, could that person justifiably claim that Weight Watchers made them fat? That Weight Watchers should be rejected as a weight-loss program, in fact, attempting to lose weight in and of itself is a bad thing, because this person gained weight whilst ostensibly being a follower of the program?

    If you can see how ridiculous it would be to blame Weight Watchers and to abandon the pursuit of weight loss because someone who cheated on the program had a bad outcome then why can’t you see it when the same reasoning is applied to atrocities committed in the ‘name of’ Christianity

    H/T Rodney Lake at Thinking Matters Tauranga

  • John Loftus on Madeleine Flannagan and Women and Other Red Herrings

    A few days ago I posted, Sunday Study: Slavery, John Locke and the Bible; in this post I defended an argument proposed by John Locke that the Bible does not support slavery. In that article I quoted from John Loftus’ book “Why I Became an Atheist” as an example of what is typically meant by slavery when sceptics claim the Bible supports slavery. John Loftus runs the blog Debunking Christianity, is a former preacher and student of William Lane Craig, turned new-atheist. On page 231 of his book, Loftus cites an eyewitness description of a malicious, brutal and bloodthirsty whipping of a female slave that took place in the antebellum south. Immediately after this he asks, “Why didn’t the Christian God ever explicitly and clearly condemn slavery?”

    Now by juxtaposing this question next to the description of the beating, Loftus insinuates, that the scriptures explicitly or implicitly condone these sorts of practices. In his book, Loftus reinforces this by noting that,

    the Bible was still used by Christians to justify the brutal slavery in the American South. Distinguished Princeton professor Charles Hodge defended American slavery in a 40 page essay written in 1860, just prior to the Civil War.

    Here Loftus suggests that Hodge supported the “brutal slavery in the American south” which he had just described, on the same page only a few lines earlier, with his graphic account of a female slave being beaten. In the same paragraph Loftus also refers to the book Slavery Sabbath and War, which summarises various pro-slavery theological arguments to the same effect and then he states, “The Catholic Church didn’t condemn slavery until the year 1888, after the Civil War and after ever other Christian nation had abolished it.” This again suggests that the writers in Slavery Sabbath and War, along with the Catholic Church, all condoned and failed to condemn the practices he refers to.

    Now in my post I pointed out that Loftus’ claim that the Bible does not explicitly condemn the kind of practices he describes is mistaken. In the comments thread I also noted his suggestion that Hodge did is also mistaken. Hodge did defend the existence of slavery an as institution, but on page 831 of Cotton is King, the book Loftus himself referred me to, Hodge states that if the bible is used to argue that “slavery as it occurs among us [in the US south]” is sinful, then “he has no objection.” Hodge only objects to the idea that all forms of slavery, including the ebed in scripture, are unjust. On the same page, he states that laws allowing people to beat, harm, kill and starve their slaves are condemned by scripture. A point, Loftus conveniently missed. On the next page, page 832, Hodge again states that it is very plain that the institution which existed in the US was condemned by scripture.

    The same is true if one looks at Slavery Sabbath and War. Many of the pro-slavery theologians Loftus referred to, in fact, criticised the abuses that were occurring in their day and suggested these should be condemned.

    It is also worth noting, at this juncture, that Loftus’ claim about the Catholic Church has been shown to be false by Rodney Stark. Stark notes that “[the Catholic Church repeatedly condemned slavery] … beginning in 1435 and culminating in three major pronouncements against slavery by Pope Paul III in 1537.” He notes that Pope Eugene IV (1431-1447), Pope Pius II (1458-1464), Pope Sixtus IV (1471-1484), Pope Paul III (1534-1549), Pope Urban VIII (1623-1644) issued bulls against slavery; in addition, the Roman Inquisition condemned slavery on 20 March 1686. These condemnations were largely motivated by concerns about new world slavery.

    In addition to weighing into the comments, Loftus responded with a post on his own site, Nitpickers Have Started to Attack; this response led with aspersions about my education and intelligence concluding that my comments were “nitpicking” and did not address the real issue. This lead to a response by Glenn Peoples, Skeptics and the annoyance of the little things…. like facts. Glenn noted.

    Apparently it’s just in poor taste and really just skirts around the edges to point out that contrary to the claims that some skeptics love to make, the Old Testament does not endorse what we call slavery. But I daresay that annoyance has clouded John’s vision, for what has been shown is that in fact God did condemn kidnapping and/or mistreating people, the very things that Loftus is concerned about and which he is calling “slavery.” it may be irritating to have the rug ripped out from under your argument, but getting annoyed and demanding that people deal with the “main” argument by pretending that the rug is still there (for the sake of your argument and nothing else) is a bit of an ask, don’t you think? Why not just graciously thank the other person for their helpful explanation and remove the argument from your repertoire?

