Category: Apologetics

  • Response to William Lane Craig’s Question 225: “The ‘Slaughter’ of the Canaanites Re-visited” Part I

    Every week William Lane Craig answers a question on his website; this week’s question of the week is entitled “The “Slaughter” of the Canaanites Re-visited”. The questioner asked what Craig thinks of the Canaanite Conquest account. I got a mention in Craig’s reply:

    The EPS Session at the SBL: Richard Hess, Randal Rauser, Paul Copan, me, Michael Rea

    “The topic of God’s command to destroy the Canaanites was the subject of a very interesting exchange at the Evangelical Philosophical Society session last November at the Society of Biblical Literature Convention in Atlanta. Matt Flannagan defended the view put forward by Paul Copan in his Is God a Moral Monster? that such commands represent hyperbole typical of Ancient Near Eastern accounts of military conquests. Obviously, if Paul is right about this, then the whole problem just evaporates. But this answer doesn’t seem to me to do justice to the biblical text, which seems to say that if the Israeli soldiers were to encounter Canaanite women and children, they should kill them (cf. Samuel’s rebuke of Saul in I Sam. 15.10-16).”

    Craig raises an important issue. In God and the Genocide of the Canaanites I, II and III I defended Nicholas Wolterstorff’s take on the Canaanite massacre in “Reading Joshua”.[1] Wolterstorff argued that the book of Joshua is a highly figurative, hagiographic and hyperbolic account of Israel’s early skirmishes and it is not intended to be taken literally in its details. My adaptation of Wolterstorff’s argument consists of three points.

    First, taken as a single narrative, and taken literally, Joshua 1-11 gives a contradictory account of events to that narrated by Judges and also to that narrated by the later chapters of Joshua itself.

    Second, those who put these books into a single narrative would have been well aware of the obvious contradictions mentioned above. These editors were not mindless or stupid, particularly if we hold that God spoke through them.

    Third, while Judges reads more like “down-to-earth”[2] history, a careful reading of Joshua shows it to be full of ritualistic, stylised accounts and formulaic language. I supported this third point with research into Ancient Near Eastern conquest accounts. Studies show such accounts are hyperbolic, hagiographic, figurative and follow a common transmission code. Comparisons between these accounts and the early chapters of Joshua suggest Joshua was written according to the same literary conventions and transmission code. I suggest these three points, taken together, provide compelling reasons for thinking that one should interpret the text as a hyperbolic, hagiographic and figurative account of what occurred; it was not meant to be taken as literally true in all its details.

    Craig’s objection to my position (and that of Paul Copan’s whose position is very close to mine) is a reference to 1 Samuel 15. Craig referred specifically to verses 10-16, where Samuel rebuked Saul “because [Saul] has turned away from [God] and has not carried out [God’s] instructions.”[3] The instructions in question were given in verse 3; God commanded Saul, “Now go and strike [nakah] Amalek [the Amelekites] and utterly destroy [haram] all that he has, and do not spare [hamal] him; but put to death both man and woman, child and infant, ox and sheep, camel and donkey.”[4] Craig suggests this “seems to say that if the Israeli soldiers were to encounter Canaanite women and children, they should kill them”. I think Craig pushes an important objection (more…)

  • In Defense of Reasonable Disagreement

    At the close of his 1967 book “God and Other Minds”, Alvin Plantinga argues that if theistic belief is to be dismissed as “irrational”, or in some sense “epistemically sub-par” on the basis that it lacks a rationally compelling argument, then likewise we should also reject belief in other minds, since the best argument for the belief in such minds (the analogical argument) is not rationally compelling[i]. What this implies is that if belief in other minds is justified even in spite of the fact that it lacks a rationally compelling argument, then equally so, belief in God may be justified in spite of such an argument[ii]. To hold then, that belief in God is unjustified in the absence of a compelling theistic proof, would be to hold a double standard[iii].

    What elephant?For obvious reasons, few people would dare to dispute the contention that belief in other minds is rational. However, Plantinga’s critics have two options: (1) they might contend that belief in other minds is rational, but only in virtue of a rationally compelling argument. Hence their burden would be to produce a rationally compulsive version of the analogical argument. (2) They could admit that there is no rationally compulsive version of the analogical argument, but argue that there is a relevant difference between theistic belief and belief in other minds, such that the two beliefs are not epistemically equivalent or, as it were, “equiprobable”.

    In this paper, I am not concerned to argue against (1), but suffice to say I think it thoroughly wrong-headed. I am concerned however, to argue against one particular version of (2). Some of Plantinga’s critics have charged that belief in God and belief in other human minds are epistemically unalike in the sense that reasonable people do not disagree about whether or not other minds exist, whereas reasonable clearly disagree about whether or not God exists.

