Category: Philosophers

  • Ronald Hendel on Pascal, Evangelicals and The Society of Biblical Literature

    Ronald Hendel, of the Biblical Archeology review, has written a critical piece entitled “Biblical Views: Farewell to SBL“. His beef appears to be that the Society of Biblical Literature (SBL) is allowing into its membership, heaven forbid, various “evangelical and fundamentalist groups.” This, he suggests, compromises the group’s scholarly integrity.

    Much could be said about his comments, here I will only parse some of them. First, Hendel begins by citing from Pascal’s Pensées, “The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know.” Hendel clearly approves of Pascal’s contention and goes so far as to appropriate the sentiment, he elaborates Pascal’s position as follows,

    This famous line from Pascal’s Pensées draws a wise distinction between religious faith and intellectual inquiry. The two have different motivations and pertain to different domains of experience. They are like oil and water, things that do not mix and should not be confused. Pascal was a brilliant mathematician, and he did not allow his Catholic beliefs to interfere with his scholarly investigations. He regarded the authority of the church to be meaningless in such matters.

    While I am not a Pascal scholar this appears to be a caricature of Pascal’s position. Hendel  suggests that Pascal’s distinction between “reason” and the “heart” is a distinction between faith and reason. He goes on to state that Pascal believed the two did not mix and had different domains, and that the latter (the heart) had no bearing on mathematics or other scholarly investigations.

    Now the former seems plausible, just after the citation Hendel refers to Pascal states “It is the heart which experiences God, and not the reason. This, then, is faith: God felt by the heart, not by the reason.” However with regards to the latter points Hendel made, Pascal goes on to state,

    We know truth, not only by the reason, but also by the heart, and it is in this last way that we know first principles; and reason, which has no part in it, tries in vain to impugn them. The sceptics, who have only this for their object, labour to no purpose. We know that we do not dream, and, however impossible it is for us to prove it by reason, this inability demonstrates only the weakness of our reason, but not, as they affirm, the uncertainty of all our knowledge. For the knowledge of first principles, as space, time, motion, number, is as sure as any of those which we get from reasoning. And reason must trust these intuitions of the heart, and must base them on every argument. (We have intuitive knowledge of the tri-dimensional nature of space and of the infinity of number, and reason then shows that there are no two square numbers one of which is double of the other. Principles are intuited, propositions are inferred, all with certainty, though in different ways.) And it is as useless and absurd for reason to demand from the heart proofs of her first principles, before admitting them, as it would be for the heart to demand from reason an intuition of all demonstrated propositions before accepting them.

    Pascal is quite clear, far from being “oil and water” and having nothing to do with maths or any other scholarly discipline Pascal believed that the very foundations of all knowledge, whether mathematical or another form, are based on faith; reason reasons from these premises but cannot prove them (not that it needs to). When Pascal goes on to state that “those to whom God has imparted religion by intuition are very fortunate and justly convinced” the implication is that certain religious beliefs, known by faith, function as properly-basic beliefs’ at the foundation of ones knowledge and, as such, are the premises one can legitimately reason from to other conclusions without first needing to prove them.

    Second, Hendel’s objection to allowing evangelical groups into the SBL is wanting. His basic objection is that,

    The SBL online book review journal (Review of Biblical Literature) has featured explicit condemnations of the ordinary methods of critical scholarly inquiry, extolling instead the religious authority of orthodox Christian faith.

    Hendel’s concern here seems to be that some evangelical groups are opposed to critical and scholarly inquiry. He substantiates this further,

    Listen to this, from Bruce Waltke, widely regarded as the dean of evangelical Biblical studies: By their faith in the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, [evangelical scholars] … hear the voice of higher biblical criticism, which replaces faith in God’s revelation with faith in the sufficiency of human reason, as the grating of an old scratched record.

    This, however, is a non-sequitur. Waltke in this citation criticises “higher criticism,” Hendel concludes from this that he opposes critical and scholarly inquiry. But this is not the same thing, why can’t a person, for example, engage in critical and scholarly inquiry, engage in careful research, follow the rules of logic, and so on, and yet reject some of the methodological principles of higher criticism. Alvin Plantinga has offered a carefully argued epistemology of religious belief that provides the basis for a critique of higher criticism. He might be mistaken but surely one needs to actually engage his argument instead of simply assuming it is wrong. Hendel’s assumption, that it is impossible to do this, surely needs more than mere assumption and assertion.

    Hendel’s objections to Waltke are similarly mistaken. In response to the above citation he says,

    This is a quaintly stated position, which directly attacks the applicability of human reason to the study of the Bible. Instead of reason, “faith in the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob”—as interpreted by evangelical scholars—should be the rule in Biblical scholarship. Waltke dismisses critical inquiry as an annoying nuisance, like the scratchy sound of an old LP.