    Glenn wasn’t the only person to ask Loftus to respond to the main argument and address the factual claims I had called him on. Loftus’s response to this pressure was to single out the only woman who’d criticised him along the same grounds, Madeleine. He dedicated a post to her, Madeleine Flannagan is Happy to be Treated as Women Were in the Bible!, publicly ridiculing her as “backward thinking,” “incredibly ignorant” quoted her out of context and finished with an aspersion on our marriage:

    Here’s exhibit “A” of the backward thinking of some Christians. This is incredibly ignorant:

    “So yes, I…am happy to be treated the same way women were in the Bible.” Link

    How much more ignorant can someone be? Although, her husband probably likes it! 😉

    Of course in the actual comment Madeleine qualified her statement (as the “So yes” will tell any observant reader) and of course Loftus pasted it without this qualification into his own contextual understanding which assumes that his take on the Bible and on its teachings on gender is correct and is what Madeleine meant.

    I write this post to demonstrate how some people who pass themselves off as free-thinkers or rationalists are often dogmatic proponents of a secular party-line who will happily ridicule and attack other people personally who question the orthodoxy that they expound even if the facts get in the way.

    Madeleine asks that even though Loftus hefted a stone at our marriage that commenters refrain from doing the same in turn.

  • Published: Abortion and Capital Punishment UPDATED

    ThinkHeh!

    I just discovered on Cambridge Journals that my publication for the Spring 2009 edition of Think: A Journal of the Royal Institute for Philosophy is online.

    UPDATE: As some people are having trouble with the direct link to the pdf, try here for the html version of Abortion and Capital Punishment: A Response to Beverly Harrison.
  • Maverick Philosopher on the Historical Atrocities Argument

    In making their case against theism many of the “new atheists” (indeed many of the old) commonly appeal to historical atrocities allegedly committed by believers in God. I was discussing this phenomena recently with Doug Geivett in the aftermath of the Craig v Hitchens debate. I cited the need for Christian apologists to rebut not only the contention that theism is false but also the contention that it is oppressive and dangerous. I proposed that someone of the calibre of Rodney Stark should address the sociological claims about the effect of religion on society to supplement the defences of its truth by scholars such as Bill Craig, Alvin Plantinga, etc. The full (ongoing) discussion can be found within the comments thread here.

    Yesterday I discovered this gem on the same topic on one of my favourite blogs of all time, Bill Vallicella’s Maverick Philosopher, (in fact the inspiration for MandM). I have reproduced a little below to whet your appetite and have furnished the necessary link to finish the meal. Enjoy.

    Extract Taken From:
    Is Religion the Problem? Why Isn’t Belief As Such the Problem? The Special Pleading of Some Atheists

    One of the arguments against religion in the contemporary atheist arsenal is the argument that religious beliefs fuel war and terrorism. Rather than pull quotations from such well-known authors as Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris, I will quote a couple of passages from one of the contributors to Philosophers Without Gods, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. His piece is entitled “Overcoming Christianity.” After describing his movement from his evangelical Christian upbringing to a quietistic rejection of Christianity, Sinnott-Armstrong tells us how he became an evangelical atheist:

    My quietism ended when current events taught me the dangers of religion. I had always known how religions, including Christianity, led to wars in the Middle East, Ireland, and so on. Many wars, of course, are not based on religion. Even religious wars result from non-religious forces as well. Nonetheless, it is hard to deny that many wars have been and continue to be fueled in large part by religious beliefs. It is no coincidence that terrorists are so often motivated by religion, since it is hard to get non-religious people to volunteer as suicide bombers. (76)

    It is true that people holding religious beliefs have used, and are using, their religious beliefs to justify war, terrorism, and such other evils as forced conversions and inquisitions. No reasonable person can deny this. But what Sinnott-Armstrong (S-A) says above in the second sentence is that religions lead to wars. Does he really want to say that religions lead to wars? All religions? Buddhism? I understand that there are some Buddhist terrorists. But surely a professional philosopher such as S-A can see the difference between (i) Some Buddhists are terrorists and (ii) Buddhism causes war and terrorism. If a Buddhist is a terrorist, this is an accidental fact about him; there is nothing in the essence of Buddhism that enjoins terrorism. No Buddhist qua Buddhist is a terrorist. It escapes me how the doctrines, precepts and practices of Buddhism cause war, terrorism and kindred evils. Similarly for Christianity. Plenty of atrocities have been committed by people who identify themselves as Christians. But that is not to say that the characteristic doctrines, precepts and practices of Christianity cause war, terrorism and the like. It is rather the opposite: when the doctrines and precepts of Buddhism and Christianity are acted upon they tend to mitigate human savagery.