    While he doesn’t explicitly respond to Plantinga or any of the so called “Reformed Epistemologists”, Richard Feldman argues something akin to in his article entitled “Reasonable Religious Disagreements”. Hence it makes sense to analyze his argument in the context of an objection against Reformed Epistemology.

    I do not find his argument convincing. In-fact, as I will go on to argue, un-sharable private evidence in the form of religious experience proves an intractable problem for Feldman’s argument with respect to religious disagreements. That is not to say that there is no epistemic parity between theistic belief and belief in other minds, rather it is simply to say that at least one attempt to establish any such parity is not successful.

    Feldman’s thesis is that reasonable disagreement between epistemic peers who have fully disclosed their evidence is not possible[iv]. That is to say, reasonable disagreement cannot subsist between two parties that are equivalently intelligent, have approximately equal powers of reasoning, are equal with respect to background information and have shared all relevant evidence[v]. When he says that reasonable disagreement cannot subsist between such people, Feldman does not mean to say that both parties should agree. Rather, what he means to say is that both parties should suspend judgement[vi]. In other words, those who are party to the discussion cannot simply “agree to disagree” (at least they can’t do so rationally) . Rather, they must opt for a position that can only be described as “agnostic”. The final preliminary point to clarify is the issue of “reasonability”. By this Feldman means to say is that a belief is “reasonable” just if it has sufficient evidential support. This point is important, because as Feldman points out, if by “reasonability” one simply means that there is no “obvious blunder”, then it’s possible to be “reasonable” and yet base ones beliefs on confusion and misunderstanding etc[vii]. Feldman introduces his thesis by way of the following questions: (more…)

  • Guest Post: One Less God

    Bethyada from True Paradigm writes:

    I have read a few posts on the ‘one less god’ proposition. Stephen F Roberts originally put it,

    “I contend we are both atheists, I just believe in one fewer god than you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours.”

    elsewhere he says,

    “We are all atheists, some of us just believe in fewer gods than others.”

    I have read a few responses against this illogical claim.

    Some of us just go one god further

    One retort is to state that Christians do believe in several gods, it is just that the lesser gods are demons and Christians claim allegiance to the true God. Yahweh is not just a local deity (1Ki 20:23) but the true God, creator heaven and earth

    And Hezekiah prayed before the LORD and said: “O LORD, the God of Israel, enthroned above the cherubim, you are the God, you alone, of all the kingdoms of the earth; you have made heaven and earth. (2 Kings 19:15)

    the most high God,

    Abram said to the king of Sodom, “I have lifted my hand to the LORD, God Most High, Possessor of heaven and earth,…” (Genesis 14:22)

    Though there is truth to this, depending a little on how one defines God, I do not think this rebutal gets to the crux of the problem.

    Another response is to state that polytheists believe in gods for different reasons than monotheists believe in God. Polytheists believe X and monotheists believe Y, thus the monotheist’s refutation of X does not refute Y, which the atheist is claiming. In other words, the reason Christians reject other gods is not the same as the reason they accept the Christian God. This is logically true, and hints at the atheist error, but does not get to the heart of it. It is inadequate though because it is not immediately obvious that polytheists and monotheists have significantly different reasons for theism. Romans 1 suggests that there are some basic reasons why all people are theists, but our fallen nature means this may be distorted such that theism becomes polytheism or, as per Romans, animism and pantheism.

    A related response is to state that Christians see polytheism is a distortion of monotheism. As such, removal of the distortion does not remove the argument. The dismissal of the wrong elements of theism is not an argument against theism. This gets closer to the problem.

    The primary problem with the atheist position is that it makes a category error. The following analogy demonstrates this central issue. As such the analogy is useful, but for several reasons I think it is inadequate and could be improved upon. Nevertheless, if it illustrates the problem it is helpful.

    “Let’s say that people are debating the best colour for stop signs. One person may prefer red for stop signs. Another green. Still others think that any colour can be used and no standardisation is necessary, and others promote the use of all colours on every sign.

    The atheist response is like saying you can’t agree on what colour to use because there are in fact no colours. Colours do not exist.”

    Debating colour preference is not the same as debating the existence of colours. Dropping from one god to no gods is not a continuation of the number-of-gods argument, it is a completely different argument.

    Consider the deity set. It is either empty: atheism; or not empty: theism. The argument over the number of members in a non-empty theism set is unrelated to argument about whether or not the set is in fact empty.

    Douglas Wilson put it well in his response to Sam Harris,

    “You say, “Understand that the way you view Islam is precisely the way devote Muslims view Christianity. And it is the way I view all religions.” Well, no, not exactly. And well, actually, no, not at all.

