Category: Theology

  • Jesus, Hot Cross Buns, Easter Eggs, Ishtar and Constantine: Is Easter Pagan? Tim McGrew says No!

    Easter can be annoying.  My kids all want chocolate, this year the hot cross buns sold out and Matt brought crumpets home from the supermarket instead. People who don’t normally have any time for Christianity suddenly feel they must go to church, whilst some of my Christian friends refuse to let their children eat chocolate because Easter is a pagan festival. Navigating it does my head in sometimes.

    Easter

    In the past week we’ve had people phone, email, text and raise in conversation that Easter was invented by Constantine, that the bunnies and the buns are pagan and thus consuming them is an offence against God. We’ve heard that the dates are wrong and that Easter dates do not coincide with Passover, that it is a Roman festival, while others say that Easter is tied up with Ishtar. This wasn’t limited to people coming to us; Matt was on the Pat Brittenden Mornings Panel earlier in the week and because of that we heard that talkback radio was full of this too. So, it was very cool that Matt and I were able to have a word with the producers at Radio Rhema after the Panel, and put them in touch with Dr Tim McGrew whose interview as to Whether Easter is Pagan aired on Tuesday – click the link to listen.

    Tim is a good friend, a world renowned scholar whose expertise on miracles and particularly the historical accuracy of the resurrection qualifies him as an authority on some of these Easter-is-pagan claims. While he does not touch on all of the above in the interview he debunks a lot of it.

    Normally Matt and I try to do a Passover-ish meal – we do lamb, rosemary and red wine – and the kids all get to choose a king size block of chocolate each (they reason they get more chocolate for the money than buying Easter Eggs) and I try to ensure indulgement in a decent hot cross bun. Throughout the weekend we focus on Christ, his death and resurrection. We read relevant passages, we have conversations about the Passover and the fact that Christ is the fulfillment of it, in years gone by when the kids were younger we’ve made Easter story cookies. Basically we enjoy the food, the public holiday and we weave learning opportunities and ways to focus on Christ in as we go so that the thrust of Easter is on him.

    We are not worried about taking this approach because Christ conquered all and our focus and heart and intent is on him. Don’t get me wrong, it is important to pause and check that one is not engaging in Paganism but just because something at some point had something to do with Paganism does not mean it is Paganism presently. Tree worship is common among Pagans so must we eschew wood? What about Pythagorus’ theorem? If Easter was just Ishtar worship then we would not be celebrating it; how many of us wanting the spiritual side of Easter are heading to the local Ishtar temple this weekend? As for Constantine inventing Easter, direct evidence for Easter being celebrated by Christians can be identified in the 2nd century, some couple of hundred years prior to Constantine – Wikipedia can tell you that much.

  • Come Let Us Reason: New Essays in Christian Apologetics – Available on Kindle or Pre-Order the Book, Feat. William Lane Craig, Paul Copan, JP Moreland, Gary Habermas, Matthew Flannagan et al.

    The kindle edition of Come Let Us Reason: New Essays in Christian Apologetics, published by B&H Academic, edited by William Lane Craig and Paul Copan and featuring Craig, Copan, JP Moreland, Gary Habermas, Craig Keener, Mary Jo Sharp, this blog’s Matthew Flannagan, and others, with the foreword written by Rick Warren, is now available at the link above on Amazon.

    The book version of Come Let Us Reason: New Essays in Christian Apologetics can be pre-ordered at this link on Amazon.