    Here Hendel contends Waltke denies “the applicability of human reason” to the study of the bible. This again does not follow. In the above statement Waltke denies that reason, by itself without faith, is insufficient but to say reason is by itself insufficient does not entail it has no application at all; it simply states that it has to be supplemented by faith to get a true or accurate answer.

    In summary Hendel confuses the claim that reason, unimplemented by faith, is insufficient with the rejection of reason altogether. Moreover, he seems to think that reason and higher criticism are the same thing. This, however, simply appears to, at best, misunderstand and, at worse, caricature the views of faith and reason many evangelicals hold. Had Hendel reflected on what Pascal actually said, he might have understood this a bit more.

  • Wolterstorff, the Canaanites and Hyperbole: A Response to Ken Pulliam

    Critics of Christianity often ask how can a good and loving God command the extermination of the Canaanites as is taught the Old Testament? A clear assumption behind this question is that the Old Testament teaches that God did in fact command the extermination of the Canaanites, an assumption which is based on a straight-forward literal reading of some passages in Joshua and Deuteronomy. In an earlier blog series, Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites, I elaborated and defended the position of Nicholas Wolterstorff that such a literal reading of these passages is mistaken. The language of “leaving alive nothing that breaths” or “destroying” and other such language should be understood as hyperbole and hence is analogous to someone today saying after a ball game, “we totally slaughtered the opposition, we annihilated them just as coach told us to.”

    Ken Pulliam has taken issue with this defence so here I will respond to some of his criticisms. (I plan to address some of the other objections in future posts). Before doing so it is important to address some rhetorical tricks his article contains. To begin with Pulliam entitles his response “Grasping at Straws Part Eleven–Evangelicals Defend Genocide” and cites Wolterstorff and myself as examples. But neither Wolterstorff or I defended genocide, we argued that God did not command genocide. Moreover, referring to my argument, Pulliam states that I cited “external evidence of how other ANE nations reported their exploits of war [by citing] evangelical Kenneth Kitchen.” Now it is true that Kitchen is an evangelical and that I cite him, however, Kitchen is also a leading Egyptologist and I don’t just cite him I cite numerous examples of Ancient Near Eastern (ANE) reports of war where language similar to that used by Joshua and Deuteronomy are used hyperbolically. I also noted evidence that Joshua is written according to the literary conventions of such reports.

    Instead of addressing this evidence directly, Pulliam gives a series of arguments for the claim that the text is not hyperbolic but literal. One objection Pulliam raises is that this interpretation “fails to solve the other moral problems in the Hebrew Scriptures.” He asks, “are we to explain away all of the problems in the Old Testament by appealing to hyperbole?” The answer of course is no; it is hard to see why this is an objection. Why does an interpretation of one passage have to answer every question about every other passage in order for it to be plausible? Interpreting the first line of Pulliam’s post literally does not solve every problem I see in it should I, therefore, not take it literally?

    A second, objection Pulliam makes is that “it fails to take into account how these hyperbolic passages would be misused in the future by those who thought they were following divinely commanded principles.” Presumably Pulliam means that God, by allowing his word to be mediated through the literary conventions of ANE historiography, would forsee that future generations will misinterpret it. This, of course, is correct. Again, it is unclear why this means that the text should be taken literally. After all, it seems any language which God mediates his word through, whether literal or figurative, will have this implication. A message mediated through the more literalistic conventions of 21st century English, History and Moral Philosophy would be misunderstood by numerous people as well (his seems to be more a problem with verbal revelation per se rather than any particular interpretation of it).

    Pulliam’s other arguments are more on point. He argues that a hyperbolic interpretation “fails to appreciate that Judges 2:1-5 says that the Israelites did not obey the LORD in totally destroying the Canaanites, and that as a result, they will have problems for generations to come.” Pulliam poses a rhetorical question, “if the genocidal commands were never intended to be taken literally, why are the people scolded by Yahweh and told that their future problems will come as a result of their disobedience?” In fact, in articles which Pulliam refers to both Wolterstorff and I cite this passage and point out that, in fact, it says no such thing; it states,

    ‘I will never break my covenant with you,2 and you shall not make a covenant with the people of this land, but you shall break down their altars.’ Yet you have disobeyed me. Why have you done this?3 Now therefore I tell you that I will not drive them out before you; they will be thorns in your sides and their gods will be a snare to you.4

    Here Israel is criticised for disobeying an order to not make a covenant with the Canaanites and to destroy their altars. There is nothing at all present in these passages about extermination and genocide. Moreover, both Wolterstorff and myself pointed this out.

    Pulliam further objects that,

    One must ask if Wolterstorff’s opinion that Joshua uses “highly figurative” language is based on literary considerations or is it driven more by his need to solve the moral problems involved? He does not provide any direct parallels between Joshua and other literature which is clearly recognized as hagiographic and figurative.