    And then there is the case of Gandhi whose principle of ahimsa (no-harm) derives from his Hinduism. Hinduism as understood and practiced by him surely did not lead to war and terroism. Did he perhaps not understand the principles of his religion? So it cannot be religion as such that causes war and terrorism. The central teachings of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity are anti-war and anti-terrorism.

    So one of the mistakes that people like Sinnot-Armstrong make is that they confuse the doctrinal content of a religion with the behavior of some of the religion’s adherents. … read the rest here [the comments are worth looking at too]


    RELATED POSTS:
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I

  • What About the Poor? More on Sustenance Rights

    In my last post, What About the Poor? Sustenance Rights Examined, I noted the position of Nicholas Wolterstorff that, “If a rich man knows of someone who is starving and has the power to help that person, and chooses not to, then he violates that person’s rights as surely and reprehensively as if he had physically assaulted the sufferer.” I argued that as stated, this position is subject to three problems; first, that it leads to absurd consequences, entailing that I have a duty to give to every poor person I know about. Second, that it has totalitarian implications and third, that acceptance and practise of this principle would destroy any incentive people have to work.

    In a more recent article “Christianity and Social Justice,” Wolterstorff attempts to defend his thesis against the three criticisms I mention above.

    Turning to the first problem, Wolterstorff’s response is to note that “acknowledging a person’s right to some good does not imply laying on everyone else a duty to extend to that person that good.” This seems odd, if a right to sustenance on the part of the poor does not mean we are obligated to give them the means to sustenance, what bite does it have?

    Wolterstorff puts forward an interesting suggestion. Turning to the paradigm of a right to not be assaulted, Wolterstorff suggests that while we have a duty to not assault people we do not have a duty to protect every person against assault. However, he goes on to note that in addition to having a right to not be assaulted, people have a right against their society “to have practises” and “social structures” that protect them from assault. In particular, such things as a police force, courts and an army. Clearly, if the right does not just mean that members of society refrain from attacking people, it also means that these members have a duty support the police force. Further, if the police force is ineffective, people have a duty to try and improve it (through such things as voting and lobbying).

    Moreover, Wolterstorff suggests if “I see you about to get mugged when no policeman is in view – then I may be obliged to offer you my protection in a direct way.” Wolterstorff’s argument is that sustenance rights are analogous to the right to not be assaulted in this way. People have a duty to support whatever institutions or charities exist that alleviate poverty. If they are ineffective, they have a duty to reform them. Further, if one encounters a person in extreme necessity one is required to assist them in a direct way.

    Turning to the second criticism, Wolterstorff makes three points to get around the totalitarian implications sketched previously. First, he states that,

    the general idea behind having such a right to some good is that individual actions and social practices ought to be such that one enjoys that good. But the role of the government in practices which secure that right may be nil or negligible. Not all rights are enshrined by law. Sometimes in the early church the care for the poor of society was principally in the hands of the bishop.

    He goes on to note, correctly I think, that,

    Far from acknowledging that there is such a right, nothing directly follows as to what, if anything, governments should do by way of securing that right. In particular, it does not follow that the poor should be put on a dole supported by public taxation. In principle there is a wide variety of other practices which would undo the violation of this right, some of which the government would have little or no role.

    Accepting sustenance rights then, does not entail accepting massive public ownership or redistribution.

    Second, he tries to mitigate the objection by appealing again to the analogy with assault; “in our fallen world… we do not suppose that, in the face of all the aggressive impulses of human beings purely voluntary arrangements would suffice to secure our freedom from assault.” He goes on to note, “why should we suppose that, in the face of acquisitive impulses of human beings, purely voluntary arrangements would suffice to secure our right to sustenance?” Finally he notes, “it is true, indeed that there are dangers lurking when governments try to ensure that the rights of the poor are respected. But who would be so foolish as to argue that the armies and police forces that we assemble propose no threat?”

    Wolterstorff makes some pertinent points here. However, it is worth noting that if one takes the assault analogy seriously, several things are evident. First, the police and armed forces actually do not play as big a role in protecting us from assault as it may appear.

    The Police do not patrol everyone’s houses at night, nor does it have 24/7 video surveillance cameras set up on every home, nor do we have publicly funded burglar alarms. If people want any of these things, they hire private security guards, install privately owned cameras and buy their own alarms. The police are called when these systems fail and there is immediate danger.