    Matt’s chapter is “Did God Command Canaanite Genocide?” Here is the editorial review from Amazon:

    Come Let Us Reason: New Essays in Christian ApologeticsCome Let Us Reason is the third book in a series on modern Christian apologetics that began with the popular Passionate Conviction and Contending with Christianity’s Critics. The nineteen essays here raise classical philosophical questions in fresh ways, address contemporary challenges for the church, and will deepen the thinking of the next generation of apologists. Packed with dynamic topical discussions and informed by the latest scholarship, the book’s major sections are:

    • Apologetics, Culture, and the Kingdom of God
    • The God Question
    • The Gospels and the Historical Jesus
    • Ancient Israel and Other Religions
    • Christian Uniqueness and the World’s Religions

    Click to View the Table of Contents of Come Let us Reason

    Contributors include J. P. Moreland (“Four Degrees of Postmodernism”), William Lane Craig (“Objections So Bad That I Couldn’t Have Made Them Up”), Gary R. Habermas (“How to Respond When God Gives You the Silent Treatment”), Craig Keener (“Gospel Truth: The Historical Reliability of the Gospels”), and Paul Copan (“Does the Old Testament Endorse Slavery?”).

    Paul Copan is a professor and the Pledger Family Chair of Philosophy and Ethics at Palm Beach Atlantic University in West Palm Beach, Florida. He holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Marquette University.

    William Lane Craig is research professor of Philosophy at Talbot School of Theology in La Mirada, California. His Ph.D. in Philosophy is from the University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom.

    The Come let us Reason series is designed to bring scholarly work to the lay person so, depending on whether you prefer Kindle or book form, order or pre-order your copy now and let us know what you think.

  • True Reason: Christian Responses to the Challenges of Atheism – on Kindle

    The kindle edition of new book featuring responses to the New Atheists, aimed to be readable at the popular level entitled True Reason: Christian Responses to the Challenges of Atheism is now available on Amazon. This blog’s Matthew Flannagan contributed to a chapter in it alongside William Lane Craig, Sean McDowell and others.

    Matt’s chapter is a reprint of his chapter “Did God Command Canaanite Genocide?” in the forthcoming in April B&H Academic book: Come Let Us Reason: New Essays in Christian Apologetics edited by Paul Copan and William Lane Craig.

    Here is the editorial review from Amazon:

    True Reason: Christian Responses to the Challenge of Atheism“While New Atheists like Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and others proclaim loudly their rationality, clear thinking, and incontrovertible scientific arguments, others are beginning to wonder how genuinely rational they are. Have they proved anything? Have they argued convincingly? Have they pinpointed any real challenges to the credibility of Christian faith?

    “True Reason,” edited by Tom Gilson and Carson Weitnauer, brings together a compendium of writers–philosophers, apologists, ethicists, theologians, historians–who look carefully at the best arguments atheism has and evaluate their validity, logic, assumptions, and naturalist conclusions.Authors include noted philosopher William Lane Craig and popular apologist Sean McDowell, along with Gilson, Weitnauer, John DePoe, Chuck Edwards, Matthew Flannagan, Peter Grice, Randy Hardman, David Marshall, Glenn Sunshine, David Wood, and Samuel Youngs. Each chapter tackles a different atheist argument and brings reason fully into the discussion.

    Which is more reasonable: atheism or Christianity? Read “True Reason” and think for yourself.”

    Get your copy now, read it, and let us know what you think both here and on Amazon 🙂

  • Jerry Coyne on God and Morality Revisited

    Late last year I, wrote a criticism of Jerry Coyne’s piece in USA today. Entitled, As  atheists know, you can be good without God.  My critique attracted some attention. Getting commentary from Mary Ann Spikes, Jason Thibodeau,  Jeffery Lay Lowder, and Brian Zamulinski.  Since the USA today article Coyne has written a follow up article where he purports to address the kinds of criticisms I made in this post. This article is entitled Maybe my Philosophy isn’t so Unsophisticated After All.  However, far from exonerating his poor reasoning, Coyne’s response simply further demonstrates my point.

    In this article Coyne focuses almost exclusively on criticisms I and others have made to his use of the arbitrariness objection. This is significant, for this criticism was just one of several criticisms of Coyne’s article that I raised .  Consequently, even if Coyne’s rejoinder is sound it addresses only one of my objections.  The rest remain untouched.