    This again is simply a distortion of the situation. In my original post I gave a large number of direct parallels between Joshua and other literature which is both figurative and hagiographic (in Wolterstorff’s sense of the term). Given that I did this and that Pulliam has clearly read the post (he did link to it) one wonders why he claims no such parallels have been offered. Moreover, Wolterstorff, in the article he cites from, does provide several literary considerations for his thesis. It seems evident that several of Pulliam’s arguments involve simply ignoring what Wolterstorff and I have written and distorting the evidence.

    Equally puzzling is Pulliam’s argument, “If Joshua is hagiography, why shouldn’t one believe that the Gospels are as well? Why should one take their stories as literal history?” This is puzzling because my post addressed this. There is compelling textual evidence both from within the text itself and also via comparisons between Joshua and other ANE texts to suggest that it is hyperbolic. These parallels and textual considerations are not present with the gospels. Similarly, in his book Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks Wolterstorff discusses the genre of the gospels and cites comparisons with ancient Greek biographies to defend the claim that the gospels are ancient Greek biography. Again Pulliam’s response appears to be to ignore what those he criticises actually wrote.

    It is worth noting that this kind of argument relies on a peculiar assumption, that if one grants that one part of a text is non-literal then one cannot, non-arbitrarily, take any other part of the text as literal. Pulliam’s own writing falsifies this claim. He concludes that “Wolterstorff is more sophisticated than some of the other harmonization attempts we have seen, it is in reality just another case of grasping at straws.” Surely, his phrase “grasping at straws” is a non-literal figure of speech (I am assuming he did not mean to refer to real straws) does it follow then that we should not take anything else he says in his post literally?

  • Contra Mundum: Secularism and Public Life

    Legal scholar Stephen Carter stated,

    One good way to end a conversation – or start an argument – is to tell a group of well educated professionals that you hold a political position (preferably a controversial one such as being against abortion or pornography) because it is required by your understanding of God’s will. In the unlikely event that anyone hangs around to talk with you about it, chances are that you will be challenged on the ground that you are intent on imposing your religious beliefs on other people. And in contemporary political and legal culture, nothing is worse.

    Carter puts his finger on an important perspective which is pervasive in contemporary liberal societies. This is the view that citizens of liberal democracies may justly support the implementation of a law only if they reasonably believe themselves to have a plausible secular justification for that law. Further, they must be willing to appeal to secular justifications alone in political discussion. The upshot of this perspective is that it is perceived to be unjust to support or advocate for laws for theological or religious reasons.

    I will refer to this position as secularism, the commitment to the position that the public square should be secular. The secularisation of political culture is, of course, an implication of accepting this position.  Richard Rorty described it as,

    The happy, Jeffersonian compromise that the Enlightenment reached with the religious. This compromise consists in privatizing religion — keeping it out of … “the public square,” making it seem bad taste to bring religion into discussions of public policy.

    My experience as a New Zealand citizen is that secularism is widely held and taken for granted in our culture by media, politicians and popular culture. I also think, perhaps predictably, that secularism of this sort is questionable.

    Let me begin by pointing out that several writers have observed that prima facie there is something unfair or discriminatory about secularism. Contemporary critics of secularism, Christopher Eberle and Terence Cuneo, note that it entails “There is an important asymmetry between religious and secular reasons in the following respect: some secular reasons can themselves justify state coercion but no religious reason can.”

    Another critic, Philip Quinn, observes that secularists impose “burdens on religious people” that they nowhere suggest “imposing on nonreligious people.” Secularists do “not propose that nonreligious people must be sufficiently motivated by adequate religious reason for their advocacy or support of restrictive laws or policies. The lack of symmetry is striking.”

    This raises an obvious question, why the asymmetry? On the face of it secularism appears to privilege secular ideologies and doctrines in public debate whilst relegating religious or theological perspectives to the private sphere.  What is the basis for this? Two reasons are typically offered and neither is terribly compelling.

    The first is that it is dangerous to allow theological or religious concerns into public debate. Defenders of secularism raise the specter of the wars of religion that tore Europe apart during the 17th century or they mention episodes such as the Inquisition and Crusades, which are said to be consequences of allowing religious reasons to influence public and political life. It is argued that the only way to keep social peace and prevent the kind of violence that Europe witnessed is to ensure religious reasons do not influence public life and that all political discussions take place on secular terms.

    This argument assumes that appeal to religious reasons is the cause of religious wars and appeals to secular reasons protect us against such wars. Writing in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Eberle and Cuneo note that the religious wars of the 17th century were caused not by the appeal to religious reasons per se but rather by the violation of religious freedom. Moreover, they note that even in the 17th century, religious persecution was typically justified on secular grounds. They go on to observe that religious freedom is not necessarily safeguarded by secularising public debate. They note that many “secularists have a long history of hostility to the right to religious freedom and, presumably, that hostility isn’t at all grounded in religious considerations” In addition, they note correctly that some of the most important defences of religious persecution and defences of religious tolerance, such as those proposed by John Locke and Pierre Bayle, appealed to explicitly theological grounds.