    Suppose we are considering a phenomenon that is, by most accounts, inexplicable by an unsupervised occurrence—three of us attend a sophisticated party uptown, and halfway through the evening at the party we find a trout in the punch bowl. At this point, the three of us divide into three schools of thought. I think that Smith, a practical joker, put it there; our friend Murphy thinks that Jones, the avant-garde performance artist, put it there; and you think that it has simply shown up as the result of natural forces. My central point is not to interact with the truth or falsity of your naturalistic position—except perhaps through the use of this absurd example of the punchbowl—but rather to show that you are arguing for something completely different from what Murphy and I are arguing. We all have an explanation but your explanation is of a different kind altogether.

    The differences between two of us (between Murphy and me) concern who put the trout in the punchbowl. The difference between the both of us together and you iswhether someone put a trout in the punchbowl. And who and whether represent different questions entirely. Quite apart from who is right and who is wrong about this, it is important to note that we are not disagreeing in the same way or over the same kind of issue at all. Murphy and I are disagreeing over the relative behaviours of Smith and Jones, but not over whether the trout calls for an explanation. Maybe I am more hostile to Smith than I ought to be, and maybe Murphy is deeply prejudiced against Jones. Maybe we are both wrong about who put it there. But thinking someone’s explanation is inadequate (when we agree the phenomenon must be explained) is quite different from arguing with someone who says it calls for no outside explanation whatever.” (Letter from a Christian Citizen)

    RELATED POST:
    Selling Atheism

  • Guest Post: Tim McGrew defends “The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth”

    Tim McGrewA little while back we published a post linking to some talks by Tim McGrew on Undesigned Coincidences in the Gospels. For some bizarre reason this post of ours prompted fellow kiwi blogger Deane Galbraith to write a post on the Bulletin for the Study of Religion, linking to our post, on the separate topic of Tim and his wife Lydia McGrew’s article “The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth” which was published in the The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology.

    Here is a snippet of Galbraith’s post from the beginning:

    There are quite a few academic and quasi-academic studies in which statistical analysis seems to be employed as a substitute for thinking. It is, perhaps, fairly understandable why some people are tempted by the allure of numbers. Those mysteriously complex formulae, mindnumblingly boring statistics and obscure mathematical notations lend a magical aura of scientific objectivity and plausibility to even the most patently absurd claims.

    What gets me talking about this at this moment is my dumbfounded reading last night of an article published by Timothy McGrew and Lydia McGrew, entitled“The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth” (2009). In this article, the McGrews utilize Bayesian probability in order to argue to the “scientific” conclusion that the probability of the resurrection of Jesus is a “staggering” 100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
    000,000,000,000,000 to 1.

    Are you staggered? overwhelmed? swooning? Were you previously skeptical about the Christian claim that Jesus was resurrected, but now you’re feeling pretty silly? Perhaps not.

    The post goes on in the same vein to accuse the McGrews of trying to trick people into belief in the resurrection. It is littered with terms like “flimsy basis”, “populist apologetics”, “fanciful” and “deeply and unavoidably farcical” and is illustrated complete with a giant white-robed Caucasian Jesus wistfully looking heavenward as he steps out of the tomb. It finishes with Galbraith laying out his understanding of their mathematical reasoning, the tone at this point is dripping with lashings of smug, self-congratulation at how easily he, PhD student from Otago whose research area is giants in the Old Testament narrative, had dispatched two of the top philosophers of religion working in this field, both specialists in probability theory.

    Not being qualified remotely in Bayesian probability theory myself, and therefore not wanting to presume anything beyond assessing the tone as exceedingly arrogant, I passed on Galbraith’s criticisms to the McGrews on Facebook. Well it turns out that Galbraith isn’t the only non-qualified liberal/atheist to take a punt at their reasoning on this piece. Tim McGrew explains that straw men have been popping up all over.

    Straw Men Burning: Misinterpretations of our Article on the Resurrection

    One of the hazards of writing technical philosophy is the risk that someone who lacks the appropriate expertise will attempt to critique it. In the case of the article on the resurrection that Lydia and I wrote for The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, this has already happened. It is hard enough to correct misimpressions of this sort on a relatively neutral topic; when the subject rouses passions of the sort that, as Hume reminds us, religious disputes are apt to generate, then the difficulties are redoubled.

    But one thing that we did not anticipate is that (more…)

  • Undesigned Coincidences in the Gospels – Tim McGrew

    Timothy McGrewIf we have a question on the historicity of the resurrection, Timothy McGrew is our first port of call; there is no one we would turn to before him on the subject. Tim is also highly regarded for his work on probability theory and on miracles – he is the author of “Miracles” for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. We have previously linked to his Library of Historical Apologetics.