    As it is, his response is poor.  He begins by noting the response to the arbitrariness objection proposed by William Lane Craig. According to Coyne, Craig’s response is “whatever God orders is good and morally obligatory simply by virtue of the fact that He is God.” He cites this as a quotation but fails to provide a source. His response to this is to refer to alleged atrocities taught in the Old Testament and claim Craig’s response is “too stupid to address”

    Three things are evident, First, this is not Craig’s response to the arbitrariness objection; in his book Philosophical Foundations of  a Christian Worldview, Craig argues that Our moral duties are constituted by the commands of a just and loving God” (emphasis original)   and that

     this fact also supplies the key to the arbitrariness objection.  For our duties are determined by the commands, not merely of a supreme potentate, but of a just and loving God.  God is essentially compassionate, fair, kind, impartial, and so forth, and His commandments are reflections of His own character.  Thus, they are not arbitrary, and we need not trouble ourselves about counterfactuals with impossible antecedents like “If God were to command child abuse . . . .[1]

    So, Craig, in fact, maintains it’s impossible for God to command actions which are cruel, unjust and so on.   He does not, claim such actions can become good merely by God commanding them and Coyne appears to insinuate.

    Second, I actually addressed the Old Testament atrocity argument in my original article . However, Coyne simply repeats his argument.

    Third, calling someone “stupid” is not a rational rebuttal of their position; it commits a fallacy that logicians call the ad hominem fallacy, where one attacks the arguer instead of rebutting his argument. The distinction between attacking a person and refuting their argument is an elementary one in logic; it’s hard to believe Coyne is unaware of it.

    If Coyne thinks misrepresenting people, insulting them and then repeating an argument which has been addressed counts as competent philosophical or theological analysis he is gravely mistaken.

    After setting this tone, Coyne turns specifically to my criticisms. After suggesting that responding to on MandM is “a mugs game” he directs the reader to an article by Jason Thibodeau who Coyne calls a “real” philosopher” and cites two paragraphs which he claims “decisively” refute me.

    Now it doesn’t need saying that simply finding an article that agrees with you and maintaining the author of that article is a “real scholar” is not really a response to anything. Neither is simply asserting that someone has offered a refutation itself a refutation.

    But what’s interesting is Coyne’s selective citation. After noting my point, that a loving and just person would not command the kinds of actions he mentions, Thibodeau states

    There are a few problems with this response. The most important (and the one that I think that Coyne had in mind) is that if we are to understand the reply to mean that a moral God would not issue immoral commands… the response implies that there is a standard of morality that is independent of God against which he and his commands can be judged. But if morality is independent of God, then the DCT [divine command theory] is false.

    Coyne suggests this response “shows pretty definitively that” my argument fails and it “sets the record straight” for all thinking Christian’s

    In fact this response is mistaken. The fact that a loving and just being does not command certain actions does not entail that there is a moral standard independent of that being requiring them to not command those things. This is because it is possible for a person to be loving and just with being obligated to be loving and just. Suppose, for the sake of argument, morality was an illusion and in reality no one really was required to love their children.  Would it follow that all parents would cease to love them, or that they could not exercise love?  Not at all, I can be loving without being under an obligation to be loving. So this objection fails.

    Interestingly however, Thibodeau actually points this out in the very next line of the article which Coyne snips from his quotation. Thibodeau writes:

    In any event, as Flannagan indicated, the debate does not end here because the divine command theorist may concede the point but still insist that all he needs is that God is all-loving, and he will get the same consequence (or at least one that is close enough); namely that God will not issue commands that require us to cause horrible pain and suffering (or do anything that we all agree would be horrendous). If developed in the appropriate direction, this reply can lead to a fully developed response to the arbitrariness objection.