    Yale philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff makes a similar point, he notes that much of “the slaughter, torture, and generalised brutality of our century has mainly been conducted in the name of one or another secular cause–nationalism of many sorts, communism, fascism, patriotisms of various kinds, economic hegemony.” He also stated that “many of the social movements in the modern world that have moved societies in the direction of liberal democracy have been deeply and explicitly religious in their orientation.” Wolterstorff cites examples such as the abolitionist, civil rights and various other resistance movements as examples.

    The assumption that secular reasoning is always tolerant and religious reasoning is always intolerant does not survive scrutiny. Particular types of religious reasons in particular political contexts can lead to wars and abuse, whereas appealing to other types of religious reasons in other contexts can be beneficent. The same is equally true of secular reasons. Certain types of secular reasons can be dangerous in particular contexts and other types of secular reasons are not. To single religious reasons out as being ‘too dangerous to be aired in public’ and insisting on a default to secular reasons seems ad hoc and unjustified.

    The fear of religious wars is not the only argument typically offered for the secular public square. The main reason offered for secularism is that religious reasons are not accessible to all people. Auckland Law Professor Paul Rishworth observes, “some have contended that the nature of religious belief is such that, while it may be integral to individual autonomy and development, it has no proper role in public policy debates and that these ought to be conducted exclusively in secular terms that are equally accessible to all.” [Emphasis added]

    Something like this is also evident in defences of secularism. Leading secular Philosopher Michael Tooley states, “For it is surely true that it is inappropriate, at least in a pluralistic society, to appeal to specific theological beliefs of a non moral sort… in support of legislation that will be binding upon everyone.” Robert Audi, one of the leading defenders of secularism, states “as advocates for laws and public policies, then, and especially for those that are coercive, virtuous citizens will seek grounds of a kind that any rational adult citizen can endorse as sufficient for the purpose.” [Emphasis added]  In essence, because not everyone in society accepts the existence of God or some theological perspective on life then it is unjust to base laws governing their conduct on theological or religious grounds.

    This argument is deeply flawed. If taken consistently it would require not just the exclusion of religious reasons but the exclusion of any reasons that were controversial and not accepted by all people. The problem is that many secular justifications and ideologies are also controversial in the same way. Quinn makes the point,

    If the fact that religious reasons cannot be shared by all in a religiously pluralistic society suffices to warrant any exclusion of religious reasons for advocating or supporting restrictive laws or policies, then much else ought in fairness also to be excluded on the same grounds.

    He goes on to note,

    Indeed, it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some citizens of a pluralistic democracy. And if justification of restrictive laws or policies can be conducted only in terms of moral considerations no citizen of a pluralistic democracy can reasonably reject, then in a pluralistic democracy such as ours very few restrictive laws or policies can be morally justified, a conclusion that would, I suspect, be welcomed only by anarchists. [Emphasis added]

    I agree with Quinn. There is special pleading going on whereby theological beliefs are rejected on certain grounds, while secular ones are not, even though the same grounds and reasons, consistently applied, should lead to the rejection of secular beliefs.

    On examining secularism and the main arguments for it, it certainly is not evident that a just or fair society will have a secularised public square. To insist this is the case prima facie seems to favour secular views of the world for no adequate reason. Contrary to what some maintain, secular reasons, like religious reasons, can be used to justify atrocities and human rights abuses. Further, like religious reasons, secular reasons are frequently controversial and not shared by all intelligent people. Of course, secularists might consider religious views of the world to be false but then, of course, religious people consider secular views of the world to be false and given the diversity of secular moral theories on offer they cannot all be true (some are at odds with each other) so why single out religious views? The question remains as to why morality requires that public discussions privilege secular perspectives by requiring that all such discussions are engaged in on secular terms.  I suspect we will be waiting a long time for an answer.

    [In this article I acknowledge being influenced by my wife Madeleine Flannagan’s supervised research paper “Religious Restraint and Public Policy” which she wrote under the supervision of Professor Rishworth, the Dean of the University of Auckland’s School of Law.]

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the June 10 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

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    Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith
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  • Myth, Truth and Genesis 1-11

    In Naturalism Defeated, Evan Fales attacks the biblical teaching that man is made in the image of God. One reason he gives is, “How seriously, then, should one take the testimony of Genesis 1:26-27? … There is the generally mythical character of Genesis; many of the themes in the first 11 chapters are borrowed from, or influenced by, the myths of other ancient Near Eastern cultures.”[1]

    Fales’ reasoning here is not uncommon. He argues that what Genesis teaches is false because Genesis 1-11 is a myth. The latter claim he substantiates by comparing the early chapters of Genesis to various Ancient Near Eastern texts which we know to be myths. Fales contends that a comparison of the texts in question leads to the conclusion Genesis is a myth and hence what it teaches lacks authority.