    I mention all this because Tim recently gave an excellent talk, which is available free as an MP3 and is entitled “Undesigned Coincidences in the Gospels.” Tim’s wife, Lydia McGrew, who first alerted us to this talk, writes:

    Undesigned coincidences in the Gospels … is an argument that was well-known in the nineteenth century but has, for no really clear reason, simply been forgotten as time has gone on. It is a cumulative case argument that the Gospels reflect, to an important extent, independent knowledge of actual events. Please note that this argument is quite independent of one’s preferred answer to the synoptic question. That is to say, even if, e.g., Mark was the first Gospel and others had access to Mark and show signs of literary dependence on Mark, the argument from undesigned coincidences provides evidence for independent knowledge of real events among the Gospel writers. There are many more of such coincidences beyond those given in the talk.

    Two of Tim’s other talks, which overlap the material in this talk but also extend it, “Beyond Minimal Facts, Part I: External Evidences” and “Beyond Minimal Facts, Part II: Internal Evidences” can be ordered for a small fee – details here. Matt and I have both of these and can highly recommend them.

  • Debate Review: Sam Harris and William Lane Craig on Divine Command Theory Part I

    William Lane Craig v Sam HarrisLast week Sam Harris and William Lane Craig debated the question: “Is the Foundation of Morality Natural or Supernatural?” at the University of Notre Dame. Given my interest in divine command meta-ethics I found the debate and the subsequent online discussion concerning it extremely interesting. I was particularly interested in how the ‘new atheist’ movement would address this issue given Dawkins’ neglect of moral arguments in The God Delusion. Unfortunately, the debate turned out to be very one-sided. [Both the debate video and the debate MP3 are now online.]

    In this review I will analyse the debate in two parts. In Part I, I will look at the discussion of Craig’s contention that,

    1. If God exists then we have a plausible account of (a) the nature of moral goodness and (b) the nature of moral obligation.

    In Part II, I will examine Harris’s contention that,

    2. If atheism is true then we have a plausible account of (a) the nature of moral goodness and (b) the nature of moral obligation.

    A couple of definitions are necessary here; what both Craig and Harris are defending are rival accounts of what both goodness and moral obligation are. When Craig or Harris offers an account of the nature of goodness, each is offering an account of what moral values and obligation are, that is, their ontological or metaphysical nature. Similarly, when Craig refers to God, he is referring to a personal immaterial being who is necessarily existent, omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect.

    Craig’s Argument for a Divine Command Theory
    In support of 1(a) Craig argued that if theism is true, goodness could be identified with God himself. His view is that goodness is best understood in terms of an exemplar, that good is identified with the perfect paradigm of a good person and that the goodness of everything else is measured by its resemblance to this paradigm. An analogy to this idea is the official “metre stick” that exists in France today. The metre stick is exactly one metre long, and the length in metres of every other length is determined by comparison with it. In the same way, God is both perfectly good and is the standard of goodness for everything else. God’s goodness, for Craig, is cashed out in terms of certain character traits. To claim God is good is to claim that he is truthful, benevolent, loving, gracious, merciful and just, and that he is opposed to certain actions such as murder, rape, torturing people for fun and so on.

    In support of 1(b) Craig argued that if God exists, moral obligations can be identified with Gods commands. He therefore advocated the version of a divine command theory of obligation proposed by Robert Adams in Finite and Infinite Goods.

    While Craig sketched his account of goodness and obligation in his opening statement, he never offered any actual argument for why he thinks that if theism is true, this account is correct; yet later in the debate he said it was obvious. While I myself agree with a certain version of divine command theory, I think this suggestion is inadequate. There have been many objections raised against such theories in the literature, and hardly any of them presuppose the non-existence of God. I think these objections fail, and most of them fail miserably. But it would be a gross overstatement to claim that, given the truth of theism, a divine command theory is obvious.

    Later in the debate, (more…)

  • On the God Topic: Responding with Reason and Precision

    For anyone for whom Houston, Texas is not too much of a trek to get to, Biola University and Reasonable Faith Houston are running an apologetics conference in April. Speakers include: JP Moreland, Craig Hazen, Mary Jo Sharp, Louis Markos, Micah Parker, Scott Swiggard and more.

    On the God Topic:

    Responding with Reason and Precision

    Details:

    1 – 2 April 2011
    Friday 7:00 pm – 9:30 pm
    Saturday 8:30 am – 4:30 pm

    Gloria Dei Lutheran Church
    18220 Upper Bay Road
    Houston, TX 77058

    Conference Sessions:

    Defending Your Faith Kickoff
    With JP Moreland, Craig Hazen, and more

    The A, B, Cs…Ds & Es of Defending the Gospels
    with Mike Licona

    Did Jesus Really Rise from the Dead?
    with Craig Hazen (more…)