    So, the “real philosopher” Coyne cites actually says this argument is unsuccessful, for reasons I had already indicated in my criticisms.  Coyne’s response therefore appears to be as follows (a) find an article that agrees with his conclusions (b) assert the author (apparently unlike me) is a real philosopher (c)  quote an argument  the author actually says fails to address my point (d) Snip the context so your readers don’t know this (e) assert boldly that his comment refutes me.  Far from showing that my criticisms of Coyne are mistaken these kinds of tactics suggest I was on the mark.  Of course readers of Coyne’s work online or in USA today won’t have the original articles Coyne cites from and so will take his assertions on faith. This is effective propaganda but little else.

    After these dubious manoeuvres, Coyne then asserts that the rest of Thibodeau’s article makes devastating points against me but does not cite or summarise these arguments.

    In fact Thibodeau’s makes two arguments both of which fail.

    Thibodeau’s, first argument appeals to God’s omnipotence, which he defines as the ability to do whatever is logically possible.  If omnipotence is defined this way, then God could command the torture of children.

    Now whether omnipotence should be defined in this way is in fact a matter of dispute. However, suppose we grant Thibodeau’s definition; the argument still fails. Adams’ position is that that moral obligations are constituted by the commands of a loving and just God.  Even if God, being omnipotent could command the torture of children, he could not do so and continue to be loving and just. This is because it’s not logically possible for a loving and just being to command things like this. So this argument does nothing to show that a loving and just God could command torturing children and hence does not refute Adams’ position.

    Thibodeau’s second argument is similarly mistaken. Thibodeau argues that it’s possible that there exists an all-powerful creator that enjoys watching sentient beings suffer, he labels this being Azura. He then notes that Azura could command the torture of children.

    Now assuming that it is possible that Azura exists (which I doubt), this argument is beside the point. The fact that an evil being who is all powerful could command the torture of children, does not entail that a loving and just God could. So Adam’s contention that moral obligations are best accounted for by the commands of a loving and just God remains un-refuted.

    Both arguments fail because they misconstrue the position that Adams and those who follow him defend. These people contend that the nature of moral obligations is best explained by the commands of a loving and just God. Pointing out that they are not explained by a God who lacks these attributes does not address this contention. It ignores it.

    Interestingly,  in  some commentary on Coyne’s exchange with myself arguments philosopher and ethicist  Brian Zamulinski notes that he had pointed this out to Coyne months before he wrote the USA today article. Zamulinski  writes

    Robert Merrihew Adams contended that morality is constituted by the commands of an essentially loving God.  The Euthyphro dilemma collapses because an essentially loving God could not command just anything.  In his USA Today article, Coyne rehearses the Euthyphro dilemma but does not mention the Adams reformulation.  This is odd.  I had an e-mail correspondence with Coyne some months earlier in which I pointed out the Adams reformulation.  Coyne should have taken time to rebut the reformulation.  He did not.

    Coyne’s final riposte is to ask a question, how do you know a loving God exists? And this whole issue is “moot unless you can show that there’s a God to issue moral commands”. This however is to reason in a circle, in his USA today article Coyne was criticising the argument that morality was “strong evidence for [God’s] existence.” People like Adams argue it is because the best account of the nature of moral obligations is that moral obligations are commands issued by a loving and just God.  To contend Adams is wrong because no one has offered an argument for a loving God’s existence is to assume the very issue under dispute. One could just as easily argue Coyne’s argument is flawed on the grounds that his arguments are flawed.

    Nothing in Coyne’s follow up leads me to revisit my initial conclusion. Misrepresenting people’s views, calling people names, quoting from articles out of context, denigrating others’ scholarly qualifications and confidently asserting a position whilst reasoning in a circle, and ignoring objections, are not the same as actually addressing them.  I doubt such sophistry would pass muster in the scientific community when people write on scientific topics, and it does not pass muster when scientists comment on theology or philosophy.