    In this post I want to address one aspect of this argument. The key premise I want to contest is that if Genesis is a myth and of the same genre as Ancient Near-Eastern myths then what it teaches lacks authority. Note this is a conditional claim: I am arguing that if Genesis 1-11 is mythic in genre then this would not necessarily entail that the text lacks authority. I am not, in this post, committing myself to any claim that Genesis is mythic; I am simply asking what follows if it is.

    As a way of entering this question let me start by summarising a debate between two evangelical scholars, both of whom affirm biblical inerrancy. In Inspiration and Incarnation, Peter Enns compares the story of creation, fall, flood and Babel in Genesis 1-11 to various Ancient Near-Eastern texts such as Enuma Elish, The Gilgamesh Epic, Atrahasis Epic, the Sumerian Flood Story and the Sumerian King Lists. Enns argues that:

    (a) these writings appear to be earlier than Genesis; and,
    (b) the latter four in particular contain obvious parallels to Genesis that cannot be mere coincidence; and,
    (c) these texts are myths.

    In light of this, Enns argues that Genesis must be understood as a myth.

    When Enns says Genesis is a myth it is important to not misunderstand his meaning here. In contemporary English the word myth is often a colloquial term for a falsehood, so that calling something a myth means it is false. In Enns’ use of the term the word ‘myth’ refers to a particular kind of genre, “myth is an ancient, pre-modern, pre-scientific way of addressing ultimate meaning and origins in the form of stories: Who are we ? Where do we come from ?”[2] Hence, by saying Genesis is a myth Enns is not committing himself to the claim that the text is false.

    However, later in the same book Enns goes on to state that “the biblical account, along with its ancient Near Eastern counterparts assumes the factual nature of what it reports. They did not think, “We know this is all ‘myth’ but we will have to wait until science is invented to give us better answers.”[3] He suggests that while the text is myth, its original hearers would probably not have distinguished myth from what we would call an historical narrative.

    It is worth noting that Enns is not alone in this kind of assessment. Drawing on the same literary parallels, Gordon Wenham has argued that the author of Genesis 1-11 was retelling stories that were well known in Babylonian culture. However, the author was transforming them to make a radically different theological point. These  points, in fact, repudiate and at times ridicule, the very teachings the Babylonian myths  were trying to teach.

    Like Enns, Wenham notes several important parallels between Gen 1-11 and Ancient Near-Eastern myths and legends to substantiate this point. Wenham suggests that in retelling the Babylonian myths to make theological counter points the authors assumed or took for granted, the historicity of the folk stories in question. In The Erosion of Inerrancy in Evangelicalism, Greg Beale responds to Enns’ suggestion, “But Enns is saying more than this: the biblical writers thought they were recording history but were really recording myth … Thus one ends up with a completely inspired bible  in which the narrators recorded what they thought was history, but we know they are wrong. This is tantamount to saying the biblical writers made mistakes.”[4]

    Beale goes on to state that Enns sees Genesis as “a genre of divine accommodation,  whereby God knew better but the Israelite writers did not. They thought they were writing true history, but God knew they were not. In this respect has Enns formulated a new version of sensus plenor?”[5]

    I think Beale is correct; Enns’ position does commit him to the claim that the biblical authors made mistakes. However, I think the conclusion he tries to draw, that this claim compromises the authority of scripture is too quick. It is worth noting that Enns claimed that the biblical writers assumed the factual nature of what they reported. He explicitly states also that the genre of myth uses stories to teach answers to certain theological and existential questions.  For example, questions regarding ultimate meaning and origins, such things as, who are we? where do we come from? and so on. Hence while Enns position accords errors to what biblical writers assumed, it does not necessarily entail that what the text teaches is erroneous. This may sound like a minor technical point but I am inclined to think it is important.

    An example might help to illustrate this point. Let’s take as an example the well known story of  the boy who cried wolf. This story, on the face of it, is simply a description of a shepherd boy who was killed after giving false alarms about wolves. Taken in a straight-forward, literal fashion it appears to relay an historical event. Now most people recognise that this story is not designed to teach us an historical event, those who retell this story do so to make a moral point about the dangers and pitfalls of repeatedly lying. The story is a powerful and graphic way of teaching this point and gives the point a vividness and power that the mere claim “don’t lie” does not have.  It is also clear, I think, that no one would consider what this story teaches to be false if it was discovered the events the story described never happened (which they probably did not). This is because once the genre of the text is realised, it is evident that the text does not teach that the events happened and if it does not teach that they happened then the fact that they did not cannot render what it teaches as false.