    It is also worth noting that the ability of the Police to catch and prosecute assailants is limited by such things as the presumption of innocence, the need for warrants, probable cause, etc. In societies with lower crime rates, police typically have more sweeping powers, powers our society rightly rejects precisely to avoid the danger of excess state intrusion and its subsequent abuses. As such, if the state is to secure our rights to sustenance similar limits should apply.

    Turning to the third criticism, Wolterstorff states that while people do not earn their basic human rights by merit, such as the right to be free from assault or the right to liberty, the same is true of the right to sustenance. Wolterstorff notes correctly that a person can forfeit these rights by misdeeds; if a person attacks another his right to be free from assault is forfeited and I can strike him if necessary to defend myself. Similarly, if a person commits a crime they forfeit their right to liberty and can be imprisoned.

    In the same way, Wolterstorff suggests that the right to sustenance can be forfeited if a person is capable of providing for themselves but refuses to do so; just as a needy person has a right against society to sustenance, society has a right against those it supports that they will take responsibility for themselves when they can and not pass of their responsibilities onto someone else.

    As far as I can tell, Wolterstorff’s responses enable him to accept sustenance rights without falling into the problems mentioned in my previous post. It is worth noting, however, his response makes the claim that the poor have sustenance rights significantly qualified.

    What it means is that individuals in a society have a duty to support various institutions that aid and assist those who are unable to provide for their own needs. These institutions may or may not be run by the state but if they are, the state plays a last resort role and is subject to careful checks on its power. This picture may differ from that some proposed by certain types of Libertarian, particularly those who believe we have no obligations to support the poor at all, but it is hardly the charter for statism or massive public ownership

  • What About the Poor? Sustenance Rights Examined

    When I began university I had strong socialist leanings. The reason was that I believed, as a Christian, we had a duty to help the poor. Studying at Waikato University, however, brought me face to face with socialist academics and left-wing activists and I discovered a hostile and dangerous social agenda that I could not in good conscience embrace.

    That, however, left me with a burning question. What about the poor? If the classical liberal or conservative view is correct. What about the poor?

    In the next two posts I want to discuss my thoughts on this a bit. I will do so by examining Nicholas Wolterstorff’s defence of welfare or sustenance rights. I will argue that, as initially stated, Wolterstorff’s position is subject to three problems. In my second post, What About the Poor? More on Sustenance Rights, I will suggest that while Wolterstorff’s position can escape these problems, it does so only by qualifying itself in such a way that there is no necessary link between accepting the poor’s right to sustenance and the kind of statist re-distributionary policies favoured by the left

    In, When Justice and Peace Embrace, Nicholas Wolterstorff suggests that “If a rich man knows of someone who is starving and has the power to help that person, and chooses not to, then he violates that person’s rights as surely and reprehensively as if he had physically assaulted the sufferer.” Wolterstorff suggests further that this conclusion is orthodox Christian teaching. He provides citations from Basil, Ambrose, John Chrysostom and Aquinas to substantiate this claim.

    One immediate problem with this line of analysis is it ignores something of the context in which these theologians wrote. They were addressing the situation of alms-giving. A wealthy person living in a small town or village in the Roman Empire would come across destitute people in his community whom would ask for assistance in most cases a wealthy lord would be able to do so. In the age of the mass media, however, things are quite different. It is not just about the poor person down the road; I am regularly bombarded with stories of poverty and suffering of thousands of people all across the globe when I turn on the new or surf the web.

    In this context, to suggest that failure to alleviate any poverty I know about violates the person I fail to help and is analogous to assaulting them is problematic for a couple of reasons.

    First, take my duty (and corresponding right on the part of others) to not assault people. This duty applies 24-7, it is not like I can refrain from assault on Fridays but smash peoples heads in on Sunday. There are 6 billion people in the world, as I have a duty to not assault anyone I owe that duty to all these 6 billion people. Moreover, each one of them holds a right to not be assaulted against me. This is not problematic, because discharging my duty to all 6 billion is not hard, I can do so by refraining from assault.

    Discharging such a duty and its corresponding right, is unproblematic because the duty to not assault is a duty to not do something

    A claim right; a right requiring me to do or give assistance, however, is different. Clearly I cannot give assistance to all 6 billion people in the world at all times. I simply do not have the resources or the ability to do that. Hence, each individual poor person cannot hold a right to assistance against me. At best, I have a duty to help some people, some of the time, with some of my resources.