    [1]William Lane Craig and J P Moreland Philosophical Foundations of a Christian WorldView (Downers Grove Il:Intervarsity Press academic), 531,

  • Thinking Matters Youth Conference

    This Saturday is the first, of hopefully many, Thinking Matters Youth Conference, the schedule is  below.  I am leading a breakout session on Moral Relativism

    WHEN: Saturday, February 18
    WHERE: Greenlane Christian Centre, 17 Marewa Rd, Greenlane, Auckland
    COST: $10


    Schedule:
    10am Registration
    10.30am Jeff Tallon – Is Science a Threat to Faith?
    11.30am Sean McDowell – Is Faith Blind? (via Skype)
    12.15pm Lunch
    1pm Breakout Sessions 1

    • Stream 1: Is morality relative and does it matter? – Matt Flannagan
    • Stream 2: How can one religion be “right” and the others “wrong”? – Trevor Mander
    • Stream 3: Why doesn’t God do something about the evil in the world? – Ben Carswell
    • Stream 4: Does God get mad when we doubt? – Jason Kumar and Dominic Bnonn Tennant
    1.45pm Breakout Sessions 2 (repeated)
    2.30pm Tim McGrew – Is the Bible Reliable? (via Skype)
    3.30pm Q&A Panel – Jeff Tallon, Ben Carswell, Matt Flannagan, and Trevor Mander
    4.15pm Conference closes
  • Back from San Francisco: A Belated Report

    MandM has been quite of late, this is because Madeleine and I have been very busy.  With moving house in the midst of Christmas and New Years and Madeleine working part-time in a law firm and so on, we’ve had little time to blog. We are now set up, to some extent, and so this post will be a belated comment on my recent trip to San Francisco.

    In November I flew to San Francisco where I attended I attended the  Meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society (ETS), The Annual Meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society (EPS), The Evangelical Philosophical Society Apologetics Conference and The Annual Meeting of the Society for Biblical Literature (SBL) and American academy of religion.(AAR). While I would love to give detailed commentary on each session, to do so would require several blog posts of inordinate length, instead I will simply summarise what went down.

    I arrived in San Francisco at around 4pm  on the 15th. I presented my first paper at 8:30am the next morning. My paper was a critique of Walter Sinnott Armstrong’s arguments against divine command theory meta-ethics. Armstrong contends that the nature of moral obligation is best explained by identifying moral obligations with the natural property of harming others without justification, and, focusing largely on Craig’s work, argues this is superior to divine command ethics. I argued: (a) his argument fails to note the conditional nature of Craig’s (his main target’s) contention that if theism is true moral obligations are best explained as divinecommands (b) Armstrong’s does not provide a better account of moral objectivity (c) Armstrong’s account is not more economical than a divine command theory. (d) Even if it were an economical account, it does not explain various features of obligation such as (i) the social nature of moral obligations (ii) the fact that moral obligations constitute a decisive reason for acting and (iii) the specific moral content of obligations; as well as a divine command theory. All in around 30 minutes!!! The paper was very well received, with several people asking me to forward them a copy. I plan to get it published later this year.

    The rest of the morning was filled with me hearing various papers on moral theory and philosophy of religion all of which were interesting and stimulating. These panellists all shared similar perspectives yet were astutely critical of each other’s arguments. Particularly interesting was the dialogue between Baggett and Craig. Some of the issues here were technical and deserve further discussion so I plan to blog on this dialogue in more detail in the future. But in sum: Craig has defended a counterfactual: if God did not exist then moral obligations would not exist. Baggett  argued for various reasons that this is too strong; if God, the creator and sustainer of the universe, did not exist, the universe would not exist. To make sense, Craig’s claim needs to envisage a compossible world, which is like the actual world in all respects except that God does not exist, if it’s like the world in all other respects however, then it has all the features of the world God has created – and hence the resources for something like moral obligations to exist. Instead, Baggett contended, one should argue that a world with God provides a better explanation of the nature and existence of moral obligations than a world without God does. This means the theist does not have to argue, with Craig, that there is no adequate secular account of the existence of moral obligations, only that a divine command theory is more plausible than such accounts. Both Craig and Baggett made telling points which I will have to elaborate on some other time. highlight of Wednesday was the afternoon session. A panel discussion of David Baggett and Jerry Wall’s new book “Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality”. This book is the latest defence of divine command theory ethics, recently published by Oxford University Press. Baggett and Walls sketched briefly the content of the book and Paul Copan and William Lane Craig offered critical commentary, to which Baggett and Walls responded.