    Now, let me provide a hypothetical situation. Suppose I was researching the origins of the story of the boy who cried wolf and I discovered that at some point in the past a person heard this story and believed it to be literally true, the person believed that the events actually happened. Suppose this person was also struck by the fact that these events provided a powerful illustration of the dangers of lying and issuing false reports so much so that this person began using this story to teach about the dangers of lying. Suppose that this person’s pedagogy caught on and the story entered into cultural consciousness and that those people who heard and retold the story also believed it actually happened. Would this discovery lead us to conclude that what the story teaches is false? Again it seems clear to me that it would not. This is because whatever the original teller believed about the story, what the story teaches remains true. The original teller may have all sorts of beliefs about what was authored but unless the story was actually used to teach each of these beliefs the story is not discredited by any finding to the effect that these beliefs are false. The story of the boy who cries wolf teaches us about lying it does not teach (nor does it purport to teach us) an historical event. As such, it is shown to be false only if someone can show us that what it says about lying is false.

    It is important to see the limitations of this illustration. I am not arguing that Genesis 1-11 should be construed as a fable in the vein of the story of the boy who cried wolf – I think Genesis  is clearly not a fable – the point I am making is that there is a distinction between what a person assumes about a story when they tell it and what the story actually teaches. Even if a person falsely assumes the factual accuracy of the events in a story or narrative as true then that does not entail that what the text teaches is untrue. The example of the boy who cries wolf shows that with some genres the truth of what is taught stands whether or not the story used to teach this truth is historically accurate. Even if we grant that Genesis is myth or folklore, it does not follow that what it teaches is false.


    [1] Evan Fales “Darwin’s Doubt, Calvin’s Calvary” in James Beilby Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000) 55.
    [2] Peter Enns  Inspiration and Incarnation: Evangelicals and the Problem of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids MI : Baker Books, 2005) 50.
    [3] Ibid 55.
    [4] Greg Beale The Erosion of Inerrancy in Evangelicalism: Responding to New Challenges to Biblical Authority (Wheaton Ill: Crossway Books, 2008) 69.
    [5] Ibid.

  • Showing Christianity is True at Apologetics 315

    Brian Auten of Apologetics 315 has run an essay series through the month of April on the topic “Why is Christianity True?” Brian has accepted 23 submissions from various apologetics bloggers from around the world and has each day posted 1 essay in the series along with a podcast of each. At the end of the series a PDF ebook version of all the essays will be made available.

    Matt’s essay “Showing Christianity is True” was selected to be the concluding essay and it too has been made into a podcast. To hear the podcast and join in the global discussion pop on over to Apologetics 315 (or you can read it below).

    Showing Christianity is True

    “Can you show that Christianity is true?” To help us focus our thinking as to how one should answer this question I will pose some other questions as follows. Can you show that other people exist or that there exists a world that endures independent of our senses, which continues to exist when we no longer perceive it? Can my belief that it is wrong to inflict pain on another person for no reason at all be shown as true? What about my belief that Russell’s sceptical hypothesis that the whole Universe came into existence six seconds ago, including all apparent memories and signs of age – is this false or true?

    I hope that the point of these examples is clear. Unless we want to fall into a global scepticism that defies all common sense we have to acknowledge that there are some beliefs which we hold rationally and know are true that, nevertheless, cannot be shown or proven to be true from premises that all intelligent people are required to accept. In fact, somewhat ironically, the claim that one is only rational in believing something unless it can be shown to be true from premises all sane people are required to accept, is self-refuting; after all, many sane people reject it and it has yet to be shown to be true from premises that all sane people accept.

    However, one is rational in accepting some beliefs independent of any argument showing the truth of those beliefs; philosophers term such beliefs ‘properly basic beliefs.’ These beliefs typically function as foundational beliefs, a person reasons from them as premises to the truth of other propositions one holds. Similarly, they function as the background data against which one assesses hypotheses proposed for one’s acceptance. They arise because ongoing appeals to premises to prove premises to prove premises have to end somewhere. Properly basic beliefs constitute those beliefs where it is rational for the appeal for proof to end.

    It needs to be noted that properly basic beliefs are not groundless. While one does not believe a basic belief based on an inference, basic beliefs are often based on some form of experience. Alvin Plantinga discerns two types of experience, “sensory evidence”, such things as appearing to see, hear or feel a given object and “doxastic evidence”, which he refers to as “the belief feels right, acceptable, natural.”1  Doxastic beliefs appear to be self-evident. An example of such a belief is the corresponding conditional of modus ponens. When one entertains the conditional of modus ponens it just seems to be correct. Modus ponens seems self-evident in a way that an overtly-fallacious inference does not. It is this kind of experience that grounds basic beliefs.

    Many philosophers and theologians such as Calvin, Pascal, Alston and Plantinga hold that certain theological beliefs are properly basic. Belief in the existence of God is, from the believer’s perspective, properly basic and grounded directly in some form of religious experience; hence it is justified and rational to believe these doctrines independently of any argument in favour of them. Although I cannot elaborate it in a small article, I am in fundamental agreement with this position. The request then that Christians show or demonstrate that Christianity is true often relies on an assumption that I think is mistaken; this assumption is that rational Christian belief requires that arguments or proofs be provided for Christianity and failure to provide them renders the believer irrational.