    A related problem is that unless I live just above the sustenance level and force my family to do the same, and donate every cent I earn above that level to the poor then I will be failing to discharge my duty. Hence, accepting Wolterstorff’s claim would quite literally imply that everyone has a duty to live just above the poverty line. Wealth of any sort is a sin, a conclusion at odds with scripture which commends many wealthy people (like Job and Abraham) as Godly people and not as mass murderers.

    A second problem is the quite oppressive political implications of Wolterstorff’s claim. Given what I have outlined above, if failure to give to a poor person when we can is analogous to assaulting them then every person who does not live just above sustenance level and does not donate everything they own and earn to charity is in fact a serious criminal. A just government would then be required to lock all these people up, their children would end up in foster care and all their property confiscated and given to the poor as restitution. The implications of accepting a right of the sort Wolterstorff affirms is totalitarianism; a system where everyone is poor and anyone else is arrested and detained. The state would be obligated to take almost everything.

    A third problem, which follows on from the first and second, is that if everyone must be self-frozen in their income to just above sustenance level and any falling below it grants one a right to receive what’s needed to get above the sustenance line wouldn’t this destroy all incentives to work or be productive in any shape or form?

    The problems with the idea of ‘sustenance right’ were not lost on Aquinas, whom Wolterstorff interestingly cites. In the Summa Theologica Aquinas addresses the question of whether a destitute person who steals food to avoid starvation has committed theft. Aquinas’s answer is no and he cites with approval the claim of Ambrose of Milan that the poor have a right to sustenance and any property given to those unable to maintain themselves is money they are owed.

    However, Aquinas goes on to offer some important qualifications. First, in the articles prior to this section of the Summa, Aquinas defends the concept of private property and argues that those who claim the private property of others are in sin, further, those who claim we are required to renounce property to be Christians are expounding a heretical doctrine. Second, Aquinas states that;

    Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible for all
    to be succored by means of the same thing, each one is entrusted with the
    stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of
    those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that
    it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be at
    hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no
    other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by
    means of another’s property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this
    properly speaking theft or robbery.

    Aquinas observations are worth noting. Because there are so many in need and I cannot give to all I am not required to give to every needy person I know of. Instead I have a duty to give some of my money to some needy people and it is my choice to decide who. It follows from this observation that giving to the poor is an imperfect duty. Unlike the duty to refrain from assault it is not a duty to be discharged to all people at all times, but rather it is a duty to give some money to some poor people. But it is at the discretion of the property owner to decide who.

    While there is a duty to give to the poor there is not a duty to give to any specific poor individual and hence no individual poor person has a right to my property (although I will be in serious dereliction of duty if I give to no-one).

    Aquinas does provide an exception; what has been called the case of extreme necessity. As Donagan puts it, if a person “encounter[s] another who then and there needs help, which only he can give without disproportionate inconvenience” then such a person has a duty to give it and the other has a right to such help.

    The medieval position Aquinas expounded is well summed up by Donagan in The Theory of Morality. Donagan suggests that all people have a duty of beneficence, “it is impermissible not to promote the well-being of others by actions in and of themselves permissible, in as much as one can do so without proportionate inconvenience.” By promoting the well-being of others, Donagan means things such as [paraphrasing Donagan] promoting the well being and up-bringing of those who are not adults, especially orphans; helping those who have duties, which owing to bereavement, injury, illness or desertion, they can’t perform without help; restoring to a condition of independence those who have been incapacitated with illness, accident, or injury and caring for those who are crippled, deaf, blind, are chronically ill, or senile.

    However, the principle of beneficence is an imperfect duty. No individual poor person has a right to my assistance except in cases of extreme necessity. Donagan draws the appropriate conclusion; apart from cases of extreme necessity,

    Duties of beneficence, seeing they are not owed to specific individuals generate
    no enforceable rights; and apart from duties of beneficence, no innocent
    person has any obligation to contribute to the wellbeing of others, except as he
    may freely undertake.

    Donagan suggests that the duty to benefit the poor is an imperfect duty to pursue a particular end and not based on a right that another may have. While one has a duty to pursue this end, it is at a person’s discretion as to how exactly they would pursue it.

    It would seem then that social polices based on alleged welfare rights of the poor and the authority of the state to coercively uphold such rights are unjust. While we have a duty to aid the well-being of the poor as an end, no poor individual, outside of cases of extreme necessity, has a right to such assistance and hence one cannot justly be forced or required to give any individual such assistance.

    In my next post I will look at how Wolterstorff responds to criticisms of this sort and how he qualifies his position to do so.