    Thursday started with an excellent critique of evolutionary (more…)

  • More Mistakes: A Rejoinder to Randal Rauser

    For those who aren’t aware, there has been something of a “debate”, but what I’d prefer to refer to as an “in house discussion” between Randal Rauser (Professor of Historical Theology at Taylor Seminary) and myself.

    The discussion so far can be found here:

    My initial article was Randal Rauser’s Mistake: A Defense of Calvin’s Doctrine of Election

    Rauser’s response: Calvinism and the Arbitrary Camp Director Revisited: A Response to Andrew

    Andrew and CalvinBefore I begin, I should point out that I have been on the Kapiti coast for the last week at a TSCF (Tertiary Student Christian Fellowship, a cousin of Inter-Varsity) retreat where I was without internet. Hence it’s only in the last day that I’ve learned that Professor Rauser has kindly taken the time to respond to my initial article. So I apologize for my delayed response.

    I would also like to point out that while my intention was to provoke Rauser’s response, it was not to be rude, and I apologize if that’s the impression he has received. I have a great deal of respect for Rauser, particularly given (as I pointed out in my last article) that he is a Professor of Historical Theology with an obvious background in analytic philosophy, while I am a mere undergrad with far more ambition than actual ability. The last thing that I want is for this discussion to devolve into the kind of vitriol that plagues almost all other web based discussions of the philosophy of religion and/or theology. I say this, largely because I fear (from the tone of his response) that he has received the impression of ill intent on my part.

    Secondly, I appreciate that Rauser took the time to respond to my article, and I appreciate that he also took the time to counter my personal testimony with that of his own.

    Randal Rauser and ArminiusBut now to specifics: How does Rauser respond to my claim that the arbitrariness objection (at least if it is to be an objection) begs the question against Calvin’s doctrine of election? On the face of it, he doesn’t seem to challenge my point that God may not be acting unjustly if we are undeserving of salvation. To the contrary, Rauser seems to admit for the possibility that the tortures may be justly deserved. But if that’s the case, then, as I tried to point out in my first post, there’s no real injustice or immoral state of affairs that obtains if God so desires to instantiate those punishments. Paradoxically though, Rauser refers to my theology as “brutal” and “morally incoherent”. Both of these terms, emotionally provocative as they are, seem to suggest that there is something nasty, horrible, evil (whatever negative adjective your heart desires) about a God that selects some for salvation while selecting others for damnation. But if, as Rauser seems to allow, the tortures are justly deserved, then none of those adjectives can rightly be said to stick. After all, if the tortures are justly deserved, and God decides to carry out those tortures, then God can only be said to be doing what the demands of morality and/or justice require. So wherein does the moral incoherence obtain?

    But according to Rauser, I would still be missing the point. After all, he (Rauser) says, the Camp Director Analogy was not intended to show that God, given Calvinism, is “unjust”, but rather that He cannot be seen as “maximally loving”. I see no real reason to deny Rauser the liberty to make this distinction, but its relevance is, at best, unclear.

    Thankfully, Rauser does seem to hint at one possible way in which we could interpret this as an objection. He seems to engage in something of a pair-wise comparison between two possible scenarios that are supposed to be relevantly similar to the Arminian and Calvinist conceptions of election respectively.

    • Scenario 1: The director arbitrarily selects some children for beatings and others for loving rehabilitation.
    • Scenario 2: The director selects all children for loving rehabilitation.

    According to Rauser, were God to bring about scenario 2, we would state that He is more loving were he to bring about scenario 1. There are three things that I have to say to this (more…)