    There is another more moderate question which lurks in the neighbourhood. If one grants that the believer is rational in accepting Christian belief in a properly basic way then what reasons can the believer give to those who do not hold to the same properly basic beliefs for accepting Christian belief? Perhaps some people, on the basis of some kind of religious experience, have immediate properly basic beliefs but many people do not have this kind of experience – what reason can be given to them for accepting the Christian faith? This problem is exasperated by the fact that it is extremely difficult to demonstrate the truth of foundational beliefs precisely because they are foundational beliefs. To prove something one needs to appeal to premises and the whole question in this instance is over what ultimate premises to accept. How then would one show to these people that Christianity is true?

    I think several strategies are available but due to space I can only briefly sketch them here.

    First, in many instances, one can show Christianity is true by rebutting objections to Christian beliefs. Properly basic beliefs are beliefs that one is rational in believing independently of any argument for them in the absence of any good reasons for them. It does not follow, however, that these beliefs cannot be defeated by reasons offered against them.  If I see John screwing his face up and grasping his leg, I might form the belief that John is in pain. However, if later John tells me that he was not in pain but rather rehearsing his death scene in a play he is acting in I might change my belief to believing that he was not in pain. The initial belief that he was in pain was properly-basic; however, because of what I later discovered, its rational status was defeated.

    I think many people stand in an analogous position to various Christian beliefs; they reject them not because they do not see them to be true but because they accept various objections to these beliefs. Consider Richard Dawkins’ “All appearances to the contrary, the only watchmaker in nature is the blind forces of physics, albeit deployed in a very special way… it is the blind watchmaker.” What is interesting here is the phrase, “all appearances to the contrary,” Dawkins admits that, prima facie, the world appears and looks like it was designed and in the absence of any reasons for denying design then the natural observation is to say that it is. Dawkins suggests, however, that appearances are deceiving because science has allegedly provided defeaters for this belief. Showing Dawkins’ arguments are unsound in such a context enables people to accept appearances.

    The second line of argument is to show that various alternatives to Christianity are false. Often people fail to see the truth of Christianity because they accept mistaken views of the world and mistaken epistemic standards such as those associated with naturalism. They may experience God’s presence in nature but believe this is an illusion because they are convinced that nothing beyond nature exists. They might think that only things which can be empirically demonstrated can be rationally believed and these experiences are an illusion fostered by evolution to ensure social co-operation. Showing that these pictures of reality are false helps them to re-consider the veridical nature of these experiences. Refuting alternatives to Christianity provides another impetus for seeing the truth of Christianity.

    People have to live by some vision of the world. In terms of practice, one cannot remain agnostic on many existential questions. If all the viable alternatives to Christianity can be shown to be implausible then Christianity has to be taken seriously by people who cannot, in practice, live a life which suspends judgment on ultimate questions.

    Third, even if a person does not accept a given proposition they can still reason about such beliefs. One can reason “conditionally”,2  if one accepts certain premises or propositions as properly basic beliefs. Then certain other positions, hypotheses and theories are likely, and people from all sides of the dispute can assess and debate whether the reasoning is cogent. Plantinga notes,

    The conclusions of theistic science may not be accepted by non-theists, but the method – trying to see how best to explain the relevant phenomena from a theistic perspective – is indeed open to all.3

    One can show that when one does reason from a theistic perspective then certain existential and theoretical questions can be given coherent answers. One can explain such things as the origin of the universe, the existence of contingent beings, the existence and nature of moral obligation, the existence of laws of nature, existential questions about guilt and forgiveness and so on. Plantinga notes that the existence of God imports a “great deal of unity into the philosophic endeavor, and the idea of God helps with an astonishingly wide variety of cases: epistemological, ontological, ethical, having to do with meaning, and the like of that.”4 Showing that if one accepts theism, then plausible, defensible, comprehensive and unified answers are available to what would otherwise be intractable questions, provides one way of showing others why they should accept belief in God as a properly basic belief.

    The fourth and final way is to put a person in a position where that person is likely to have the requisite experience that grounds properly basic theological beliefs. Suppose I see a tree in the park and my wife asks me to show her that this tree exists. The obvious way to do so is not to construct a proof of the existence of a tree but to take her to a park and show her it. Similarly, many people fail to grasp self-evident axioms of logic because they fail to understand them, but when these are explained to them they become self-evident. The same is true with Christian belief. One way to show agnostics the truth of Christianity is to put them into circumstances where, if they are attentive, they are likely to start seeing the truth.

    One can explain the scriptures to them, encourage them to seek God in prayer – this is analogous to the way a person lost in the bush might call out to a rescuer even if he or she were unsure anyone was searching for him or her. One can encourage them to engage in the study of the scriptures whilst taking seriously the possibility that they are the word of God. The person could get involved in a community of believers where God dwells and works, where the person could be encouraged to live in accord with the moral law and honestly confess their failings and seek forgiveness for their moral errors. Pascal made this point in his famous wager; while an agnostic cannot simply choose to believe something he does not believe, he or she can choose to look, to seek and to understand. When the agnostic sincerely does so, it is likely that he or she will come to experience God. Just as a person who attempts to understand logic will see why its axioms are self-evident or a person who actually looks in the park will see that there is a tree there.

    In conclusion the basic doctrines of Christianity, if true, constitute properly basic foundational beliefs. One does not believe them on the basis of argument or proof as they are grounded directly in experience. Typically it is very difficult to prove with argument that a foundational belief is true; however their truth can be shown in other indirect ways. One can argue that the arguments against such beliefs are false, one can argue that the alternatives to accepting them are false or problematic, and one can show that if one accepts Christianity then these beliefs make coherent sense out of the world, they provide comprehensive answers to many theoretical and existential questions. Finally, in the context of all of the above, one can assist the sceptic to adopt the stance of a sincere seeker; to get him to put him or herself into the kind of position where he or she can come to have the requisite encounter with God so as to see that Christianity is true. This is ultimately how one shows that Christianity is true.

    1 Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 110-111.
    2 See Alvin Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” in Darwinism Design and Public Education ed John Angus Campbell & Stephen C Meyer (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2004) 521-232; “Reason and Scripture Scholarship” in Behind the Text: History and Biblical Interpretation ed C Bartholomew, C Stephen. Evans, Mary Healy & Murray Rae (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2003) 98-100.
    3 Alvin Plantinga “On Rejecting The Theory of Common Ancestry: A Reply to Hasker” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 44 (December 1992): 258-263.
    4 Alvin Plantinga “Two Dozen or so Theistic Arguments” accessed 7 March 2010.

  • Oxford Calling… Can you Help Glenn Peoples?

    The 18th Conference of the European Society of the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Oxford is on “Religion in the Public Square” and will feature my favourite philosopher (next to Matt of course) Professor Nicholas Wolterstorff and New Zealand’s own Glenn Peoples who blogs and produces brilliant podcasts at Say Hello to my Little Friend. Back in February Glenn blogged of his interest in giving a paper to this conference and of his intention, if accepted, to find a way there.

    The first hurdle was to get his paper accepted, which is no small feat but one that Glenn has pulled off – well done Glenn!

    The second hurdle is to raise the funds to get there, which is a work in progress…

    Glenn’s situation is much like Matt’s. Glenn holds a PhD in Philosophy and a Masters in Theology (the opposite way around to Matt). He is a very good Christian philosopher; I referenced him in my own philosophy of law paper on the subject, Matt has cited from him also  in several works (see our Glenn Peoples tag) and we both view Glenn’s blog to be MandM’s toughest competition in the NZ blog rankings for our niche .  Like Matt,  since graduating, Glenn has struggled to find work in his field. He currently works for the IRD and earns a very modest wage. Glenn is trying to find a position using his skills, if not in New Zealand, anywhere in the world so this conference is not only an opportunity for him to meet one of the world’s best living philosophers in Glenn’s field, it is not just an opportunity to have New Zealand Christian philosophy showcased at Oxford but it is a chance to help someone with a gift take another step towards using that gift to provide for his family and to support the broader church. Donations are currently being gathered and more information is available here if you would like to help and/or follow his progress.

  • William Lane Craig and his Debate with Michael Tooley

    “Is God Real?” was the subject of the recent debate between William Lane Craig and Michael Tooley at the University of North Caroline on 24 March 2010. Whilst it is not available for free anywhere online, you can purchase it here, find reviews here, a pre-debate radio interview between the two here and of course the transcript of the first debate between these two back in 1994 is here.

    Hat Tip: I am Jonny King

    Dr Craig has written his own thoughts as to how the debate went in his Reasonable Faith newsletter:

    By contrast my debate the following evening at UNCC generated a lot of light but very little heat! My opponent for this debate on “Is God Real?” was Michael Tooley, a well-respected philosopher from the University of Colorado (Boulder). He has recently published a very complex argument against God based on examples of certain evils in the world. In preparation for the debate I worked through his argument carefully and prepared a four-point response. To read my critique of his argument click here. (I’m indebted to Timothy McGrew and Matt Flanagan for very helpful interaction!) Tooley also came well-prepared to the debate. Indeed, this was his undoing, for he had all four of his speeches (including “rebuttals”!) canned in advance. As a result, he was utterly inflexible and so didn’t respond to virtually anything I said in my rebuttals. It was as if I didn’t even need to be there! So the debate turned out to be pretty one-sided, with me replying to each of his relevant points and him just ignoring me and plugging ahead with his prepared speeches. While Dr. Tooley would, of course, disagree, I think Christian theism came away looking eminently reasonable and credible. [Emphasis added]

    Matt had emailed Dr Craig a modified version of his Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part I and Part II blog series prior to the debate. Matt’s piece criticises the main line of argument Michael Tooley used in his recent debate with Alvin Plantinga and he is currently seeking its publication.